A Heuristic Structure for the Study of Sociocultural Integration by Moodey, Richard W.
Loyola University Chicago
Loyola eCommons
Master's Theses Theses and Dissertations
1961
A Heuristic Structure for the Study of Sociocultural
Integration
Richard W. Moodey
Loyola University Chicago
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1961 Richard W. Moodey
Recommended Citation
Moodey, Richard W., "A Heuristic Structure for the Study of Sociocultural Integration" (1961). Master's Theses. Paper 1649.
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/1649
A HEURISTIC STRUCTURE FOR THE STUDY OF SOCIOCULTURAL IN'l'EGRATI<II 
R1c'lw-d W. Hoode7. S.J. 
A The.l. SUbld.tted to the FaO\lltl' ot the OI'aduate School ot 
lAyola UD1 ...... ltq in Partial hlflllment ot the 
Requ1remarlt. tor the Degree ot 
Maner ot Arts 
June 
1961 
3 
PREFACE 
The writer's interest in sociocultural integration began with one of the 
first works he reported on in his graduate studies in sooiology J Sorokin· s 
Soc1al ~ Cultural D,ynamics" volume I. 'When an acquaintance pointed out some 
si."1lilarit1es between Sorok1n's sociology and the ph1.losopby of science worked 
out by Bernard Lonergan, S.J. 1n Insiibt, the writer read Insight in order to 
make the comparison more expUcit. l'inalq, the writer'. interest in Redfield 
Callie .!'.rom a specific interest in small vlllag& canmun1t1ea, wh10b in turn 
steDned tram an 1u1iel"e8t in the miaaione ot India and lfepal. For Redfield 
concerned bimaelt wrr muoh with the integrat.ion ot small communities, with 
studying them &I wholes. 
The present thesis is an attesupt to bring together 80M ot the results of 
what might be ce.lled a discwJaion between three thinkers who have played a 
great role in molding the writer's thinking about society and culture. Other 
men enter the d1acus8ion, especially prominent 18 Michael Polany1, who b.u made 
a 8ip:ttioant contribution to the wr1ter' s understanding ot society and 
culture. 
The thesis 1s not a systematiC presentation ot the theories ot any one ot 
-
the men in the dialogue, nor is it primarily a criticism ot their ideas. It ie 
rather a selection of those ideas and concepts which the writer judges will be 
useful in carrying out research in small comnnmit1es. 
11 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PROBIEM 
1. Redfield's toraulation. Robert Redfield..,.. that he first sees a 
village or COIlII1nity that he atud1.s .s an "intuited whole .. It in much the same 
fashion u he first saw the Mcma Lisa or P1caeao' s "Guernica U as wholes.. or as 
he apprehends the tace ot a living person. H:u lIOi.nt.1t1c training as an 
anthropologist, however, prevents him froM going out 1mmedlate17 to wite a 
book baaed upon his first impression. For he beoo:mea critical. of his first 
impression. '1'be problem becomes one of analys1a ot the or1g1na1 whole, and re-
synthesis of the analyzed parts into a sy8tam. "I .. e a col'llml.nity first as an 
intuited whole. I then begin to understand part1cular things about it. From 
connections nov discovered among these parts I conceive of systems. We shall 
become interested here in cona1dering the poaalbillty that very much, perhaps 
all, ot the lite ot a comma.n1ty Jnq be conoelwd as jut a rev qetems, 
possibly 88 one all-encompaas1ng .,.ta. Can an lnt1l1ted whole gift vay, as 
1 
study proceeds, to one equal.l1' comprehenalw analyzed qst.am?" 
2. Soroldn t s tormulat1oa. A 81111lar queetlon baa been put by a socio-
logist, Pit1r1m SorOJdnI "Is e'YfJr'T culture an integrated whole, Where no 
1rhe L1ttle COBII'lun1tl (Chioago, 195,), pp. 17-19. 
1 
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essential part i. incidental but each is orpnioall¥ connected with the rest? 
Or i.e it a mere spatial oongeries ot CNltural objects, values, traita, vb1ch 
bave drifted tortuitoual;r together and are united on17 by their spatial 
adjacency, just b;r the tact that they are thrO'iID together. and by nothing 
more?,,2 Sorold.n's "int.crated whole" lIOUld seem to correspond rather close17 
to Redfield'. idea ot an "8D.8l.yaed .,..tem. tt 
J. ~ heuristic ~.2! integration. This thesis will be devoted to 
what might be called a "heuristic theor;r" or the integra.tion or small village 
cOCIDlWlit1GS ot the type mentioned by Redfield. A heuristic theory in'l;'Olves 
keeping diff'erent theories or ~theses reacv tor use in research. According 
) . 
to Joseph Bensman and Arthur V1d10h, heuristic theorj' d1£f'ers .t.rom "cod.1f'1ca-
tion of theoretical perspectives," tor such codU'icatlon is a logical synthesis 
in terms ot the p:.t~opositions in the theories, and t.be camposite perspective 
thua./ach1evad is applied as a unit to research problema. Heuristic theory, 
however, "allOHB past theory to remain as a residua or latent possibilities 
'Which the research worker can bring to bear on his specific field problem." 
But it "cannot 'WOrk 11' the reseazoch worker on ! P£!.ori grounds 18 unwilling to 
entertain the pos.ibility of' using or seriously eonaidering all or a variety ot 
the available theories. ,,4 The toClle ot th1e the.is on a heuristic theory of' 
28ooi&1 and Cultural DzD!!1cs (New York, 1937-1941), I, 3. 'l'hia work will 
be re.terred to as pjii!!1cs. 
)"300iolog10al Theory in Field Research," AJS, LXV (May, 1960), p. 58). 
-
4Ibid• 
-
3 
integration in small communities is a result or an anticipation on the part of 
the writer of research in small cOl!mlt1U1ties in Northern India and Nepal. It is 
likely, however, that the results or the thesis lIOuld be applicable tow.rda 
the study of larger areas, or even towards a syatematic theory of social and 
cultural integration. The work ot Redtield and Sorokin will be Qed in this 
thesis because the writer judges their work to be particularly relevant to the 
problem. Redt1eld himaeU tocuses b1s work on small communities. Soroldn 
works in the area ot general tbeOI'7, but his ·grand scale It tbeOl7 as presented 
in his I?z'n!t!4os centers on the problem. of integration. "Considered objeoti vely 
theee volumes are an investigation of the na~ and change, the ~os ot 
integrated culture. its types, its processes, its trends, fluctuatiOns, 
rhythms, tempos. The m&1n material with which this inftstigation deals is that 
provided b7 the Oraeco-Roman and We8terft civilizations during the more than 
5 
twenty-five hundred ,ears ot their histo17. 1f 
B. THE PROCEDURE 
1. Sl!tem 2!:. oopprtes. Knowledge of the little conmmn1ty as an intuited 
whole depends upon a pereonal experience ot that cOIllllWlity. This knowledge 
depends upon how the cODmUDity &treats the observer; it is mare akin to an 
aesthetic experience than to a scient1tic explanation. From such personal 
experiences, the scientist viabes to proceed to more precise statements which 
can be subjected to ver1tication. And he laya down rules ot procedure which 
specU'7 the means to be taken to reach the desired end. Redfield spec1tied the 
5 Dynamics, I, x. 
end as knowlfJdce ot the lit.tle oommunit.y aa an anal7Sed .,..tea. Sorok1n 'lent 
a step turther and specitied alternat.ive ~t.heses--~ culture might be 
either an integrated whole, a syst.em in Redfield's term8, or a congeries, 
whioh lacks S78tematio relationships. 
2. Smitioation!!!!,!!~. SiDae it is neoessar;y to have some 
methodical wq ot workiD& towarda one' s goal in research, one lIlU8t somehow 
specify the goal. ot hia researoh at the outset. Bernard 14nerpn.· S.J. s..,.. 
that this speoitication 18 the tunotlon or the heur1atio structure. "Scientist 
achieve understanding, but theY' do 80 only at the end ot an inquiry. Moreover, 
their iDf:lU1r1' 18 methodical, and method co~ts in ordering means to achieve 
an end. But how can _ana be ordered to an end wben the end 18 knowledge and 
the knowledge is not ,.t acquired? The anllWfJr 18 the heuristic structure. 
Name the unkno1m.. Work out ita properties. Use the properties to direct, 
6 
order, guide tbe inqu1r7. If 
). Alterutive hypotheses. Two auch heuristic structures worked out bY' 
IDnergan are cl.aical and atatistioal heuristic stru.otures. Arrr range ot 
obserYatioDa can be subewned under either one ot the heur1atic struotur.s--
01ass1oal or statistioal. "On the torarr lvPothesis it will be possible to 
discover some orderlY' s81"ies, progression, or grouping. On the latter 
hypothesis no suoh series, proll"ession, or lVouping exists. Both hypothese. 
can be tormulated, their implications are to be wrked out J and the tacts are 
to decide which h1Pothesu is, if' not ultimate truth, at least the beat 
6 
wight, 2nd ed. (New York, 1958), p. 4U. 
---
7 
available op1n1on at the given stage ot scientific developnent." The 
"orderly series, pt"Ogr'esa1on, or groUpinglf S881118 to correspond to aome extent 
to soroldn's "integrated whole,· and the lack ot such an orderly series, 
progression" or grouping seems to COlT_pond to a "congeries. 1f 
". Redtield' 8 torma 2! t~. Instead ot speak1ng ot "heur1atic 
structures, If Redtield speaka ot the "tonu ot thought It that help towards 
knowledge ot the little community as an anal)'zed s1St.. "What shall be the 
torma ot thought that vill help us toward this mre strictly controlled 
knowledge, a knowledge that will pre.ern some of the holistic qualities ot the 
8 
things compared?" Again, he asksl "What is, the torm ot the arrangements ot 
the parts ot the conception to OM another? Or, to what model" present to 
experience from some other source than the human oommUD1ty" does tb.1a chos. 
holistic cOQOept tend to conform?" As exaplu ot models he giftS ft. k1nd. ot 
machine,· • "ft8t orgaD1_,· a "textbook on tormal 10gic,1f and "drama or other 
torms ot literary art.,,9 Altogether, Redtield gives five DlXiels. the causal 
model, the f\mctional model, the logical model, the aesthetic model, and the 
symbolic model. The caual. and the functional model correspond to the machine 
10 
and t.he O1"ganiam, and are the mdels that are predom1Dant in nat.ural science. 
7Ibid., p. 67. 
-
~e Little C01n1IIWl1t.l, p. 2. 
9Ibid., pp. 1,-16. 
-
l°"The Relation ot Ant.hropology to the Social Sciences and t.he Humanit.ies,,1f 
Ant.bropoloSl T~, ed. A.L. Kroeber (Chicago, 19,2), pp. 733-73,. 
----
6 
Each ot these models is a way ot wrk1ng out. the properties ot the unknown in 
order to use theae propert.1es to "d1reot, order, guide the inquiry. It Thq can 
be regarded as alternative ~the8e. which require a controntation nth the 
tacts in order that the best mieht be chosen. Speaking ot these forma ot 
thought that "when at least two named things are 80 ident1t1ed in the pre-
arrangement, and when fUrther lome cormection between tbe two is supposed, then 
I have posed a question of a relationship. then the prearrangement.. the 
initial. mental torm, includes l!JOIleth1ng often called a 'bypothesis'--a toresc3D 
connection or relationship stated in such a Wtq' aa to tacilitate ita proof or 
11 disproof. " 
5. Sorokin' I torme ~ 1nteFat10n. Soroldn attirJu the necelsity ot 
working out the propert.ies ot the unknown in order to pide the 1nqu1rT when he 
sharplT critioizes inveatigators ot culture _0 "taU to elucidate exaot17 
what 1ihey zr.ean by integration or unity or interdependence of parts or organic 
character as applied to a culture." He theretore proposel to work out more 
specit1c "u1n forma ot relationship between the varioua culture traits, 
characteristiol, and oomplexes tram the standpoint ot 1ntepoation.,,12 The torm 
ot relationship in a culture can be that ot a congeries, or one of three types 
ot S1Btemel u80c1ation due to atl external factor, oausal-tunctional, or 
1) loaico-meaninatul. Sorokin later distinguish.s bet'tftlfm two tqpe8 ot 
ll.rbe Little CcInDam1tl. pp. 152-153. 
12~., I, 7. 
l)Ibid., p. 10. 
-
7 
congeries I (1) those that are lfapat1allT aontipoua aDd peroeptionally 
a1m1lar," and (2) thol. that are lfapat1alq contiguous and mecbanical'l1' cohe-
sive. 1t And he apeaka of tour types ot 878temar (3) indirect cauaal-tunational 
which 18 the same .. a unitT due to "lOc1ation with an external tactor, (4) 
direct causal-functional, (5) 10gico-mean1qtul, and (6) a synth.sis ot log1.ao-
meaD1ngtul and causal-tunctional..14 Lik. Redfi.ld' a forms ot thought or 
models, the •• aix ditter_t kinds ot un1tiea can serve as alternative 
hypothe •• s collC8l"ldng the vq a little co-.mity 18 integrated. 
6. ...Pr ... oc ...... edtare ............. g! ~ thena. The procedure in this ttl •• iI will be to 
name the unk:no1m or UIllaIo1ms wh1ch mwst bec~ known it one 1s to understand 
the integration ot a little ocamm1tYJ to work out the properti88 ot the un-
known, and to 1Ddioate how thue propert1e. can guide empirical 1nqu1ry. The 
propert1es, ot course, will be different. accord.1.Dl to d1tterent. po.a1ble 'WIq8 
that. the ooJlDlllJll1ty can be integrated. ADd Redfield ad Soroldn can be used 
to point out V. different h1Potb.elea concerning intesration. Redt1eld 
pro'lides more apecit1c 1II&ter1al dealing with small OOJIIIl11Il1ties, but Sorokin 
providea a w1der theoret.ical context in which to locate the problem ot 
intep'ation. P1u.117, Lonergan provides a .tillmore general context, tor he 
deal. with the nature or heu.:r18tio .tNotun. in general. And a tfJfI more 
1ntroductory wrda oOReaming the nature ot hev1at10 .truoture lII1at be siven. 
14. S001.t.T, Culture, !!!! Per.onal1tl (New York, 1947), p. 14,. 
8 
C. HEURISTIC STRUCTURE 
1. !h! conc!p! ~ nature. In Redtield' 8 statement of the problem of 
integration, the investigator must proceed from an "intuited whole" to "one 
equally compreben81ve analyzed system. It Th18 involves going tram a personal 
experience qu1te sim11ar to the appreciation of a work of art auch as the Mona 
Lisa--an experience which can be delcribed--to a scientific explanation. 
Redf'1eld brinp out the contrast between such an aesthet1c description aDd a 
8cientU1c explanation, but sees "a continuum ot effort and ways ot work 
between tbe novel1st and the stat1atioal experimenter. II One should be aware ot 
where one is on that continuum, but should no~ stop work tor tear ot not being 
scientitic enough to sat1817 everyone. for "be oonaun1oatioft of the nature ot 
a culture, a community, or a wrk ot art, il part of the business and the joy 
of human linne, and neede to be carried on whether or not there is a strictly 
behavioral 8Cience. ttl5 Talking about "the nature ot a culture" is using a kind 
of heur1atio concept, for it points out that there is an unknown to be kao1m, 
whether it 18 tA> be known by art1lt1c or soientllia means. Talking about 
natures is not restricrtred to 8C1ent1at.a J philosophers 11lce to do it too. For a 
scientist, however, a nature is not knowD, even approx:1m.&tel3', Wltil a 
l:\Ypothesis baa been fomulated about it and has been verified. In scient1t1c 
research, it 11 uuallT not 8Utticient to name the unknown "tbe nature of 
culture," but 11 lWO.laary to spec1ty the concept by how it 11 to be lmo1m. 
But it, for example, one specifies that culture is a system to be known. by' 
establ18hing precise correlations between variables, oae 1s on a more 
15!h!, ;Little Cormawdtl, pp. 166-167. 
-9 
~otheticaJ. level than if he merelY' aska about the nature of culture. For 
the nature ot ou.lture, or ot this particular culture, ma;y' not be By'steroatic; 
it might be a co'ngeries. 
2. ! mathematical !!!5?le. The function ot naming the unknown "the 
nature ot culture" oan be illustrated by a mat. ... ematical exa1J1ple. In algebra, 
it is common to nUle the unknown number "x. 1f Then if one has a problem, sucb 
as determining the first time af'ter three o'clock that the l1dnute hand will 
exact.l.y cover the hour hand, one can write dowl '·Lat x be the number ot 
minutes atter three o'clock." Then, one can inter that 'while the minute hand 
moves over x minutes, the hour hand move8 over x/12 minutes. ibird1y, one 
observes that at three o'clock the hour hand haa a 15 minute start.- There 
tollow the equations 
X. x 
-12 
There were tour stepI" "(1) giving the unknown a name or symbol (2) inferring 
the properties and relatione of the unknown, (3) grasping the p08sibUity' ot 
combining these properties and relations to torm an equation, and (4) solv:ing 
the equation. II Lonergan generalizes front the example, appl.ying the mathemati-
cal example to empirical inquiry I 
In every empirical inquiry there are known8 and unknowns. But 
the knowns are apprehended whet.~er or not one understands J th.,- are 
the data of' sense. The unknowns, on the other hand, are what one 
will grasp by insight and formulate in concer>tions and suppositions. 
Accordingly, let us bestow a name upon the unknown. Rather 
let us advert to the fact that alread7 1 t has been named. Jor 
what is to b. known by understanding these data is called their 
nature. Just as in algebra the unknown number is x, until one 
tIndi out what the number i8, so too in empirical inquiry', the 
-10 
unknOwn to be reached bT ina1ght is named • the nature ot • • • • t 
Once Gal1lee discovered bis law, be knew that the nature ot a tree 
tall was a conatant aoceleratiLon. But before be dUcovered the 
law, !'rom the _" tact that he inquired, be knew that a tree tall 
possessed a aature, tb.ouib be did not know what that nature waa.16 
). MetuocioloV. To attinn that there 115 some ~lligib11iV in data 
gathered in the 11ttle OOIrllItUlitT i8 to ma.ke a metuooiological, not a 80cio-
logical judpent. Aa Fr. Paul Hanly Furter says. metaaociology Eurniehed "t1.o 
methodological presuppositions neceaaar;y tor carl')'inl out sociological research 
const.ruct1nc sociological systems, and cr1ticiz1ne; ncb syatema att,8l" they haw 
been completed.,,17 AJld the soclo10C1at or anthropologist, like Galilee, b7 the 
mere tact ot hi8 1nqu.1.r.y, att1rma that the ob3ects ot hie study pos.ess some 
intelligibility, a aatore to be cruped by 1na1cht. 
4. Galilee' •• c1eut.1t1c advance. When Galilee aft1rmed that a tree tall 
had a nature to be d18covered, he did not yet haw an explanation. To obtain 
an explanation he mean.redl el) the determinate distaDoe ot a tall, and. (2) 
the deter.1nate amount or time a bodl' takes to cOYer that diatance. Atter a 
serie. ot measurements, he diacovered in them a pt'l8ral rule. "the distance 
traversed 111 proportional. to the time squared.1I18 ThWI Galilee went, beyond his 
Pl"e-scientilio Aristotelean opponent.a, who .... e content to talk about the 
nature of U.ght. the nature of beat, etc. Galilee 1nau&urated modern science 
by lnaut1nc that the nature ot weight wu not enough, from sensible s1Jrdlarity 
l6tonergara, pp. )6-37. 
17'l'be Scope am Method of Soc101oq. ! Metaaociological treatise (New 
York, lm-), p. 8:- -
18 Lonergan, pp. )3-34. 
-11 
which resides in the relations ot things to our senses, one must proceed to 
relations that hold directly between things tb8mselves."l9 
5. Unity throuih heuristic concel?!.!. There is an advantage to the tact 
that the concept of nature is not an explanation, it can unite seyeral 
difterent explaations. Man's understanding ot thinp can develop, and a 
change ot understanding invo1 ves a change ot explanatory concepts I "tor the 
explanatory concept may be defined as an expression of the content ot the 
understanding." Thus, Aristotle coDOeived tire as an element, the predecessors 
ot Lavoisier as a manitestation ot phlogiston, and later chemists as a type ot 
oxidation. Yet the heur1atic concept ot "the, nature ot t1re" unites these 
different explanations, aud "without this unU'orndty it 'MOUld be incorrect to 
aq that Aristotle bad an incorreot explanation or what he meant and we mean 
by ttre.,,20 
Difterent explanations ot SOCietY' can also be linked by a common heuristic 
structure. otis Dudley Durlcan and Leo P. Schnore I tor example, speak ot three 
oontlict1ng perspectives in contemporary sociology' "the behaY10ral scientist 
studies society as a s78tem ot social interaction and interpersonal relations, 
the culture theorist approaches it as a culture pattern or value a18tem, and 
the human ecologist examinu society u the functional. organization ot a popu-
lation in process ot achieving and maintaining an adaptation to its environment 
If our experience is t7Pical., these perspectifts are not only ditterent. they 
are so d1tterent that it 18 difficult to explain and juatity one or them to a 
19~., p. )8. 
2OIbld., p. 737. 
-
• 
12 
sooiologist committed to auother."2'- What is ot speoial importance here, how-
ever, is not the dittaren.ces between battling perspectives, but the W&y' that 
they are united, for Duncan and Scbnore say that they are "tooueing on the 
nature 0.1' society as the !;5?lanandum ot sociological. theory .... 22 The "nature 0.1' 
sooiety" is a general heuristic concept uniting the three different perspeo-
tives. 
6. Hypothetical heuristic concms. 7be concept. ot a "sy'lStem of social 
interaction and interpersonal relatiOns," of a "culture pattern. or value 8)'s 
and ot ".functional crganization of a population in prooess ot acbievin& and 
maintaining an adaptation to its enrlronment,· like the conoept or "the nature 
, 
of sooiety," are heuristic concepts. But unlike the concept of "the nature of 
sooioty," thsse ooncepts are hypothetical.. they assart much more than the 
simple anticipation that society baa an intelligibility that can be grasped by 
insight. The antagonism that Duncan and Scbnore sq exists among these 
difterent viewpoints 1s a tine example of tailure to tu.l.t"ill the conditione 
laid down. by :Bensman and Vidich for the heuristic use of theory, vh10b "oannot 
work it the rasearch lIOrker on..a priori grounds is unwilling to entertain the 
possibility of using or seriously considering all or a variety ot the available 
23 
theories. II FBilureto realize that such lover-level heuristic concepts are 
hypothetical. leada to inter-tribal warfare in soaiolog)". Znanieoki says that 
2lUCultural, Behavioral, and Ecological Perspectives in the Study" ot 
Social Organization," AJS, I:I..V, (September, 1959), pp. l44-145. 
-
22~41' p. 132. 
2.3aensman and Vidich, p. 583. 
-1.3 
JID1Ch ccntrO .... sy steIns from ignoring the tact that either the hypothesis that 
society is a "natural .,.temll or the hypothesis that it is a "cultural syatem." 
is scientifically legitimate nit used heur1etically to search tor facts which 
agree witb it, but not dogmatically to prevent tbe diaooY'ery ot tacts which 
disagree with it. n24 
1. Experience, ina1Et, !!!!! judgaent. When the scientist seeks to know 
the nature ot some phel1OM1'lOl'l, be antiCipates an intelligibility in that 
phenomenon whiob can be grasped by human UD<ierst.andil'll, by an inaight. This 
nature to be grasped is an UDknown, but caa be known 1rl ita general character-
istic 01 beiDg 1Dtellig1ble. What the scient~t knows before be understands 
are his data, vbich he can apecUy in terms ot the acta ot knowledge by vh1ch 
be will laJ.ov them, even though these acts are not the same as the act by which 
he grasps the nature ot tbe data. Finally, he is not satisfied with merely 
getting 1nsights into the data, but insists on verification. And the wa;y tbat 
be lmo.. that a theory is Y'er1tied is not the .. e as the way that he lmo1fs the 
data, or the way that he tirat p"up8 a possible explamat1on. Data are known 
by experience, their nature is grasped by insight, aad the Y'8l.1dity of what has 
thus been grasped 1s aftirmed or denied in judpent. Lonergan represents these 
three lIDIlents of cognitional. process sohe.tioall.y. 
ItI. Data. Perceptual Images. Free Images. 
II. Questiona tor Intelligence. Insights. 
m. Questiona tor renection. Reflection. 
Utterances. 
Formulations. 
Judpent.1I25 
~lor1an Znan1ecld, "Controversies in Doctrine and Method," ~, L (May, 
1945), p • .$19. 
25Lonergan, p. 214. 
-Experience, wight, and judp!ent make up a heuristic structure, tor a 
heuristio concept is "the notlon ot an unlmovn content and it is determined by 
anticipating too type or act through which the unknown would become known," and 
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a heUristic structure "is an ordered set ot heuristic notions." 
8. Lower-level heuristic st-ruotures. The heuristic structure which 
ant1c1pates the experiences by which data are known, the insights whioh lead to 
the formulation ot hypotheses, and the judgments which result tram verification 
is cOllll1On to 8'D1' empirical scienoe. For the investigation ot integration, 
hoWever, tbere haYe been proposed less general heuristic stl"'.1Ctur'es. One can 
antioipate wights that result in the tOl"1lUl~t,1on of 818tems, but ODe can alao 
anticipate tl,e general characteristics of the S)"lltem that will be formulated. 
These turther spec1t1catLODa are b1potbetia.l. Redtieldfs causal, tuDotlonal, 
logical, &eathetic, and Q1Ilbol1c modela coutitute h7P0thetical apecilicatioDa 
ot what the formulated 8)'8tem will resable. Soroldn' s indirect aud direct 
cauaal .. tun.otional Q"IItems and his logico-maaingtul 818tema are .imilar 
.pecitications. hrthermore, be.ide. the insights that grasp ayet_tic 
relatiouh1pa, th.... are .. in ...... e wl&bta' by wbich one realise. that the 
antiCipated qatematic relationahipe do not exist. "While direct insight 
graaps the point, or sees the solution, or COtIH to lmov the reuon., illY8rse 
insight aPP'!ehenda that 1D. SOll\8 tashion the point is tbat there is no po1nt, 
or tnat the solution is to derv a aolut1on, or that the reuon is that the 
rat1ona1.1t;r ot the real adDd.t. d1et1nct1ona and. qualiticatlona. u27 SometbiDg 
26 Ibld., p. 392. 
-
27 Ibid., p. 19. 
-
--
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11ke an inverse ill8ight. i. needed to knoll' that. a s.t. ot cultural traits and 
elements oonatitut..a a congeries. 'l'bus, Redfi.ld and Soroldn provide a aeries 
ot hypothetical heuriatic struotures whoae implications must be further 
elaborated in reterence to the study ot the lit.tle community' as an integrated 
whole. But 111 eYery case, whether one ant10ipatea a congeri .. or one ot the 
several var1eties of systems, the huic structure of experience, insight, and 
judgment vill be emplo;red. 
D. RELATIONS BETWEEN SYSTEMS 
1. SUbordination, Ooordination, ~ ooyeries. It will not onlT be 
necessary to work out the general properties pt dUterent t.7P8s ot '1St .. , but 
it vill alao be necesS&r7 to treat ot the relationshipa between system. 
Soroldn says that there are 80 many' empirioally giftrl sooial and cultural 
systems that "amidst auob. an 1ntin1tude we are as helpless as amidst a jungle 
ot oongeri ••• 1t Be says that m&n1' ot the attempts ot social sc1ent1ats to 
olassify th.se IIlUltitudes ot systems into a tn.aIlq8able number ha .... been UD-
realiatic. "The class •• they gift are not real 871t ... , but just nomiul 
pigeOl'lholtDg that sometimes di Tides the real syatea into two or more parts and 
28 
unites into one olus the parts of dUter_t 871t.B and congeries. It Be goes 
on to AT that the w.n ft)" to arriV'e at a correct reduction of t.he multitude 
of s,.neau and congeries to a reuonable m.unber "is baaed upon the fortunate 
fact ot the subordination or the .ystems to one another, c1 v1ng us a vast 
continent of a moet embracing system COlIlpoaed ot subsY8tema, and each ot theae 
of their sub-sub-sub • • • 8)'11tems." Examples of subordinated qsteJu ot 
28 Pm!!!ics , IV, 107. 
» 
-
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systems given by Sorokin are mathematics, each ot the sciences and the whole 
systan of scientific knowllldge, .)"Stems of religion, law" and art. Besides 
subordination, there is also coordination, as ot state and church in count.r1es 
with separation of church and state, and of the judicial, executive, and 
legislative branches of govemmenta. And finally, 81Btems can be non-
.ystanatically related to one another, toming a congaries of systems. 29 
2. Qeneti9 ~ d1alectioal relatione between mteu. '.l'be aboVe i. in 
structural, rather tbarl in d7namic, t..... Concentration on structural 
relatlonehipe leads to a oonception ot sooiety and culture that i. static. But 
besdies a F!!p ot ay'IteJU in an area whioh ~.es. either systetr.atic or non-
systematic relations to OM another, tbere are alao s!llence. of systems that 
are neither sy-staatically' or non-Q1Itamaticall.y related. Thus" besides 
classical method, which 18 baaed upon the antioipation ot a constant .,..tern, 
and statistical method, whioh is baaed upon the anticipation that data will not 
contona to ~, Lonergan. apealca ot genetic and dialectioal methocta. Genetic 
method i. grOUBded by the anticipation of an intelligibly related sequence of 
ayatans, and dialectical method 18 srounded in the anticipation that the 
relationsb1ps betwen noce8sift qate_ vJ.ll be non-systematic. Lonergan 
claims that the abovo tour methoda--cluaical, statistical, genetiC, and 
dialectical--"are relevant to arrr field ot data; thq do not dictate what data 
muat be, they are able to cope with data no matter what they wq prove to be." 
29 Ibid., pp. 107-110. 
-
,30 Lonergan, p. 48~. 
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F. PROPERTIES OF mINas 
1. Indiv1dualit l 2!~. Although the tour methods enumerated by' 
lonergan are supposed to be applicable to &IV' data, their use depends upon a 
basic condition. General syatema and structures towards which these methods 
bead IllU8t be "d1acoTered, ver1tied, and applied in data that are all 
individual." Theretore, "to link intelligibly the individual data with the 
general structures, there 18 needed a tartber and diat1not type ot understand-
ing that fP'upa oonerete unities, identities, 1Iboles." SiDee a concrete unity, 
identity, whole is a thing, "1t tollows that the aenera1 structures are 
conoerned with the properties ot things, wher~ properties and things are what 
18 to be known by understa:Bd1ng the aaae data by different but complementary 
31 procedures.- 'l'hus, besides the insight. that grasp syet .. , there are alao 
insights that grasp a concrete Wlity in data to give knowledge ot a thing. 
2. Apt., lJ!!!!ine, vehicles. The d1at1Dction between properties and 
things can be applied to Sorold.n'. breakdown of the "generio phenoJllel1.On" 
studied b7 100101017. He aaye that -the moat generic model of' &'ftT soc1ooultura 
phenomenon" is "_antnstu1 interaction of two or more bumart 1ndi vidual •• .32 He 
analyzes mearWIgtul interaction iato the oomponents ot "(1) thinking, acting, 
and reacting human beings as subjeots ot iateraotionJ (2) _anuws, values, 
and norma tor the sake ot which the ind1v1duals interact, realizing and 
exchanging them in the course ot the interaction. en evert actions and 
material phenomena as the vehicles or oondv.ctore through which immaterial 
32Societ" Culture, ~ Personalitl, p. 39 ... 40. 
• 
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33 yalues, and norms are objeot,1t1ed and sooialised." Human beings are things 
which have propert.ies that enable t.bam to tld.r:ak, act., and react. Meanings, 
yalues, and noms are the prodUct.. ot human th1nld.ng and derd.ring, and 
constitute the "ideological culture" ot an 1nd.1v1dual or ot a croup • .14 Overt 
act.ions are the external, visible aspect of a human being'. aoting and react.ing 
and constit.ute t.he "behavioral culture" of an 1nd1v1dual or a group. Mater1al 
phenomena as fthicles or oonductors are first the mater1ala upon whioh humans 
act., and alter being tr.atormed by human activity, ar8 the EO<iuota of human 
activity. These matedal pheD.Qn8D& constitute the -'terial culture" ot an 
individual or p-oup.,,35 
3. Propertles 2! agents. Sorolcin sap that although the socl010gist 
leaft. the .tudT ot the biological lad PQObologioal properties ot INman beinge 
to the biolog1at aDd the pa;ycholog18t, the tollov1.rag ahould be kept 1n mind. 
(1) Po ••••• ion of a wll-developed D8I"fOU8 .,..t-, with iu 
reoeptors, oonductors, and ettector., 1Ih1oh enablu man to react. 
to the 8timuli exerted by other humIa beines. (2) abillt7 to 
pertorm a wide variety ot OV'ert actiou. en Poe.easlon ot 
miDd, with ita el_ts of a .. ationa, pereept.iou, ideas, imagina-
tion, meJIOl"7, aaot1ol'Ul, teelinga, and volitlona. Man 18 a thinklng, 
8lIOtioD&l, aftecti .... , '9011tlcmal arpnl., able to act aDd r.act in 
the superorpn1c world of mears1.Jtca, value 8 , and 1\Ol'I1l8. (Why and 
how he has beoome suoh a creatur. does not ooacern 118 at thie point..) 
(4) Biologioal and ,,,,,,bologioal heteropne1t7 in reapeot to race, 
aex, ace and other pb;raical cblracter18t1ca, .. well as meatal make-
up--int.81ligeace, emotionality, will power, and 80 on.36 
33Ibld., pp_ 41-42. 
-
J4Ibid., p. 31). 
-
3SIb1d. 
-
.36 Ibid., p. 42. 
-
$ 
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IDgiCally, these propositions from biology and paycholoQ' are postulates ot 
gorokin's sociology. Furtey distinguishes between empirical postulates and 
supra-empirioal postulates. He says that postulates on the mind and on the 
11111 are supra-empirical)7 Therefore, the properties of the subjects of 
interaction listed above include supra-enp1rical poetulatea. Furthermore, it 
i8 difficult, it not impossible, not to make statements about mind and will 
when studying society. Sociologists may want to w tate the physical scienoes 
in their progress whioh is oomparatiftlly unrurned by disputes, but in practice 
this has been impossible. "The data of empirical sociology have such an 
intimate connection with hurnan1. t,. that hardly. anyone can resist the t..ptat1on 
to interpret them in the light ot Rpra-emp1r1oal principles in one wa:y or 
another. Therefore JII8D3' sociologists haft frankly introduced aupra-empirical 
postulates into their works--an a great many' haft introduced them taclt17 • .)8 
4. Properties!! vehicles. Soroktn _phaa1s.. that material things as 
fthicles ot mean1ngs acquire propertiee over and abo'f'e their Jlh7alcal, chemical 
and biological properties. "When a stick becomes a churinga (the most sacred 
reUgiows objeot ot the Austr'allan buabman), a riDS becomes an 'enpgement 
r1Di,' the sun becomes the SUn God or' aymbol of 1f'1.adoa, joy, and lite--tbeae 
cultural mea:d.ngs are imposed upon the buic meaninc that aign1t1ea theae 
material objects .. nch, with all the1r chem1.oal, pbJ1r1oal, biological 
37Furtey, pp. 218-225. 
38 Ibid., p. 50. 
-
-39 properties. It 
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5. Bebav1.ol' • 'l'b.e generic phenomenon to be studied is mean1ngtu.l int.er-
action. Now interaction is itself neither a tb1na nor a property. bu.t a , 
process consisting at actions and reactions. S1m1lar17, th1nldng, desiring, 
willing. acting, react.1ng are not prope:l"t.iea, but covert and overt behavior ot 
butnan beings with properties Wb1ch enable tbea to act in theae ware. AnT 
proces., wbether it is the prooess at solving a problem, ot cho.1ng a meal in 
a restaurant, ot cazT7ing on a oonver.atioll, ot writing a book, of building a 
house, or of d1geatiDg a meal, consiat. in a aerie. ot eveta. Thus &n1' inter-
action proce.. will consist ot a aerie. ot actio_ and reactions of the 
. 
indirtdual. tmolved, and each action and reaction it.elf constitutes an event. 
Therefore, the .tudT ot interaction i. not. mere17 a atudy ot t.hing. and 
propert,ie., it i. alao a atud;r of prooes.e. and the event. that make up these 
procesaes • 
6. Soc1ety, culture, !!2 pe!"801UIlitl. Attar breaking meaningfU.l inter-
action dcnm into it. component. ot agents, meaning., and vehicles. Sorokin 
gives a sliahtlT different. aoal.ylli.. "(1) personality as the aubjeot or inter-
action; (2) 800ietl as the totalit70t interacting peraonalit1u, with their 
sociocultural relationships and proo ..... , and (3) culture as the totalit.y of 
the meanings, value., and nol'Wl posse.sed b7 the interacting perso_ and the 
totality ot the vehioles which objeot1ty, sooialise, and 00llV87 theae 
40 
mean1Dp." Wh.n speakinl ot the intesratlon ot the little caammity as a 
39~c!l' IV, 14, lootnote 12. 
4°8ooiet1, Culture, ~ Personality, pp. 63-64. 
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whole it will be neceSAl"T to look tor the int.egrat,lon of personality, ot 
society, and ot culture, aad tor the intecratlon ot all three with one another. 
"Any theory," sa,.. Soroldn, "that str..... only one of them in a etudy' ot the 
sociocultural world, or that seeke to keep the three aspecta separate, is 
inadequate. For pedagogical purpo... they JIl8l' be .tudied separatelYJ but when 
the anal78i. of eaah member of the tr1n1ty 18 concluded, th1a eleDl8D.t mat be 
referred to the tr1ad1o man1told, or matrix, in which it ex1ata ... 41 
Q. StlMKARy 
1. l!!! Foblem. The writer expecte to st.u<:\Y small oOllllUDities in India 
and Nepal. 'J.bel"e be will uk the question ot Whether eu.oh communities oan be 
, 
knoWn as analyzed ~, 'Whether they are integrated wholes or mere spatial 
oongeries. Be will ask queetiona co11Cem1Dg the integration ot the society be 
tinda in these Tillaps, the culture of tbeY11l.age., aDd the per.onalities of 
the people U'Ylq there. He will obllene a collection ot things, properties, 
and events, aDd try to disco.,... whether or not they are all .yatematloallT 
related. 
2. 'l'be Procedure. The prooedure will be to work out a heuristic 
_ ................... -=-.. 
structure or a heuri.tic theory ot the integration ot amall communities. The 
steps in working out a heuristic structure &reI "Name the unknoWll. Work out 
its properties. Use the properties to direct, order, gu1de the inquiry." The 
UDkno1lll hu been named "the integration ot the Uttle community. If Following 
Sorokints anal7a1a, three 1nte:rmed1at. unknowns have been named: (1) "the 
integration ot SOCiety,· (2) "the integration ot culture," (3) "the integration 
41 Ibid., p. 64. 
-
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or personality." The jrOperties ot the un1c.nollD have been suggested by' Soroldn, 
with his congeries, causal-functional integration, and logico-meaningful 
integration, by Redfield, with his causal, f'unctional, logical, aesthetic, and 
symbolic models, and by Lonerpn, with hi. claes1cal, statistical, genetic, and 
dialectical heuristic structures. Th1a thesis is ooncerned primarily with 
further elaboration ot these properties of the unknovn. Tb.e last step, that of 
using the properties to direct, order. guide the inqu.1r;y. will not be taken 10 
the tbes1e t but in the research that is antioipated in India and Nepal. 
» 
-
CHAPTER II 
THE LITTIE C<I-!Mt1Nrl'Y III REIATION TO SCitOKDl'S 
THEDaY or SOOIEn 
"Name the unknown. Work out its properties. Use the propertiea to direct 
order, guide the 1Dqu.1ry.1t !he unlmoWn haa been named the "integration of the 
little cOlIl11l\JDity." In tb1e ohapter, there will be a brief presentation or the 
properties that Redt1eld ues to make explioit the way he is ua1n& the term 
"little CCII\1IUl11ty." But the greater part ot the ohapter will be devoted to 
trying to see what :pE"Opel"tiea Sorokin attributes to the little community, in 
the light of his theory or society. 'l'h1a expos1t1OD will oonstitute a nominal 
det1n1tion or the little C01'IltIRU&it7J it will, in other words, tell how the words 
are being ued in the present thes18. 'l'b.e question ot a real or explanatory 
definition will be ra1.aed, but will DDt be able to be settled in the present 
chapter. For it rwe. SOIlle YeI'7 basic and difficult m.etuociolog1cal iseue8 
dealing with the relativity of judp.eDta. 
In d.1aculing the looation or the little oClmllUlli ty in Sorokin' 8 theory, 
there wlll be opportun1ty to elaborate somewhat on the six main tonu of unity 
he preaenta--tvo types ot conceries and tour types ot s;rat... In the 
application ot theae type. of unitT to lOOi8t7, it will be seen that tor 
Soroldn the litt18 cGm'IIIUDit7 11 !?z det1n1tlon a oauaal-tunotlon.al. u well as a 
lOgioo-mean1ngtu.l unity. 
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-A. lEFINITION OF THE LlT'l'IE C<HmNITY 
DUterent explaDationa ot the senaible phenomenon called "tire" were 
united by the common identification of the known unknown as "the nature ot 
tire." L1kew1se, d1f'terent pet'spectivea in tIOoiology are able to argue with 
each other beoaue ot a comJII)ll identification or the known unlmovn as "the 
nature of _oiety." '!'be apeoit1catlon of the UDlmoVD 111 this thena i.e not in 
terms of "nature" but in terms of "the integration of the little oommunity." 
And 8ince 111 the little oollllUl1ity can be found the aspects ot SOCiety, wlture, 
and personalit)", the pNbl_ or the theais can be 'Viewed as concerning the 
integration at each ot theae three. Because i~ is the little ocmnun1ty--and 
the particular types of SOciety, culture, aM personality that lUke up the 
little COUlIIBIIl1ty--tbat i.e to 'be invastipted, it seems necessary to make clear 
just. what is me&l'lt by' tbe term, "little 00DI'I1Uni ty • It 
1. lkmd-aal. definition. At the beginning ot an inquiry, one bas to name 
the th1np be is ta1J.d:na about, and dove det1nit101'l8 of his most importarrt. 
tenaa. BieNtedt poiDts out that at the begimdng of an inquiry, bove1"el", one 
cannot give the exact det1n1tlon of what be i8 st'u.d11ng, since one at the major 
goals ot the 1raquiry 18 to dieOOYel' that det1nitlon. One cannot give an exact 
definition ot tire untU ODe has bad an wight into the nature ot tire. Bier-
sted,t·. solution to this dilemma 1s the distinction between nominal and real 
definitions. In nominal de1'1nition, one 'begina with obaenatton and seek. to 
apply a name to "objecta, phenomena, or properties that have something in 
common." In real detinition, one begins with the observed thing alreacq named 
and 8.U to define the term b;y a dJ.aoovery and artioulatlon ot the properties 
of the thing to which it refera--"ve begin with a concept and want to discover 
pi 
-
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and to articulate the properties associated v1th ita referent. If Nominal. 
det1n1tion, for e.x:aDJple, tel18 how one is U81ng the term "fire" or "societYJ" 
real definition detiDes "tire lf or "soo1ety" in terms or wbat 1Dquiry baa 
diaOO't'el"ed about "the nature ot tire" or "the nature of sooiety. fl Lonergan 
says that although aominal de1"inition does not demand. insight into the thing to 
1Ib10h the term reters, it does raquire an insight into the use of words. For 
Ua languap 18 an enormoualy comp11oated tool v1th an almost endless variety of 
parts that admit a tar greater number ot signif'1cant oQmb1nations. It insicht 
is needed to see bow other tools are to be used ptOperl1" and etteotively, 
insight is s1:m.ilarly needed to use a laDauase. prooperly and effectively.·2 
2. NOIIl1Dal definition !! little coJ8JA1U1ty. Redfield's designation ot tbe 
little comPlUn1tyas an "intuited vbole h iD11catea \bat he is ident:U'y1.ng what 
be means by a little oommunity by appeal1ng to the content of 8Ol'n8 lnunan 
experienoe, namely, ot intuiting the little OO1'IImDUty as a whole. Be sifts a 
olearer explanation ot bcnr he 18 ua1na the t8l"lll by giving tour qualities ot the 
little OORmID:1t.yt (1) d1atinot1vene88, (2) smallnes8, (3) hamoPD8it7, and (4) 
all-providing seU'-autticieac;r. The distinctiveness 18 evident to thoae both 
inside aDd outside the oolll'1\Ulit7, wh1ch is emal.l 8l'JGUgh to be either the lUd.t 0 
personal observation or to provide the observer v1th a unit of personal 
observation tully represatrtative ot the whole. It 18 ".1011'- ohanging" or 
homogeneous, 80 that "acti'91ties and states ot mind are mtlOh alike tor all 
persona in oorreapondinc sex and age posi tiona J and the career ot one ganeratiol 
laobert Bieratedt, uNOIdnal and Real Detinitional" ~sium on Sooio1ogic4l 
Theorz, ed. Llewell.3'ft OroBS (Evanston, n11DOia, 1959), p. 7. -
2Lonergan, p. 11. 
~---------------------------------. 
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repeat.. t.bat of t.he preced1ng • .J Th.8e four cbaracterletl0' will probabl,. be 
.,..uled in fev of t.be oonmmitles to be studied by' the writer in India. This, 
bOV8Y8r, 18 not a source or d1.tttcu1tyas long as they are taken merely as a 
nGlldnal definition, telling one bow the term 18 uaed. 
). ~lanato17 definition. Explanator,., or real, definitions require Ita 
tlJ,rtb8l" insight into the objects to whicb language refers ... 4 It one defines a 
airol., for example, as rta perfeotly round plane curve ,It he baa g1 van a nominal 
det1n1tion, telling bow the name ·oircle" i8 used. But an explanator,. 
definition demands a fu.1-tber ins1abt. And 1na1gb.t 18 a1...,.. a grasp of 
iatelUgibilit,. in experience. Sere, the ~iential aapect can be the image 
ot & cart wheel. On. then uk, the question, "Why 18 it round? n Is it beO&WJe 
itl spokes are equal? Its spow could be equal, but sunk into the bub and the 
riM unequallyJ or the rim could be fiat between the spokes. But it the hub 
decreases to a point, the ria and the spokes to 11Ms, and it an 1nt1nitJ' of 
equal. spokes radiate from the hub, the rim would be perfectil" round, and 
ucessaril,. 80. Nov points and line. are not imaps, but concepts, tor as 800n 
.. the bub i. made into an imaginable dot, the spoke. could be sunk into it 
uraequalll", and there wuld be no nec ••• ity of rOUDdnes8. To obtain the concept 
it is necessary to suppo.e that the dot, po ••••• ing magnitude and position, has 
ollly position. And the euppoa1ng, thi.nk1ng, considering, formulating, and 
det1nine that produc. the conoept oocur only in COnjunction with an inSight. 
3 !l!! Little Commun1tl, pp. 3-4. 
4umergan, p. 11 • 
.. 
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this insight occurs, and only if it oocurs, can one intelligently uttar the 
definition: "a. circle is a locus of co-planar points equid.istant from the 
~ 
center. w' 
4. Pr1rrd.tive terms. Even explanatory definitions, however, must be 
defined by other terms, which tbemael ves presuppose other terms. It might seem 
that any definition is based, u1. tirnately', on either undefined t'3l'm8 or upon 
definition in a circle. This would be true 1f' definition was merely' a matter 
of I(l3.nipulating tel:'rr.I8, which it is not. For definitions "emerge in solidarity 
with experiences, images, questions, and insights. II No insight can be express 
by a single term, and sane insights are basic in that they do not premppoae 
. 
other insights on the same topic: 
Latus say, then, that tor every basic insight there is a cirole 
ot terms and relatioa, 8UCh that the terms fix the relations, the 
relations fix the terms, and the ins1ght fixes both. It one graapa 
the necea88r)" and sutticient condit1ou tor the perfect roundness ot 
the 1m.ag1Ded plane curve J then one grasps not on.l.y the circle but &lao 
the point, the line, the c1rcumterence, the radii, the plane, and 
equality. All the concepts tumble out toptber, because all are 
needed to expJ:"es. adequately' a Single insight. All are coherent, 
tor cober~e basioally' means that all bang together !rom. a single 
1naigb.t.6 
When terms are defined by their place in a "circle ot terms and relations, 8\lOh 
that the terms fix the relations, the relations fix the tame, and the insight 
fixes both," they are said to be defined implioitly. 
5. Implioit definition. Implicit detinitlon consiat. in "explanatory 
definition without nom1na1 ciet1n1tion. ft 'lb.e 8tatmr;ent that "tv.> and only two 
5Ib1d •• pp. 7-8. 
-
6 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 
-
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points determine a straight line" :La an i.mplic1t definition of both point and 
straight line. 1'be UOJId.na1 def'initiona ·polition without magnitude" and 
"length without width or breadth," ve omitted, tor the det1n1tion ot point is 
sat1st1ed by an ordered pa1r at numbers, since tw such pairs detemine a 
straight line, and the det1n1tion of line 18 satisfied by a tirst dell"" 
equation. "'!'be signit1canoe ot 1mpiioit de1'in1tion is its complete pnerality. 
The omission or nominal definitions is the om1esion ot a restriction to the 
objects which, in the first instance, one happens 1;0 be thinking about. The 
axclusi va use ot explanatory or postulat,ioD8l elanenta concentrates attertt10n 
upon the set ot relationahipa in which the wh~le scientifio significance is 
contained •• 1 
6. Explanato!7 definition !! 1ittle ~t.l. Explanatory definitions 
come at the end at an inquiry. But the prescmt work, although it 18 the 
beginning of inquirY' tor t.he writer, is to make use ot the previous 1nquiriu 
of others, particular17 ot Redfield and Sorold.n. FolloWi.ng Sorokin'. general 
IIOciolog1cal t.he017, it 18 possible to approach 010.", at leut, to an 
explanatory det:Ln1tlon ot the litt.le o01lllllUn11iy. The acmmt.ap of worldng from 
a larger scale 800101ogio&1 theory 18 that it awakeDB one to the po8sibiUty 
that the little COII'1IUl1ty dDea not ditter, in ita explanatory relatioubtpa, 
from other aoo1al IZ"~. Its ditterences, in other words, might be OD a mere 
desoriptive level. 
7 Ibid., pp. 12-13. 
-
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B. THE LITTIE COf1MUNITY AS AN nmRACTION SYSTEM 
The little community 18 a sooiety, which is, aooord1ng to Sorokin, "the 
totality of interacting personalities, with their sociocultural relationships 
8 
and processes." In the little COll".mun1ty, the number of interacting 
personalities in that totality is determined ~J residence within the community, 
an area small eaough to be illveatipted by one man. t·Jba.t i. more important 
hoWever, is the investigation. ot the sooiocu1tural relationships and pr'Oces •••• 
These can be investigated under the title ot ditterent types of interaction. 
1.. 'llP!s 2! !!ttera.c!-ion. Soroldn d1stlngu.ishes between Itsuperficia1 and 
shortliYed interactions" and "the durable, t~ recurring, etfective, and '.fUll 
grown' interaction process.s that generate important sooiocultural structur.s 
(social groupe, cultural. 8)'1Iteme) and sociocultural persons, in contradistinc-
tion from purelY' biological organisms." It is, ot course, the second kind ot 
interaction processes that are ot the most interest to sociologists. He 8~ 
that these are the processes that are: "(l) orpntzed, in contrast to the 
unorganized and disorganized, (2) solidary, in diat1nction from arl:ta.g~)ftistio 
and neutral) and (,3) integrated, in contrast to the uninteS!:ated.,,9 
2. Det1n1tion ot interaction. Soroldn defines interaction as "any event 
-
by which one partly /Jie .:!tangibly intluences the overt actions or the state ot 
10 
mind ot the other." An interaction process that i8 durable, recurring, and 
8 Soci~, Culture, !!!S Per8OlUllitl, p. 6). 
9Ib1d., pp. 69-70. 
-
10 Ibid., p. 40. 
-
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effective wlll, then, be a series of events. Since sociocultural interaction 
is meaningful Sorokin gives a definition of meaning' "anything which, for 
some!dnd, stands as a. Algn of someth.ing 81se. The generio significance of 
meaninc is tha.t in whioh A mean." B if A operates as representing B, U' it 
stands far :S, or oalls it to :llind. nll It is this meaningful aspeot of 
interaction that figures largely in the disoussion of ideologioal ou! ture, 
but it is important also in differentiating the different t;ypes of interaction 
processes. That this should be so follOlls from the faot that the actions and 
interactions ot men oonstitute their behavioral. oulture, a large part of which 
is an expression of t:le meanings, values and, noms of their ideolOSical 
culV...1re.12 
3. 2!:ianlzed interaotion. If A social group, It Slqs Soroldn, "as a totali-
ty ot interacting individuals, ls.rganized when its central set of meanings 
and values. as the reason tor their interaction, is sOOlewhat consistent within 
itself and assumes the form of the law-norma precisely defining all the 
relevant actions-reaotions of the interacting individuals in their relation-
ship toward one another, the outsiders, and the world at large, and when these 
norms are effective, obllgator.r, and, if need be, enforced in the oonduct of 
the interacting persons."l) Here it is the oharacteristics of the ideological 
culture of the group--the meanings, values, and norms-that distinguishes 
organized:fran unorganized or disorganized interaction. The ideologioal 
llIb1d., quoting C. I. Lewis, "The l>lodes ot Meani~,ft PhUoso2& and 
Phenome'iiO!?Jieal Research, IV (1943), 236. -
12~., p. 313. 
13Ibld., p. 10, original in italios. 
-
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culture of the group Il'lUst (a) be Ifsomewhut consistent within itself," and (b) 
assume "the fom or law norms •••• It The first characteristic, that of 
internal consistency, concerns the integration of eul ture. 
4. Inmrat10n !!!1 orsaniution. Although the three olassifioations of 
interaction that Sorokin gave were (1) organ.1zed, (2) solidary, and (3) 
integrated, along with the nega.tion ot these as three opposite types, Soroldn 
is not entirely oonsistent in applying t.'is distirction. For he consistently' 
uses "integration" to rder to the relationship of cultural elements, and 
"organization" to reter to the relationships of bwnan beings to OM another. 
An organized group is oonceived as the social oounterpart of an integrated 
qstem. ot eul ture, as Sorokin shows by the toJ.;'lowil¥! analyses I 
Human beings in their relationship with one anot,her give: 
1. Isolated human beings 
2. Unorganized human groups 
3. Organised groupe 
A) Solidaryt 
Subordinated to 
Coordinated wi til 
B) Antagonistic to 
C) Neutral wi t.h 
one another 
Meanings, values, and Norms in their relationships with one another give. 
1. Isolated meanings, values, and norma 
2. Congeries ot meanings, etc. 
3. Integrated systems of meanings, etc. 
A) Conaistentz 
Subordinated to 
Coordinated with 
C
S) Contradictory to 
) Unrelated congeries 
neutral to 
14Ib1d., p. 316. 
-
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» 
32 
But this parallelism does not imply that the culture ot an organised 
group is in aDT V&7 identical with that group. An organised group and an 
integroated cultural .yatel1l oyerlap or coincide only "insotar as any organised 
group bas a set of meaniDgs, valu •• , and norms as the raison !!'!!£! ot it. 
existence J and th1s set tmBt be and usual17 is integrated in the bulk ot its 
meanings L!deological culturi/, especially in its law-norma, and in the 
respective actions L.&tbav1oral cultureJ and 'fthicles L}iaterial culturi{ ot the 
group ent .. ced by it •• 15 Tbe cmtrlapping can onl.7 be partial becausea (1) 
any organized group bas otbar 8)'8tema of cul tve besides the main one J (2) 
cultural syatema generallY' do not localize ~d 111nit themselves to one group, 
but are shared by m&Il7 different groups; and (3) even with referenoe to the 
set ot lIleaninp, valuel, aad norma that &l"8 a group's raisoll !!'~, it ie 
possible that the S8118 set could generate mother organized group completely 
16 
isolated trCll'l and independent ot the first. 
S. !!!-noru. The IIOlt sipitioaat part of the main set of meaainga, 
norms, and n.l.U8S of aft organised group are its law-nora. Sorokin distinguish 
es law-norms from purely moral norms, tecatcal llOl'!IUI, norms ot etiquette and 
tashion, DOrMS of reli&1on, mores, tollaf'aya, and customs. Relig1oll, more., 
tolkw'ay'a, and customs are collections ot several different kinds ot 1lO1"IIIII.17 
Law norms are "&113" norma ot conduct (of do1Dg, nondoing, toleration) that 
lS Ibid., p. 33S, original in italics. 
-
1~1d., p. 3)6. 
-
17 Ibid., pp. 83-85. 
-
--
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attribute a certain right (the object of right) to one party (the subject of 
right) and a certain duty (the object of duty) to another party (the subject ot 
18 duty) are law norms." Besides the "official law-norms" of a group, which are 
embodied in constitutions, written law, etc., there are also "unotticial law-
norms" which supplement, or sometimes contradict, the official law-norms .19 
The psychological characteristics ot law-DOrms include not only an intellectual 
grasp ot the pattern ot action demanded, but also a grasp ot strong reasons tor 
20 
conforming to the norm, along with torcetu.l emotional and volitional backing. 
6. Distributive ~ organizational tunctions 2.! !!!-~. Law-norms (1) 
distribute rights and duties to the members ot the group, and (2) organize 
, 
activity connected with these rights and duties by enforcing obedience to the 
norms. Law-norms distribute not only tuuctiou and roles to be pertormed, but 
also values ad burdens. .A. right uaually entails title to a va1ue--property, 
services, obedience ot others; a duty usually sDtails a social burden--payment 
ot taxes, ob$dience, rendering ot service. 21 Law-norms organize group members 
under authority, whioh "oonsists not in the physical force of the members of 
the government (sometimes they are very teeble persons pnyaically), nor in the 
power ot various gadgets which they have (these are operated by many human 
agents subordinated to them), but in the law-convictiol18 ot the members ot the 
18Ibid., p. 72. 
-
19~., p. 79. 
20Ibid., p. 75. 
-
21Ibid., p. 77. 
-
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group (or of their "ll&.jori ty) which attribute to the government the right to 
govern, to legislate, to judge (alt-18\YS u.nder apacified conditions), asoribing 
at the same time to the members of the group the duty to obey ita orders. 22 
7. Solid.::rz interaction. A prison i8 an organized system ot interaction. 
Yet it is unlikely that the interaction 1s largely solidary in the pri8on, tor 
"interaction is solls!!!I when the aspirations (meanings-val ue8) and overt 
actions ot the interacting parties concur and are mutually helpful tor the 
realization of their ob.1ectlvee. fI The interaction in the prison ie more likely 
to be either ant.yoq1etic interaction, in which -the desires (meanings-mues) 
and overt actiON! of the parties are opposite ,and lnutuall.y hinder one another," 
or mixed.23 In almost all organized groups, there are elements of antagonilal, 
"purely solidary organised groups are rare, limited ma1n1T to small groups 11ke 
the 'perfect tailyf or to the interaction or devoted friends. ••• '!'he 
decisive evidence tor this in practical1,y all organized groups is the existenee 
of ... c -oe;;;,;;rc ....... i;,;;;o;,;;n!!!J! sanctiODf in their official law. 1t In a purely solidar,r group 
all r~1f3mber. would freely do their duty without coercive sanctions. And the 
greater the ant&goniem_ present, the greater the sanctions normal17 must be.24 
Solida.ry' or antagonistic interaction can be direct or indirect, can vary in 
intensity, "extens!ty," and motivation.2; Sorokin speaks also of familistic, 
24Ibid., p. 94. 
-
25Ibid., pp. 9;-98. 
-
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mixed or contractual .. and compulsory t;ypes ot interaction, which are respective 
2(. 
lY .. mostly solidary .. both solidary and antagord.etic, and mostly antagon1at1c. 
It i.e interesting to note that the pt'1JIuIry criteria of solidarity is the 
conourrence of the interacting parties in their aspirations (mean1ngs-ftlues) 
and their overt actions. Lack of tbts COl\CUrl'8UCe can be from perllOna.l 
antagon1ama within a group, tram factions within a grouP .. and from. personal or 
group derlationa from the law-norma, or other norma .. of a group, whether this 
deviation is throuah overt action or through unw111iog but forced conformity. 
It the ideological, bebanoral, 8Dd material culture of the whole croup is 
vell 1ntearated.. there will still be room le~ t.. • lack ot solidarity. For 
the ideological culture of all the member. ot the group JUq be such that it 
leads them to oClllllpetition, to a ruthle •• eftort to get the upper-hand over 
other.. All the p-oup can have the same nol'lll8, which lead to 8Qtagonist.1o 
interaction by their ""'1' nature. 27 
8. Sut!aarz'. The little commun1t;y waa nominalq defined in terms of di.-
tinctivene .... smallnes., homogeneity, and all p.rtov1ding selt-sufficiency. An 
elaboration of Sorold.n t • concept of meaninctul interaction baa bean given in 
order to proceed towards an explaaatory det1nition of the little comam1.t;y. 
Interaction 18 orprdzed it the culture of tbe interacting individuals i. 
integrated in ita NiD rneam.np, values .. and norru .. so as to ruult in law-
-
~ that diatribate rights and duties IIlld organize the intvact1ng 
personalities under an authority_ The total culture ot an organized group is 
26 Ibid ... p. 99. 
-
27 Ibid., pp. 121-122. 
-
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not necessarily integrated just because it po .... se. an integrated set of law-
norms. For there are 1IlA1l7 other areas ot culture beside. the central meanings, 
norms, and values that generate the &roup. L1kew1se, an organized group need 
not be characterised y.r1marily by solidary iDteraction, tor a group may be 
organ.ized eftl'l though its melbera have con.fiict1ng aapiratiou. ADd solidarity 
is not identical with 1n.tegration or culture, 'becaus. t.be aame aspiration can 
lead to contliot of individuals pos_.ing that upirat.1on. as when two men 
want to bold th. ... job _ Organisation aDd 1Btep-ation are not identical, but 
parallel, orPAisat1on reter. directly to tile relatl.onebipa between human 
being., but integration ret ... directly to ~ relatio_hip. between meanings, 
value., and DOl'IU. The parallelt_ will be f\utther elaborated, in order to 
explain more de.t1n1tely what 18 _ant b;r a littl. commun1ty in terms ot 
Soroldn'. Sl'8tem, and what is MAnt by the integration or tbl little community_ 
C. THE LI'r'l'IE CCl4Mt1ffrrY AS A COLLECTIVE UNITY 
In the i.ntroduetory obapber, Soroldn wu said to have 11 'Yell six type. ot 
unitie.) two of the.e were oonpri •• and .tour ..... 878t-. '!'he •• types of 
unities O&m be applied both to organizat.ion aDd to integration. Her., the 
concentration .f attention 11111 b. on the orpaillational. aspects, with 
oceasioDal. reference to the integration ot culture. 
1. Co!e!'ie., sp!t1a1!l ooratipt!! !!! p!!:"~1ona11z .imilar. '1'h1s is 
not an i:m.portaDt type ot unity in Soro1d.n'. theory, but is given tor logical 
completeness _ An example of this would be a pile of sand or bricks. 28 
2. COtlg!!1.esl spat1altl oontipus ~ mechan10allz cohesive. 
28 Sooietz, Culture, ~ Personalit:, p. 116. 
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Another less important unity tor Sorokin, exempl1t1ed by ft. piece ot rock, • 
stick, • box containing all the unassembled parts ot • car ... 29 
). Indirect causal-tpActional system. This type ot unity is had when a. 
set ot objects are related to one another indirectly by a common relationship 
to some agency axtemal to all of them. Soroldn gives as an example the 
collection of objects in his studT: "books, manuscripts, typewriter, lop 1n 
the tire-place, tiBh1.nc tools, olock, pictures, various boxes, furniture." To 
these he adds it.eme in his pocketsl "money, pen and watch, handkerchiet, SGlle 
letters, automobile license and registration, comb, etc." '!'be.s objects need 
not be spatially adjacent, they have no ~ cauaal-tunctioaal relationship, 
and .yet somehow they all happeD. to be united through a common agent, the 
individual and his needll. Each ot thea is in oaual-tunotional relationship 
w.l tb the indi:r.Ldul and his needs, and through this ccrrm¥)n apnt, the:y are 
indireetly eormected by causal-functional tiea, Olle with another.,.)O 
4. Direct cau.aal-tunctional mtem. "An .. sembled automobil., a solar 
system., the Columbia Broadcaeting Sy'atem, and an organism are also unities, 
though sane ot them, like a solar ayatem or the radio network, cannot be 
perceived as .etlI017 unitt •• , their parts are separated by distant apace and 
are not T1a1ble at ou Ilano .... ll There 11 at, tbe baste ot their unit.y& (1) 
a causal depm.d!nce, Vb:1ch 1s Ita ona-aided dependence ot the ettect A upon the 
29Ib1d• 
-
31lbld., pp. 145-146. 
-
---
cause B, so that when B 1& given A is give., when B is cbaDging A 18 changing, 
but the reverse ma.y not be true. ••• W1r1d 1& the oauae of the !lower bend-
ing, wbile the !lower is not the cawse of the w1nd blowilllJ" and (2) a 
.f'unCt.lonal 1ntel"d!p!t!dence, wh1ch 18 "a JIIl1tu1 1nterdepencienoe of two 01' more 
variables where A 18 the cause and e.ttect. of B and vice versa. • •• When t1lO 
irOn st1cks, one bot, the other cold, touch one another tbe reaulting process 
18 an equalizatiOn of their temperatures. In this equalizattoll ne1ther of the 
sti.okais tbe ca11M or the effect J both 1ntlU8QCe each other and are tunction-
al17 interdependent.,,)2 A buic characteristic of oausal-twtctioD8l unit1es 
ia that "each part, depend.a upon the whole and ,the whole depends UPOIl the 
parts • .,)) 
5. ~l sm-- At the buis of such unitle. "U the logical or 
aesthetic coneuteocy of their mean1ncs-norma-ruues. All 818tau of mean1ngs-
norma-'f'&l.ues that show such a oouistenoy' are meaningful, 10g1co-aestbetic 
unities, begSmd.ng vJ.th a s1mple propo.ltlO1'1I A 1a S, 2+2-4, and ending v1th 
all the cons1ateDt se1en.tltic, phUosophical, rel1g1ous, eth1cal, artlstlc 
S)'8tema of mean1qs-'nOl'Jfl8-Yalues. 1t The el_nta related in this 'type of unity 
are not the ... thle, ecmcrete parts of the caual-tunottonal unity, but 
"1mmater1al and ftOn-s_01'7," and "tI:.lerefore apaeel ... and. tilel .... " Oaly When 
they are objectified in actions and vehicles are tbey "spat1ally concrete and 
)2Ibtd., p. 146, footnote 2. 
-
33Ihid., p. 146. 
-
.... 
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sensor1ly' perceptiouJ. like a statue, a P1otve, a building or a book.".34 The 
d1.t'terence between causal-functional am mean1ngf'ul. un1ties 18 brought out in • 
formulation or the criteria tor each 11'1 parallel terms I the criterion ot • 
causal-fwlctiODal. unity 18 ft. tangible causal or tunetlonal interdependence of 
its parts upon one &I'lOther, of the Whole upon its parts, and ot the parts upon 
the whole ••• pro'f'1ded thia interdependence 18 vieWed. as due to the phyeioo-
chemical or biological. properties of the whole and of its parts; ,,3S the 
criterioa ot a logioo-m.eaniaghl unity 18 Ita 10g1cal [Or aeathetiy 
compatab111ty md apecit1c dependence or interdependence of each meauing-
element upon other meanings-elements, of the ~eanings .. elam.eat8 upon the whole 
system, ad of the sy'IIt.ea upon the elements. ,,)6 
6. ~l-oausal-tuDct1onal SZ!tem. 1'h1a is a causal-tuuctloul 
sTstem 1l'1 vh1ch t.he interdependence is !!!! due "to the physicocheJn1cal or 
biolog1cal properties of the whole and of 1ts parts. It U there were two 
!.,.ndepend.eQt lrlveatlons ot atom1c bombs, tor example, there wuld be a meaning-
tul tie between the two bomb.. lIt, however, an inventlon of atomic bombs 11'1 
the United states factually 1nf'luenoed their invention somewhere elae, then tba 
with each othel'. !b1s example illustrates msaniDg1'u.l-cauaal (f\motlonal 
unity. ",7 
34Ibid. 
-
J5~C8, IV, 4. 
36Ib1d., p. 21. 
-
37Socletz., Culture. !!!! Peraonalltl. pp. 147-149. 
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7. ~p£lica.tlon 2! !.!-! t-~s !:2. society ~ culture. Sorokin applies 
these types to the organized group,J8 and to cultural lntegr:-ation)9 'l'he 
difference is priJoar11y one of ~J in viewing the organized group one's 
attention ill primarily upon the relationships or people, but these relation-
ships are founded u}lOft meanings-norms-values, which are cultural; in viewing 
the integration ot eu.lture one'a attention i. concentrated upon the meanings-
norms-value., but th.a. U". only grasped 1naotar as one discovers the meanings 
objectU'1ed 1r1 the behavioral and material culture ot the people one is study-
ing. It 18 intePesting to note that Whereas one ot the examples given tor a 
direct cauaal-tunotional unity in the tirst ~a1tio1'l was an assembled 
autonobile J Sorok1n later olusUied this as a oaual-mean1ngfUl unit,., because 
the parts are "all causal'J¥ oormeoted with one another ani all created by the 
purposive activit1es of the groupa • ..uo In this respect, it 1s s1m11ar to an 
oren1sed F2!P' wh10h 18 a oauaal and meaningtulwdty. 
8. ~ or,an13ed I!!'!P !! ! causal !!!! 1,!\ea&U.PR'!!1 unit:. Firat ot all, 
Soroldn would not make 1t h)rpothetioal that aD organ1sed group is a 0&8&1-
i'unotlonal unitT' "The "ffIIt'1' det1n1tion ot sooial interaction points out at 
once tbat any Il'OUP ot 1nteraot.1nIind1ri.duals 18 first ot all a cauaal-
tunoticm.af unitl in which all oom.ponents are mutually and tangibly inter-
dependent. In any interaction ayatem there is a triple interdependence ot one 
38 Ibid., pp. )))-))5. 
-
J9Ibid., p. 3)4. 
40Ibtd., p. 147. 
-
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part upon the other important parts, ot the whole upon these parts, and ot the 
parts upon the whole interaC ... iOll syst,am.. For such. a unity there i8 no need 
tor either spatial adjacency or mecbaa1cal cohes1on. 
Second, Wan organized interaoting group is a me!!!!S~ !!ttl-If Sorokin 
gives five reaeons tor th1s usertiolU 
(1) The 1DIIIlbers interact becau8e ot or tor the sake ot oertain 
meanirlga-norms-values. By defin.1tion only meaningful inter-
actio. aa.kes a lrOoiocult\U'al 11'OUP. 
(2) ••• a ~p's oausal-tunotional unity 18 determined, to a 
gl"eat extent, by ita component of meanings J they create indirect 
or direct cawaal.-tunctional dependence ..mere otherwise, by virtue 
of the bioplv81cal propertie8 or the objects 1Inol ved, tbare 1IOUl.d 
be 110 oauaal-tunctlonal dependcmceJ and vice versa, the component 
ot .. ald. ott_ eliminates the cauaal-tunctlonal tie8 between 
the phenowana. ~ 
(J) A:trr orpa:d.sed II"O\lP 18 a fP'OUP 11'lYgrat.ed or 1oliOallT COB-
s1atent to some extent at least in ita ethical and. law-norma, 
meaa1rap, and 'I'&1ue8 •••• in ep1te ot the presence ot contra-
dictions in t.he otf1oial and unottic1al law ot the croup, 1llOst 
ot ita DOI'm8 are log1cally cona1stellt, aad, 10 tar aa they are 
enforced, the bulk ot the overt actiorut ot ita MlIbera md ot 
the fth1el.s used are cOIl81atent alao with"'" DOl'lIl8 &ad with 
one another. This logical consistency ot the 1aw-DOI'm8 and 1aw-
act10ruJ ot the member8 is Dever pel"teot, but its minimum 18 touDd 
in arJT group as long as it rerna1u an organised group. • • • 
(4) ltft1l outside ot lav-DOl"II8, tbe ren of the meaninp-nOl'U-
values of the group, because ot which or tor the sake ot wbich 
the ind1:f'1clu.ala interact, are 1nt.ep-ated to some extent into 
.. sthe ... ically or lolically aona1atent ayatem.s. 
(5) Af:q' 1081 ex1ating orpntHd prollP baa to haft a minimum or 
solidarity among it. moat powerful members. Solidarity in all 
it. ra1t1oatiou 18 ap1n a •• 10 of OOIl81et.eftt meanil'1ls. So t .. 
as it i. one ot the ties binding the members ot the group into 
a solidary 1l1l1ty. it 18 a IMI.111nIM tie. Oausal-1\mct1onal tie. 
are "oolorles.", neither Cltagon1atic nor solidary: PC' ee; they 
are mere17 ties of depeDdenoe an::! iDt.erdeper1dence .hl 
9. Detild.tiou ~ met.uoc101oll_ Tbe above section sbows how 1mportaat 
4lIbid., pp. 147-148. 
-
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for Soroldn's theory is his statement that the generic phenomenon tor sociolog-
ical investigation is meaningful interaction. For by the VC'y detin1tion of 
uinteractior" If it turns out that &rq" group of' interacting 1nd1v1duals 18 a 
causal-functional EQ'Stem. And by the very f'act that interaction 18 meaningful, 
it turns out that anT interacting group is a nie~ful...causal-tunct.1onal 
un1ty, "The n1Smbers interact beoauae ot or for -the sake of' certain mean1ngs-
nonna-values.. f..t<.r definition only meaningful interaction makes a sociocultural 
grouP." The writer believes that it would he di.t:tieult to find any major 
!'la.ws in Sorokirl t s reaaoDiDg, once the generic pbenomerson 18 conceded to be 
meaningful interaction, and h18 det1n1tlon or, mearr1.ngtul int .. aetlon 1s 
accepted. Therefore, it 1a at this po1at tbat critic1am., apart tr_ 
eorrecUoM ot an:r minor 1nooD818te11cies that. miaht. be round, 1IIOUld bave to be 
aimed. But th1a ar1t.1c1am will then concern. the very definition of' sociology 
and ot ita scope.. And as rurtey says, ".ooiololiats differ a good deal among 
themselves about the aut area ot reality which their science disoua.8S. 'J.'hia 
folloW'll claarly :trom the detinit10u ot sociology which they have given •• • • 
Disputes .. to the exact area to be COftred by the science have bedeviled 
100101087 from 1ta early period down to the present. 1'0 exprus the _e tact 
in other langu.aaea {.8to;/, so010log1st.s have lle1'8r agreed very well on the 
Pl"OptJr criteria ot rel81'aDC8 tor their solenoe.,,42 And it 18 a task ot 
metaaociololl to det1ne SOc1010&7, to work out the criteria ot rel4!mU'lCe. 
10. Criteria ot relevance. Furt.,- goes on to SII.7 that "1t 18 impossible 
--- .. 
to argue t.hat one set ot relew.nce criteria 18 true and anot.her talse, that 
4!Paul Banl.7 FUrte;r, "The Problem of Values," §ptposi1lJ!1 2!! Soc1010110al 
Theo!Z, p. ;11. 
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one is right and another wrong. All one can do is to argue that one set 111 
preferable because it 111 more practical or mare illuminating or possessed in a 
greater degree of some other desirable quaU.ty. In other words, the choice 
among alternative sets ot criteria is determined b)" meataociolog1cal value 
judgments. II The choice of the criteria of relevance is, within broad limits, 
43 
arbitr!l7. This seems to the writer to have rather important consequences, 
if it is correct. For it the writer'.s interpretation ot Furtey's assertion. 
about the arbitrary character of criteria ot relevance is correct, it would 
seem to follow that the dispute, mentioned 1a the first chapter, over the 
behavioral, cultural, ad ecological perspeot~ves in sociological theory cannot 
be settled, even in regards to one's OWD 800iological researcb, except b7 _ 
arbitrary dacuio.. 'or tbese three perspectives represent three dUferent 
definitions ot sooiology. The writer baa stated a buic agreement v:Ltb 
Zoaniecki, 'Mho asserted that aucb perspectiY'Ss should be regarded as 
!VetheUcal, and thus should be used beuri8tioal..!l to search for tacts which 
agree with them, rather tbaQ dopatica11l to PZ'e'ftl1t the discovery ot tact 
'thicb disagree with it.44 But an;r arbitrary decision in favor ot one 
perapecti va rather than another reaovu the perspeoti ft, with its definition o£ 
society, fraa the hypothetical stage. For a b7P0thesis is a propoSition that 
can be carefully formulated, whose implications can be deduced, and whose truth 
or falsity 08Il be judged by a controntat1oD of' these implications v:Lth the data 
Ultimately, it seems to the writer that the criteria of relevance depend upon., 
43Ibid., pp. 511-512. 
-
44Znan1eck1, p. 519. 
-not so much the det1n1tlon of sociology, but upon the definition of societl 
which is the baais for the definition ot 1001010gy. And it the definition ot 
society carmot be stated aa a hypothesis and then ver1tied as certainly or more 
or lees probably true or false, it seems to the writer that most ot the 
propositions in the field are baaed ult1mate13 on an arbitrary decision and 
cannot be made subject to aD)" other criticism than that ot logical consistency 
with the basic, arbitrarily chosen, premise. 
11. Criteria ot relevance and n0lldrla1 definition. Another w.y of stating 
-------
this would be to _1' that it is impossible to gi VEt a real or explanatory 
definition ot sooietT, but only a nominal one,_ You could, in Bierstedt's 
formulation, apply "soo1et,.. aa a a.ame to "objeota, phellOllen&, or properties 
that haft something in common," but could not beg1n with a concept and go on to 
"discover and to articulate the properties associated with its reterent.,,45 
Or, in Lonergan's term8, one could formulate a definition baaed upon an insight 
into the w.y the word -soeietT" is uaed, but could not formulate a definition 
baaed upon an ina1cbt into the objects to which the lIOrd reters. 46 
Sorokin' s statement that 8Oc1010gy studi_ meaningful interaotion 18 a 
statement of a criterion of re1ennee. It auch statement. must be regarded as 
arbitrary, then the statements conoerning the nature of an orpnised grou.p, 
801idar1ty, and integration all are permeated by this arbitrary value judgment. 
Empirioal verllication is useless either as oonfirmation or disproof; the 
4SBierstedt, p. 137. 
46u,oerpn, p. 11. 
--
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statements are made on tbe baa18 ot an arbitrary juc.ipent. Sorokin has made 
the logical blunder ot introducing nom1na1. definitions, and then treating them 
as real. "The word we have introduced by stipulation and to which we have 
arbitrarily given a meaning COIne, through use and repetition, to be regarded as 
necessarily haTing that meaning ... 47 And it WIlld follow that the att8llpt to 
use Sorokin I s theoretical appl"oach as a means ot approaching an explanatory 
detinition ot the little COWIIl11'1ity is based upon a talse uaumption, namely, 
that Soro)dn's detiDition or mean:1.nl1\1l interaction is more than an arbitrary 
stipulation or boY be is using the worda. 
12. Criteria ot relevance and relati'ri.em. 1'be question at iS8\18 is 
-. - ( 
whether or not basic propoaitiou about the nature ot 8oo1ety, and ultimately 
about the nature ot man, can be regarded u hypotheses capable or ver1t1oation 
or disproof, or merely u arbitrary u8\IlIlptiou. i'h1a is a question about what 
might be called the buic iD'!!'Fetative trame'NOrk for one's research. It it i 
impossible to ftrity' 8.lV propolitiou ot such a tramewOl."k, the tramework and 
the theor,y it generates are relative to the personal whims or the cOllIcious or 
unconscious biases ot tbe dUterent SOCiologists. ~e would be forced to apply 
to sociological theor,- itself the principle ot cultural relativ18m as 
formulated by'Melville HerlkoTit.. "judgments are baaed on experience, and 
experience is 1aterpreted by each indi'ridual in term. or his own encultura-
48 
tion." 
47Biersted.t, p. 128. 
4~ and Hi. Works (New York, 1948), p. 6), quoted by Redfield, The 
Primitive Wi.;.;.or;.;;;.,,;;l;,;;d!.!!!!!! 'l'ranstomat1ons (Ithioa, lew York, 19,,3), pp. DiTi-14'. 
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13. Conclusions. The i.sue ot relati nan CaDnot be met here. The point 
in bringing it up was to indicate what seems to the writer to be the logical 
iJnplicati0118 ot ny1rlg that one's criteria ot relevance are arbitrary. It 
criteria ot relevance are arbitrary, it 18 still in the realm ot nom1nal 
definit10n ot the little cotmm1l1ity to say that 1t 1s a meaningfUl-C&Usal-
functional s78tem. For su.oh a statement 18 only a logical coIl8equence ot the 
detinitions ot meaningful interaction, organized group, and caueal.-tunction and 
logico-mea.nillcfUl unities. At this point, sinoe relativism cannot be discussed 
here, it will be impossible to say whether or not Sorokin's detinitiol18 are 
nominal or explaDatory. It will be necesAlT, however, to go further with the 
exposition ot his qatem in order to locate the little COl!ImUrl.ty within it, 
leartng to a further chapter the question ot whether tbia results in an 
approach to an explanatory dstin1tion, or is merely a nominal detinition that 
is more elaborate thaD Redfield'e. 
D. SCROKm t S CLASSIFICATION OF ORGANIZED GROUPS 
1. !!!! bu •• !!! _ol ..... a ......... Bit ___ i.... o_at ..... i. .... o_n. Sorokin gives two bues. "'l'he first 
scientit10 ba.18 ot the olueitioation ot the grou.pa is • • • the !.nteusi ty ~ 
olesen ••• !! oausal-ttmctloul. interdepend_o~ among its member. and 
components." Thus, 
It "'111 1000 individual. DOt united by causal interdependenoe, 200 
are united, the.e 200 make a real collective unity or group. It 
amol'1l the.e 200 m8lbers ot the group, $0 ind1viduals are, say, twioe 
or thrice more olosely interdepmd.ent, this ditterence 1n the degree 
ot oauaal. interdependence (int8D81t7 ot interaction) makes ot the.e 
$0 individual. a group within the group ot 200. It among these 50 
members, 10 are still more tang1bly interdependent, they make a group 
in a group ot $0 within a group ot 200. Thus a tangible d1tterence in 
closeness or intensity ot cauaal-tunctioul interdependence i. the 
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first objective basis for distinguishing the existence at groups 
and tor their cl .. s1t1cation.49 
But it is the component of rnemings-norma-values that gives to any group 
its opecitio ind1v1dual.it)"t 
Thus the seoond objective basis or the unity and individuality of a 
group is the character of it. com~ent ot meani!s.When the 
mean 1 nge-values-nora bi'"'caUii ot ~oh ana lor t "sake of which the 
individuals interact and establish their causal interdependence are 
different in two sets or interactin, individuals, these indiv1duals 
(with their actions and vehicles) make difterent groups. It they 
now int,aract around. the values of Protestantism, DOW about the values 
ot General Motors, now around the values of the democratic party, 
they compose not one but three d1tf'erent groups ItOOlllPOUlldedtt of the 
same 1nd1 viduals. • • • 
Thus the maiD bases or group classification quite logically tollow 
from the very nature ot the causal .. n1Oan~l unity at the groups.50 
2. Unibonded ~ mu.ltibonded groups. It a group interacts for the sake 
of one set ot reeanings-norJns-values, it i8 uni'bonded. It, however, it 
intera.ct.a tor tho salce ot two or more sets ot r;ceanings-norma-values, it is 
51 
nmltibonded. Soroldn warns ap1ut an a priori clusification of groups on 
the basis ot some nt ot basic needs or on the basis of a logical classifica-
tion at meanings-norras-valU8s. Sorokin Bays that the danger here is a 
classification that does not oorrespond to the way the human population is 
actually divided into groupe. SO he chooaef,l to "drop the speculative way ot 
tentative hypotheses and take iutead the wq ot observation. What groupe in 
human. population have actually been the powerful and perunent grou'P8? We are 
in the position or a geographer trying to chart a little known region with its 
plains and hills, streams and lakes, woods and deserts. His first task is to 
L92.,ocietl, Oulture, ~ Personality, p. 170. 
,OIbid., pp. 110-171_ 
'lIbid., pp. 171-172. 
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map these as they are given to his observation.-52 at course Soroldn's 
observations are not a simple taking in ot some (lII1tbical) "pure" data; just 
as the map-maker bas a system ot symbolic notations, 80 also Sorokin reads the 
topography ot the soolal universe with the aid ot the whole sohema ot 
definitions which has been briefly outlined aboye. 
3. Sorold.n giftS a !!!J!!!7 clua1.t1oatioD ~ Foupe, wb10h includes his 
"observations" on the main t7J)e8 ot UD.1bonded and multiboDded gl"OUpSI 
I. Unorpn!.zed!!! ~-Organi .. d Qrou2! 
1. Extern.all1' united, "as it" orguized 
2. Publl0 
3. Crowd, mob 
4. Sem1-nomiDal p1val 
S. Purely DaIJdul plurel 
II. ~ Orprdsed GrOUE! 
A. Unibonded F!Uf! 
1. Bioaocia1 groupings I 
a. Race, 
b. Sex, and 
c. Age groups. 
2. Sociocultural groupingsl 
a. K1Dah1p, 
b. Territorial, 
c. Langu.ap I 
d. state, 
e. Occupational .. 
t. Eooncm1o, 
C. ael.icioua, 
h. Political, 
i. Ideological, and educational groups 
j. NomiDal group. ot the elite 
B. Multlbonded P'OUps 
1. The family 
2. Cl.aruJ 
). Tribes 
-_ 
4. Natlou 
,. Castes 
6. Feudal .states 
7. Cluaea 
C • structural Varieties 
1. Large or small in size 
2. Well-organisftd or sem1-organ1zed 
3. Cent1"alised or decentralized 
4. With mourcb1cal, ar1atocratic, oligarchic, democratio, 
republican, tyrann1.oal, and ot,ber {"onu ot government 
,. Strat1t1ed in va:ri.ou vap 
6. LoDe and sbort-lived 
7. SoUdary, antagonist10, mixed 
8. Intepoated, unintell"ated, mi.xed culture 
9. R10h ad poor in the campollMlt. ot meaninp and ".hioles, 
in the qual1ty ot m8llbers 
10. With mutual iftter,roup relationships I 
a. SoUdary (u nbcroup to: IN'lp, or as coordinated 
group') 
b. Antqonistic 
c. Neutral 
d. UlINlated,3 
e. strat1t1ed· 
4. !!!!. little oommu.n1tl !! ! territorial EouE. Although a territorial 
group comes under unibonded ~ in the above soheme, (II. A. 2. b.), 
Soroldn distinguishes between unibonded groups which have territory as their 
only bond, aDd mulUbonded groups ot wh1ch the territory is one ot the main 
bonds. 
rr_ the langu.ace we speak, OD up to our beliets, tastes, opinions, 
mores, aad mazmers J eV8l'7'OD8 who resides in the nm.e locality tor a 
lone t1Jne is impl'egnated by its pographic, social, and cultural 
patterns. An. emergence or -the looal type of personality," ot local 
patriotism and local culture becomes inevitable in such conditions. 
With 1noreas~ mobilit~t the P2Jllation and with ~t change !l re.tden.oe~~~r~e and e eotlvenm 2l! ~ri;U-­
neijhbOrh#i 1!'.2i:~~ deCt1ni.. • • • 
The decreaa1ng role ot the locality P"OUp, in the coftditlons ot 
53 8 Ibid., p. 11 • 
-
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intense mobilit1', is due also to the dissooiation ot the Eevious9' 
multibonded lOcali~ into a series ot untiiinaidlt;up!o Among 
the poiiilations 1t i"Wti.iretheY were 'tiOm, the local l' group vas 
in fact a multibonded group in 1Ib.1oh the locality tie wu one ot 
many. Whether in a preliterate tribe or in a Hindu, Chinese, or 
other village, or in a medieval cit1' with non-migratory and non-
mobile populations the locality group vu otten tied by the bond ot 
kinship, conmaon languace, common culture, OOlIIIlOn religion, common 
citizenship, e'Nll by C01RIIIOD occupatioa 8I'1d econt.lldo interesta. 
Persons who lived all their 11"... in the same locality composed a 
multibcmded pG\\p that _lded their personalitY' in all its essential 
blosooial characteristic.. SUch a multibollded group, located in a 
limited area, is what ~ sociologists stll1 oall a "CODlml111t;y8 in 
contrast to a uniboD.ded asllOciation. 
With the increase ot population mobility tb1a multibonded group 
began to dissociate. • •• rile locality gro\tp has progressi't'8ly 
became a UDibond.ed terri. tonal group instead ot & multibonded group, 
hence a decl1fte of ita importaDce. Bence alao the notable mistake ot 
!!!.!!l SOc10l0~. who continue to treat this UDibonW \errttorti! -
grOUP as !! ~F"rtant ficcmaiii1tli !! "COntrast !! UnlbindGd 
usoo1ii1Ois :;Ii 
The little COl'IIII1W11ty, thera, 1r1 terms ot Soroldn's theory, 18 a multibonded 
territorial group. The people who li" 1n it vill be characterized by lII&DlY ot 
tbe same traits, because ot being ttimpregnated by its geographio, social, and 
cultural patterns.- The "local t7Ptt ot personality" that Sorold.n s8.11l 
inevitably emerges wuld seem to oorrespolld to Redfield's trait ot homogeneitr 
that he saya is cbarecter1stlo ot a small comnmity. The ... ter ......... r1 ... to ....... r1_&_l ~ is 
also C01YII1OD to the two difterent detinitions. rbia bond seems to lead to the 
oharacteristio ot distinctness g1"..n by Redfield. Soroldn does not seem to 
mention anyth1.ns that could be direotly pa1.red ott nth Redfield's tourth 
oharacteristic of -all-providing selt-sufficienc1" R perhaps the number and type 
ot the further bonds 'be7ond the territorial WOllld determine the degree to whioh 
a community could be said to be selt-amtticient. 
54Ibid., pp. 198-199; Sorokin'a italics. 
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E. CONCLUSIONS 
The attempt to apjroach more closely to an explanatory definition of the 
little community' baa raised an iaportant iane, which issue baa not been met, 
namely, whether or not one can give an explanatory definition of society that. 
18 not. relative to the particular enculturat.ion process that hu molded the 
ideas ot the soc1ologist do1Dg the defining. SUoh an explanatory detinition 
would have to be baaed on an wicht into the phenomenon to which the ~d 
"society" reter., and would have to bG veritiable. Bu.t whether or not 
Sorokin' s theOl7 is baaed upon explanatory detin1t1ons, the present chapter has 
served to locate the little community within ~s theory, and to sbow that the 
characteristics be .. signa to a mul t1bonded territorial group are similar to 
the characteristics aaa1grled to the little oomrmm1ty by Redfield. In addition, 
a set or t ... that will be used throughout the wrk bas been defined, at least 
tlOldnally. Such notions as nominal and explanatory and iJnplioit de.t1n1tions, 
primitive t.eras, meaningful interaction, organized group, law-norms, 
solidar1tT. causal-tunctional. and log1co-meaniftgtu.l ayatema, criteria ot 
relevance, relat1 rlam, and. multibonded and uniboD.ied groups have been 
introduced. It hu in addition been leen that it one accepts Sorokin's 
definit10u ot interaction, organized fP'O\lp, caaal-tunct1onal unity, and 
logico-meaningtul unity, be muat in logic concede that it i8 ~ !!lJX!thetioal 
that any orgardzed group is a meaningtul-causal. unity. 
• 
» 
CHAPTER UI 
MODELS AID LlWS 
In this chapter, the distinction between concrete descriptions and 
abstract formulations will be emphasized. Deacript.1ve techniques are be 
definition relative to the one doing the describing, tor description is a 
statement of the way thinp look to that describing person. Laws in physics, 
it will be .een, are beyond 100kingJ they are invariant becauee they are 
abstract. Because law are abstract, they sr. not the same as models, which 
are concrete. Models can be constructed only by concrete Warence. trom laws. 
But it 18 possible not only to conatruct sywtematio models, or schemas of 
reourrance which obey classical law, but aleo non-818tematic prooesses as 
well. 'ft).e po8sibUlvof non-systematio proce.ses, which correspond to 
Sorok1n.· s congeries, g1 ves ri.e to the pos.ibili ty ot statistical metbod as a 
distinct t1J)e of approach, which results 1n a type of intelUgibilit;y dif'terent 
from that had 111 c1anical laws. Stat1stical law have their heuristic 
anticipation in probabilit71 rather than in the nature of things, or the 
determinate correlations between abstract corre1atiYG8. Admission of 
statistical law &wids both a determinism that would attempt an imaginative 
mechanical model ot a community, and an indeterminism which regards laws as 
essentia117 unverit1able. 
A. CLASSICAL HEURISTIC smUCTURES 
1. Mathalatioal ~ "ietitic Wights. Insight into the image ot a 
52 
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cart wheel came as an answer to the question "Why is it l"OUDd? J1 and reaulted in 
the forroulatiOl1 of the explanatory definition. Ita oi.rcle 18 a lOOU8 ot co-
planar po1Dts equid.1stant trom the center •• 1 Qalileo vent beyond his pre-
sclentU'io Aristotelean opponents by h1a insisht into the r-elationship between 
distance and time, he discovered that 1n a tree fall -the d1stance traversed is 
proportional to the ti!lle squared.·2 The explanatory definition of a circle 
puts one in the realm of the non-imagill&ble, tor points and line., unlike dots 
ed threads, cannot be 1macined. ·Strangely, sometblng similar happena when 
ODS formulates the law ot talling bodies. It holds in • vaOU'Ulll, and to realize 
a pertect vacuum 18 impossible. What oaJl be ~lilhed experimentally' 18 that 
the more 010le17 ODe approxtmat .. to the cond.1tiona ot a ftC\1Url1, the more 
&CCUl"ate the law ot oo~ &Gceler.tien is toartd to be."l 
1'ba mathematical aDd tbe ac1entit1o wights are difterent. Galilee could 
DOt .imply imag1ne tree talla, as tba mathematician can. imagine oart wheels, or 
in hlgher _~tios, more INbtle Q'Ilboll0 imaps ot operat1eu oarried out in 
lower-level proceduru. he bad to do field work, perform experiments. And no 
matter how many experiments he completed, his data would alwaya remain 
dUcroete, represented by a serie. of separate points on a diartaace-tiM gl"aph, 
unlike the ccmtimloua smooth 0UJ'Ye of the oart 1fbeel. theretore, while 
1Dalght tate the uture ot the oirole pouped the neoessi ty ot roundne.s, 
lLcmerpn, pp. 7-8. 
2Ibld., pp. 13-.34. 
-
)Ibid., p. )4. 
-
---
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inSight into the nature oE a Eree Eall em give onl.7 possiblllty, Eor .., 
number ot difterent curves could pass throuch all the known points on the 
graph. Furthermore, in mathematica, the 1raaginatlon can chanae as JIUOh as 
necess&1"7 in its ettort to approximate the concepts, but ln emp1rloal science 
the data up their own way' with their uunal:vsed multiplicity aDd their 
re.tractor1nns to meuurameu.ta that U'e more than app.rox1mate .,,4 
F1nall¥, the circuit oE .. thematioal thought is 'l.mlllment. Uit IIOveS tram 
images throuch 1DS1ahts aDd coDCeptlons to the production ot .,mbollc ilnages 
whence higher ins1gbta arue.· But the cireu1.t ot scientific developcent is 
not immaDent. it "1Dalud.es action upon extern.al th1np1 it BIOW8 from 
- , 
ob88l"'t'&tion and expeM.aent to tabulations and graphs, from these to wicht. 
and tomulatiou, from formulations to tm-acute, trom toreoaats to operatiOns, 
in wb.1ch it obta1u .tr •• h ev:l.dence either tor the oontinaation or tor the 
revieion of ex1at1Dg views. uS 
2. InTerae insyht-. "When I aa;r that an event 18 pverned by ebanoe, I 
6 deD7 that it 18 governed. by order. n This atat __ t ot Polany1. t 8 illustrate. 
the role of iIlYers. 1.r.ud.sht, lfhieh ar&8p8 tbe fact that the tJPCI of 
1ntellil1bility that ODe anticipated 18 ab •• t. Aa Lonerpn aaya that wh ..... 
"direct wicht grupa the point, or ."8 the solution, or oomea to Jmov the 
reasoa., 1m'ene iu1ght apprehenda that in. aome tuh10n the polnt 18 that there 
4Ibid., pp. 34-3S. 
-
)Ibid. 
-
6mcbae1 Polarqi, Peraonal Knovledp (London, 19$8), p. 33. 
.... 
55 
15 no point, or that the solution 113 to deq;y a solution, or that. the reason 11 
that the rationalitY' of the real adm.1ts distinctions and qualif1catlons. 1t 
Inverse insight i8 not concerned with the corrections of .false or inadequate 
answers to questions 80 much &15 it is concerned with the legitimacy of the 
questions themselves, or with the wa:;r that they are asked. "In a demonstrative 
scienae it is to Pl"OTe that a question ot a given type cannot be answered. In 
an empirical ac1snce it 18 to put forward a sucees8ful. hypothesis or theo1'7 
that aatNll'188 that certa1D questions miatakenl7 are supposed to require an 
answer. It 7 An example of iDV'erse inaigbt in ampirical. science is Newton' s 
denial that cou1;irmance of 00DStant velocity ~ straight-11ne motion depends 
upon the action ot SOinS ext.emal torce. Tb.1a ne,ation "ruu oounter to the 
spontaneous ant1c1pations ot huma1lintellilGDCe, for spontaneously one thinks 
of uniform mt10n not u of a state like reat but as of & chaDp that require. 
6 
an ext.eraal ~e." 
). !!!!. emp1rioa~ residue. What Lonergan calls the "empirical. residue-
bears some resaM>lance to invarae 1na1Sht, tor there i8 a denial of intelligi-
bility in 'both. But there are differences between. the two concepts. Wfer-
ences of ~, IIP!O!, and 1ndiv1dualitZ belong to the empirical. residue, which. 
"(1) COD8iata in positive emp1r1c&1 data, (2) 18 to be denied any' ilnmanant 
int.ellic1h111ty of 1ts ova, and () 18 CODUcted nth some compensating 
7 LotJ.el"garl, p. 19. 
8 ~., pp. 21-22. 
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intelligibility ot notable importance. tt 'J.'hua, unl1ke innrse insight, there is 
na mention ot a denial ot spontaneous questiou--ordinarily people do not 
spontaneously suppose that there is a reason for one place being ditferent fro 
another place, 01" ¥by this moment is not the moment that preceeded it. It is 
further unlike inTer.e ins1gbt in being ·connected with some compensating 
9 intelligibility ot DOtable importance." 
The ~ating higher intelligibility ot the empirical reaid\1e is the 
posslbility ot scientific generalisation and collaboration. For it there was 
a different 1DInanent lntelligibili ty to different times and places, "every 
place and eftrT time would have its own pby'a1ps, it. own chemistry, its own 
biolo8'7J aDd siDee a science cannot be worked out 1netantaneouely in a single 
place, there would be no physics, no chemistry, and no biology. It And in 
relations to scientific generalization there is another important aspect of the 
empirical I"esidwt, namely, that mare17 numerical differences are not explained 
by a direct insight. "Thus, the pbyalc1st otters different explanations ot 
'red' and 'blue' J he otters different. explanations tor dttfercmt shades of 'red 
and be 1IOUld discern no sense in t.he proposal that he should try to find as 
many different explanations .. there are different instances of exactly the 
same shade of exactly the same colour. 1t The merely.-pirlcal difference of 
numerical difference can be further illustrated by the fact that Ileven it there 
vere reached a single comprehensive theory of evolution that explained and 
explained difterently e"f'f!IrY instance of lUe on tbia planet, still in strict 
logic we should haft to inspect all other planets before we could be absolutely 
9 Ibid., pp.26-29. 
-
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certain that in tact there did not exist another instance ot evolution similar 
in all respects ... 10 
4. OlassUication ~ correlation. Since individuality pertains to the 
empirical residue, the "nature" that one seeks is universal. Understanding one 
set ot data is, at the same time, understanding all similar sets ot data. 1'hua 
in working out his heuristic structure, the mathematician writes down the 
properties ot x, but the eupirioal enquirer notes that the "nature ot • • ." 
that he seeks must be the same tor all similar seta ot data. But there are two 
types ot similarities. (1) Things are similar in their relations to the 
o'b8erver--aimUar in color, shape, sound, taste, touch. These similarities are 
known betore "the nature ot • • • It baa been d1acoYer8d, and torm the buis ot 
preliminary elassilicationa. (2) Things are similar in their relations to one 
another. "T'hus, they 'lIJIq be tound together or apart. '!'hey may increase or 
decrease concomitantly. They'fIJIIJ.Y have similar antecedents or consequents. 
They may be sWlar in their proportions to one another I and such proportions 
may torm series of relationships, such as exist between the elements in the 
periodic table ot chemistry or bet_en the sucoessive torma ot lite in the 
theory ot evolution. ltll 
'!'he s1m11arities ot things in their relations to one another are the 
"proximate materials ot insight into nature. Hence I the empirical inquirer, to 
emphasize thi. tact, will say that hi. objective 1s not merely the 'nature of 
10Ibid. 
-
11 Ib1d., p. :37. 
-
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• • .' but more precisely, the unspecified correlation to be spec1tied, the 
undetermined twlotion to be determined. tt GalUeo went beyond hiB Ar18totelean 
opponents who spoke merely ot "the nature of wight," to diacover the specific 
oorrelation between the distance of a fall &lld the amount of time it took a 
bodT to travel that d18tance .12 
5. Cl .. sioal heuristic anticipations. The specification ot the correla-
tion and the determination ot the .f\mction i8 carried out by Muurement, 
tabulation ot meuuramenta, insight into the •• , and expression ot th1a iuight 
in a general correlation or twlotion. It this .tu.act1on is verified, it "vill 
detine a limit on vb10h converge the relatlo~ between all subsequent 
appropriate l'I188.8UreImeota." Classical heurist10 at.ruoturea anticipate insight,,:; 
"ot a type 1I08t easily identified by mentioning the names ot Ga1Ueo, Newton, 
Clerk-Maxwell, and Einstein. 1t And the presuppositlona behind th1a tJl)8 of 
beuri8tic structure are "the m1n1mal suppositions that iu1ght.a ot a oertain 
type occur and that 1nqu.1ry' a1m1nc at. such insights 1U1' be not haphazard but 
methodical. Iti.3 Just as the mathematician 'Works out and writes down the 
properties ot x, ao alao the empirical 1nqu1rer can -.,rk out a differential 
equation that expru.ea athematically certain Ter7 general teatures ot the 
data. tt14 
l2Ibld., p. )8. 
-
llIbid., pp. 44-45. 
-
1.4 Ibid., p. 39. 
-
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6. Invariance. 1'1:me and space perta1n to the 81flP1r1cal residue. But 
pby'8icists deal with motion in time and space, which leads to the cOll8truction 
or rererence trame. which designate. all points and iutant.a relative to a 
particular point and iutant. Cbanpa in reterence frames can result in 
changes in the statement of laws. Nevertheless, "when a special ertort i. made 
it is possible to state law mathematioally' so that the etataant does not 
change desp1 te cbaages in reterence trame.. This 1nftriance means that 
physical lava and pr1nc1pl.. can be the same tor all observer.. One explana-
tion tor th18 that 18 aomet1mes given 18 that ltJ>l\rs1cal objects look the same 
.trom all observational standpoints. It LoD8l'~, however, sa.ys that he prafars 
the position taken by Einstein, wb1ch state. that lan can be 1nvar1ant because 
"phyaical pr1Dciples and laws are simply and completely outside the range ot 
seeing, hearing .. touching, teeling, and all other direct and indirect acts ot 
observing." Tb1. position. is consi.tent with the premi.e that it 18 the 
relations of things to one another that science seske to discovers 
For, as baa been remarked, observationa give 11'111' to meaeurements J 
meuurement.a relate things to OM another rather than to oar sene .. J 
and it i. onl7 the more r .. te relations ot meuuremeat. to one 
another that lead to empirical correlatlona, f\mctlons, laws. Nov 
clearly it law are reaohed by elllll1Dat1Dc the relatione ot thinp 
to the een.e. ot ob ....... and b7 arriV'1ng at relatiou bet .... n the 
meuured relat10118 ot thiDp to one another, then there ex18t.a an 
extremely .olid toundation tor the attirtation that principle. and 
law are the __ tor all ob.ervers bee .. e tbq lie limply and 
completely' outside the range ot observational actIY1ties. It 18, tor 
example, not the appearance ot colour. but the pIleral explanation in 
terms of wave-lengtha ot lIght that 18 exaotly the same no _tter what 
mq be the state ot observer t. eye., the lighting bT which thaT see, 
or the speed with wbich the)" mq happen to be in relat1ve 1'IIOt1on.15 
15 41 Ibid., p. • 
-
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7. Relevance ~ classical heu:r1atic atructures. '!'he preceeding summary 
of some of Lonergan's statements about classical heuristic structures can be 
expected to provide the reader with no more than an insight into the W&7 the 
tarme are being used, it 18 impossible, within reasonable spatial limits to 
follow Lonergan's analyais into detail. Lonergan's ana~1s is ot classioal 
heuristio structures as operative in mathematiw ph;ya1os. The relevance of 
olassical heur18tic struotures for the stud7 of the integration of the little 
oommunity is not in the mathematics, and it is not in the restriotion to sense 
---- ----
data which is leg1t1mate17 made by pb7aics, but in the abstraction from the 
-
empirical residu.e. 
8. It 18 not in the _tbematics, for the uae ot mathematios in soience 
depends upon meanrements, vb1ch are not as neoe.8&l7 in the study of man as in 
the stw:b" of atoms. 
The ext.raordina:r'.T success of the pbyaioal so1enoes natural17 enough led 
investigators ot the organism, the J)87Cbe, and intelligence, to a 
servile rather than an intelligent adoption of the successful proce-
dure.. In phy8io. and ohem1atry J meaaur1ng is a basic teobnique that 
take. inquiry from the relations ot tbinp to our sen .. s to their 
relations to one another. But When one mounts to the higher integra-
tiol'lS of the organism, the psyche J and intelligence, one finda that 
maaav1Dg 10 ... both in aignificance and in ett1oaC7. It los .. in 
sign1t1C&DCeJ tor the higher integration is, within lird.ts, independent 
ot the exact quantities of the lower an1told it qatematiHd. More-
over, the higher the integration, the greater the independence of lower 
quantities, .0 that the meaniDg ot one's dreams i. not a fUnction of 
one's wight, and one's ability in mathe1M.t1os does not vary with one's 
height. Besides tbU loa. in s1gn.ilicanoe, there i. also a lo.s in 
eftioaq. Cl.aasioal method can select among the fUbat10ns that solve 
d1tterent1al equations by appealing to meuurement. and empirical17 
established curves. What the differential equation is to classical 
method, the general notion of developnent is to genetic method. But 
while the differential equation is mathematical, the general not10n 
ot development ia not. It follow that wbi.1e measurement 1. an 
efficacious teobnique for f1nd1.ng boundary conditions that restrict 
dUferential equations, it possesaes no .. signable efficacy wben it 
.... 
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comes to particularizing the general notion or deV'8l0pnent.16 
Man 18 an organism, a psyche, and an intelligence, allot these must be studied 
not statically, but u dew loping aspects ot:man. Besides the tact that 
society conditions the developnent or the individual, it is also true that 
society and culture themselws can develop, can make progress or decline. 
9. Not in re&tr1ction to sense data. The restriction to sense data in 
-- ................. 
physiCS pertains to its criteria 2! relevance. The contents ot dreams, 
imaginations, personal desires are irrelevant to the physicist, but not to the 
psychologist or the sociolOgist, tor these all bave a great intluence on the 
behavior ot people. What the pb.7eicist must ~gDOre they 1II1St explain.17 Corre 
sponding to what Furtey calla "criteria ot relevance, tt is Lonergan's canon ot 
-
selection. This states that "it a correlation or bJ'pothes18 or probability 
expectation or theory or qatem pertains to empirical 8cience the (1) it 
involve8 sensible consequences, (2) such consequences can be produced or, at 
least, observed. NlB And he &cus ••• th1a canon in relationship to the 
soiences of mana 
As we have tOl"Jllllated it, the oanon or 8election d8D&lds sensible 
oonsequenees. Bltt it IU1' be urged that 811p1r1ca1 Mthod, at l .... t in 
its es.ential features" 8bou1d be applicable to the data ot 
conac1owmess no 1 .. 8 thaD to the data ot sen... Nov, on th1a matter 
a great deal Dd.pt. be said, but the present is not the t1m.e tor it. We 
16lbid., p. 463. 
-
18 Ibid., p. n. 
-
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have followed the ccmmon view that EIIp1rical science i8 concerned 
with sensiblY' veritiable laws and expectations. If' it i8 true that 
essenttall.;y the same method could be applied to the data ot 
consciousness, then respect tor ordinary usage would require that a 
method, which only in its essent1als i8 the same, be named a generalized 
empirical method.19 
10. Classical!!!! ...-ab;,,;at;.;.;;..,rac;;;.;.,..;;.t. To MY'that classical laws are abstract 
demands some explanation ot the term "abstract." ROn a simple and common view, 
the abstract is an impoverished replica ot the concrete. ,,20 Lonergan, however, 
mainta1n8 that th1s 18 an incorrect view, abstraction ia enriching rather than 
impoveriah:lna. For in 1ta first 11lO1'ItIftt, abstraction :La "an eariching 
anticipation ot an intelligibilitY' to be added to aenaible presentationsJ there 
i& something to be known by insight." Second. abstraction :La "the erection ot 
heuristic atructwea and. the attainment ot i1'laight to reveal 1n the data what 
is variously named as -i;he aip.U'icant, the relevant, the important, the 
essential, the idea, the torm." And the third moment :La "the tormu.lation ot t 
intell1c1bllit;y that 1nIight has revealed." It is onl;y in thi& third moment ot 
tormulation that "the 1nsip1ticant, the irrelevant, the negUgible, the 
incidental, the merely empir1cal res1clue tJ is lett out. "Moreover, this 
omission i. neither absolute nor der:t.nitift, for the empirical residue posse.se 
the universal property of being that from wb1ch intelligence abstracts. Such a 
univeraal propertY' provides the baais tor a aecond aet ot heur1atic procedures 
that take their stand on the simple premise that the uoD.8)'8tematic cannot be 
8ystematized.n21 This second set ot heuristic procechtres constitutes 
19!!!!:!., p. 12. 
2OIbid., p. 81. 
21Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
jii!ii 
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statistical method. 
Classical laws are, then abstract in their heuristic antic1p!tion. And t 
enriching intelligibilit7 that is anticipated is anticipated as univeraal: 
lithe nature to be known will be the __ tor all data that are not s1gnitioantl 
different, and the correlation to be apeoit1ed is reached only it it holds tor 
all parallel instances.· And thq are abstract in !!erim.ental technique. ~ 
diSC0!!l'l1 
For the experimenter makes no pretence to deal with concrete situations 
in their nati .. complexitn on the contrary, he aima overtlY' at 
reducing that complexity to a minimum and so he does all he can to 
bring the concrete into some approximation to an ideal, typical, 
detinable conjunction ot materials and ~t8. Accordingly, as he 
beg1na with an atfort to secu.re mat.eriala from which all impurities 
have been removed, 80 he ends with an argwy,aent that rests on their 
theoretical definitions. A.s be begins by requ1rina instruments 
constructed in acoord with aocurate spec1t1cations, 80 he enell by 
interpreting their performance on the baais ot their ideal, otten 
schematic structure. He measures, but he does 80 many times, and his 
accepted result is just the probable mean ot actual reaults. Ue 
reaches a conclusion with vb1ch others apoee, but the agreement makes 
allowance tor the intrusion of ext.raneou factors and it acknowledges 
no more than a limited DUIJlber ot aignU1cant decimal places. At everY' 
turn 1t seems apparent that the concern ot experimerlt is to determine, 
not the part1cular observable qualities ot the part1cular _terials 
with which one deals, but a theoretical correlation betwen definable 
and abstract ent1t18s.22 
Third, they are abstract in their tormulationl 
Aa law, they are correlations 11.Dlc1ac correlatives, and the oorrelatives 
are never the unique data ot sane particular time and place. Indeed, 
they are not EmIIl genera11sed data, but genera11zed combinations ot 
combinations ot combinations ot data. Nor mq one suppose that the 
data, taken 1n these serial oomb1Dat10na, uniquely deterJll1ne what the 
law lTIU8\ be. For the discontinuous set ot ob ....... t1ona, represented, 
say, by po1nts on a graph, can be satist1ed by any munber ot lava, ot 
22 B Ibid., pp. 9-90. 
-
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which the scientist ohooses the one that, all th1ngs considered, he 
reputes to be the simplest. Enrich1ng abstraction is still at lIOrk.23 
Finally, the abstract nature of clusical laws is true of their ver1t1cation: 
For veritication is reached, not by appealing to this or that isolated 
instaDce, but by securing as larp ad var1ou8 a range ot ilUJtanoea as 
both direct and indirect procedures make posa1b1e. It to11on that 
what 18 ..... iti.d ia, not this or that part10ular propoaition, but the 
general, abstract formulation that alone admits the large and various 
range ot app1ioatioll8. A.p1n, to repeat the arcumeut from another 
viewpoint, what is verified is what can be refuted or rev1aed. What 
can be ret\1ted or revised, is the pmeral, abstract formulation. And 
so what is ft1"itied ia the general, abstract formulation. 24 
11. Conclusions. 1'be sign1t1caDCe ot classical. laws tor the study of the 
integration ot the little community is not in the mathematioa1 form they' take 
in physica, nor in tbe restriction to sense data as the basis tor pl'Qraical laWl 
but in their abstractness in (1) heuriatic antiCipation, (2) experimental 
techniques ot disco .... ry, () tonmUation, and (3) ftritication. The heuriatic 
antioipations ot cwsica1 :method are anticipations ot sCientit1o, u opposed 
strictly mathematical, insights. Inverse 1naYht is the diacovery that the 
spontaneous anticipation ot intelligibility ia mislea.d1ng, that one ia asking 
the wrone kind of questions. What direct insight abstracts from is the 
empirical reaidu.e-...... d1tterenc.a ot time and plaoe and !l\UI1ber--wbioh is 
denied any innaftant intelligibility ot its own. It is becauae intelligence 
abstracts !rom the empirical residue that elua10al law are uni veraal, that 0 
can say that aimilar aeta ot data are similarly understood. It is necessary to 
distinguish between similarities ot things to the observer, whioh torm the 
basis ot preliminary descriptions and clus1t1oatlons, and similarities ot 
23Ibid., p. 90. 
-
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relationshiP' among thinp 1n themselYe', whioh are the proximate materials ot 
inSight into nature.. 'l'be abatraotnees ot 01u.10al tOl"Dl.llat1ons, however, 
requires that one i.e seeking to determine theoret10al correlations between 
lIabatract and definable ent1tie." rather than to determine "the particular 
observable qua11ties ot the particular material. with which one deal.. In 
phy81c" the emp1r1ca1. 1Dveat1ptor can work out "a differential equation that 
expre.ses atheaa.t1ca1.ly oertain very pneral features of the data," just as t 
mathemat10ian O&rl work out the p:oopertie. ot the UDkrlovD, x, in order to solve 
tor x. 
Invar1ance ot formulation of pb7&1oal la!8 1& po8lible beoause of their 
abatractn .. &, because "pb,Ja1cal pp1Doiplee and 1_ are simply and completely 
outside the raage ot seeing, hear1ng, touob:1ng, teeling, and all other direct 
and 1nd1rect act. ot observing. If It 1a ~ bee .. _ "phyaloal objects look the 
... from all oba .... Q:biona1 ataDdpo1Dts." 'l'b1a 1. a1cn1fioant, tor the emrpnc 
ot an explanatory'ri.npo1nt that can cope with the question of relativism. Aa 
lAnergan 8&78, 1t baa taken 80M time tor thi8 Yiewpoint to beooIIle e8ta.bUahed 
in .c1enoea ·one Dd.ght 8&7 that 1t baa taken modern se1ence tour centur1e. to 
make the diacoftry that the objects of i te irlqu.1ry .. ed not be imag1Dable 
ent,lt1e. mov1Dg through imaginable prooesses 1n an 1mag1nable apace-time. • • • 
Even before E1ut.e1D arad Be1aeDberg 1 t was olear enough t.hat the world 
descr1bed by so1enttats .. strangely different from the wrld depioted by 
arti8ts and inhabited by men of common senae. But it was lett to twentieth-
oentury physioist8 to env1aage the poulbility that the object8 ot their .oieno 
vere to be reached only by .evering the umbi11cal cord that tied them to the 
p 
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maternal :lJrag1na.tion ot man ... 2!) 
B. CAUSAL-FUNCTIONAL MODELS AND CIASSICAL LA\t1S 
The abstractness ot classical law baa an important bearing on the useful-
ness ot imaginative mdels in the studT of sociocultural integration. Por 
models are not abstract, l:N.t concrew, imaginable. ADd both Redtield and 
Sorokin make use of mode18 when discussing integration or the holistic approach 
1. Redfield'.!!!. 2!mod __ "_18__ "What is the fora of the arTangeJMnts of 
the parts of the conception to one another? Or, to what model, present to 
experience !'rom scme other aouroe than the human cosam1 t)", does th1a chosen 
bol1at1c concept tend to coutorm?1t Redfield ,uggests as e.tlIJ'VC"S to his 
question a "1d.Dd of maoh1D.e," a IfTUt orgam.sm," a If textbook on tormal logic," 
or "drama or other tem. of l1ter81'7 art.. tt26 Be notes the tendencY' in the 
social sciences fltoard concepttona or tamotlonal or causal relationab1ps ot 
parte within the whole. Ver)" predolll1nantl)", the more developed conceptloruJ tor 
deacr1bing human whol., approximates the model ot the machine or the 
organ18m.w27 In tba cau.aal model clua. ot phenomena are arranged in the form 
ot general causal 1.avs wb1ch would make it possible tor au :ldeal observer to 
predict all tuture atates of a 8)"8tem from conditions at a gi Vtm time. ,,28 In 
25Ibid., pp. xx-xxi. 
-
26.n. Little C08IlUD1tr, pp. 1$-16. 
27Ibid., p. 164. 
-
2B'*The Relation of Anthropology to the Social Sciences and the Human:lties, 
Pp. 733-734. 
-67 
the .t"unCtioDal. model Ita oult.ure or a soe1et,. is seen as an organization ot 
aeaDS designed to achieve oertaln enda _.,29 
2. ~ ~ observer. An 1111t1&1. observation can be made conoerning the 
notion ot an ideal oba8l"Y8r that om prediot all future state. of a 818tem from 
conditions at a given time. Th1s assumption ot an ideal ob.erver tUl"llll up 
again and again in sociolocr. It .... to have ita roots in the idea ot a 
Un1versal Mind that .. auae.t.ed by Laplace.. Polany,l. points out some ot the 
weaknesses ot thi. Hind, even it it " ... a poH1bl1lt1'1 
Assume, tor the sake ot argume1lt, that we po ••••• a oomplete atcm1.c 
theory' ot 1nan:1Jr.ate matter. t'l!e can then envisage the operations of 
a Un1veraal M1nd ill the 88Me ot Laplaee, The initial positiou and 
velocities ot all the atoms ot the world' being given tor one mmem 
ot t1Jne, all the torces acting between the atoms heille lmowD., tbe 
!..aplacean Mind could compute all tuture oonticurationa or all atoms 
throu&bout the 'WOrld, ad fl'om this reault va could read ott the exact 
physical and chemical topography of the world at any future point ot 
time. Bv.t we nov lcnov that there is a great and YU1.ed olus ot ob-
jocts which cannot be identified, and still le8s understood, by 
establishillg their complete J>h7aioal and oh.emioal topograpb.y, for they 
are constructed with a view to a purpose which pbyalcs and ohemistry 
ommot defifte.. So it tolle. that the Laplacean Kind would be nbject 
to the sae lif.',itatlolll it could not identity any'machine nor tell 
us how 1t 1IOl"u. Indeed the Laplac.an Kind. could ldent1t;r no object or 
process, tho meaning ot wb1ch cone1ats in serrlng a purpose. It would 
ignore ther.tore the ex1atenc. not cml7 ot machines but alae ot any 
kind ot tools, foodstuffs, hous.s, roads and any writt.n records or 
spokea mea.aps.30 . , 
The postulated ideal obserTel' ie, according to Polany1, incompatible with using 
the analolY ot a maob1ne, tor the type ot knovledp poas.8aed by noh an ideal 
obserYar does not include the knowledge ot purpose. Soroldn 8eems to recognize 
29lb1d. 
-
3O:m.cbael POlanyi, !h! Stu~ ~ !!!!'! (Chicago, 1948', pp. 48-49_ 
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tJds, although he does not call attention to it, when he modit1es his earlier 
statesnents that a machine 18 a pure cauaal-tunctional ~ by saying that a 
mach1ne is a m~ !'d21-causal system beoauae the parts are "all causally' 
oonnscted with 0_ ar»tber and all created by' the p!u?>sive activiti.s ot the 
gE'Oups. till 
It is not neceeHl7, bavever, to enter 1nto the realm ot tm'POsi va 
functions ot meohan1cal art1tacts to Cl"iticize the ideal observer ot Laplace. 
It can be recalled that. in t.he &01188ion ot 1rlYar1ance, the position that 
"PbTsical objects look the same tr_ all obaer"V'ational ltandpoints" wu rej.cte 
in favor ot the E1ut.e1n1an polition that ~cal prlncipl.s and 1_ are 
limply aDd capletely outside the range or s.ing, hearing, touching, teeling, 
and all other direct and indirect acta ot oba...n.na • .,.)2 So a non-mechanical 
example ot a eauaal-tunotlorl&l. qJJtem liven by Soro1d.n, the solar qetem., "can 
serve as a bridge back to the conoept ot cWlioal law as developed by 
Lonergan. Per the solar qstem, unlike a mach1Da, need not be understood in 
reference to a purpose. It 18 a .... !! ... N_OUl'r--._ano ............... which can be predicted 1n 
all it. fUture statu .from lc:novladp ot oondit1oDa at a given t1me. It is what 
Lonergan tenna, Ita ~t1c process,· wb1ch il a result ot a concrete 
Werenae from alaesieal law. 
,3. Szptematio I!'!cesa. A concrete inference from abstract laws i. not a 
.3l.Society, Culture, !!!! Peraonal1tl, p. 334. 
32 Lcmerpn, p. 41. 
• 
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,.cbaAiCal deductive process that could be performed by an interenc8 machine, 
tor only insight can graapl "(1) which 1_ are to be selected tor the 
:1nf'erenoe If (2) how the selected laws are to be canbined to represent the spatial 
and dynamic contirurat1or.ul ot the conorete situation, and (3) what dimensiolllJ it: 
the situation are to be meaeur't)d to supply numerical values that particularize 
the selected and combined law. ff 8u.ch inference caD be carried out by a 
}X"8.ctical insight that occurs onl,r when a suitable concrete situation arises. 
But it is also pou1ble, by U8DI of a oomrt.:ructift insight, to 'WOrk out ideal 
pI'Ocesses without att.1ng tor app&"Oprtate ooftCll'et.e sit.uatiou to OOCNr. SUoh a 
constructive insight "tends to be a tree exploration of the potentialities ot 
, 
knOwn laws, and its pri1'lCipal f'Nlt. is the torJlll1at1oD. ot ideal. or typical 
processes that are dominated thl"oughout by hu1It&a iDtelUpnoe. For 111 such pro 
cesses the basio situation is any aituatioll that sat1sfias the requirelleDts ot 
the coutructive insight and, prov1d.ed the prooen 18 closed ott apinst all 
extraneous infiwmoe, every antecedent and oouequent situation must. aasu.me the 
dimensions determinsd by the suoce .. !.,.. staps ot the imaginat1ve model." It 
such an ideal prooe.s can be 'V'erified in a s8l"i .. ot concrete s1tuat10u, then 
one insight or set ot tm1t1ed wights grasps both tbct wbole process and every 
event in the process, a corresponding set ot laws expresses the insight or set 
ot insights 80 that &TlY situation OM be deduoed tram any other without explio1 
consideration ot the illterven1ng situations, and thus data on one situation is 
equivalent to data on the whole proc .. s, data a1grd.f'i.cant. in one situation will 
be eign1t:1oant in a:r.rr other, and a report, on any situation can be checked by 
p 
-~------------------------------------------------------------, 
10 
b1 reports trom arrr other sltuat1on.;3) 
4. !2!-sID!!!!t1c i!!CU8. Bat 1deal.17 conet1"U.oted processes need not be 
qstematlol 
Let us define syatetAat10 process. by the alreadT enumerated proper-
tles that, other tb1np beine equal, 
(1) the whole of a qatematlc process and 1. t8 eft17 ewnt 
possess but a single intelUg1bl11t.y that COl'rnpoftde to a lingle 
wight or a lingle set of un1t1ed iulghte, 
(2) any situation can be deduced from 8ZtT other without an 
explicit coDllid .. aUoa of 1nt.er'nln1nc sltuat1oD8, u.d 
(3) the 8I'Ilp1r1cal lImtat.1ptiol'l or such prooe.s.. 18 marked 
not. only b.r a notable t80111. lAueet"ta1!l1nc aD:l ohecldng 
abundaDt and a1p1t1C&1tt data bt&t. a180 by a aupreme ..... 1; whea 
all data tall into a s1ngle perapeot.lft,: ~ deductiou become 
pou1ble, and au.'bsequent. exaot predlotlons repl.arl1' are tulfilled. 
Now ....... a Sf'OUP or s .. i.e. 18 ~ em. de~t.e 
pr1Dolpl_, it. 18 al1f&1'8 pos81ble to COlt8truot a d1.tter8llt group or 
series by the simple expedient ot violating the ~ pr1ne1plu. 
Jut the p-oup of .:yat. ... t1c proce.... i. ooutruoted on detezom1Date 
pr1noiplea. therefore, by violatlna the_pr1nelplu one can oonat.ru4t 
other procen.s that are non-a1lltem.at1c.-'" 
'l'bu, in DOn-ar.rat;emat1c proceaa there is no .iDale 1uight or srO\lP of wights 
that ~ups tba p.l"OO8S8 as a whole, &ad there will be DO correapond1ng set ot 
related law. lfoG-l7IIteu.t10 proc ... an be understood, bat. understanding will 
be tbrough a .. t of dilter_t wicht. or through a .et ot dUterea:t unified 
seta ot inlight,s. Revertb.el ••• , it the law apreSling all the releftnt. 
wight. are completely knolm, it there 18 no extraneous :l.nterterenoe with the 
process, it there is full intormat,ioD on 0'n8 s1tuat.iqu, it there are correct. 
llz.o.rpn, pp. 46-47 • 
.l4n,1d.., pp. "6-49. 
-
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1D81&hts 1nto "he baaic .ltuation, 1t t.here i. _tielerat .kill in the ma1pula 
~1on of aat.heat1oal ~e .. lolllJ, it there an oorreot wicht. 1ato all 
dedaOfJd .1tuat.1cma, aad it there is no ts... 11Dd.t on the proc... of mald.rlc tblt 
de<JU,Ot1oD, then--and only th8l1--can .... 17 8'nIlt 1n a DOIl-qat,_tic proc ••• be 
decluced.3~ It a1.ght be noted, hovever, that no merely human m1ftd i. likely' to 
baTe autt101eu\ kDowledge of 1 ... , 1ritormatlon _ the basic .ituation, skill ill 
dedUot1on, or time to make tbe dedu.ot.ion to deduce all the .'t"eII\a in 8l\Y DOD-
qate.matio proo.... ~hermo ... J it a Laplacean M'1nd--Redt1.1d'. ideal 
o'baerftl'-... 1a poAulat.ed., 111. 111 at.Ul aeoulU7 to aaHl't that ROb a m1Dd would 
.t111 be UDable to i~ a aacbW or an 0~pn111D, mm tJltNlh lt understood 
all the :plv1r1eal. and ebem1eal law that wen ... l...-ant. 
5. C!!I!:!:!:... EftD tbouah a non-qatemat1c prooen 1. th .... t1oal17 
deaible 1a all lingle eventa, it stUl .... '1£1 •• co1llc1dent.al .. epte .. in 
wb1ch "(1) tba lII8JII1Mrs of the aarepte have 80M lUd.v'based on .patial 
jUxtapoett1on 01' 'temporal ftCoe .. ion or both, and (2) there 111 no oorreapond1ng 
a1ty' on 11M 1 ..... 1 of 1Da1&bt and. iat.11.1c1ble relat1oD. 1J Jot onl.T 11 the 
proces. a ao1Dc1.deat.al aarecate, .. alao we the aeeveral 11l8tpte by which 
the .evval part,8 of nou-e,..telJlat1c pro.... are und.er'atood, a and 80 alao .. e 
the "auco .. e1on of ditt ... t prat.aee b7 vb1eh dUferlftt stap. of non-
I18temat.1e pl"Ooe •• .,. be dadv.ced.,,- Pol' all \bree po ..... a um:ty based on the 
apat.lo-tallporal UBit.)" of the total prooes., but po .. e .. no correepondi.rag \Ud.ty 
on tba 1 ... 1 of 1atellJ.&1b111t;y.)6 SoroldA'. CODC8I"1 .. oorreapoDda to 
3SIb1d., pp. 48-49. 
l6nwi., pp. 49-50. 
p 
IAmC"gatl" eoincldf.mtal. agrepte. A •• t ot .. utal-tunotional law expla1n1.Ds 
the dU'terent ennu in a nol'l-~.at1o pro .... or ooacerl. •• vwld it •• U be a 
ooapriu of log1eo-meaa1natul ~, tor the 1awa would DOt haft a unity' OD 
the level of 1ntellig1lri.lit7. but onl.7 on the bui. of the epatio-tempol'al 
Ul'l1 t.7 ot the data. 
6. !!:!! oanon !! 0P!!'!t1ou. Tbe coutru.ctiw iu1ght by which ideal 
proouaea are eonatNoted b7 cOD8Nte W .... DCe8 from known lava 1. ... tr •• 
GPloratioD or tbe potRt1al.it1_ ot kD.own law. ad ita pr1naipal mit 18 the 
tOl"Jllllat1oll of ideal or tf1pical prooeuu tha are dom1u.t.ec1 ~t b7 
auman 1ntel11pDoe. For 1ft INCh process.. t~ basic situation 18 utl' .ituation 
that aat1afiea the requireme.rata of the col'l8'tirw:t;iw wight and, provided the 
Pl"OCea. i. olond. ot¥ qainft all edr&l'leOU 1ratlwmoe, 8"IfIl'Y antecedent and 
COJUlequent fri.tvatm mut, ...... the d1meDs1one detAnlinad by the noc_81ft 
stage. of the 1.ma.g1nati ....... 1. lf31 But coutruotive wilbt C8Il lead not. 01'1l.7 
to the coutruotion ot ideal 1ugiDative mod.ta, but &leo to teobnololictal 
development. Han can build JIIIOh1De8 baaed upon the -tree aplorat1oG or the 
potentialitiel ot lcDo'tm law.· A. techDoloctoal 1na1abt, aa Po1aD,y1 and Sorold.n 
both haft 1Dd.1cated, _at utili. pbyeioal l.awe and pd.noiplea in order to 
achieve a purpose. and thus mut be able to idenwitT a purpole and to graap the 
relat.loD8h1p of ptqaioal pr1nciplea to the at.tainment of tbat purpo.e. Wbat 
Lonergan call. the "canon of operat.1one" states tbat "juat as 1nqu1r,y into the 
data ot aenae y1.elds 1ne1ghts tbat are formulated in olaaeical &lid .tat1stical 
laws, eo inverselT, the lava provide premises and rule. tor the pidance ot 
31 1. Ibid •• p. ,,1. 
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hUm8l'l act.1 Yit.T upon NDS1ble Object.s • ..38 
The oanon of operat.ioraa proYLdes a F1!elple !! cumulat1ve !!p!Il!lon, tor 
"law guide aot.1YLties, which bring forth new law, wldoh pide turthar 
activities, and 80 torth 1nd.et1n1tely." Bat more tban this, the canon also 18 
a 2;!1t!iple !! ~lon' 
Han kraov8 beat wbat man makes tor h1u.U aDd 80 ". bepn oar studT ot 
lnsllht b7 exam1n.i.Dc that elementary artefact, the cart-Wheel. But t.he 
denlopmant ot SC18l108 is followed b7 a teohnolos1cal expanaiOll, by a 
vaet iDOl"eue of the t.h1np that man can make tor himself and 80 oan 
uod.arstand adequat.el)" beaaue be baa aade 1hea. Moreoftl", the .,.. 
ret1ned &ad reaourcetul technoloQ' becomes, tbe greater t.he trequenq 
of t.he art1t1oia1 synthesis of natural products. TINa, Nature ltselt 
becomes U1ld ... t.ood in t.he same iub.101l aa maD'. own 8l"t.etacts.39 
It. is a pr'1Dclple of anal18iss 
01 ... 1,., man can aaal.y&e t.he objeota t.hat. be h1aaelt can GOut.ruot. 
But. it. 18 DO le.. true that he can also anal,... objecta wb1oh, .. 
yet., he cannot manaae to ooU't.l'uct.. For anal.yals is a mental con-
struction ad, where oper .. c.:a.onal control taila, tbeoretloal lmovledp 
can step in to accoUftt tor the failure of control, to ldeftt,ity the 
WlCOlltl'ollecl tactors, to detand.ae aod. me&8U'e tMir utint,. ad. 
1ntl.uence, to d1aeount their perturbing etteot, 8Dd 80 to extrapolate 
to the law that would bold did th87 not 1atertere.40 
Tb1s C&DOn 18 1mportant in other reapecta--u a principle ot C\UII1latlve 
verifioation, a teat of observationa, .. pr1nolple of systemat.1zation, 8lld a 
source of Mabel' n.ewpotnta41_-tbat e&mlOt be elaborated upoIl at the IIOUIlt. 
38Ib1c1., p. 74. 
-
39r:! Ibid., p. 7;;1. 
-
40n,ld. 
-
41Ib1d., pp. 7$-76. 
-
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The po1nt 18 bere that tb1e pr-1noiple 18 a practlcal princlple far techDololi-
cal advanCe, but as a practical :r:rinciple lt aida ln the theoretical under-
,tanding of nature tnsotar .. there 18 a Q'Uthea18 of natural prodtlcta. But 
be.ide. aiding theoretical understanding in thi. manner, it alao 18 a theoreti-
cal pr1nc1ple of ~18. But in 'both cues, there is required an wicht to 
acbieve a concrete Werenee froIIl abstract law. And both instances are rele-
vant to a d18cuaa1on ot models, for a model is constructed in accordance with 
knOwn pr1Dciple. and la ....... and can be either pbJaical17 ooutruoted or 
1lrtag1DatiYell' coutructed. 
7. Alternative. of oluaioal or .tatl8tical heur1.ttc nruoture •• 
-----.................... - - .................. -----
Concrete 1Dterenoe from ow.iDal law can reault in either qat_tic or non-
ayetematio proce... Nov it an ideallT ccmetruot.ed qat_tic proce.. can be 
verified in a .erie. ot concrete 1nataDce. there 18 given a a1tuat10n similar 
to that described by Redfield in hi. torttlUlatlon ot the causal model--it 18 
po.8ible to predict all tut\U"8 state. ot the 87lltem trcm conditiou at a I1Yen 
time. Tbu, "our planetary IIJ'IItem i. periodic J it 18 an ind1 'ri.dul .et ot 
..... , moat ot them are ri..ibleJ and a relat1'V8lT small llUlIlber of concrete 
1naight. makes it po.aible to determine an indefinite sequence or partlcular 
cuea.·
42 Obaervatlona or the planetarT qat. coutltute a ramp or data that 
can be ent1rell" aubsumed under clu.ical heuriaUc structures. It.. atated 
that it 1. hJpotbeticallT possible to deduce every event in a non-,ystematlc 
}rcce.s, given autticient time and intormatlon, and sutf1cient kDovledge ot 
cl&88ioal law. But as a matter of fact, cl&8,loal inquiry does not attempt to 
42 Ibid., p. 67. 
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explain ewry e .. nt in a non-8)'1S'teat1c proce... For rIOt on11' would saob. a 
deduction demand luller knowledp ot clua10al 1&118 ttum 18 po ••••• ed, it alao 
1I)uld require more Wonution and more time than 18 a"nl11able, and the result 
would be lacldng in generality, tor the oonoluaiona WOl1l.d not even be a eate 
approx1tnatlon to the eYellt. of another noa-a~tto proce •• with a .licht11' 
d1fterent baslc ait.uattoa.43 Aooord1nal;r, a raqe of data can aleo be sub ... 
UDder atatl8tical heuriat10 .tructur •• baaed OIl the ant1cipation of a dlaconr 
ot probabl1itz ot ooourrence of events, rather than on the aatlc1p&tion of the 
d1acoftr,y of the theoretical oorrelation between definable and abatract 
oorr.lati.,.. •• 44 On the hypothesla that a I'uae ot obaervatioBl 1. to be 
, 
subsumed UDder ol .. aloal heurlatlc atructure., ttlt will be po •• ible to diaoo 
aome order17 aeri.a, prop'.asl.on, or lI'oUP1na." Oft the bJpotb.eai. of 
natl8t1oal hnr1atic s'Wcture., "no aucb aerl .. , procreatoD, or iP"oup1Da 
ex1ats. Both bypotheaea can be formulated, their implications are to be 1IOrk 
out, aad the tacta are to decide 1ib1ch bJpotheaia ie, it DOt ultimate truth, a 
leut the beet aft1lable opinion at the l1.,..n .tap of .c1ent1t1o deYelop-
ment." 45 
6. Soroldn and Redfield OD statl8tical method. In the aecond chapter it 
----- - ............................. .- ....... ---
was ahown how a little cOilDun1ty turns out, 10 Sorok1o'. qatem, to be a 
4.3n,id., pp. 56-57. 
-
44 Ibid., p. 60. 
-
4S Ibid., p. 67. 
-
F' 
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~;i'ul-causal system by det1ni tion. And this brought up the question of 
the ver1£ica'i,ion of the defini tiona which serve as premi._ tor thia ooncl.ua1on 
It seems that the causal and rnean1ngful integration of a colll'll'W1i.ty 10._ 
significance as a question to be decided by empirical investigation. U tbe 
notions of systematic and non-ayatemat1c prooesae8 IU"e applied, however, it 
can be seen that eftn it mea.ningful interaction is accepted aa the generic 
object of stucty J an orr:anized interaction process doe. not neae8aar.1q beccme a 
systemat·· 0 PI"'OCeSS, tor the events conetltuting such an 1.ntAraet1on proces. 
need not be deduCible i'l'om a single unif1ed at of abstract law. !.t the .. 
ewnt.a are not 80 deducible, they constitute .. non-aystematic process, end 
require the use of atat1sti cal methods. 
Redfield and Sorold.n both recognize statistical Il'Ilthod." but __ to 
reganl them ... ana to obtain causalo:r .functional qatema. Redfield, tor 
exemple, after saying that causal laws make it possible to predict al.l1'u.tu1'e 
states of a qat.em !rom conditione at a g.t.wn time, goes em to say that there 
are two lnqS of deftlcping a causal ilJyffbem, either .",. conoe1~ a ay'stem ot 
uni'1eraal relatiomrh1ps out of the observation ot one or a few case.," or "from 
stat:1.stical interoorrelat1ons of t,raits and tra1t ocapl .... n46 
And Sorold.n, although he distinguishes between _yatem and oonr.eri .... 
aystem.atio and non-ayatema.tic process, approximately ......... e alao to regard 
Itntistieal mthod as roore17 one of eeftnU. ways ot arriving at causal-
functional lawSI "almost all of the eontemporaJ'7 social. scientists assume that 
46ftTte Halation ot .Anthropology to the ~'ioc1al Sciences and the Humanitie.," 
PP. 733-7.34. 
--
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culture is a tunctiOr.al unity. 'llirougb experiments, throUf!,h statistical 
ctn-reJ..."J.tion. through obsel"'f'ation. through the comparative historical method. 
throur)l '(',ase studiJ'Ja,' and thro~ all the other possible methods .. approaches, 
and tec..lm1ques, the,. haw been bus:! hunting for the causal-tunct1oncl relation-
ships, unU'omitiea, ltnd laws VtiOO 8'!JPPO~ exist between two or more 
culture var1ablea. n47 This indicates a. tendene,y '.n Soroldn to :regard causal 
and functional law as expreSSions of relnt1OMbip8 between concrete f!1'Ironts and 
laVa are abstract} he rejects the positJ.on ~ the objects of science must be 
1magine.ble' UWb.ile the pb.ysioal sciences haw aJ.reaq, aba.ndoned the atom ... 
the elementary' un! t, and haw found t.bat an ~"ing lI.1JI.ber ot the 
eleinentary particles are of a less and les. 'material' nature, our tbome-made 
~sici8ts' are still pl.a7ing with atomic marbles, std.l.llook1ng fbI' social 
a.1:;Qms as the simplest and _llest units at perJChoeocial ):ile~.J.L.6 Yet 1t 
can be questioned. whether Soroldn' s idea of ab8traction 18 adequate I for he can 
8~.11 hold t11.at causal .. .tunctional law are "1mpoveriahGcl replicas" ot the 
concrete eleraentary particles, ewn though the. partlcal.s ere len "material" 
than atoms. On th0 view th.!lt abstraction is impoveriehing, although one can 
ach:1. t that t.b.$re are cws:i O$l nM statistS.cal laws.. "one wm .. n ol..aims 
41 ~c~, I, 18. 
48rade and Foibles in Con~r& 5oo101or;: and Related Science. (Chicago 1956), ~ , _. - , 
F 
-
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Lol'lBrr,an, "be at a los8 to determine sc:ae coherent manner in 'Which both 
eJ,.ass±cal end statistical law can be aelcnowl.edged.." For S01"Okin and H8df"i&ld 
both, stat1nt:1cal lAllS are a typt'J ot causal. or functional. lad} they both. 
disPlq' Q sort ot reduct1om.. that hel1tatea to acknowledge tlm distinct. t)rpe_ 
of intell i gibilit:y. Accord~, a look at the reason tor the ditt1cul:t;y of 
the view that. abstraction is Smpowrishing 'Will not be 1r.relevants 
Let A,B,C, denote semsibl.e data, and let a,.' ,att , • •• J 
b,b',b", ••• J c,et,c·, ••• J denote ttm tot~t,y o£ tt~~ 
Utpcmtrisbed replicase Then, there is no aspect of seMible 
data vithO'lt its impoverished replica, irlvereeq, the totality 
ot aanaibllJ data can 'be constructed Ouit of the totall t.y of 
i.."!lPOver1hd replicas. 
Henee, it one admits 80.I00I olassjoal: laws, OM admit. tllat 
some iIrJpoftl'18hed replicas ant related 81'8temat1~. Moreowr, 
if one admits the class:' cal In:WIt as objectiW, there MUnt be 
systematiC relations not on~ betwc-en the impover1shed repl1caa 
but also between the COllCl'\9t..e aspects of 8EmeS.b].e data to Which 
t.hey OOrftlspond. It follows. that the claea1eal laWI can be 
object1.ve only if tr.ey hold in the concrete. F5.nally',:i.t 
will be onq by ~ the canon ot complete explanation or 
an data, thnt O!'8 can ednrl.:t. ~mtic :relations l::etween some 
~'Wr.lshed nplicas and del\r s.rstematio relations t.etween othent. 
It Will follow tlmt the only law 11111 be olassical lmrs, and 
that sta'ti Itical lave cannot be more than e. cloak for 19nonmce. 
l'lWerae~, if one admits some statistical l.ttw, then one 
001'11019 ~7stefl.aMC relnt:1.ons 'be~rl !:'lOMe ~mpoVt=lrished :replicas • 
.If tho s1iatifJt~tcal laW8 are object!\!'e, there cannot be ~t1c 
rea,tions between the oorrespont:1irlt1 aspect.s of sensible dat ..... 
At least in those case... claSSical. l.avIJ ArIt excluded. !-'fOreoYer. 
to shml that class1 001 lnws flm not )"';~rely the mnClX)SOOplC illmr.t.on 
resulting from a multitude of microscopic, random ocournUloea, 
t1 correct theo:r.r of the abstract is needed J and in the present 
~t.he.1., that correet theo1'7 is J.e.ck1ng1l49 
the correct theo17, acoording to Lonel'gan, is tt18t abatract1.on is enrtclW'I. 
This has al.read;y been treated :in tJl1s chapter. 'l'he 'V1eu that abstract.1on is 
.. 
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~riahing leads either to a position of dete~, in W:'d.ch ttstatistical 
laws cannot be more than e. cloak for ignorance," or ot 1ndete~ in which 
"classical J.sws are ••• merel¥ the macroaeopic illusion resulting from a 
multitude of microscopic, randc:n occu.:rrence: ... " 
10. ~. In the preceding section, the abstractnelt8 ot claasica1 
law was stressed. 'It.d.a abstract':.on itJU said to be enriching. In the present 
section, t.1-te alternatiw theo17, that abetmotion is !mpowrish1ng, has been 
seen to lead e1 ther to a determ.1.n1sJl or an 1ndet6m1n1em. The det.e:mdn1st 
ca..rmot acknoWledge non-aystemat1o process, erA the 1ndetendmst cannot 
acknOWledge ayatemat.1c proceeD. On the theo17 that abstract,ion is enrich1.nc, 
the construction of ~~.l~. either Jlb1'sical or imaginatiw, 1s not a1mp~ a 
process of matching up ~r1ehed replicu w1th concnte ~erenta, but 
require. creat:2:v" irudghttl. The. insighta can be practical or thaoret.1cal, 
that i8, a.:1aed at understanding the implications of a I1tuat1on that baa 
occurred, or aimed at explori.ng the potent1al1t1ea ot known laws. Furthermore, 
these insights ani clo~ Nlated to the canon of operations. For the canon 
of operatiOns requi.ras that the empirical inquirer leave the rea.'la ot the 
abstract, in which the mathematician pcrpetueJ,q dwells, and re .... nter the realm 
of the concrete. HG thus use_ his lava to guide technological production, and 
to create imaginative lJOhemea as a :aoatUS of analp:ing what would happen it 
circunstancea beyond hi.s power to control did not interfere. '!be canon of 
operat,:tOl18 provides Q. principle of vcrt:fieat1on as vall, tor on.'l\v correct law8 
can conai~n~ guide concrete operations succe.eat'ul.q. Such concrete 
intorences from clus: cal lava reqtdl.-. a grasp of how law can be utilized in 
the atta1rmlent of a ~se, and as rruc..'l are beyond an flideal observor,fI at 
-leaSt if this obsel"\fer is ooncei'Ved after the Laplacean Unlwntal :iind. The 
ideal obaerver also seams to utilize lat", that are oorreln.tions of ~.he4 
replicas of concrete objects. lledtield's formulation of the cs.'l.1581 model 
would :imrJ¥ a deterministic posi tion, ultirlw.te~» in the user of that MOdel. 
Sol"Okw, howe'\'6r. as ehall '!::e seen, leans toward the indbtel'll'Jn1st side of the 
dilemma. 
c. THE REUTIOlrSHIP or CIAsstC".L A.ND STATISTICAL 
can be tJtudied b7 clu .. :i cal law alone, but if it constitutes a llOn-tr;1atematic 
process, stat.istical method is neec1ed alao. Sorold.n claims that human histo17 
i5 e. non-syst.ematl0 prooeu. "It should be noted. here that, sinee no broad. 
culture is caueal.l7 or logi~ integrated in its totality, histoMJmS Who 
(as lrl.storl.ana) attempt to deal with all it. aape~. are Ul'ltiI.ble to provide a 
..... II b 
thoroughgoing formula of un1tcm1ty, Vletb.er causal. or OtheM.ee."~ Human 
history is a pert of world process, and Lonergan sq. that "wheth()l" wol'''ld 
proce •• ia 8ysteJllatic or non...,-stematie is .. question to be settled by' tJia 
empiriccl, method of stat.1ng both bJ'pot.~_., worldng out .a ~ .s one can 
the totality of their implications, and confronting the implicatiOns with the 
obael""lable facta."Sl If, as Sorokin oJ.ai.n'..a, no broad cultu,,""C.l is to~ 
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integrated, then both human history and the world process of which it is an 
1ntegrEl1 part are non-systematic. '!ben the use of statistical l1JEItbod is not 
mere~ a cloak for ignorance, but a necessary means of understanding world 
process. Closely related to the difference in the kind of process that ('.an be 
explained in terms of classical laws alone or in terms of classical laws joined 
to them are the following four elementary differences between classical and 
statistical heuristic structure au (1) Unlike abstract laws, which are the goal 
of classical investigation, statistical investigation regards concrete 
aggregates of events-nthe sequences of occasions on which a coin is tossed or 
dice are cast, the sequences of situations c~ated by the mobility of molecules 
in a gas, the sequences of generations in which babies are born, the young 
marry, and the old die." (2) Rtatistical inquiry is concerned with the actual 
results rather than with the theoretical process, the probability of casting a 
Itaeven" or the rate of death, rather than with the laws of mechanics followed 
by the dice or the diagnoses of the causes of deaths. (3) The attention ot 
the statistical investigator is not directed 'to correlations of spatial" 
temporal, and other variables, but toward frequencies that answer the question 
!tHow oftEln1tt (4) Classical investigators discover new theories by paying close 
attention to minute differences, but "statistical inquirers make it their 
business to distinguish in their tables of frequencies between significant and 
merely random differences.n52 
But random differences are factual. As such they can be data for inquiry. 
But since statistical investigators ignore them, there is something like an 
inverse insight than denies intelligibility to these random differences for the 
--
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statistioal :.nvest1gator to decide that differences that are not random require 
turther inquiry, but that it would be silly to try to inquire further into 
merelY random differenoes. The defect in intelligibility i8 not in the sinele 
.wents, but in the frequencies of events. For, as haa been seen, every event. 
1n a non-syste-fl1atic process is theoretioally dedUCible, given the proper condi-
tions. Thus, the assertion of random. differences in frequenoies does not 
necessarily imply that single events are indeterminate, random, or not. 
deducible. And just as the assertion of random difference. arises &om. an 
1nverse insight so also non-B,ystematic process depends upon an inverse insight 
that denies to non-By'8temat1c process the unt.t:.1ed intell1gibilitQr characteriati 
ot systematiC process. The properties of non-systematio process "are very 
surprising indeed when they are canpared with what caumonly Laplace i. 8U.pposed 
to ha.ve meant when he olaimed that any situation in world history could be 
deduoed from ~ other.-S3 
2. Creativ," moment!!! ..,st .. &.t.i .. s .. ti;;.;W--. method. It. 1s true that 01as8ioal 
inqu1r.r could lead to laws that explain every event in non-8j'lJtematl0 process, 
but as a matter of taot neglects such process. For not only would a classical 
deduction of ev"ry event demand more information 'than is to be had and then 
require unlimited time in order to conrplete the deduction, it would also cOlle 
up with a result lacking in generality, tor the conclUSions would not be even & 
sate approx1m.ation to the events of another n':m-s;rstematic process With a 
Slightly different basic situation. But because what statistioal SCience 
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studies is what classical science finds lacks the anticipated intelligibilit,y, 
"besides the devaluated inverse insight thut has been our conoern hitherto, 
there is to he acknowledged in statistical sOience another basic moment that is 
positive and creativer" 
Aristotle was quite ~are of whntwe have named non-systematic process, 
for he contended that the whole course of terrestrial events was just a 
aeries of acoidents. But to this devaluated inverse insight he failed 
to add the further creative moment. Instead of discovering statistical 
method, he attempted to account tor the manifest continuity ot the 
terrestrial senes of accidents by invoking the continuous intl uence 
ot the continuous17 rotating celestial spheres.54 
3. Probabill:!i'. The 1ntellig.1biliV t.~at is sought in statistioal 
inq'dr;r is that of Erobabill:!f:. In illustrat~onJ Lonergan analyzes the genesis 
of the insight that grasps that the probability ot head.s in a series ot coin 
tosses to be one-halt. "In my given instance the result Ttight have been 
different if (1) the initial position at the coin had been different, or (2) 
different linear and angular momenta had been imparted to 1 t, or (3) the 
motion had been arrested at a different point.- The possible combinations of 
all of these determinants il very large, but the wole set of possible 
c",mbinations divides into two equal parts, tor in a.I\Y and ever;r oombination the 
coin can start from either a "heads" or "tails" position. Ever;r sequence of 
actual combinations of deterninants is a randOlPl selection from the set or 
possible combinations, and the relative actual frequency of "headsn i8 obtained 
by dividing the number of "heads" in the series of tosses by the total. number 
of tosses: 
Clearly, this fraction can and often will ditter from one-hill. For 
the result of each to.1 is settled by the actual combination ot 
determinants, and that combination may be any combination whatever. 
However, ditferences between relatl ve actual frequenCies and one-
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half" must be a coincidental a€wregate. For if they were not, they 
would f"orm an order17 series; if the dif"ferenoes tormed an orderly 
series, the results would have to fom an orderly series; i:f.' the 
results tormed an orderly series, the sequenoe ot combinations or 
determinants would f"orm an orderly series. S hypothesi, this 
conclusion is false; therefore, the IItlPPosition ',m1S false. :1ore-
(J'I1er, relative a.ctual. frequencies cannot help oscll1atinf't about one-
half. For the set of posaible combinations divides into two exactly 
eq"al parts; and ever-;/ seq;.lence of actual c:;.mbinations is a ra..l1dom 
selection .from the set of possible combinations. How in a random 
selection of a sequence the sequence is stripped of all order, a.ll 
regularity, all law; hence, while it can and will include runs of 
tthaads" and runs of "tails, It it cannot possibly stick to one 
alternatIve to the exclusion of the other, and so relative aotual 
frequency ia b"tmd to oscillate about one half • 
• • • Intelligencr" then, can grasp a regularity in the 
frequencies by abstracting from their random features and by 
settl ing on the centre about which they o;;cillate. That a..')strac-
tive grasp of intelligibility is the insi'ght that is expresaed by 
saying that the probability of "heads" is ana-halt .,5 
4. Analog.!!: heuristic structures. There ls am analogy b!1tween 
cla.ssical and statistical heuristic struotures. The unknown is na.:~lOd the 
"nature of • • .If or the If state ot • • ..It Both heuristic structure. pre-
suppose a given, but whereas olassical heuristic structures seek to understand 
"data. of different kinds, It statistical heuristic structures seek to understand 
"ordinary and exceptional, nor:r.a1 and abnormal ro:.tnS of events." And .just 
as classioal structures utilize the "heuristic theorem" that It similars are 
sLnilarly anderstood," so statist.1cal heuristic structures operata "because 
a notable regularity is compatible with random differences in runs of events, 
states are linked with runs that desPite occasional lapses are ordinary or 
normal or, again, with runs that are pronounced exceptional or abnormal 
though they contain a few ordinary or normal elements" --state of one's 
health, the state ot the market .. the state of the na.tion. Classical 
-
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explanation is achieved thr::mgh the discOV0ry and verifioation :yf functional 
relations; sta.tistical. eXplanation is "in the association of sets of classes ot 
eVents 1,dth corresponding sets of probabilities. 1I Like classical sCience, 
statistics mO\f9S to scientific description, repla.cing the adjeotives "normal" 
and ltabnorm.a1tt t-litb_ c';unting events and tab,:;lati':!n of rates. Just as 
J!lathe;~tica1 reasonir.g is relevant to classical lnvestigat-: on, statistics 
utilizes the calculus of probabillti es, techniques to )"1o'/e from relative actual 
frequenci~s to probabilities, and opr:'rator equationc which yield eigen-iunction 
and eigen-va1.1]('s Ifthf'.t serve both to select classes of events and to det'Jrmine 
the r(~spHcti va probablli ties of the selected «¥asses. It Both classical and 
statistical constrlctfl abstract from rtthe empirlcally rcsidual aspects of 
indl T;.cuali ~;~r, of the continuum, of partiC"..llur places and tif1es, and ot 
conste.nt velocl ty.1f But classical lallS also abstract from coincidental 
agrrerates, demr:ndirl{ t i1e q'lalilication "ot.l}er things being equal, tf whereas 
statistical states abstract from random d1fferi':'nces in rolative actual. frequen-
eios in order to reach an intelligibility in coincidental aggregates. Both 
types of laws .must be verified, and bot:l yield v111id predictions, "hilt. because 
relative actual frequencies differ .at random i'rom probabilities, statistical 
predi.ctions nri~lU'i1T regard the probabilities of ever.ts and only secondarily 
det"r'r,lne the corresponding frequencies that differ at random fran the 
probabilities." 56 
,. ?robabilitl 2! events !!.E .2! ';erificati ons. There is a distinction in 
regard t::l probability- which is important at this point. Not only is tt1ere a 
-n 
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probability ot event., investigated through statistical heuristic structures, 
there is also a probability ot verifications. The first probability .eta • 
norm from which relative actual frequencies do not systematically diverge. "It 
is the regula:l"ity in the frequencies and it is to be known by a leap ot oon-
structive intelligence that grasps the regularity by abatracting from the random 
ness. It Probability of verifications is not known by a "leap of conatructive 
intelligence that abstracts from random. differences, for sUch leaps never yield 
anything but hypotheses." Verification does not abstract from random differ-
ences. itA prepondera.n.ce or favourable tests does not make a conclusion almost 
certain) indeed, a very rew contrary tests ~tice to make it highly improba-
ble." Probability of verifications "is known through acts of reflective under-
standing and judgment J it means that an affirmation or negation leads towards 
the unconditioned; and it is estimated, not by counting verifications and 
abstracting from random differences, but by criticizing verifications and by 
taking everything re levant into account .. 1t57 
Thus, probability of verifications is on the leval ot judgment, and 
probability of events is on the level of insight which must be formulated and 
then verified as probably true or not. 
6. Sorokin'!I ~ :?! statistical !l?ncepts. Sorokin' s inc lusion of 
statistical concepts in causal-functional method oan be illustrated. 
--
-
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Causal-functional formulas like the Newtonian Law ot Gravitation sum 
up brien,. a prodigious number ot separate relationships. They are 
like a beam ot light that cuts acroS8 chaotiC darkness through all 
its unlimited depths. This, with proper Nservations, can be said 
ot 8f'l1' CAUSal tormula. It achieves its purpose by' establishing a 
u.n1torm1N ot relationship between the variables urder scrutin;r. 
'.l'hrOUiih a vast concurrence ot tragmentar,r events, torms, objects, 
and relationships becomes a comprehensive whole. i:1ben the formula 
shows that the variables A and B--depreselon and birth rate, modes 
o! production and ideological forme, isolation and suicide, 
urbanization and crime-are more or less un1torml,y ASsociated with 
each other in the sense that B nomal.1y follows A or change. with A, 
this unl!orrrd.!}l binds the variables together, introduces a readil1' 
understOOd causal order into disorder. 58 
Depression is a state, which is a statistical concept, as i. also birth rate. 
And in all ot the examples except the one ot the law ot gravitation, the thing 
, 
to be determined seems to be the degree or, state, ot rate ot, or trequency ot 
some clus ot events. In the law ot gravitation, however, there i8 no question 
ot how frequently a change in gravitational force accompanies a change ot mass 
or distance. There i8 indeterminacy in how precisely this change can be 
measured perhaps, but there i8 no question of the variables nuctuatinc 
together .ore or le88 frequently', normal17 or abn01"'!1lally. On the other hand, 
the relevant question in the other examples is "How otten?" How otten i8 
isolation toll owed b.1 suicide? How otten does crime occur in urban communities 
as cOOlpared with rural oommuni ties? How trequent are births in depression eras 
as canpared with prosperous times? 
7. ItIntensiY-"!!!. relationshi28. Sorokin, however, does not distinguish 
a ~e of intelligtbilit,r that results in the specification ot a determinate 
F' 
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tunct10n or correlation from another tqpe ot intelligibility that re8Ulta in the 
establishment ot a probability or ideal treque:l1CY trom which relative actual 
frequencies di'¥Vge only non-s78tematically. He rather speaks ot a correlation 
ot rates or trequencies ot events as a meane of establishina the same type ot 
correlation of variables that the phys1cist obtains in h18 dUferential 
equatiou. Rather than a distinct type ot law, he speaka of d1tferent degrees 
ot intensity: "Oaueal-tunctional connections vary 80 greatly in degree 2! 
intensity that we not only have cues in which we can be reasonably certain ot 
the causal nature ot the association, but also others in which we are not 
certain whether the association 18 really c8.W!al or merely incidental {E2!!!!2:. 
2!"opt!r !'!2! and the like).,:59 This fits in perfectly with bia conclusion that 
"cultural conglomerations can be ranged theoretically upon a scale beginning 
with those which are a mere spatial congeries, that is, are unintegrated in the 
proper sense ot the word, and ending with those which are completely integrated 
lOgically.,,60 There is a smooth contiIlUU.'1l ot a.ggregates ot events and objects, 
ranging from mere spatia-temporal unity to highly' integrated unities. And there 
ia a corresponding continuwn of tormulations, ranging trom the logical unity ot 
a mathematical treatise, to the unity found in Newton's law of graVitation, down 
to the unit.y ot relationships in the way economic prosperity and birth rates 
fluctuate, ending in the mera catalogues of men and evants that a historian 
might report. 
59 8 Ibid., p. 2 • 
-
60Ibid., p. 48. 
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8. External!!!2 internal relatioDSbip,!. Aa a result of th1a extension of 
the idea of f\mctional relationship, whioh is based upon a mathematical analog, 
Sorokin baa to say that Ittunct1ona1. or cauaal connection of separate units 1s 
almost al..,... interent1al and external; it rarely' gives us an intimate or 
internal comprehension of the connection." He says that "experimental or 
observational or statistical manipulations It enable us to determine only ~ 
two variables seem al".,.. to go together, but not !!5[ they do so. He gives 
examples--force ot ~aY1tation varies with mass and distance, volume ot gas 
varies in inverse ratio to pressure, hydrogen and o:x;ygen combine to torm 
water--and sa)"8 that Hall we know is that w1~in the limit. ot our perception 
they have usually' done 80, and that they will probably continue to do 80 in the 
future. ,,61 Soroldn t.bus atf1.rms that the type ot laws that lonergan t.erms 
classical, establish a pro'ba'biU.ty tor future events (as contrasted with being 
probably verified), rather than giving an explanation of how a certain process 
takes place. 
9. ~nt 2!. inteEation. Very closaly related to the position that 
causal laws give onlY probabilities and external relationships is Sorokin's 
tendency to speak ot the Tariable. to be correlated as concrete objects or 
units. Th-,se variables will then be upsets of concrete data, and as such will 
never be tully determinate. "fore preciM conceptualization and measurement is 
always a possibility implying, as long as this possibility remains, a certain 
degree of indeterminacy. Causal-f"unctional laws, in themselves, are logiCO-
meaningful systeu. According to Sorokin, the !.,ntern:a]. unity of' such systems 
can be grasped. Each concept has a meaning in relationship to the other 
• 
coaoeptdl a the tOl'1llUlat101l. But \he 00Il0N1ie UD1u, Oft the other bad, 11nce 
tbq Mil .1'81' .... M17 deWrm1ned 1D 1;be.el"..l, caaaot. be said to haft th1a 01' 
tbat to.l17 de~ oauaal 01' f"aaot1olta1 I'el.tio_hip betwea other 
1~te utt •• OIIoe tId ..... t1a11adetma1rJaOy ot re1at1ouh1pa 18 
adldtted, 1t 1a a loc1oa1 ute_loa to ad1II1t raap. ot 1Ddeterll1naq aolDe all 
the .., dna to a .... .-t1&l aad teIIporal ad..1-IlCT. 
Mericm. bu po1ated out how tbe GODOept, ot tbe uteDt ot iAteptat10a .... 
Sorold.n'. dUt1Dot1oa bet__ qat.ea &ad ooqer1e. 1.aok prHin -ardlaa. Be 
praise. Sorold.n, aa,1.rla that he "baa l»olcllT OOIItroDted the problea ot bow to 
daterm1aa tlle uteIR to wb10h nob 1atep'at~ Ooev., reoolllu1na, d.eep1te hie 
rltr1ol10 o_ata oa tile etat1at101&u of our .... te .... ttla to deal. with 
the utant or decr" of 1D1;e&rat1oD ....... 11.,. 1apUe • .,. ataUattoal 
......... art be adda that Itonoe the 1'101;10ft of exteDt ot ateIV.tion 11 mtro-
d.uced, the exine .. of t1P88 of Imowledp vb1ab an aot 1nteptated with the 
6~ 
d~ t8I'ldeac1 •• cellOt be rtewd .re17.. 'OOnpr1aI' or .. ·cont1.rlpftt.·" 
It 0_ make. tIM cI1ft1aotion be_ •• olaaa1oa1 aDd nat1n1cal bnrlat10 
atruct.urea, tao ......... , the !n!! of .,... of 1moVledp \hat 000tU' OU be de:U"'\j 
1D teru ot olu.1ea1. law (alt.up aot 1ft tbe fora of the dUterent1al. 
aquatioDl ued b7 JIOCIern pbn10a to apr ••• olualoal law>, and tile fr!9!!!!l 
ot ooovrnoe of dUterellt t".. of qateM ....... d .tat1atloal17. ADd the 
... _ .. aa1d of other IOOlal and oultural 8ft... thq nll be dat1nad 1ft 
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terI18 ot cl.auloal law, but rill be Itud1ed 1D their coaerete ocourrenoe by 
et&t18t1oal JIltIthod. •• 
10. Indetera1!!"l- Althoulh Sorotdn d18tinFiabea bet'tlMen a oaual 
~ aDd a caual. law, wld.oh 18 in It .. U • lo&1co-1'QNDiDgt'ul qatea, he ~ 
to 1nter'pret caual la_ concretely ... tbouch the,. expreaed relatioft8h1pe 
between concrete ....... and th1Qp. Ioaerpn 11&71 that. it olue1oal law.at 
be 1nterpreted coDDreteIT. "tb.elr eaaent1al d.e~ 18 In radical cont1.1ct 
vttb the haliaa of daM, and 80 o1.ue1cal law eesent,1allT ... lmftrU1able.-
BQt olua1cal lave ,..d not be 1Irkrpre\ed eoncrete171 
'.l'hq can be atat.emanta ot eI._ata 1ft ~traot ~ Dr. 
(1) t.be abatract, qatem 18 ooaetltuted b7 impl101tly deftaed 
relatlou ad ....... 
(2) the abeVact qatea 18 connected w1t1l data ncrt. dlreot17 
bu.t t.brcucb \be ...station ot a oampl~ .. t ot desorlptlw 
conoepta, aM 
(3) the law of the .. vaot qatem are aa1d to be 'ftl"i.t1ed 
i.DaSDlOh AI they _1&Q 11ll1ta OIl *1., otlrar thbsp beiq equl., 
YUt .,..let.l. of data eOD'ftZ'p. 
()Q tb.1a ebow1r.as. the OOIJplete1;r deteralu:t.e retat10a ot claulcal 
law are 'betW8l1 the oorap1etel.y deterJd.nate twru they 1IIpl1oltly 
define. ftd.8 oloaed etraoture 18 referred to data tb.roqh a .. t 
ot descrlptive an4 eo &pJ:rox1llative oo_eptdJ. rs..ll3', the cloaed 
atruotw. 18 prOYed 1'.1 .... ' to data, DOt 1M uaot oo1Do1.dellOe, 
but b7 -i&n1nI tbe 111l1ta on vh10h data 8OImIl"p.6) 
It 0JJe aeJmow1edp. ol.au:loal. tau to be abnraet, tbert it 18 po.elble to 
d1acover deteN1laat.. relat10u betwen detend.rtate teru. '!'he tormulatiOn is 
verified 1Daotar .. 1t .. sipa l1m1ta Oil vb10h data ooanrp. 'l'h18 new adldta 
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a pr1DC1ple of 1rIdeterll1Dao7 1D the appUoat1oD ot deterlll1nate law to ooaore1;e 
l1tuationa, 1:Nt doN DOt P u far .. Sorok1a" ~ of the oaual 
torslat1ou \baMl ...... 
11. ~ RedtleU, on the otw baD4, 1a apea:td.q of an ideal 
obaer'Nl" • .-1<1 1Ipred1ct. all Mure state. of a qateIIl tl'OIIl ooDd1Uou at a 
&1ft11 tUe,· fornalate. bt. aauaal mdel in ~ of a det.ertDi.m.. LoDll'"pIl 
..,. tbat d.termm:J.a .te .. from Itthe Galilean VOl"ld vin.· '01" alth:nJ.p 
OI.Uleo'. law ot tall1q bodie. lD&qW:'at.ed 1IOdIitrn lel.no., Qal11.o did DOt 
recop1 •• "bat the law 18 abatraot. 'J.'hue, 1DIat.ead of plaolDe tbe propoeu of 
loieDOe 111 tile treultlO1l from d.Norlptton ~ u;planatlon, be spoke ot red.uc 
the mere11' apparftt, aeooadar7 qullt1. of t.h1IIp to their obj.otl .... , real, 
Pl"i.Jnaz7 qul,lt1e., vt:d.ch "he COQOelved .. tbe JU.t,heatloal d1analo_ of 
utter 111 .,"lon. II !berefore, the "Oall1.eau lava of Datur. ar. DOt OODM1ftd 
in abltranlon troll .. D81ble or, at l_t, iaa1aabl •• 18lll8lltl and, 
oonaeqwmt.17, • • • the 0.111 .... law .ta. ill \he ti.ld, DOt ot OW' abstract 
ow.ieal Ina, bat ratMI- of our' .obeae. ot reovreu. ill .1ob abatran lawI 
and. 1IIIc1:aaJ>le .l.eaenta .. CCIIlb:Lae.1I bre tollowl a _ebatat det.erld.l\1a 
wb1ch 18 bu1oal.1¥ hoatll. to .tat1atlO1l. 1_, 
'or, in the abetran, ol.aulcallawa pone .. UD1".. .. liV aDd ... -
.11'.7_ 'fbe Gall1._ aoknovled&e' th1I \Ud..,...eallt7 ad Dloea.l_ bat 
C&IlDtJt NCO_.. tt. abet.re.otneu. For hla, it 18 attached 
u-d1&t,ely to lM&iDUl.e pantol •• or .. lmeci_ble aet.her or both. 
For Ida, 1t 111 a1.ru4y oonorete, aDd 10 11'. 11 not 1m lIMd of .tuz.t1Ier 
de~1oM to reach oonor.t.eae ... 101" Ida, the turt.her determ1. ... 
Dattoaa, vh10h vov.l.d hi DOD-qat.emat.loall¥ r.lated to 0118 anotlm', 
.1IIplT do not ex1A. AocordiDIl1', 81ao. be baa 110 doubt. of the 
ex:1AeDoe of ol.ua1oal law, be OUlDOt w.t reprd natUtlca1. law .. 
...... tozw.latloM of 0\11' 1pranoe. !bare 11 aOM YUt agrept.e of 
d1Hrete or cODtialou bat ~l.e .te.a.taJ tllq are abject to 
untft1"l&l. ad DIce....,. law. aD4 the buSM •• of t.ba eo1ent1at 1, 
the hard taak of detmWd.llc tho .. law ucl • pred10tiDa wbat CIUDOt 
'but ocotar. 
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Moreoftr, v1t.h1a tid .. o_text, the _ptlon ot statUtioal 1_ 
1m'o1ft' m.echalWm. A ach1De 18 a let of i.J8aC1nable part., each of 
wh1Ch .taad8 1rl detel'ltd.Date 8)'11teutlo relatiou to all the otbar •• 
In 11ke II&DD8r, the univerM, baplia1t in Ga111ean metbodolol7, 11 an 
earepte ot '11Iq1raable partl aDd each 11 related 178tematloally to 
all the other.. Tbe .ole ditterenoe 11 that, apart from the macb1ne, 
there are ot_ iMCiaable el .. ft\8 that can i.ftterfere nth ita 
operation, but apet frOlfl t.he un1ver18 ot 1Jaaa1ft&ble eleent.., what 
i.J8aC1nable iJaterYent.iO¥ 0&Il tllere .. l.e? Mecbu1.8a aooordi.aalT 
'become. a det.end.n1 ... 64 
12. WeaJmeH!! ... 1lO ..... de ........ l .... Sorokift, as baa been Hen, reject. t.h1l 
dBterm1n1em for an 1Ddat.erm1ra1.8ll. Be exp1101tlT reject.. t.he re.trietion of 
object ot .eience to the i.J8aC1nablel "Whlle the phTaical .ci.nee. haft a!rea 
abandoned the atom .. the ete.nt.arT unit, and have tound that an ever-
inCre .. i", number ot the e 1 .. ntar7 particle. are or a 1... and le.. 'material 
nature, our tbome-made pbJw1cllta' are .till P1.¢nc with atomic marbl •• , 
still loo1dDc tor .oa1al _to_ .. the .:Lmpleet and _ll •• t W11t. ot pqoho-
1001&1 phenoama.- It 11 1nt.ereat.1nI to DOte, bowYer, that Sorold.A rejeotl 
eeneible or ~ partiel .. oot 80 _ch becaue ot t.he abatract nature of 
clauical law, wt beC&U8e ot an 1Dcreu1q 1mm&ter1alit,y ot the objeeta 
"out t.here- to be .tudied. '!'hl ..... to remain _ ooncrete trrterpretatton of 
cla •• 1cal la .... , ta.llT coruti •• tellt. 'l,li.t.h hi. pr1Mr7 exampll!'t8 ot the _chine ADd 
the orpn1.a. It baa been ... n how the concrete 1nterpretstion of olanioal 
law. can lead to elther a det.ermud .• or to an 1Ddet.ertllD1S11. SorokiD'. treat 
ment ot cl ... 1o&1 lan tellda toward 1Ddeterm1n1a. Redfleld, wbo al80 I1ve. 
the _chiDe &I • pr1mar7 example ot a clas.ical or caueal syat.ea, treats 
6hIbid., pp. 130-1)1. 
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cauaal la_ in a det.era1JUat tubion, altboqh hi. tot.al position is not Ollll 
of 1II8obaD1et datend.D1sa. It 1a also relevant at th1e point to call attention 
to the tact that Radt1eld's conoera nth IIIOdela rather thaD _thode indicates 
a teDdeaoy to 1JaaI1ae _at soi_titio 1&_ are aoine to look: like, tor models 
are imaps. Imag1Dary IIIOdela haft 8Il iaportaDt heuristic furlotlon, but vben 
the t.maa1Uz7 model beOOlll8. the ...... ion ot soientitio explanation, tben 
there hae been a tailve to diat1np1sh betwe. the ab.tract la_ and the 
concrete iMp.-_· tbe U1Ilbilloal cord that tied tbft to tbe .. terDal tmaatna-
13. Conoluaion. Sorok:1D'. oaua1-ttmatioD&1. _thod aDd Redfield's 
, 
oaueal IIIOdel inolude DOt one, 'bu.t two, buio tOl'lU ot tboupt or heuristio 
antlotpatiou. Classical bHr1atl0 atnotures anticipate abatraot .,..t,e., 
... klDg to lcrM:nr tbe "nature of • • •• or, 11101"8 preo1ee 11' J ·80_ uupeoUied 
oorrelatlol18 to be epeo1t1ed, s .. 1ndeterm1Date hDotion to be detersrd.ned." 
Stat1stlcal Murlatic structures antic1pate a detarm1aatioD of probabillties 
ot concrete e_uts, uk:1q questiona about trequeQC7 rather tban about the 
natures ot th1np. D1st1np1sb1na bet .... en tbI two heur1et10 str11ot1lre. doe. 
not l180esearilT Nt. oat ulna stat1etioal oorrelatlon as a ... ot 
diaooftl"1D& olase1oal la .... 01" Iqpot.hese.. More trequDt17, how .... r, there is 
a t7P8 ot olassical bJpotbesl8 'betore stat1at1cal 1Ilftet1ption 18 'bapn. And 
tbi. tqpotbeaia 11111 1aplloity or tacitly be oonoernina the explanatory 
det1D1tlon of a olaas of pbeDO_U. TIme, the -aniDi ot suioide would be 
implioitlT defined by ita relatioD to i.olatlon, the _anina ot .. :mal 
interoourse vou.ld be 1aplioltly detlD1d bT its relatlon to eooDOldo oonditione 
(birth rate aDd depre .. lon), ad the -an1Dc of criae vou.ld be blplicit17 
-defined bJ' ita relation to tile Yarioua upeota ot city lite. Tb.1aprocedura, 
bowver, impl1e. an iumled1ate relation between tbI term. and the ooncrete 
events, and 80 a concrete interpretation ot caua&l aDd tu.nctlonal laws. And 
slnce there 18 DOt a aterad.nat.. relatlouhlp .. yet discovered (or likely to 
be discovered in tbe near future) between nicide and :I.801&tlon, birth rate 
and. d.epre_toll (which 1., bu1oall,y, a quetlon ot wh1' sexual intercourse 
ocou.rs), oriM and. city lite, the tqpotheaea cannot be aaid to be ver1tied, 
be,ond a¢ng what e'ft1"1bod7 lmew alreaq--tbat birth rates I08s up in 
depreSS1oDII, or 1D sa. ot the., that more or1aes are coaa1tted 1n the 01t7. 
etc. Theretore it one 18 COIIIitted to an 1~termiD1_. he will speak ot mare 
1nteuee and. l .. s inteDH tustional relat1ona, it one 18 collll1tt.ed to a 
determ1D1em, he will take retup 1ft hulnble stat.ement.s about the "1rIaatv.rltr' 0 
the behavioral sCienoes, a:ad spur b1maelt on to heI"c\11ean ettorts 1D. the field 
ot metbodolopcal apeculat10n, hop1Dg to scmehow uke b1a subjeot matter 
conform to hie untortunate metuoc101ogical pOatulates. 
D. SUMMAB.Y AND OOrIJUJ'SIOIS 
1. !!P!!'1enttal ooNgat.s. In cl ... 1cal henr1et10 structures, ODe 
seeks to lcDcnf "the DAtare of •••• " wh10h 18 speo1f1ed b7 some it ... trOll 
experience, nch as "the nature ot !!!:!. n "the _ture ot 1OO1et7." tba nature 
at a fr .. tall." 'lbeae speo1ticatlons are descriptlft, 'baaed upon tbe 
--
relatione ot things to the obserwr. The7 are what Lonergan terms "e.x;per1ent 
cOnjupte.,· wh1ch are terma or "correlatlws whoae meming 18 oxpressed. at 
l .. t in the lut analya1a, by appeal1ng to tbe content at SOM human 
exper1en06." Thwa, ·color,· .. defined by appealing to the experiences of 
.seln, red and blue, and "sound" when deflDed by appealing to experiences at 
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bearing dUterent 801M., are exper1eDt1&l. .onju .. :be_. 6S Bxpertenttal co$-
ptea are tbe words _n uae to reter to the concrete pre .. ntatioDII of their 
ow experteDOe. 
2. ~ !!N!ptea. "hr. (oJ' expl.au.to17) coDjqatel, Oil the other 
band, are .orrelati .... detiDed 1JIp1.lc1t'17 bT 811p1rloau';r .art.abl18hed correla .. 
66 tlone, tuDOt.lou, l.w, tbaor1e., 1,1Itau. tI Pure ooujuptea are .ad to 
expre •• the nlatloD8bipe bet.en tbiDp in t ... l ..... , and are defined 
1mplloitlT. 1'b.a7r ... lt frOIll inallbt into ttthe _tun ot ••• - or 1ft. 
indeteraa1nate tunotlol1 to be determ1nad." !'bey IN .. 1c terJu and terJII 
darlftd trOll the .. buic terM, and r ... 1t tr,_ lDaipt_ that ren1t in Ita 
circle ot teru and relattou, nob tbat the tel'III8 ttx the relat10., the 
relatlou tix the tene, and the i_tabt ttD. botb •• 67 Cluaiaal law are 
abatraot 111 tbe1r axperu.atal teclm1q1&e. ot dl.00ftZ')"1 "At 1 .... l'7 tura, it 
.... apparellt that the 00I.lCerR ot experl_Dt 1. to determine, DOt the 
partlov.lar ob8erftble qualit1ea ot tbe partlcular _wiale v1t1l whlcll oae 
deala, but a theoretical correlattoD betwea det1Dab1e and abetract Intlt1e •• • 
'!'bey.e abltract in their t01'llllat1cm. ItAa law, they are acrrelatioDl 
UnkS ... correatl .... , and the correlatl .... &1'8 DilftI' tbe \Ul1qu data of lOla 
partioular t1u and plaae ... 68 tbe "detinable aad abstract en1tll.," the 
correlatl .... 1.1n1ced 'by conelaUoDl, are ezp1auato17 oonjugatie •• 
6,LoIlVPIl, p. 79. 
66Ib1d., p. 80. 
-
61Ibld., pp. 11-12. 
-
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3. EvaN. Statistical law deal Vith tbe occurrence or eftnta. For 
.wry questiOD about the _ture of 8D object, there ls a further question t.bat 
aslea whether there are arQ' nch objects. It 18 po_ibl. to aDIIWl' noh a 
"estlon for ren.etion" by "Y •• " or "No, II but 1t 1. s1117 to Manter tbe 
question as to the sture of fire by "Ye •• " SUch "quest1ol18 for intel11pDOe" 
IU"~ be &DIIWred by at&tina the DAtura, the correlation, the function. 
"GenerallT, the emmo1atioQ of eftl7 law caD be toll.owad by tile quut10n tor 
reflection tbat asks wbether tbe law 18 ,..Ul8d, and the det1D.1tion of .""7 
term can be folloved by t. question tor rellection tbat un whether the 
defined ex1ste or occurs. IDftr.e1T, wbeDaver one .... rts 1'WU1cation or 
existence or oceurrence, 0_ mq be .sked wbat 18 YerUied, what ex1sts, what 
occurs.· low eveata are to ooaJuptes, .. qu,estioDS tor reflection ... to 
qwt.t:l.ona tor intellipncel "Vlthout 8Warta, ooDjapto. OM be aeitller 
di.oo ..... d nor Termed. Wlt.hou.t OOJIjupt., events caD be .. ither dlst1u-
69 piahed or related." Statl.tlcal laws deal with the frequenoyof eveuta. 
4. Proce.s. Proce •• oons1at. ot a aer1es ot .vente. Tbua, the differ-
ent type. ot interact1on--orpnized or lluorpnlzed or d180rpnised, solidary 
or antagon1nlc or neutral, integr-ated 01" Wl1nteerat.d--are different t7Pe. of 
aerie. of .... nt., .1.nce 1nteraot10D 1. a proce... The d1tterent types of 
swots that c1eterm1oe whether an interaction 1s orpnized, intesrated, or 
aolidazoy, and the extent. to .hloh the interaction proce •• 18 one of th ..... vil 
be d1at1np.1eb.ed on the bu1s ot ooDjuptee. 
69Ibld., pp. 82-8). 
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Processes can be botll 8)'1Item.atio and DOft-qa'teMtio. It the)" are 
qatematic, 8"'1"ye'f81lt in each process CAD be predicted 801e17 OD the bu18 
of kncn,ledge ot olaaaioal. law and the 1Dit1al 81tuatlon. It proce •••• are 
DOt s,..tamat1c, .venta oan be pred1cted s1.DclT, but DOt as a whole. to cleal 
with the ..... ot tba whol. pt'OOe •• , statistical 1_ are Deeded vh10b aeek 
to d1800ft1" Pl'obab11itl ... 
.Redtield &lid Sorolda both 1.aek a tboroqll dlet1ftctlon bet .... n clue1eal 
and atat18t1oal 1_. _e they botll tend to ooDtue .... ata and OOD.jqates. 
Tbe caw model of Bedt1eld illpl1es a aeobalat detel"lda1. and ult1MtelT 
camaot aokDowledce stat1stloal law, and the ,oauaal.-tuatioul 1ntell'atloft ot 
Soroklft d1aplap an iadetermim.. that recarda 01_1oal law u stat.eDts of 
probabilities. This JUT YV'T _11 'be the reason what _ orpntsed P'OUP 18 
for 8orok1ft &11 1Iltell"aHd W'd.ty b7 det1a1tioa. For lutell'ation beoo.s a 
question ot "more or le.s- that 18 'ftry nex1ble, Ii ... n an indetera1D1a. 
The contrat 'between descript,ion and explaDat10D baa been empbuized 
so.-what, blat neede more preo1ae application to the 8'tia.dT of the little 
OQ1lJllUnlt,.. There 18 the quat10n ot wbat. is to be expl.a1ned, wh:1ch 1nwlwa 
the metaaoc1010,1oal quniotl ot thl criteria ot relevance. There will be a 
diaounlOl1 ot th. wide and the outside ri.ew of the little colllWl1ty, and a 
CODlpaoieon ot the .. 't"1e1fII ot Redfield with Sor0ldn-s d1at1u.etlon betwen t.he 
psyoholol1oal &rlCl 800101oatoal read1np ot CNltural pha ___ na. ADd the 
relation ot the 1'1ewpo1nt. taken to the quanton of relat.1T1n will be 
diaouued. The quation ot relati'f1lra 'br1np OIlt the need tor the expl.aDator7 
Y1ewpoint :La 100101011', wh1ch i. a need to CO be10nd tbe uaa ot Q;per1ent1al 
coDjupte. to the 11M ot pure OJ' uplaaawl'70onjuptea. It. fill be aeea that. 
exper1.race, urader~, aDd .1Ud .. - oompriae not oalT a heviatic at,rv.ot 
ot the acta aatlc1pated by the sOieDttat, bat alao are 'baa1o teru reterr1Da 
to aN obaraoterll1q the o'b"e" nudied b7 the soi.e ... ot man. !he .. are 
CODaclou acta, ad. OU oaly 'be laIo'wD 1'7 tald.q the luide Yiev. Exper:Le:ace, 
1na1&ht, and jud ..... are not uplaMto17 teru in tbe natval ac1eaeea, 
bee ... 1a.orpnS.o mater1als, plut.., ADd lowr aa1ale do not haw experle .. s, 
1na1ahta, and judpeata. Mea do ltaw them, alone with emotlona, deairea, and 
wlltlcma. ADd theIe are an .... ntial part ot the data to be explained. 
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1. Me\UOle ... III 8OO101olT, _aabap, norma, and value. are part, of 
the data to be colleoted. Sooio1011n. ~ DOt oDly 1Ibe abje0t.8 of later-
actiOn aDd \bail' propwt,l .. , bu.t a180 behavior, .,.nta, pro ..... , and the 
prod\lOt. ot ach bebanor. And aIlODI tbe produob ot human actlnt,. 18 h\1:I&an 
\mOwledp. It 18 a part ot wltve. .t, as Polalvi sap, Ita man'. 111ulo_ 
are not tbe ... aa h1a knov1e •• M Ther.tore, "pre_tlT we t1nd ow .. l •• 
_said niDI kaowledp or allepd lmovledp, in tt. ... ....,. .. vheJl ... reneot 
on what _ our.elves krxJv, or beUew we lmov." He CO •• on to note that 
loc1c1&U d18t1np1eh bet __ lcnovledp ot ~np aftd reflection upon the 
. 1 
knOlfledp of til! ... tbe cl1tterence between science and metuoience." 
800101081, iDaotar as 1t lDcludea men', kDowledp and tb81r value. in 1" 
aubject matter wl11 have I1AD,T ot the charact&r1atic. ot a meta-acience, as it 
18 here dttaceibed by Pol.an;v1. One should 0. caretul to note, however, that 
cr1tical re.f'leot1on \lpon kIlowledse or npposed knowledge 18 not do_ only in 
a JIletucieatUio co.a.Wxt.. Indeed, 1t .... to '" ODe of the moat lmportant 
aspects of "ientilic me\hod, for uo ftr1tioattoa ot a Iq'pothesia (apposed 
Ia1owledp) caD take place without. crltical. ren.otton upon .. t 18 stated 1n. 
the bypothea1.s. Tba aclent1at IlU8t ask, "Is this tOrJlU.latlon correct?-
2. Metaaociololl. Ketuc1ent.it'ic reflect.ion would aeem to be raneottoa 
on the f!19!iplea 0" u.a ln 80181'1111£10 refleotion. Tb8 que8tion 1s not 80 
much "Is thi8 tornw.lat1oD correct?" bu.t "By what Erlnc1ples or oriteria do I 
jud&'e tb1a tOl"lllllat1on to be 00l:"l'ftCt or 1ncQ1'reot?" This 18 clearer 1A 
= 
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Furta,.'s descr1ptioa of the tuk of Mtuoclolo.,. .. atudtiIII lithe _tbodolo-
peal pro.suppo8tt1ou aeoeUU'7 tor 0&l"l'71Da CNt aooioloc1oa1 r ..... oh, COIl-
st.ructtna -101.0810&1 ~, aDd erltt01stac nob. r8 ..... and 8\lOh ~ 
after they haw beeD OOIIlPlet.ed • .,2 Buell _tuoololopoal theary, aooordi.. to 
Robert Bieratedt who UI4IS the t.erII\ 1.a a .ue YfIr'T s1Jd.1.ar to the ..,. hrfey 
ue. lt, "18 DOW a blablT deftloped d18c1pU.-.1t But ''8001010c1o_1 the .. ". 
OD the COI'lV&I'7, 18 nUL .. 1fHk &ad pall1d tb.1nI whoa. pu'8U1t 1"8oe1 .... DO 
apeo1al acour ...... w1th1n the prot_lon ad ... major acb1eY8M.u 
trequeat17 ... DOt troa acad8l1d.c1au btlt boa .ftllata, jowDali.at8. 
pibl1c1aU, aacl tho .. re1&t1.,.17 fn 800101oa.u's vbo ... DOt afrald of 
eplthets like 'uuo1ent1tl0.' ",3 
3. Cr1w1a!! ... ra_le .... 'A_DCeiioiiiiooiia• Metuoc1oloc7, aooor41Dc to hrf., -.at 
oolltribt.l.. oriMr1a of rel.eYalaoe to 8oc101os1oal reaearcb. nt.pttee &beNt the 
def1D1tton of 80010100', t .. aaaple, are Mtaa00101oatoal d1ept&tee 0ft.I' \be 
orlter1a of releftD08 .. , up 'by dUterent eoo1olopate. Ie 8Oclolo.,. 
cenceraed nth hiator1oal. taota, peJObolol1o&l natas, or curreat Pr'Obl ... ~ 
It has bee. _ted tbat crlteria of re1Jrtuc:le baft alreaq bee. Mtabl1ahed 
tor the p&"_. theela, by the .. tHr'e aooeptaaoe of Sot'old.Jl'. "aeaa1n&:fUl 
1nteraot1oftu ... the nbjeot matter ot eooloto.,., 1d.th the d1T1810D tate 
2,..t87, I!!! $!?Op.e !!!2 Kethod ~ Soc10101l, p. 8. 
laoben B:l.aratedt, "BoDdnal and Real. Dats.n1tlou,· ~81lua 011 
Socloloc1!!l tbaoU (eel. Llawll.7n aroas (Iftutoa, IlltilO; 1959T pp. 124-is. 
4rvt87', "!be Problem of Values," Sl!lR2s1a OIl S00101osioal tbaoU, pp. 
ru~U. - · 
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IOc1ety, culture, a1'ld p8r8OQaUf,y. 1'be shd.l.ariV between orlt.eria ot 
rele't'lU1Ce and ~rg_'s oaJ1Ol1 ot .. lection hu &leo beal1 not.iced, Lonerpn, 
- -
1t will be recalled, eqs that the "'MIl .. i.e ... have a d1ttere. canon ot 
pleot1on hom the natural 8010 .. " in that the,. deal with the data ot 
COUC10W1.U ... well &I wit.h the data ot saDIe. !be data. of conso1ouanus 
are irre l.evaa\ t.o pl'q1I1ca. S Bec... the lIlCoeu of the Datural 801ence8 baa 
led 80me who nuq MIl to a 1I8r'f'11.e rather tban an 1ntAlllpnt adoption of 
acientif1c procedures, th ... bu reaulted the pbaDO'll8DQD called -scienf,1Im." 
William B. wtvte. Jr. sqa that this 18 "the Pl"cxaiae that with the 88M tech-
niques that. haft WOl"ked 1n the ptqBical acie'¥'e. we can 8V8ntualq create an 
ex.act sci8llGe ot man. ,,6 1'h1a prOlld.ae aad hope t.ellda to lead t.he p!"utltt.o.rs 
ot soient1lm to appq the ... oaDon ot _leot1cm to the social .o1ellCes .. 
the pbpic1at appUn to b1a .ei.... Th1a C&nl'J)t be done I however, Without 
violatina aaother important 08l'l01l ot aoi.elm1tio _thad, the canon ~ complete 
e!J2luat~. It1ftle &0&1 ot emp1rioal metbod, t't it nate., ItU cOIIUIDllly stated 
6a to be the complete explanatlon of all pb.tmomeQll or data." 
4. Criteria!! eel_tittc 9!!Utz. The or1ter1a ot 'reltmmOa dat4trla1De 
1Ibat tbe tOl"JllUlatlona of a _ann aN to be about J 1:Mt tbe croiter1a ot 
scientific qul1V determ.ne lISOre preo1eeq the obaracter1at1o. a propoaltSoD 
IIUIt haw it it, f.a to be att1aed. III " .... ch, a source ot 1ol1cal ocmtuiOll 
'WM1"p.n, pp. 11-12. 
&nae Or",.uioa !:!! (N .. York, 19)6), p. 26. 
6ar.onerpu, p. 84. 
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otten 00-. tre "tM tall.aq ot the OODRqant,. 
Couider the ....... 
It J:v'.pothea1. X 18 true, then oouecpmcea x,T. aDd I 11111 
toU .. ". 
But, 11.,7, aad z do follow. 
'1'beretore bJpotbeal8 I 18 1;,ne. 
0bn0u17, the -au-nt dou DOt really pro .... that X 18 true, 1t 
.... l;y p,roTe. that X can qpla1D 11.,7, amd z. Howwr, there 
..,. u1at ... alteru.t1 .... ~11. l'vb1oh caa al.ao expl.a1n 
thea. Moreovw, vban a 1I1d.er ranp of pbe....,... 18 exaalDlad, 
-- tact v lIlT tun\ up Whlob OaD be uplaS.ned by r bat aot 
by X. Far Xto be .... it1ed o01lri.J:tcila&1T 1t would be D8C8N8l"7 
to .. pe. 
It, !!!t !!!k !;!, IvPotbelta I 18 tne, X,T, &ad I will 
to11Ow. 
Bu.t. XiT, aad I do tollow. : 
!htlNtore X 18 true. 
In other 'IOl"'da, tw X to 'be oODT1M1Dgly 'fW1tied" 1t muat not 
0Dl7 u.pl.aia all the kaova tacta, but 1t ..t be 1aIovll to be t.be 
~ tvPot1aea1a vb1ch can expla1n them. 
Iu prac\1oe, it 18 unall;y "IfIr7 d1tt1eult to exclude all 
altemat,iw b7P0--... &ad to atate w1t.h ~ t.hat, lu 
the cml.7 pou1ble ceDaraliHUn that, can oonoe1ftb'q expla1u 
the kDo_ tacta. tforMlq, .cd.ea.tUt.1 do DOt olal. t.b1a aort 
ot ftl'it1.eat1ou t .. their puval1latloua.1 
S. So1ent1t1o SUal1tl !!!! yalue 2!l!!nt.. The tact. tbat ao1ellt1ata 
do DOt ow. absolute lo&ioal Terit1oat.1on tor their h7P0the... leads Purtey 
to the ooDOluion that .olent1ata accept. bypothe ... Oft the buts of ftl_ 
judpellte. "As Ru4ner bu ftry vell ,aid, 
low I take 1t that no analp1a ot what oonn1t1l'tes the JIletbod ot 
100ence would be aat1ataotory uul.eu 1t oompr1aed __ ueert.10n 
to tb8 etten t,bat the scient1st .. sc1eDt,1at aocepta or rejecta 
tqpot.he.... Bu' it thie 18 80 then olear17 the ao1Amt.1at. u aoltm-
t1st doN aake value judpenta. For. atnce DO ao1entU1c )vpothe.1a 
18 ever oomplete 17 ftr1t1ecl. 1a aooept.1na a lVPo~1a the 101eDt1at 
J1USt, ake the decia10n that the evidenoe 111 nttio1el'ltli{ .trona or 
t.hat the pt'obab11it7 i8 ntt101eftt.17 hich to warrant aeceptan.oe 
ot tdw b;ypotheeis.8' 
1'h1a, hotre'ver, trequent13 18 not recognized 111 accounts of .o1entUio _thocl. 
Pol.alJT1 aqa that alth.oqh "8D7 critical ver1f1catlo11 ot a lCient1t1o stateme 
require. the same power. for reoop1z1nl rattonalit7 in nature as doe. the 
pl"ooeN ot 801ent11"lo d18ooftrT." .;J1ent1tic methodolo&1ata olterl 1&Rore this. 
"When ph1l.oaophera ana11M the \'VU1oatiDn ot lC1ent.U'1c law, theT 
inftr1ab17 choose as 8peci.ama such law .. are not in doub\, aDd thus 
1DeV'1tablT overlook the inter'ftnt1on ot the.~ powers. Tbey are dea .. 1blDc tba 
practiOl.l deaoutrat1oa ot IOlell\1t1o law, and 110' 1ta .. 1t1oa1 ?Vitiation.-
6. !!:!! context !!. a1!dpnt. If DO acientific tvPotbeata 18 completel)" 
verilied 1a the .... that 1t 18 tbe =17 !Q'pot.haa1a that .. upla1a the 
fact., than Rudner's etat..ement. tb.at, "the .c1entiat -..t make the deo1eion 
that the ev1deD.ce 18 attic1ent1T 8tronc 01' tbat, the pt'obab11itT 18 
eutt101entk h1cb t,o varraat ,be acoeptanee of the tqpothesu- 18 correct. 
And l'artey adda that before the so1ent1at can an the deol8iGn that a 
bypothes1e is aooept&ble or probable, he _t make aneral prell.DArT 
dec1alou as to "wbat makes a re18VlUlt obeC" .... t1oD. what oontrola shou.1d be 
applied in tak1a& obaervat1ou, vbat obaenatlou 0\lIht to be _de, what 'mode 
8IbW., p. $1" (f&Ot1D& 1U.cluard Rt1dnsr, "The Sc1eD.ti.t S!! Scientist Make 
Va.lue ~,- Philosophy !! Science, II (Jamtal7, 1953), pp. 1-6. 
9pol.alv'1, p-~ bovl!$!P, pp. 13--lb. 
---
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to use u .. ~work for ob8ervationa, aJ'ld 80 on."lO Now all of these 
Ifdec1s1ou" are baaed upon "ucJa-nta. One's put jud.pMmta "_in 1d:hh hill. 
It",.,. fora a bah! tWll orientation, preaent and opeNt1 ft, but onlT tro. 
behind the acnae. 'fhe7 10Ye1'rl the d1rection of attention. evaluate 1na1ghta, 
guide to1"fllU1at1ona, and influence the aocept.aaoe or rejection of DeW 3WJI-
Jl8nta.ttU !he habitual or!entation one baa .. a reault of a context ot put 
judgments 18 net unique to oneself, tor MD in the 8_ aultural .,.. .... 
share an o1"'1entation that is, to a large utent, the ea.. Pol.an1i 
illuatNtes th18 b)r a di.ute betwen two oOJllPetent so1entist.a. In crder to 
have a basis tor ~ntJ each .. t Nq.- .~ standarda V11ch be believes to 
be obl.1ga'to17 both tor hiD8elt and the other. Eve..,. time e1 th&tr of them 
_1<8s an uaertion as to what is tJoue and valuable ill sOience, he .. 11. 
bl1nttq Oft a whole ayatM of collateral tacta and _lues accepted bT 
8c1enoe.·12 
1. ~01" lmowle<!e. Th1a 8)"8teI of collateral. tacta and Yaluu 
accepted by sotenee would H_ to correspond to the realIt, no" ~ ot 
-.tuc1entit1c theor;r, but also or OU'I"NDtl,J' accepted scientific theo17. M1I 
syatn of science oan ltan4 onq ineotar u 1ndiv1dual scd.anUs., who haw 
peraoaal knowledge ot oaq a ..u .trac-nt. of the total1\y' of so1ent1t1o 
~an, p. 277. 
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theolT, tNet other scientists to uphold their parts ot the system.1) Polauy1 
sq'S that although he dissents tram lOIIle ot the accepted standards of sc1ence, 
"such beterodox.1e. must raain tr ... lltar7 it science 18 to sum.ve as a 
coherent qst. ot 8Upenor knowledge, upheld by people mutually NCOCniz1ng 
each other as eeientilts, and. acknowledged by' m.odern society as ita guide." 
Besides SCience, Polan,r1 includes in superior knowledge "all that 18 
coherently belieYed to be right and excellent bT men within their culture ... lb 
There 11 a huge m.uaber ot hwaan attirPlatiolll, only a small £repent of which 
is visible to &D3' .. bel" ot the culture. 
They' are the utterance. of prophets, poets, lecialators, scientists 
and other masters, or the •• ssages ot men who, by their actions, 
recorded. in h1ato1"7. have .et a pattern tor posterityJ to which are 
added the livilll VOiCH of cont.por8l".Y cultural leaden, coapeting 
for the allegiance of the public. Thus we may regard in the last 
anaJ.,yaia, the entire auperior knowledge _bodied in a modern highly 
articulate culture a8 the SUll total of what its clusic8 haft 
uttered and its hereea ar:d mnte han done. It we balOlll to thia 
cul tun then the .. are our great men. .." to whose lI1.lp8ri.ori. ty we 
entrot cmrsal.va., by tzoy1nl to understand their vorda and to follow 
their teachings and ex&I!\ples. Our adherence to the common beliefs 
and. atand.arda on which lntallectual exchanges within a culture 
depend, appears then equivalent to our adherence to the 88M aasters 
as tountaina ot authority. • • • When reterr1.ng to such superior 
knowledge .. are not lq1ng down standards tor judging the persona 
to wbaa we attribute thi. knowledge. we are subm1ttlll1, on the 
contrU'T. to the standards laid down by them tor our own guidance.1' 
8. S!p!rior knowl!dg8!!!! _tuociololl. It would 8e_ that a hulc 
task or metuocioloQ' would be to make explicit .. DlUCh of this qst. ot 
l.3z.on.rgan, pp. 703-106. 
14Polazvi., Personal Knowlec!se, pp. 31,-316, original. in italic •• 
l'Ibid _.
---
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au:perior knowledge al poslible, at least insofar u it would bear on socio-
logical research. Darld BidneT sqs tbat the 1IIportant task of metaetbnology 
or met.aantbropology or metaaociolOQ' is the "inve.tigation of the basiC, 
logically primi ti"e Ulwaptiona as to the nature of the world and of man 
involved in arr:t one given cultural. STstem." This, however, is a task that the 
posl ti vistic OI'ientation ot .eae .ocial scienti.ts has led thea to overlook. 
It is h1chl7 s1gnitioant, theretore, that a sociologist ot 
the stature ot Soroldn has endeavored to introduce this meta-
cultural perspective into contemporar,y sociology. His Social and 
Cultural ~ca is baaed upon the major pradae that f.hi · -
itpreauppOfJOu ot a culture detel'11l111e its empirical un1te.-
tationa and. iut1tutiona." His analyaia at all cultures into the 
au.pertyp_ senaate, 1cleational, and ideaUat10 i. an .tteapt to 
provide a "logico-mean1ngtul" hula tor t.he integration at arr 
given culture (inaofar as it i. integrated) in term. ot itl ultimate 
epi.temologioal .... taphya1oal presuppositions. The point I .. 
concerned to JU.ke here 1s that there il • real funotional clitterenoe 
between the phUosophical taskl ot the metaanthropologist and the 
aetuooiolog1.t, on the ODe hand, and that ot the empirioal 
anthropolOl1st and sociologist, on the other. The taot that so 
taw .ociologists have been inclined to tollow the path indicated by 
Soroldn demonstrates how exceptional. tn hi. phUosophical interpreta-
tion ot the role ot the lociologlat.16 
There .881. to be a cliaorepanq between Bidne7's concept ot aetuooiolOO" or 
metaanthropopolOQ', and. tbe ~oncept .. uaH by' rurttq and Bieretedt. Fu.rtfl1' 
would not ... to regard a .tu. as a.tuooiologioal UDle .. it eng.,ec:l upon an 
ana.l.7a1. ot the ltepist.8mological.-m.etapb7.1oal preeuppoa1t1ona" ot the 
SOCiologist,. iuotar u th •• e had a bearing on hil 8ociological. ruearoh. He 
e:Jq)l1cl tly place. S0r01d.n· 8 .tudT or the fiuctuation ot dirt.rent cr1 teria ot 
108 
17 tr'Uth 1n the realm ot the sociology ot lmowl.edge. And Bi81"stedt' a statement 
that " .. tasociology is now a. hllhly developed diao1pl1neft seems to indicate 
that he would not use the term to charaoter1.u Sorok1.n t s work, which 18 along 
a path which tew 8oc1ologists have been wUl1ng to follow, according to 
B1d.ney'. 
9. Contrast between metuoc1ol2ll .!!!! !!!! sociolos:r .2£ lmowlSe. 
Metuooiology, as a "highly deT8loped discipline," seems to consist in practioe 
in a set ot norms that are to guide the scientist's research behavior. Meta-
sociology illYOl ves ana.l.yals pr1mar1l.T or the norma aspect ot the ideolOC1cal 
culture ot the sociologist, neglecting the iJr!iegration ot these norms with 
other behav10ral norma ot the .ociologist, and ot norma with the meanings and 
values he also holds. The soo1010Q' ot knowledge, on the other hand, would 
ooncern itselt with the total ideological culture ot the sociologist, and with 
the relationship ot the SOCiologist's meanil'.lgs, nOl'lU, and value. to his actual 
situation in the sociocult.ural. universe. And although, u B1eratedt aqa, 
SOCiologists are quite willing to lq down norma tor research behavior, the;r 
aeea to be quite reluctant to recognize the relationship at their own 
metaaooiological oonvictions to their place in a living social .,..tem.. As 
Gideon Sjoberg s...,.. "Contanporary SOCiologists when evaluat:b_ social 
scientist. at the past an prone to 'ri.4N these mell .. products ot their oul. ture 
and historical period. rmt these s_ sociologists are reluctant to conoede 
that they too are oaught in the web ot d_andJI 1apoaed by their own prilurr 
17rurt.." "The Problem at Values, If p. S20. 
--
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group, by the nOl'U ot Bci.noe, and especially' b7 the broader socIety in which 
theY live.1t text. on _thod, he claiu, general17 di8regard ttthe 1JIpact ot 
the sociocultural syataa upon the inve.tigator, upon h18 techniques, and upon 
his mode ot anal78is. Although conaidel"ing the researcher as rtIl'Iloved. trom hi. 
social qatem-i.e., u it tunction1.Dg in a vaouwa-ma;.r prove in aOM inatanc .. 
a useful anal3'tlc device, it ls deoidedl.;r unrealistic and distorts 1!I1U\V' 
aspecta ot the real world. in which the social scientist DlUIt neo.ssar1l.7 
tu.nction •• 18 
10. Conclusicma. Criteria ot relennc. cannot, it .... to the writer, 
be arbitrary_ Rel .... anc. criteria that deIV ~e data ot conaoiousnes., and 
thereb7 dtmT the aignit1cance of meanings, noru, and values are being 
-
arbitrary in their denial ot an 1Ilportant part of the data. Such oriteria 
would rule out aqr such study as the soololocr of knowledge. Furthermore, 
relennoe criteria that den.r that the sociologist doing the study' has an 
lnterpretati ve tr-.work, aoqu1red in a proce.. ot encul tvation, shaped "" 
the aoc1ety and culture in which he vas educated, and that would d.eIV that thi. 
interpretative f'rD.evoI"k i. highlY' influential in the re.earch and conolusions 
ot res.arch, are meTano. OJiitel"ia that arb1trar117 rale out verifiable tacts. 
Sociologist. have noms and v&1..u •• that can be subjected to sociological 
analysis. When the aociologist 1s considerecl aa operatIng in a vacuUII, 
detached and un1.ntluenoed by hi. sociocultural. qst.em, he Is--oonscious17 or 
unconsciOU$17--.. eldng to .... WIle the position ot Redtield's ideal observer, ot 
a Laplacean Un! vereal Mind. 
l8ftOperationalia and Social aesearch, II SppoaiUlll!!! SocIological 'fhe0!'f, 
P. 610. 
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To acknowledge oneselt u having enculturatecl experience that lnfiuences 
one's research is, however, to put oneael.t in the position o! having to cope 
wi th relativism._ "How, tt asks Sjoberg, tlis it possible to gain generalizable, 
uni V'eraal knowledge it this knowledge 18 mere17 a reflection ot the 
intellectual'" own culture or of his position in the social system?u19 Accord-
inglJ", since Redtield and Soroldn both recognize that they' are 1nnuenced by 
their culture, it will be receasar;y to look into their treatment ot rel.ativia. 
In disoussing Re<lt1eld's positd.on, his ooncepts of "the inside aDd the outside 
viewpoints" will also be diaouaaed. And in d1.cussl~ Sorokin' 8 posl tion, his 
concepts ot the "psychologioal reading- and ~ "sooiologioal-phenomenological 
reading" ot au! ture will be diecuaaed. 
B. RBLATMSM. REDFIELD 
1. Relatlvism!!!!.!!! llttl.e cOllll1Wl1tr- When gOing into a amall 
oommuni ty ot a cul tuN ditferent frat. his own, the inve8t1gator must be .ensi-
tive to the tact that the people he w:Ul _et and talk with are 101ng to have 
atandarde ot right and wrong, truth and. tal.itT, that mq be 80J1ewhat d1tferent 
trom hie own. Even within a sincle wide culture area such as the United. States 
such ow. tural d1.tterenoea are recognized in the popular stereotype. ot the 
silJlple tara-boT and the sophisticated city-slicker. According to Redfield, 
cultural relatlY1_ in anthropology is a result ot anthropologists askiDI 
whether one value 18 better than another. 
!he anthropologists have, on the whole, considered. the question 
as asking it their flcienti.f'1c m.ethods are applicable to questions 
--
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abou t whether something is better than sCIIIlething else. Not beine 
theistic theologians, they have not aeked it the intrinsio good 
can be determined b7 consulting the revelationa ot God, and not 
be1rc philosophen, th.,. have not sought a rational demonstration, 
resting on co_on knowledge alone, that one way ot thought or 
action is better than another. '!'hey have tound that the way they 
use their minds in coa1.nc to a conclusion as to what 1d.n4 of pottery 
people make or what ld.nd of values these other people, not 
anthropologiete, place on cannibal.1a or on chastity does not work 
when they are uked to e.tablish that one value is better tor a man 
to hold than another. And they h .... not experienced much trouble in 
distinguishing tact statements hoa value statellents. The tormer 
onl1', they' are sure, are their bueineee.20 
2. Redt1eld t. critlque !! relat1v1a. llerskovita states that It judgments 
IJ"8 baaed on experience." Redfield note. that the aperiences ot anthropolo-
gists 8ft cl1anS1na, and b:r the principle of r,latlT181l itself, their judgments 
about relatin... haft also been chancing. When thq are asked to anthrapolo-
gl_ the lane, tor example, rather that 8OA'le r_ote tribe, it is cI1fticult t 
them to maintain a detached neu.traUty that g1 ..... equal validity to all 
cul.turea. Ms is eapeCial.ly difficult since, in practice, 1"8lativi_ haa not 
enjoined a cessation ot valuation, but positi .... evaluations. The anthropolo-
gist is auppoae4 to be neutral tor eYer.ybod,y.21 AnthropologiSts have alW8J's 
tended to value stable and vell integrated SOCieties, perhaps because of the 
anthropological practice ot comparing oul tuns u unchan&ing qat ... 22 But 
the anthropologist will value the integrated socle. over the d1alntegratecl 
80ciety on more huaan18tic grounds as well. "The anthropologist can hardl7 
comince us-or himael.t'-that 80 tal" as he i8 concerned a disorganized culture 
fOrb. Pr1m1tiT8 World and Its Transtormationa, pp. 143-144. 
- --
22Ibid., pp. l49-1S0. 
-
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that talla to prov1.de a desire to l1ve 18 ... nJ.1d as arv other. Equal 
validity can be aatelJ" attributed onl.T to culture. t.hat arrange it 80 people 
do what t.hey' want, to do and are convinced that 1 t 1. the right thing to do ... 2) 
The most dec181.,.. crit.1c1sm or arrr radioal relat1Y18Dl, however, can be 
aimed at the princ1ple .. applied. to 1tself. Herakovlts has to recognise a 
deVelopment in knowledge which enabl .. him to toraulate a principle which he 
would not expect the primitive people he studie. to tormulate. It he holds 
the principle as valid, he cannot help tacitly a88\lDling that the society Whoae 
enculturatlon Pl"OC._ enables him to tormulate the principle or relativism is 
better than a aoc1~ whoae enculturation proqes8 makes this impossible. 
Redtield says that anthropologi8ts reoognlze a trend in historr which bas 
resulted in a Btandard. ot truth and good inherently better than that ponesaed. 
by the pri1111Uves-"1nbel"ent.1y' 'batter, not just better relative to the judplent 
impressed on hill by hi. enculturated experience. • •• The pr1rll1tive Man is 
not expeoted to raach the kind. or truth w call Bcientific wi tb. the __ 
aucea .. with WHich Civilized man is expected to reach it. There has be"n a 
tramslormat.iou ot judgment as to truth ... 24 
l. Science.!! ~ ... cul,;;;;;;;.;;;t.,;;;;;W" ... al-. value. This tranatomation ot judpant as to 
truth is based. upon the development ot a qat. ot fJUpmw knowledge which 
include. acience &. an ideal. Polany1 tormulates it 88. 
11' 
the ideal of a highly difterentiated intellectual lite pursued 
colleotiYal.1'J or more preciee17, ot a cultural elite actively' 
conducting such an intellectual life vi thin a sociaV' respOD8i ft 
to the intellectual pasaiona at thia elite. The acoeptance ot 
these assumptions Mal. a pact ot _tual contidence within the 
communiV of scientista and. seala the dedication ot society as a 
whole to the support ot their s.ient1t!o pursuita. '1'h1s dedioation 
takes ettect in the utabliahrllent ot aCient1.tic institutiona, aet 
up tor the &dTanccent ot sclenoe and. tor its d1 •• end.rJation throughout 
society under the authority ot SCientific opinion. ArJ1'One who 
integrallT belong. to the sool" In question vUl 8h ... thereby its 
cultural. dedication and the ueumptions which underlie this 
dedioation.2S 
Anyone who haa UDdel'lODe the enculturation process in such a sooieV vUl, the 
sbare thi. ideal, unle.s he is a rebel or a deYiant. And to the extent that 
his ideological culture &til hi. behari.oral cUlture aN integrated, he vUl 
engage in, or at least support, scientific ""arch. But PolAn1'1ind1catel 
the strange result. thi. haa for eoc1ology. 
The contrast in which I have set th11 lOient,.lf1c COIl8lMUa with 
the specious coherence ot a company ot traude or tool. haa shown 
that I share the asawapt10ns underl;r1ng this COn88D8U8. M7 
unqualified use ot accreditat1ve uaum:ptions like '801ent1t1c 
ataularda' and • scientifio valuu' in tonwlattng these uewapt10na 
had alread;r implied that I subscribe to what I was describing. I 
bell.... that tacit endore .. nte ot thia k1nd are uuvoidabl.e in 
referring to the bel lets and valuations wtlich one sharea, and I 
shall return to thia tact later on. MeanvhUe, let .. add that in 
subscribing to the ullUDlptions and pasaions shared by' a society in 
the Cllltintion ot science I al80 lend-to thia extent.....,. support 
to such a society. Arrr sociology which accred1. ts the beliefs on 
vhioh society ia tOUlXleci toru a juet1t1cation ot thi8 SOCiaty. 
And it the wr1. ter is a _ber ot the socia. in question, h1.a 
100101087 is a declaration ot loyalty to it. Indeed, consistency 
requires that in the affirmation ot socially shared nlu •• our 
eleeleationa should agree with our particlpation in &IV' .ocial 
actlviti. based. on the ... umed 'l'aliditT ot the .. affirmations. Yet 
it is precisely this consistency which rendere the un! verBal intent 
2S 
Polanyt, PerBoDll Knowlse, pp. 218-219. 
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ot such eleelarationa suspect, since it shows that they lend support 
to established. powers, after having been inatUled in us by the very 
society which they '9'1nd1cate.26 
4. Sociol9Sl!!!! acientlfic nluea. Several threads ot thought can now 
be woven into a scaewbat more integrated pattern. Biersted't at.f1.rmed that 
JIl8taaooiology is a highly' &mtlopEKl disCipline, but that SOCiology', or at 18 ... t 
sociological theol7, is b;y contrast weak and pallid. Now 1'Iletuociology in this 
.ense is a statement of the _taaociologiattl lOienillie idu1., an ideal which 
he share. v1 th others whom he truts to uphold their ahare of the task ot 
scientific deftlopment. This statement of an ideal is an aft1rmation of valuea 
and of nonas by which th ... values mq be real:1zed and maintained. But the .. 
noms and values are part ot the subject matter tor sociological theory-some-
thing to be apla1ned. SOCiological theory, however, baa a'VOided. the i ... 
bere, acept in the handl ot those tev sociologists who, as Biersted.t mentions, 
are not atra1d of being called unao1ent1tic. Sjoberg affirms that ·cont.por 
8ocio1ogi8ts • • • are reluctant to concede that they too are caught in the web 
of damanda ilIposed by their own pr1m.a.r:r group, b7 the nol"l18 ot SCience, and 
eapecial.ly by the broader IOciev in which they live. 1t And he indicate. a 
possible reason for thil reluotance. If How is it p08lible to ga1n. generalisable 
universal lmoWl.edge it this knowledge i. 1lerel.T a reflection of the 
intellectual's own culture or ot his position in the soclal ay-stem?,,27 Th18 i. 
precleel¥ the point noted by Pol.an71 when he states that the consistency 
26 Ibid., p. 219. 
27 Sjoberg,· pp. 609-610. 
-bet1fMn aftu..tione and participation in soc1al activities-i.e., integration 
ot ideological. and. behavioral cultve--renders auapect the declarationa of 
sociology. 1tA..ny sooio1ogr whicb accredits the beliefs on which a societor is 
rounded fona a justification ot this society. And if the writer i8 a mabel' 
of the ,ociety 1n question, his sociology i. a deolaration of 10)"al ty to it." 
But the expliCit ideals formulated by the sociologist in his JHtaaociology 
torbid tlw entrance of "declaratione of loyal.1t into the real..m. ot .oientitic 
attirmatione. '!'heretore, text. on mathod generally' disregard "the 1mpact ot 
the aooiocultu:ral system upon the investigator, upon his techniques, and upon 
hiS mode of analya1., "even though" conaideriJ?g the re.earcher as r8Jloved trOlR 
his social syataa-l.a., as it tunctlon1na in • vacuua-- • • • ia decidedly 
unrealisti.c and distorts maD)" aspects ot the real world in which the social 
28 
.cientlata must nece8sari1y function." 
s. Objectivity and evaluation. Redfield state. that scientific objectlv-
ity doe. not demand that the sOientist retrain from all value judgmenta, he 
maintains that it i. impouible not to value. It can be recalled that 7urtey, 
in presenting crt terta ot scientific quali t,., affirmed that. the acceptance ot 
most SCientific hypothese. inTol ve. ftlue judpenta on the part of the 
scientists. For Red!1eld, objectivity demanda verification, not elimination ot 
value •• 
The neoessit,y to understand the values of the people one 1s st~­
iDa requires, I should •• , the projection into untadllar lIOrda 
and. actione of human quali ti .. -a,mpath;r, pride, neh to be appre-
Ciated, and .0 on. otherwise the ethnologi8t will not f1ncl out 
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what the people he i8 stucb'1ng an proud about or what, for thaa, 
desern. appreciation. My own opinion is that it is not possible 
to make use of theae hUll.-l qualiti. in field work, as I think one 
1I\18t, vi thout aleo valuing what one ae... In the "'l7 necesaity 
to describe the native, one must feel tor b1a-or perhaps against 
him. The te.u~. are mixed with mutiona. • •• Objectivity 
requires that I hold in suspense each formulation I make about the 
natift 11te. It requires ... to beccae aware ot the value. I have 
that may lead .. in one direction rather than another. It demands 
that I subject ,., deecriptiorsa to the teate of doowaentation, 
internal consiste.nay', and it poe.ible the evidence and judgments of 
other observers. But I do not think that 1t &aka of me that I 
divelt lQ'lelt of the human qualitie., including valuing. I could 
not do mr work wi thout th_.~ 
6. Scienti_!!!! value.. A. strict believer in the rigid applioation ot 
natural soienoe techniques to the studT ot man would naturally be hostUe to 
aedfield'. oontention that objeot1vJ.ty does not require him to divest h1uelt 
ot ttthe hWl.an qualities, including valuing." Yet otten they will not heeitate 
to use psychologiCal. tests, interview., questionnaires, etc. And according to 
Wh,rte, those who make up and administer the .. evaluate both in the tormulation 
ot the que.tions and the interpretation ot the answere. But ubecause 'percen-
tUn' and 'coefficient.' and 'standard. deviationa' are of themselves neutral, 
the sheer methodology of using them can convince people that the,y are translat-
ing uncertainty into certainty, the subjective into the objecti"., and 
eliminating utterly the bugbear of value judgIl'8nts. But the mathematics does 
not elinl1nate values, it onl,y obscures them.")O Furthermore, every type of 
interview, que.Uonnaire, poll, or projective teat involves cOlIIIlUnicat10n 
between two hwI.an beings as subject. or interaction. This interaction i8 
29Th. Primitive World !m!. ~ Transformations, pp. 15)-154. 
)~, p. 204. 
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aeaniDgtulJ ani ror it to be intelligible to both the inteJ"9'1ewer and the 
subject being interviewed, they both mst a88UJ1le that nch teNs &I ttunderatandj 
in approximately the sae vq by both. What Redtield • .- about coammication 
lI1th people of an unfamiliar culture he att1.rma also ot communication within 
one'. own culture. "one DlUat begin by aaawdng, as common senae assumes in 
trying to reach understanding in talk1Dl with &nother person, that something is 
the a.e in that w..,. ot lUe and one's own. 1t31 
7. R.elatina!!! heuristic principle. Although the principle ot 
reiati vi ... brings on serious doubt .s to the \In! versali ty of acient1.t1c 
affirmations when it 18 raised by its 4fwoteea to an absolute principle, in 
addition to becClll1Jlg self-contradictory in such m elwated position, it 18 
oerta1nlT valid and necesa817 as a b.eur1sUo principle. For it is in bas10 
agreeaent ld. th LoneZ'l&ll t s statement that the sc1.ences oE man IIlU8t utUi. the 
data ot oonsciousnessJ it protects the inveatigator ot the little OOlIIlUnitT 
froa aubjeotiye projection bun upon atl oversight ot the taot that other 
people s .. things ditterentl7 trom the war one see. the h1aeelt. As Redfield 
puts it, the inveatigator MUst view the COlmRuniV not 0Dl;y trom the outaide, 
but also tl'Oll. the insidea 
a. •• t tiret take the poai tion ot the nomad or agricultural. 'fillacer 
or citisen ot a small town in a modern state and look out on soae-
thine as that person looks out upon it. The investigator has to aee 
the uardng, understand the valuation, and feel the teeling connected 
with object or act in the mind ot the native. Onl7 atter he has 
aeen it trom the native t s point ot view mq the investigator change 
his viewpoint and look at that object or act-together with the 
31The Little Oa.un1t,z, p. 93. 
P' 
meanilll and the value it bas tor the nat.lve-as an object ot 
,ci.ntitic intereet now to be deaoribed .from the outside and 
related by t.he investigator to other things according to the 
demand. ot a more detached and abstract understanding. 
U8 
This neees'ity to see ths thing tirst from the inside and 
then troll. the outaide aria .. in underst.and:1.ng aDTth1na personal. 
or cultural, it la true in understanding a pot or a plow or a 
aledge, for one must take the viewpoint of the native at least. 
long eDO'tlgh to ee. that to hiRI the object haa the uses and other 
meanings that are suggested by our worda "pot" or "plow" or 
"sledge. tl ••• Much ot the advance of anthropoloclcal wisdom 
has come with the more d18criDd.nat1ng and. careful aa8Ullpt.ion of 
the inside view ot things. Thus, the concept of totem1sm seemed 
a simple and urd.tora oonception in ear17 anthropology when t.he 
aota ard objects called total181l were looke4 at pretty DI1ch from 
the outa1de. Then all totemic people seead much al1lce, but as 
inside accounts appeared of Autral1an totem:t_ and ot totaism 
in other part. of the world. the ver:1 great difference. in 
meaning of the things called totem.t1Jll beCame apparent, and. the 
concept changed. its nature and ita uaefulnu •• l2 
8. Need tor both inside and outaide Y1ev. Redtield notea t.hat it 18 not 
.......... -......., - -. 
necessary for the student. of stare or starfish, of chaaical. elements or of 
atOlll8, to try to learn what these things think anc! feel. "Btlt the aentiments, 
ideas, and judgments ot good and bad. that make up the Mntal state. ot other 
people are the verr stuft ot the pereonal. and cultural studies, th.., are the 
data out ot which such science ls to be made as lta atudenta can make. On the 
other hmd, theae lIMIlltal atatea ot other people do not becOJlle data. do not 
enter into abstract and general 1mo1tledge. until. t.hey aN looked at troa the 
outslde and glven name. that relate thea now in the m:.1nde ot outside students 
to other noh data ... l ) Thus. there i. a lla1t to the extent to whioh one can 
32nw Little Community', pp. 81-62. 
3.3zb1d., p. 82. 
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take t.he inside viftl "There was a studmt. of the Zuni Indiana years ago, 
Frank Cushing, Who assumed the inside view eo perfectly' that he bee_ in 
etfect. a Zuni Indian and was made, I believe, a Priest of the Bow in their 
religion. But attar that. he told outsiders nothing more about the Zuni ... 34 
Cushing carried out in concrete action the ordera ot "absolute relativisaJ" 
the w..,. that the Zuni looked at thing. wu just 88 good &8 the WIq' anthropolo-
gists look at things, .... n t.hough the Zuni outlook placed no value upon tel11n& 
out aide,.. about th .. elvea. 
9. §t.!EarZ. Redfield a81'8 that anthropologiata do not practice strict 
relativ1-. '1'he.r are suppoaed to value every :oulture poaiUvel.7, not pass1~ 
judgrdent on the buic suppositions of that culture, but tound thil 1lIpoaaible 
lIhen they were called upon to anth1"opolog1H 1IOdern co_un! Ues. Th.,. tend to 
value atable and integrated. locietie.. ArJd t1nal.lT, they cannot u •• the 
principle upon it.selt, they muat aclcnowled£_ a development in judgment. But 
relativi8 U a lIoti ... tor aociologists to at.taIJlpt the "flight into the 
V&Cuua" were tn.., can view society as detached, ideal obs_"era, tor they 
believe that an expl.ioi t declaration ot loyU. to t.he aociet,. whioh 
engendered acient1t1c values in t.heir minds and willa would make their work 
ttunsciantit1c." A belief that .thaatical un1pulation ot data make. suoh 
data un1nnuenoed by one'. own value. is a r&ll&Cy' ot soient!.. For 4mIIl to 
get such data, one must take the inaide view, which involve. valuing. '!'he 
example ot Frank Cushing, how8"18l", .hows that one IlU8t not g1 va up the OI1taide 
3hIb1d• 
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ri."" altogethe1". The mathematical. manipulation ot data gathered by taldag the 
inside view i8 misguided. only it it tn.. to destroy a certain tension between 
the inside and the outaide 9'1_ by' pretending that the" is no inside .iew. 
-This tena1on," s .. Red.t1eld, "between the inside and. the outside nev, this 
obligation to m.anage corr80tly the relationship between the, is the central 
prob18lll in studies ~ cul tun or ot peraonallV. It)S 
The stud;y ot relatin81'll .s treated Dr Sorokin wUl require two aections, 
one dealing wi til hi. pqahol.og1cal. and soclologlco-phenOll8nologic&1. readinga of 
culture, and the other deal1ag more explic1t17 with vhat he baa to s., on the 
subject ot relati nsa. 
B. SOROKIlh PSYCHOLOOICAL Atm SOOIOLOOICO ... PHENCMENOLOUCAt 
RIWlIlll OF CULTURES 
1. Mental!,.,.. ! bcr18t1o ant101paUon. Red.t1eld aqa that Ittbe 
aent1menta, ideu, aid 3U"'nta ot good and bed that malce up the mental. states 
ot other people are the very' sturt ot the personal. and. oultural. stucl1u. II 
Sorolc1n 8&78 that all aeantugtul. intel-action baa three aapeota, the soclal, the 
cultural, and the personal, and that the oultural component conalata ot the 
t..hrM level. of ideol_lcal culture, bebaY10ral culture, and. mater1al culture. 
Redt1eld's "mental statea ot other people" oorrespond to Soroldnts ideological 
ou1 ture. In hi. p,rpes.os, Soroldn reters to this u the 1nternal upect ot 
oultur&1 ptwtnc.aM, or the "cultUN unt.al1ty.· Apart trom thia internal 
aspect, the _ternal upeota do not even pertain to oulture. It'l'b1s means that 
))Ibtd 
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tor the investigator of an integrated .8tam ot culture the internal aepect is 
paramount. It detEmtU.ne8 which ot the external. existing phenomena-and in 
vhat .. nee and to what extent-become a part ot the ayatem ... .36 'l'hua, tor 
Sorokin .. tor Redt1eld, the di8covery at culture .. ntality or meaning 18 going 
to be a bulc heuristic anticipation. Soroldn distinguish.. between the 
psychological and the 8ocio1oc1co-phenameno1011cal reading ot oul tUN 
mentaliV. 
2. P!f!llolOg1cal re!dYB. According to the pqchological method, "the 
correct read.1 .. ot the internal. upeot ot culture i8 that which regards it 
ex&C'Yl.!:.e !!!! .!!!! !!l !! .!& !!! rsarded .9t i:!! creater8 .2£ modifiers. It an 
investigator can show that. h1a interpretation i8 indeed identical w1 th that ot 
the per80ns or P'OUP8 invol. wd., then hi. 18 correct u a psyohological. 
reading. It 1'b.1. often 18 a a1mp1e task, tor .. the uan1J::lg or pvpoa8 18 otten 
clear17 and explicitly' announced by the creator." And even when this 18 not 
the 0"', the "character at the cultural object4 th ... 1Tee-1naoriptioDa, 
letters, ChroniCle., boolc8, 1IMtIB01r8, and other 'evidenc.s'-often .furni.h .. a 
autfic1ent bas18 tor the re.toration ot the or1.g1nal meaninC lntemad by the 
creator.. It thi8 were not so, the whole science ot history would have to be 
discarded because nch a psychological reading at culture is one ot the main 
procedure. ot histo1'1' ... '1 'l'ry1nc to get at meanings exactly in the way that the 
creators or modlliera ot a oul tural. phenoaenon viewed th_ seems to cOrNspond 
rather closelY' to Redfield' 8 idea ot taking the inside view. 
~C8, I, 55. 
31Ib1d., pp. 51-58. 
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). His;!:orl. Sorokin sqa that the psychological reading of culture is 
one of the ma1n procedures ot histo1'7. Th1s would .e. to con.t1m the state-
ment that taking the inside view is .. deacr1ptift procedure, tor Sorold.n 
regards history as adesoriptive sCiences "Most historical works are merel:1 
catalogues of men, events, object., value., organized mechanically' on the 
principles of t.ime or apace adjaceucTJ and their 1nterenc .. rarely haft beazo1nc 
beyond the specified area or group which they stud;r ... .38 Related to this is the 
disUnction between history as an individualising science and sOCiology as a 
generalizing science. 
'lihereu history concentrates 1 til attent1qn upon the study of the 
soc1ocul tu.ral pbellOllUm& that are unique and lll'lNpe .. ted. in t1me 
and space (the United state. as a distincti V'e nation; Chriat1ani V 
as a UD1que Nli&iooJ Abrahim L1ncoln aa a particular man, the 
Th:l.r'tq Yearts war as dias1tn1lar frail all other wars), lOOio1OO" 
studi •• tbe pzoopert1 •• of'tthe auperorganic tbat are caaon to all 
sociocultural. phenomena (general sociology) 01" ela. to all varleti. 
of a given 01_ of aociocultural. phencaena-to aU wara, &1.1 
nat.i.OlUI, all revolutions, all religions, etc. (special sooio1og1 .. ). 
By 'f'.l.rt,u of this generalia1Dg quality sociology differs profoundl7 
from history and other indi v1dualizing humanistic dtsciplines • .39 
However. u Lonergan B.,.., general systems and structure. must be "discovered, 
verified, and applied in data that are all individual." And in the preface to 
the Plnam.ici Sorokin brings out this relationship between sociololY and historyl 
The main material with which this invest.igation deals 18 that pro-
vided. bT the Qruco-Roun and Western c1 V1l1aat1ona during the 
more than twenV-ti ve hundred years of their history. In briefer 
tuhion it touch .. &1.80 on the FQptian, the Babylonian, the 
Hindu, the Chine .. , and the Arabic cultures. It i8 not, hO'iNVer, 
• hiato17 of the •• cultures, but a aoclo1oq E! their cbamp. 
38Ibid., p. 30, footnote J9. 
-
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What the difference 1s between these two, the work 1 tsel.t should 
make clear. tlor haa the W'al'"k, in its choice of materials, its 
principles, aethods and aims an;y1.hing to do with what is called 
Cul tural History. Of the semi-historical diSCiplines which it 
resembles, it 1_ nearest to what of'ten 1. styled. PhUoaoplV' ot 
Hi.stol'7 • Since almost all great sociological. systems are a brand. 
of philosophy ot h1story, and since most of the great phUosophi •• 
ot history' are a sort ot SOCiology ot cultural. change, I do not 
have "" objection to the use of this nae by arvODe who tanai •• 
it to describe the present work.40 
It would s .. to follow that the psychological reading ot culture 1s nece88&lT 
in order to obtain the data to be explained by the general systems and 
structures ot 100101ogy. 
4. Sociolopcg-phenomenolos1cal reading. The soc101ogico-phenomenologi-
cal reading ot cul tura mentality i8 baaed. upOb the fact that "the obj eot1", 
results ot an activitY" can Itdeviate greatly tl'Om the subjecti .. aims ot tho .. 
who undertake it. Poets are lelion who aim to write gNat '9'81'88. There are 
mult1tudel ot Icientist. and scholan ltlo aim to be Platos, Newtona, Danr1na, 
but do not in fact achieve aqything but mediocre result •• " Theretore, to .ay 
that there is no meaning outside ot the psychological "would mean to den.r an 
obvious tactl that. the d1acrepancy between lin intent10n and ettect does not 
necessar:il.y' make a cultural coasplex meaningless.llla. Is Sorolcin identit)1.ng the 
psychologiCal. meaning with "subjective aims" and "intention," and the 
sociologloo-pbencmenological meaning with "objeotive re.-.llte" and "atteet?" It 
this 18 true, it would s .. to follow that in reference to Sorokin's desor1pti 
of the emergence ot a eociocultural system the distinotion between the 
~oe. I, x. 
4lIbld., pp. ;8-;9. 
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psychological am the sociologico-PMIlOIlel'lOlogical readings can be claritied. 
For Sorokin gi vee three pha.e. 1n the emergence ot an empirioal soeiocul tural 
q.tezu mental integration. empirical objectifioation, and socialization. 
Speaking ot mental integration. Soroldn say.. "When such an integration 1s 
created tor the tirst time in the history ot manldnd, 1t is an abaolutelT new 
1ntegration. w'hen an existing integration of meanings is le8l"n8d b.1 a given 
lnd1 vidual or group.-f01" instance, by a pupU 'Who learns the IIlU1 tip11oation 
table-it il new to such a person or gl')up •• 42 It would ... that a pupU, 
lookiDg at the symbols by' wr!ich the DIUl tipl1cat.lon table is _pirieally' 
objectified, would be •• ekiDg to regard. the tmp-t1plication table ftexaotl;r !!! 
l!!! .!!!! !!t !! !! .!!! r!Jarcied .!?Z ~ ereaton !t 1IOdif1era, It am thus wou1d 
be attempting a paycboloa1cal reading. It, however, tne distinction between tb4 
psycholoa1cal and the eociologioo-phenomenological reading i. that between 
seeking the Itsubjeoti".e aiult of the originator and aeekiDg the "objeotift 
reaul taft ot the act! 'f'i ty J then the student 18 ob'f'iOU8l.7 attempt1Da a 
8ociolog1co-phenc:llllenologieal reading, tor he Oa:N8 nothing about the subjective 
II\OtivaUon of the creator. of the multiplication table. 
But Sorold.n Slfts thl int.n,>retation ot Aristotelean ph1l.oaopby aa ev1Clt,,'LImC.-
for the poaeibU1ty of a psyohological reading. "WhateYer mIlT be the differ-
ence. in the interpretation ot minor points of the Aristotelean philosophical 
posl tion, it. e •• entials are well known aDd similarly understood by' all 
oompetent scholars. None ot thai would ucr1ba to hill the pOSition ot a 
--
-
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materialist in m.etapby'8ic8, a pure empiricist in epistemology J an indi rldual1et 
in social and polit1cal. theory ... 43 It this is an example ot psychological 
reading, psychological reading 18 not l1m.1ted to an anal.7s1.. ot the subject1ve 
-
aims ot the creator. Btlt then the distinction between the pqchological and. 
the soc:1ologioo-phellCMnological readings remains as vague and contusing as 
eYer. 
;. Cauaal-tumtional readinl. SoroldD gives two type. ot soo10logioo-
phen0ll81l010£1cal readina., tho •• which aim at causal-functional relationahlps, 
and. tho .. which &1. at log1co-meaningtul relationships. '!'he causal-
.tuncUonal Nadine .... somevhat more clearll distinct from the psychological 
reading. It'1'heoret.icall;r at l ... t it LOClaal-tunctional read:i'Ofl aq be quite 
independent ot the payohological. rH41ng. The .1gnit1cance of the relati0D8b1p 
between da1a1tq of population and cr1ae, business oyol88 and the aortal1ty rate. 
mod_ ot production and forms of proy:.Htrty, religion and the d:1:f'orce rate, are 
exanpl.. ot the 801'1; ot phenom.eDa to 1Ii11ch the causal. reading aq be applied. "h! 
The cr1u rate can be oomputed, for example, just on the bui. ot the 11IlJIlber of 
cri.me. cOll1'l1tted, without aqr reference to the lIlotlna of the different 
criminal. or how they conceiTed their criaes. This iD:lependenoe from the 
psychological reading 1s cnl1' relative, however, tor the investigator 1s going 
to have to depend. upon lUlJY' difterent 80urces for his 1nt01"Dlation as to bow 
fI18D¥ crime. have been coamd.tted. This dependence i8 onl1' val1d insolar .. the 
investigator can uaume that all of hi8 eourcu are using the word crble in the 
4l~.. I, ;8. 
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same sense. This puts him back on the level of inter.Personal communication 
again, which ultimately reste lJpon the a •• umption that those other people who 
are talld.ng about ori_ have had. a aaMWhat simUar enoulturation process as 
one bas oneself. Furthermore t not only is crime defined in ditferent 181&1 
terms in ditterent places, but these det1n1t1ona also usually include ... 
reterence to the .tate ot IId.nd of the criminal-whether or not he WM an idiot 
Of' 1naane, vbat his motives and intentiol'l8 were. The distance aw. from the 
pS'.10h01og1cal reac!1ng of the investigator, the tact that he him.selt does not 
attempt a pqcholog1cal read1ng, doe. not obliterate the ult1lu.te dependence 
of his data on "the inside view. It 
6. L2S,1co-meanlStul N!dinI. Sociologico-phencmenological readings 
which aim at. d18COYfIlJ'1ng logico-aeaningtul. relationships appeal' to be even 1 ... 
iDiependent or the psychologioal. re.td1ng. in spite ot Soroldn t s protestations 
to the oontrat'1'. He sI\Ys that even though we know not.hi.ng about the psycholog-
ical. meaning or oausal relationship. ot cultural value., the tollowing 
questions m .,. be a.keds "Are the eleaents of a given culture logical.lJr united 
or are they l~ 10 al17 oontradicto17? Do they make a comprehensible and 
consistent ayat., or do ther not? It thq do, what is the nature ot the 
&yst.? Are there un11)1.. principles that permeate all the components ot a 
given configuration, or not. These am s1mUar problema 'I.'IJ.q' ari88 and be 
answered regardle •• ot .",. pqcholog1cal reading of the cultural configuration 
in question." The nature of this independence can be seen, according to 
Sorokin, in such examples as the reading of an.r work, "beginning with the 
examination papers written tw students whom we do not know, and ending with 
the muterp1eoe ot a known or an anorpoua author. We can judge all the .. 
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writings with regard to the logioalltT or inner oonsistency' of their ideu, 
regardless of their authorship or iDlnediate purpose. nbS The queetion that 
seems to this Wl"iter to be crucial 1s that ot how the ItlogloalitT or inner 
consistenC".f of the ideas" ot the student or o£ the known or IUlOI\YfJlOUS author 
ean be judged u."'lless sane attempt is made to disoover the ideas that each 
intended to oOi'llMUnioate in hi. work. In reading W1lf written work, it seems 
that the first task 1s to tr.r to di.soover what the author i. tr;y1ng to SII¥, 
what ideas he 18 tr,y1.ng to express in the words or the text. 'l'bes. words are 
46 
the _pirical. objeotit1cation ot hi. mental 1nteiration. Through the .. worcbs, 
the reader 1s trying to approxiJ:ate, at least" the insights and concepts that 
the au~ is trying to ccamun1cate. 
7. Dependence.e paychological. re!d1pa. Soroldn naes the limitationa ot 
the psychological reading to bring out his distinct:i.oru 
The point is that lIlOst 01 the ouJ. tural. phenomena represent the resul t8 
ot the activiti •• ot m.a.n.v indiv1duals and groups, whose purpose. and 
meanings !DIllY be d1tterent trom one another, otten opposite. They all 
Dd.x together, partly reintorcing, pU'tl.y inhibi t1ng, partl7 mod1t.y1ng 
one another, to 8Ilch an .tent that there 1.8 little likelihood ot 
our d1stinguish1nc one trom another. Whether we take the Parthenon 
OJ' one or the great Christian cathedrals or a set ot mores or laws 
OJ' beliets or AnT other cultural oreations, they all are the 
manitestationa ot the activities, ettor+'A, aims .. volitions, ideas, 
teelings, ot large mu ••• ot 1Ddiri.duala and combinations ot group •• 
It would be next to iJIpoesible to decipher or separate what in theae 
complex cultural values unitest. the aim. and aeantngs ot each or 
the partiCipants in their creation, or what i8 the "ps.rcholog:1cal 
readinglt ot each. Meanwhile the Parthenon or the oathedral or the 
aet or mores or belieta or 1.,. exist. unqu8at1onabl1' in the cultural 
world and tumtions in it as a vehicle ot the internal. aspect ot the 
4Stbid., pp. 60-61. 
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culture. If it cannot be read psyohologically, it can be understood 
eith{~r casuallY' or logico-_aning~. For readings ot these sorts 
we need: not know the documents necessary tor a psychological reading. 
we can take the elements or a given culture as data and can inquire 
whet.l'ler they logically tit one an other. 47 
Again, the elements of a given cul tUN are only going to fit logically or non-
logically in terms of the meanings and ideas that they express. These ideas 
were either grasped by the people in the culture-the human subjects ot 
interaction-ot they ware not. It they were gra8T}ed by the people who created 
the Parthenon, or the cathedral, or the set. ot laws, and it these people 
expressed their meanings-gave them empirical objectifioation-through these 
vehicles, then the logioal reading ot the cul tl1re phenOlIenon is going to involv. 
the investigator trying to grup the meanings held by the people of that 
culture. Then the logical reading of culture is not independent of the pqcho-
logical reading. It the meaning that the investigator seelea is not a meaning 
grasped by an;y of the people in the culture, then it !TIllst be a meaning 
attributed by' SOM other people to the object in question, for Soroldn himself 
insists that objects enter into social or cultural By'Stems only insofar as they 
are given meanings over and above their physical, ch8llli.eal, or biological 
properties. 
6. IndiVidualil\ng ~ generalisi,! rMd1r!ss. The only distinction that 
seems to result fran all of this is that the psychological reading is 
individualizing whereas the soclologico-phenomenologlcal reading is generaliz. 
ing, The psychological reading seems to aim at a reconstruction or a sort of 
biographical sketch ot each individual involved, uncovering all of his complex 
41Ibid,. pp. 61-62. 
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motivations, ideas, and teelings, "It would be next to impossible to decipher 
or separate what ln the.e cODIplex cultural. value. unitesta the aiJu and 
meaning. ot each of the partlcipants ln their creation, or what is the 'paycho-
logical reading' of each." 1'h.1s cl1sUnction tit. in well with Sorokin'. 
distinctlon between h1atory a. an indiYiduaJ.is1ng sclence and socl01ogy .s a 
genaraJ.ising sclemoe, tor he sq. that the psychological reading i8 one of the 
main technique. of history. But the cl1sUnction does not s .. to rest 
-
8ssentlall7 upon a dl.tinction between those .anines whioh are grasped by the 
members of the culture being studied and tho .. meanings which are sOlHhow 
"lndependent" ot the individuals in that cult"!"'_ Yet Sorok1n does formulate 
the distlnction in teru ot the independence ot sooiologloo-phenomenolog1cal 
readiDg £1'0. the pqchological reading. And this perhaps juatit1es or:ltici ... 
ot Sorok1n such u tho .. made by B1dney and Znan1eold.. Bidne.r • .,.. that in 
SoroJd.nts the01"1 "culture is said to act aa it it were a kind ot spiritual. 
8utotu.ton operat1ng in conformity with its own 'organio' 1_ ancllogiC 
in4ependent ot lts huun carr1ar .... h8 ADd Znan1eold.'s u1n objection to 
Sorokin'. theor.r is that he tail. to apP17 the "hwun1at1o ooefticientB-the 
postulate that flevar;y situation must be studied. by the investigator ... lt 1. 
experienced by the particular human lncl1Y1dual. who is coucioua of it.,,49 
Beoau.ae or thi., Sorokin t&11s to reali_ Itthat a 800ial group, as aperienced. 
and emuated. by ita MSBbers, baa the e ... ntial characteristios Which he 
48B1dney, p _ 38,. 
49nor:lan Znan1eold, '!'be Cultural Sciences (Urbana, Ulinois, 19$2), pp. 
241-242. -
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ascribes to other cul tur&1. ..,.tenu.. "SO 
9. Phclc:aeno1W. 'there 1s a reason for Soroldn'. tendency to make 
oulture into a "sp1ritual autcaaton. 1t It lies in his interpretation of what he 
mearul by a "soeiologico-pheDOlllenologio&1.· read1nc of oulture phenomena. ttl 
use the term phenomenolocical in a sense oongenial with E. Ruuerl's term, 
indioating by it the sooiaJ.ly 'objective' existenoe of a meanirl&, regardless ot 
whether it Coincides 14th the ps.robological meaning.·51 Meanings here se. to 
be sooiall1' "objective" 1n the sann that ttuv- are somebow "out there- to be 
looked at, and, being "out til ..... are not dependent upon BUT mind that grasps 
them. .And this technique of look1ng cannot g~t bqond a deaoriptl" point of 
viev, it is a basio weakne •• ot the phenomenolog of Huaserl, whiob Sorokin 
cla1ms to tollow. A. Lonergan ...,.81 
Soient1tio deaoription can be no I1lOre than a preliminary to scientifio 
explanation. But Hu •• erl begins tram relatedneu-to-u., not to 
advance to the relatedness ot terms to one another, blt to mount to an 
abstract looking trom l1ihich the looker and the looke<l-at haft been 
dropped because ot their particularity and contincenoe. The vitality 
ot an1m.al extroversion i8 attenuated trom .ensitive perception to 
intuition ot universals and troa intuition of universals to the more 
1IIpalpable inspection ot tomal es.enoe. (approx1matel1', Scholastic 
transcendental.). As objects increase in cenerality and purity, 
subjects shrink to intentional acts. With remarkable acuteness and 
discrimination there are uncovered, deSCribed, caapared, &1'ld ol •• itied 
the pure torms of noetic experience terminating 1n noematic content •• 
But the whole enterpriae is under the shadow of 1matanenoe, and it taUa 
to tranacend the model tor the pure ego. In briet, phenomenology is a 
h1&hl7 purified empirici_, am it did not take lona tor it to topple 
over into an existentialism that describe., not the abstract poe.ibU. 
ity 01 descript1on, bolt men as they' are. 
SOn,id., p. 378. 
-
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But description i8 not enough. It 1 t clai1lls simply to report 
data in their puritY', one m.,. a.k vbi' the arid report sho"ld be added 
to the more livelY' experience. If it pretends to report the 
significant data, then 110 i. deceived, tor significance is not in 
data mt accrue. to them trom the occurrence ot 1nailht. If it urges 
that it presents the insights that ari •• spontaneously', 1mmed1ate4r, 
and inevitabl7 from the data, one must remark that the data alone are 
never the so1.e det.erminants of the insights that arise in arq' but an 
int&ntUe mind and that be;rond the level ot insight there is the 
leYel. of critical renect10n with ita criterion ot the v1rtua1.l7 
unconditioned. sa 
It might be auggesteel that the independence ot Sorokin t a logical reading of 
culture trom the psychological reading bean some ruemblanoe to ftan abstract 
looking i'ro."!1 which the looker and the looked-at haft been dropped because ot 
their particularity an. cont1ngenoe." And ~ ttntore impalpable inspection of 
formal ••• enee. (approximatel.7, Scholaetic transcendentals)" ma;;r be more than 
superticiallT saUtU" to Soroldn's study' ot the fiuctuation ot the major 
premises ot logically' integrated cultures. For these major prei ... are in 
terma of the nature ot realitT, the nature ot the ultimate good, and the ..,.t_ 
ot truth, 'WbiCh are, apprcx:l.matel,., the Scholastio transoendental.. ot being, 
good, and tl"Uth. 
10. Heuristio antioipation s!.!!l! inside!!!!. In oonclusion, it seems 
to the writer that although Soroldn's d1.stinctlon between the pqcholc:gical. and 
the sociologioo-phenomenological. readi~8 ot the inner aspect ot cultural 
phenanena is simUar in Matv' respects to Red..t1eld's distimtion between the 
inside and the outside views, Soroldn t s tormulation ot the d1stirx:tion leads to 
untortunate couequeno... 'or it ..... to ignore the need, in .tud;y1nc 
_aninga, to tr7 to det81"mine what meaning. people tried to expresa or 
D 
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cOlllllWlioate in their writing, art, and 01"lania.tions. In place ot this, 
Sorok:l.n seems to substitute an "objective" world ot meanirJg. "out there" to be 
looked at by the trained investigator, which exist independentl3 ot 1nd1Y1.dual 
people who meant what the meaning. objecti.,.ely mean. This .... to the writer 
to stand in contradiction to Sorold.n· s own statenent that one II1U8t reter &!IT 
social, cultural, or personality' atuct;r back to the actual triune cOIIpOIUmtial 
.tructl.1J'8 ot meaningful interaction-society, culture, and p8l"8onallt.T--it 
one' •• tudT is not to be distorted or inadequate. Heuristically, this critici8JI 
of Sorold.n· s .oo1.olog1co-phenclllellOloa1oal reading meana that one is not to 
anticipate the diHOftl'7 ot ayst_ of meaniZ1li\. whioh are independent ot the 
meaning. intended. by the people beine studied. 
'thi. heuristic principle help. one avoid the danger ot aubject.1ft projec-
tion. '!'he investigator w1ll expect that the people be studies wUl haft 
experiences that an s1Jdlar enough to hi. own to pendt SOlIe oOlllmUnicatlon, 
but that are in acme or ma&'l7 respects tml1ke his own. '1'hus, he can alao 
antioipate that the insights of the people w1ll. be somewhat ditterent trem his 
own, and that the,y will haft a dUterent pattern ot habitual judpent.. as to 
good and truth. Neftrtheleaa, the lrrreatigator wUl approach the coonun1ty 
with a .et ot acient1t1c n0l'll8 and values that gives hill an explanatory Yiewpo1r. Iii 
whioh he taoi tl7 or explio1 t17 _st att1ra 18 a superior interpretative frame-
work. He believe. that wi thin this tramwork he oan lllAke judgments about that 
communi ty that he i. .tud,yi. that are scientifically more correct than the 
people wi th1n the society i tselt • And according13, he cannot elevate cultural 
relati vi_ to the poei U. on of an absolute principle. 
133 
D. RELATIVISM, SORon. 
1. In1!n!retative trameworka. "It is highlJ" significant, therefore, that 
a sociologist ot the stature of Sorok1n hu endeavored to introduce this 
metaoultural perapecti .... into contellporary 80010100'. • •• Sis analysis of all 
cultures into the supertJpes sensate, ideational, and idealistic is an attempt 
to provide a 'logico-Maning1'ul' baai. tor the integration of &1'\V' given 
culture (insofar as it 18 1ntegratM) in tel"lU of its ultimate epistemological-
Bl8taplV'eical prenpp0e1t10na ... S3 Soroldn give. three 1m.portant implication. of 
10gioo-aean1nctol reading of culture. "first, the application of the canon of 
deductive am. inductive logiC, ,"ond, the re~ization of the posslbUity that 
the major pralin. ot various culture • ..,. ditter, third, the u8Ul'llPtion ot an 
impartial po.ition 1n regard to the validity or 1nvalid1t,' of the major 
prem1.e .... Sb. 1'be last condition seems to bit a statement of a relativi.tio 
position, but at present it i. the f1rst two that are important. It wUl be 
enlightening to OOJlpIl'8 the .. two assertions to an anal.7sis of judgments about 
knowledge ude by Polan,y1 t 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
Correct interenc.s wi thin a true !item. 
ErrOneoua conclusions am ve'diithin a true q.t. 
(like an error cOllaitted by a coapetent scientist). 
Conoluions arrived at by the correct use of a fallaciou • 
.,..t_. fbis is an tnc.,etent aode ot r ... cm1ng, the 
relUlts ot which pos •••• au§lecuve valid1Fn. 
Incoherence and obe •• ai ..... as oS.;;::;;a Ii the ideation 
ot the s:naan., particulii'G in .chiaophrenia. The morbid 
reasoning ot sutters trom qatautic delu.ions .hould 
alao b. classed here, rather than under (3) •• ince suoh 
:lelusions impair the verr core ot a person'. rationality.'S 
$3B1dne7, p. 169. 
S4Bfn!miC8, I, 63. 
$S~~.~nal KnoWleSse, p. 314. 
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Each of the .. involves a judgment about (a) the interpretative fr __ ork, and 
(b) the application of the framework. ItU we accredit both (a) and (b), we 
have cue (1)1 if (a) but not (b): cue (2), 11' (b) and not (ah cue (3). Our 
rejection of both (a> and (b) defines the uniIIportant c .... that I have not 
listed, when a fal.e trllMWork is applied erroneouel.7, whUe cue (4) is now 
seen to represent the abeence of arv interpretative framework. 1t56 
Sorokin's first condition tor logico-meaningtul reading--ttthe application 
or the canon ot deductive and inductive logic"--corresponda, not to the 
interpretative framework, but to (b) the !PJ?lication ot the tramework. And the 
second condition--"the realisation of the pos~ibility that the major premises 
ot various culture. mq ditterfl-correaponds to the 1n:mretative t'ramework 
itself. Sorokints third conditlon--"the assumption of an impartial position in 
regard to the 't'8lldity or invalidity ot the major premiae.It--would, then, .... 
to implT a relatlnetic pOSition regarding interpretative framework.. But he 
denies that he is a relati nat. 
2. Sorckin' • .-de .. ni __ al;;; 2! relativ1ea. He sq. that the "praise or blame ot 
the bulc &88UIIptione i. the concern ot the police, the moral educator, the 
p~siclan, the m1.sional7, the statesman, and all tho .. sociocultural agencies 
that decide the choice ot value., and delend and perpetuate them, once Chosen. It 
But he strea ... that this does not malee his pOlltion a relativistic one. 
An unattentive reader, obser"l'1..ng in subsequent parts ot th11 book 
remarks about the relativity and variabU1ty of the .,.staa ot 
truth, of ethiCS, ot art, f'Jfq conclude that the author belong. to 
the group of relativlsta. skeptios, and the like •• i!X'e the work 
cont.enda, tor instance, that there are at lout three tundamentall.y 
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d1tferent systems ot truth, of knowledge, ot art, of m.orali VI and 
admits that, within their major prmses, the7 are all valid and 
that there is no deo181.,e evidence which can show one ot these 
qst_ to be valid or aupenor and the others to be invalid or 
int8l"1or. To an lnautticl.ntly discriminating ndnd such a position 
may appear to be entirely sophistical. But if the distinction between 
the abaolute character of the canon ot logic as applied in the 
logical. reading ot cultures 18 properly considered, together with the 
relatint,. ot tbe empirioally given major premis.s of various 
cultures, the pOSition of the author appears absolutistic, phenomeno-
logical, having little it anything to do with any genuine relativistic 
apostlc, skeptic pointe ot viw.57 
Here, Sorolcin seema to combine an abaoluU_ regarding the norma of logie, with 
a relativ1Sl1l regarding the major premises. This relativ1a regarding the major 
premiaes can be interpreted. in either ot two Wq&c (1) the interpretati .... 
frameworks tomed b.1 the major premiaes of different culture mentalities are all 
equall.7 valid, (2) in stud;y1nc the culture mentality of a coaauniV it is 
necessary to realize that the major premises ot other peopl .. are likely to be 
dU'terent from onets own. In the way that Sorokin states his poe1t10n here, it 
sounds as it he is tald."g the tirst interpretation, but as a matter ot fact, he 
does not take the first position, but the second. 'l'h1s can be seen from an 
examination of his position regarding the three main culture t'iJ'pes, ideational, 
sensate, and idea11st1c. 
). Ideational culture. There are tour maJor premisses I "(1) Reality' ia 
perceived u nonaenaate and nonmaterial, everlasting Being (Se1n); (2) the needs 
and enda are JU1nlT ap1r11alal; (.3) the extent of their satisfaction is the 
largest, and the level, highestJ (4) the method of their tul.t11lment or 
realization ia .elt.imposed minimization or elimination of most ot the pl\r8ical. 
needs, and the greatest possible extent. 1f On the basis of the fourth premise, 
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Soroldn distinguish .. between ucetic ideational culture, wn1ch tollove the 
tourth premise as stated, and acti"e ideational culture, which adda activity 
upon the enril'omaent .. a Meane to achi."e the gOals.58 
4. Sensate cul tu:re. The premiaes ot .en.ate cul tuN are radicall,. 
opposed to the premia •• ot ideational. culture, (l) Reality is ffonl7 that which 
18 pre.ented to the .ense organa ••• a Becad.ng, Process, Change, nux, 
Evolution, Progre •• , Transtormation." (2) Needs and ends are phy'sical. 0) 
Max1mum .ati8taction i8 sought. (4) tlThe •• thod ot reali8ing them i8 not that 
ot a modtticat.i.on within the human individual. CCftPOa1ng the culture, but of a 
mod1tication or exploitation of the external. ,orlel." And again on the buia ot 
the fourth premise he diatlncuish •• between active .ensate mentalItq, p!!.i .... 
mentalIty, and c;rn!cal .ensate mentalit,..S9 
S. Id.eall.8tic culture. ot u.n;r poUible mixture. of the ideational and 
.ensate mentalitie., the onlT 0_ that ia log1Cally' integrated i. the 
ideali.tic culture mentality. "'or it re&1.1ty i. !I&ll7 aided, with the aspects 
ot everlasting Being and ever-changing Becoudrc ot the spiritual and the 
material. It. needs md ends an both spiritual and. Iltater1al, with the 
mat.eri&l, however, subordinated to the spiritual. The method. ot the1r re&liza 
tion inYOlye both the llOd1tication of .elt aM the transtormation ot the 
external sensate world. in other words, it gi"e. !!!!! cuique to the Ideational 
and the Sensate. ,,60 
59Ibld., Pp. 73-74. 
-
6Orbid., pp. 74-7S. 
-. 
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6. Sorok1n's cnlture mentalitz. Sor'Okin, unlike social scientists who 
want to regard the1uelves as if operating in a TaOUWIl, recognises that he haa 
a culture mentality must as much as the people that he is 8tud.'ring, for he must 
haVe an interpretati.,.. trauwork. In the preface to the Dream1cs, he describes 
a process of dieUluaiollMent that led hila to break avq tl"01l1 what had been a 
preciOlllinant17 senaate Hnt&1.i Vl -This work has grown out of r:r:r efforts to 
understand something ot what baa been happeninC in the social and cultural 
world about me. I _ not ashaed. to conteas the World War and most of what 
took place atter it were bew1lder1ng to one who, in conformity with the 
dominmt currents of social. thought ot the ~lier twentieth century, had 
believed in PZ'OgNss, l"8Yolution, sociali., democra.c.r, scientific poe1t1V1sm, 
and man.Y other 'i_s t of the same sort •• 61 It cannot be laid ot Sorokin that m 
i8 unwilling to admit the impact of the social and cultural s;ysteu in which he 
lives upon hi. Sociological research. 
But in giving up his more sensate interpretative framework, Sorokin does 
not thereby 0e00D8 tree of such a fr __ orkl "The trt.and:point aseumed is 
Idealistic in the specific sense ot the term ... used in this work. It is the 
only' point of view that permits us to see without serious distortion both 
extreme typea of integrated cultuN-the Ideational and the Senaat .... 62 'thus 
it would seem that in practic. Soro1d.n did value one set of major premises oyer 
the other two. Furthermore, in the fourth volume, there appears a position 
-
61+~i<1.' p. ix. 
62Ibid., p. x. 
-
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named "integrali8Jll, It which Sorokin doea not ae. to identity exactly with his 
idealistic position, .. can be seen tram hi. explanation tor the fluctuation ot 
culture types. 
7. Fluctuation 2! !lsteu .£!. truth. In volume one Soroldn states the 
t.heM of bi. tour yolUIH wor),n "In spite ot its great si •• , the work deals 
wi th only one central problem, ruuaely the chang. and fluctuation ot Ideational, 
Ideal1stic, and Sensate culture .... 63 In volume tOUl" he shows a re .. on tor the 
fluctuation and recurnmce ot these difterent "euperaystena" ot cultures: 
The preceding Y'Olumes ot D[ne1os have shown that at the bas1a 
ot the I4eational. or Idealistic or Sensate tOnt or integrated 
culture l1e., aa its major premise, 1ts Vat. ot truth and realitq. 
It i. thi. prem1 .. that, to '118. W. I. ThOra.' terra, "de1'1nes the 
ai tuation" tor the rest of the related compartments ot ·,ach ot these 
torma ot culture. 
Art and philosophy, ethic. and rel1g1on, science and tonu of 
social organization ot a Sensate supersystem are articulations ot 
tb8 SeMate 81'8tem ot truth and reality. In Ideational or 
Idealistic or Sensate cultures, th ... compartments articulate 
Ideational or Idealistio or Sensat. ayata ot truth and. reali •• 
A. It one ot the •• 8,Ystaa i8 ent.i.rely true--is the oDly 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth-then the other 
two .yateu ot truth and reali V are entlrelT or mainly' tals •• 
Urder such an assumption the true .,.stem ot reality-and a oorrea-
pond1.~ tom ot culture-can exist and dominate torever, without 
arrr tear or poe.iblli ty ot being dislodged b7 the tala. &yst ... 
• • • 
• • •• Being true, it giv .. an adequate knowledge ot the reality', 
through that it permits ita human bearers to live a real lite, to 
adapt theuel vee 8UCoe88f'ull7 to the ad.equatal7 known env1roDm.entt 
and, through all that, to enjoy' a better social lite and culture 
than a SOCiety and oulture baaed exclusively upon error and 
ignorance •••• 
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B. It we as8Wle that each of the .. 57stau of truth and 
reality 1s entirely talse--i8 nothing but an error and fallac-y--
none ot them could dominate for &IV" length ot time, and still 
le •• recur, because no human be1~s, no society, no culture oan 
endure under the condition of complete ignorance and error. • • • 
as a matter of fact, each of our three main qatenus dominated 
for centuries and recurred several time8 in the history ot the 
Gruoo-ROIlWl and We.tern ou! tur... And 80 they did also in 
other culture •• 
C. Hence the .uper-rbl'1JlII studied ..... to b6 possible onJ.y 
under the condi tioD that each ot the three main &yates of truth 
and reality-and the corresponding fol'll of oultuJte.-ls p~ true 
and partly talse, partly' adequate and part:b' inadequate.64 
Now there SefIU to be IDl over-s1Ilpllfication in the reasoning here, caused in 
part, at least, by a. failure to make the d1etinction between (a) an 1ntel"'preta. 
tift framework, and (b) the application ot thAt trUIfIWork. )~or it seems 
posaible that a culture could have a oorrect system of truth, or interpretative 
framework, and either (1) failed to have applied i.t correct.ly, or (2) failed to 
have developed all it. potentialities. And the secom pos8ibili V, aa well as 
the tirst, could lead to a rejection ot the 8"/8tem. Furthermore, intellectua1. 
development i8not isolated !rom the total social and cultural development of 
a people, and thia total social and. cu.1tural situation provides men with 
b1.aae8 whioh hinder the oorrect application of an interpretative frameworkt 
tiThe planets would move in straight lines it there were no gran tatton, but in 
tact thtIT move in perturbed ellipses. In lik. manner, tt .. serte Lonergan, 
"social development would be simply a matter ot inte11eotual. development, it 
the human p8.1ohe were without its contribution; rut in fact man's sensitive 
nature constitutes both the d1nam10 materials to be ordered and the eubjectlve 
64BrB!eics, IV, 741-742J C. originally in italios. 
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oonditions under which the Qrder 1a diSOo'ftNCl, oOJllllUnioated, accept-ed., and. 
executed. So it ia that social order finda in the deairea and aversions of 
individuals and interaubject1ve groups both an enomous17 powerful ally' and a 
pel"l'l&lUmt source of egoistic and 01... dn1at1on. ,,65 
8. l!!! canon.s! Op!rations. Sorokin'a argumentation, becauae of hi. 
fallure to d1at1ngu1.h between a ayste:n and its correct or incon-ect applica-
tion, .... to the writer leee than oonrlnclnl. Nevertheless, the general 
principle beh1nd his reucm1nl .... to coincide with Lonergan's canon of 
operatlor:uu ttTbe canon of operations is a principle ot cumulative Y8rit1cati 
'or lave guide operations .uoc ... .tul.17 in the, lHUUre that they are oorrect. 
Hence, 1naotar u lava and their implications 1n a vast variet,y ot sltuatlona 
are repeat.edl1' found .uceeoM guides ot operations, their initial 
verit1cation 1s CUIIIUlat1Y'el.1' oontil"R\ed.n66 Sorok1n reasons that .ince none of 
the three systeu of truth guides the activ! ty ot a culture oorrectl7 in all 
situatiOns, none of the i8 adequate. 
9. MfiuHl.s! integrali_. Soroldn says "that each of the three main 
eysteu of truth-the truth of taith ifdeat10nal rqatA!Y, the truth ot reuon 
L!dealistic .ste5', and of the .e ... LHnlJate flTSte5'-ls not the whole truth 
and nothing but. the truth, is almost e'Y1.dent. It it were so, ita partiSans 
would be the 1'08seaaora ot the abeolute truth in all its manifold. 1nt1.n1ty. 
They would be the Cmniecient God. No error, and no further progress of elther 
6SLonergan, p. 597. 
66 Ibid., p. 7,. 
-
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rel1.g1on or phil080P~ or science would be possible under suoh an assumption. II 
By- the same reasoning, his integral.istio qstem oould not be "the whole truth 
and nothing but the truth. 1t As a matter ot fact, Sarokin does not make this 
claim. tor intagra1.iam.J he merely states that, since it em'braces all three ot th 
other s,yatema, it Itis nearer to t.he absolute truth than any one-sided truth of 
one ot thes. three forms. f •68 
Sorold.n goes to some length to defend the legit1lla.Oy ot the .,..tem at 
truth ot ideational culture, the truth ot taith. He 15878 that intuition i8 the 
source or the buic postulates ot arv science, ot language, and 18 the 
foundation of art, ethics, and. religion. Not, only rloes intuition provide the 
foundationa, it is the "starter at an enomous llUlIber of sensol'1' and dialectic 
disooveries and inftntlona in aU the creative fields ot culture.,,69 Hi8 
documentation i8 so abundant, hO'We"Ver, that it leave. the reader contused as to 
just exactly what intuition is-insight, beliet, rel1g1ous faith, II\Ystical 
8CStuy, aesthetic experience. And Merton questions the amount ot tal th 
Soro.kin actually puts in lntul tion himselt. 
In order to justlt.Y the "truth ot fa! th"-the only' i tam. which would 
remove him traa the ordinary critena used in current acientit1c 
work-.. he indioates that ftintui tion" pl&;18 an important role as a 
8CNJ"Oe of soientifio disoover.r. But doe. this meet the issue? 'lbe 
questIon is not one of the psyohological source8 ot valid conclusions, 
but ot the on tena and _thode ot V1Il.idatlon. \fuioh criteria would 
Sorokin adopt When "supersens;r.yrintultions are not consistent with 
empirical obserntion? In such oase8, preaumably, so far as we oan 
judge fran his work rather than from hie comments abOl.1t hi. work, he 
acoepta the tacta and rejeota the intuition. 70 
67Bre!!iCS, IV, 174. 
68rbid., pp. 748-752. 
69Ibid., pp. 762-763. 
-7Qterton Sggial 'l2.\ttQa.&lll soqiaJ, atno1;Jlrt, pp. 475-476. 
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Merton thinks that Sorold.n is diacuaaillI under the label 01 -truth" three 
distinct and not comparable types of judgments," and that he never resolves the 
probl_ of locating hi. own work wi thin the oontext ot "radica1ly dIfferent and 
disparate cri tena of truth ... 71 
Merton'. critio1_ seas to the writer to be wll-ta.ken. But it does not 
seem that it goes tar enough, although it doe. indicate the line. that must be 
taken. The distinct.1on that needs to be made is between the sourcea ot 
knowledge and mtetu of knowledge. Borokin does not distinguish adequatel,y 
nor conaistentl.7 between the tundament.al. structure of human cognitional process 
wi th its difterent acts ot experienoe, insight, Cld judgment, and. the contents 
01 exper1enc .. , insights, and. judgments, whIch are elaborated into articulate 
systea of thoucht-science, lIterature, philosopb;y, theology. Soroldn doe. 
not cooapletelT ignore the ditference between oognitional. acts and the contents 
of the acts, but he does not apply the distinotion conaIst.ent17. It 1s verr 
l1kel,y that this tatlure i. due in part to his use ot the pbenawnological 
method by' which he looks at the Ilobjecti",e" cultural facta "out there" rather 
than .tw:I¥1ng the properties ot haan 1nd1'f'idu.a1. and buUding up social and 
cul tural systems through intelligent grup of how the.e properties are related 
to one another. He tends to start out with ideally constructed, logica1l7 
integrated cultural q.tems, and then to argue back to the type of system ot 
truth that should be posse •• ed by th1a or that type of cu! tu.re. Then these 
systems of truth tend to be ident1tied wi til different acts ot knowledl_ 
8enaation, logical. reasoning, intuition. Sorok1n's us. ot the phenomenological 
method make. hi. WOl"k subject to Lonergan's criticIsm that "phenomenology i8 a 
highl1' purit1ed empirici_, It and, .. Lonergan sqs, mpir1ciam is espec1al17 
-wea.k when it attapte to reach a Yalid explanation ot knowledge. 
• • • it one hope. to reach Ws end in an inquiry into 
knowledge. then one had better not begin with the assumption 
that lcnov.lng i. '.oraething theN to be looked at and described. t 
for lcnov.lng i8 an organioally integrated aotiviQ" on a now 
of .ensiti .... experience, inqu1r,y intelligentJ.T generate. a 
CUDNlatl" auooesaion 01 ineighta, and the significance of the 
e:x.ptfrienc •• ftl"1e. ooncord.tan~ with th. oumulation of insights, 
in memory'. store of experience. and in the formulation ot 
acoumulated tnaighta, retleotion grasps approx.11Iations towards 
the v1rtu&1.lT unconditioned and attainments of it to issue into 
probable and oertain judpenta ot tact. '0 oonceive know1Dg one 
1I\1st understand the c:t;vnam1o pattern of experiencing, inquiring, 
retl.ecttna, and. auoh understanding is not to be reached by taking 
a look. '0 att1nt lcnoving it is usele.. to peer inside, tor the 
ctynamic pattern is to be found not 1n thia or that act but in the 
unfolding ot mathematics, 811IPirical scienoe, oOlDon senae, and. 
phUoeopbTJ in that untolding must be grasped the pattern ot 
lcnov.lng and, it one teels inclined to doUbt that the pattern really 
extsta, then one can tr.r the experiment ot attempt1. to escape 
aperienoe, to renounce intelligence in inquiry, to de.ert 
reaaonablene .. in cri tioal retlection. 
In brief, -.pirioi_ as a method reata on an elementary oon-
fUa1on. What is obvious in lmow1ng i., indeed, looking. CCIIlpanc:l 
to lOOking, insight 1. obscure, and grasp ot the unconditioned i. 
dOtlbly' obscure. But empiriCism amount. to the assumption that 
what i. obvious in knowing i. what knowing obti.O\ASlT i.. 'lhat 
as8UJlption i. fal.e, tor it one would learn uthematio. or science 
or phUoacpl\Y' or it one .ought c(Xlllon-.ense advice, then one would 
go to a man that i. intelligent and reuonable rather than to a man 
that i •• tupid aDd s1l1T.72 
Soroldn, becaus. he does not ent1relT e.oape from. a puritied empirici_ that 
c11ng. to the d.escript! ve viewpoint, cannot cope adequateq wi tb relati ri_, 
for .. Lonergan • .,.., there i. no help tor such relativ1a "as long &8 lien 
cling to the descriptive Tiewpoint ... 73 
72Lonergan, pp. 41,-41.6. 
73Ibld., p. 541. 
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-10. ~. Sorokin's stw\r ot the fluctuations ot ideational, sensate, 
and ideal1at1o 878tema ot culture is primari.lT a stud;r ot the fiuotuat1on ot 
the first p1"'1noiples of a culture that constitute ita interpretative trauvork. 
In the fourth volume of the Dz'r!!!ios, Sorold.n relates these fIr.t principla 
int1lllately to their foundation in d1tterent act. of knowledge, but faU. to 
di.tingu1ah conei.tent.ly between acta ot knowledge and the sy.tems ot thought 
-
elaborate4 fran the contents ot these act.. The reason tor thi. seems to be in 
his use ot the phenomenologioal. method. And the re8Ul. t ls that he nefti" 
adequately' places hil own work wi thin hi. own sTstem of thought. This 18 
consl.tent with the aHWIPtlon that knowing 1~ a kind of looking, for looldng 
is .... ntial.l.y extroverted} a look does not look at ltHlt. Sorold.n neYer 11".. 
up to his statement that the inftsUgator of oul ture sbould take an imp&rt1al 
position concerning the major prem1_ of the cultures he studt_, preo1selT 
because th1s 18 1aposslble. It one ls to investigate, OM must value a culture 
that toeters scient1t1c knowledge aver one that diacouragea it. Sorold.n, ot 
cour .. , acknowledges thls, but reu1ns hampered by' hi. descriptive viewpoint. 
I. PRIMITIVE TERMS IN SOCIOLOO! 
1. Deecription!!!! !!planation. It 1 t 1. Sorokin I s adherence to the 
explanatory point ot view that aak .. hi. treat.-nt ot r.lati....s.a incatlplete, it 
tollova that an explanato1'1 viewpoint must be attained. Fundamental17, th 1s 
involve. a transition frat experiential oonjugat8s-"correlati". .. whoa. meaning 
is expressed, at leut in the lut &n8l.7S1a, by appeallng to the content ot s 
huun expertence," to explanator;y conjugatea-"correlatives det1ned lmplicit17 
14S 
by 811P1r1ca1.~ establiahecl correlat,ione, .functions, lan, theorie., syatems.,,14 
2. Generalised _thode To aq' that acientitic adn.nce is through 
description to explanation is to state a requirement tor a transition from 
experient1al to pure conjugates. Yet this transition can be carried oat in 
two distinct ...... , tor there are two type. ot descriotion and two types of 
explanation. An inquir;y can start with a deacr1ption of the data of sen.e, or 
wi th a description ot the data of conaoiousD888. The S01elXl •• which study man, 
as haa been ... n, have to take the inaide view to sOIle extent. The sCience. 
which stut\1 "star or starfish,n chemical. el.ent or atom do not need to take 
the iMide view. They limit their inquir,y to, the data ot sens. by employing 
the tlcanon ot selection" which atatea that !tif a correlat.ion or 1J¥pothesis or 
law or probabU1 ty expectation or theory or &Tstem pertains to empirical 
8cience, then (1) it involve. sensible consequences, (2) such consequence. can 
be produced or, at least, observed. It In stating this limitation ot empirical. 
science to senae data, Lonergan rollows lithe CO/limon view that empirical SCience 
i. concerned with senaiblT veritiable laws and. expectations. If it is true 
that essentially the same method could be applied to the data or consciousnes., 
then respect for ordinary usage would require that a method, which only in its 
essentials is the same, be named a generalised empirical method. It 7; This can 
be put in terms or experiential and explanatory conj~ate8. DeSCription ampl 
experiential conjugate.. In arv experience, it 18 possible to distinguish 
between 'tthe content and the act, between the seen a.nd the seeing, the heard 
74 c ~., pp. 79-00. 
7Szbid., pp. 71-72. 
-
-and the hearing, the tasted and the tuting, and so torth." Let A stand tor 8. 
oontent, such aa a color as seen, and.A' stand tor the corresponding act at 
seeing the color. Following such a scheme, the pairs .AA.' J BB', CC', DD', ••• 
represent 8. series of experience. in which the primed letter. denote acta and 
the unpr1Dled letters oontental 
Nov oorrelations 1Iq be reached by oombining t.he unpr1med oomponents, 
A,B,C, ••• or b.r oombining the primed oomponents A', Bt, CI, ••• 
or by combining both pr1.med and unprimed components. In the first 
oase one will deal with the relations of contents t.o one another and 
one will preacind trom the oorrespondi.!l& acta. and in thu fUhion, 
without al\Y mention of things, one deals with what hitherto has been 
named the relations ot things to one another. In the second cue, 
one will preacind from contents and correlate acts, to obtain a 
psychological. or cOlnit.1onal theory. In the third case, one will be 
employing experiential oonjugates and turther information will be 
needed to settle whether one is working towarda the goal of natural 
sOience or ot oognitional theor,r.76 
). Newton's disOOYEl17" Generalised empirioal method is not limited to 
studies ot PSYCholOfa' or the process of learning, however, for Itgeneralized 
method has t.o be able to deal, at least oomprehensively', not only' with the data 
wi thin a single consciousness but also with the relations between different 
conscious subjects, between conscious subjects am their milieu or envirol'lllent, 
.and between consciousness and its neural basis.1t77 An example taken from 
Soroldn can illustrate different approaches to the same data, depending upon 
whether one's goal is natural sCienee, cognitional theory, or a sociologioal 
theor,r that deals with relationships between different C0l180iOU8 subjeots. The 
76Ibid., p. 81. 
77Ibid., p. 244. 
-
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example is a description ot Newton' e discover,y of the law of gran tation: "On 
one memorable day, an apple falls with a slight thud at his feet. It was a 
trifling inCident whioh bas been idlY noticed thousands of times, but now like 
the click of some small switch which starts a great machine in operation, it 
proved to he the jog which awoke his mind to action. As in a "Iision. he saw 
that it the nvater10us pull of the earth can act through space as tar as the 
top of a tree • • • 80 it might 8'9'en reach so tar as the moon. ft 78 This 
description is in experientIal conjugates. The cognitional acts and contents 
are kept together; the deSCription is of the apple as seen falling and heard. 
thuddi~, or the 8:lPer1enee ot the great insig~t or "vision" as well as the 
content ot that Tision-!tit the lqsteriou8 pull of the earth can act through 
space • • • ." The relationship ot this account to the science of mechanics, 
to cognitional theory, and to SOCiological. theory will be treated in that order 
4. !!p1rical method. Empirical method, as distinct .from generalized 
empirical _thod, prescinds frem the fact that Newton saw his hypotheSiS "d in 
a vision. 1f The science of mechaniCS i8 interested in the correlation which 
states that the toree of gran tation 1s directlY' proportional to the muses and 
inversely proportional to the square of the distance. f· k.;.m2. Lonergan, 
in illustrating pure conjugates sqs that "masses might be defined as the 
correlatives implicit in Newton t 8 law of inverse squares. Then, there w:>uld be 
a pattern ot relationships const! tuted by the verified equation, the pattern of 
relationships would fix the meaning of the pail" ot coeff'ic1enta, ml,m2, 
and the meaning 80 determined would be the meaning ot t.he name. mus." 79 
78~cs. IV, 754. citing L.T. More, Isaac Newton (New York, 1934),p.288 
79Lonergan, p. 80. 
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Sorokin eqs that this is a "causal-funotional law, II b.Y' whioh the praetica.ll7 
unli..'1litcd chaos of the universe u presented to one's senses is ordered into a 
series of cOO1prehensive 8y'ste;.-..s. "Cs.usal.-functional tor'!1Ulas like the 
Nem'tonian Law of Gran tatioll Sll.'ll up brieflY' Ii. prodigious rru.mber 01 sep&rate 
relationshiPa. lf80 Causal-.t'w¥:tional. lawa or tormulas reter to causal or 
functional BYstans. Newton saw that if the tore. of gran tation could act .rrc. 
the eU'th. to an appl., 1t might also ext.end .from tne ea.r-.Jl to the moon. His 
law is part of the explanation of the sol.n- syatem. for it giTeS'" precis. 
spec1fication to the ltfUnetional dependence ot tho members of the solar Q'ltem" 
which 1s, aqs Soroldn, itthe reason why ue recard it as a unity _ong the rest 
ot the heavenly'bod1ea," and to the Itst:Ul cloa8r tunctional 1nterdeperJdence 
~tween tho earth and the 1lO0nlt Which "makes them a aubuni t7 in the looser and 
61 larger un! ty ot the lolar ayatea. t1 
s. Cgpitional theoa. To treat the event whioh va the diacOY'817 ot the 
lav ot gravitation tJ'0J1 the viewpoint ot coan1t101l8l theory means that, unlike 
the natural aCientiat, one il loing to be quite interelted in the tact Newton 
saw the pos8ibUity ot gra'fitational toree between the earth and the moon "as 
in ... vision-If Scrolein introduces the exaltple as evidence to support his state-
ment that "intu1tion has been the starter ot an enormous number ot eensOl"7 and 
dialectic discoveries and inventioM in all the creative nelda ot oulture, 
beginning wi ttl 8C1ence, trom mathematics, technoloa and biology, to social Hnd 
hup!.a.nistic disciplines and phUosophy', and ending with art, religion. ethtLCB, 
~os, I, 23. 
8lsocietl, Culture, ~ Personality, p. lL6. 
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and other cultural .y.tenus." And this stateent, in tum, i. a part ot his 
defense of hi. Itintegralist" theory ot cognition, which embrace. i.deational. 
truth, idNl1stlc truth, and .ensate truth into one qstem ot truth which "is 
nearer to the absolute truth than any one-sided truth ot one ot these three 
forma," and "with its sourc.s ot intuition, reason, and the .enses, i8 a Mar9r 
approach to the infinite metalogical reality ot the coincidentia 9S?P9S1tlorua 
than the purely aensory, or pure17 rational, or pure17 intuitional. realiV. 
given by one ot the systems ot truth and reality." Sensate truth i8 one-aided 
becau.e it relies too heavl17 upon the senses whioh, "not controlled by' reason 
or intuition, can gift us but a chaotic mass C!t impre •• ion, perceptions, 
sensation, incapable ot aup-plying artT integrated knowledge, q-th1ng except 
dieorder17 b1 t. ot pseudo observation and pseudo impres.1on. If The idealistic 
truth ot reason i. one-sided because "mere dialectic speoulation camot 
guarantee to u. any valid knowledge ot empirical phenomena. It can give u. an 
un1Drpeachable 87'110118 or a mathematical dectuotton, but such a syllogiam or 
deduct10n will be empirically valid only when it. _jor md minor praU ••• are 
empirically valid." And ideational truth ia one-sided because "intuition un-
controlled by the truth ot NaSon and the .ense. goes ver.y e .. ily astray, and 
gtv •• u. ail intuiti .... error instead ot the intuitive truth."S) Sorokin here 
preacinda trQlll the contents ot the.e acta ot knowleqe in order to work towards 
a theory' ot the role of the •• acta 1n any valid knowledge. An upe\lt ot hi. 
B2Brn!!icI, IV, 7S2. 
8J;bid., pp. 762-764. 
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cognitional theory which i8 not well brought out here, but which 'brings it 
somewhat closer to the theor,r ot Lonergan's which is being used in this theais, 
is brought out by his discussion ot how the principle ot integration oan be 
discovered and validated. Regarding discovery, be S&;1S that "the principle 
m.q be suggested by observation, statistical. study, meditat10n, logical 
a.nal.ysia, even by dreaming and by what is called mere t chance,' or t 1ntui tion. t 
The question as to the manner of validation 1s anl!nfered by saying "that the 
cn tena ot valid! ty are virtuall1' the same as tor 8.lV' scientitic law. Firat 0 
all, the principle must by nature be logioal, and second it mwst star¥! success-
.tully the teat ot the 'relevant tacts,' that ~s, it must fit and represent 
them. It 84 
6. 800iolggic&1 tbe&. From the viewpoint ot soCiological theory', which 
1s ooncerned primarily with the relationshipa between d1tterent oonacioua 
subjects (m''1aningtul interaction), the interest in Newton's intuition will 
tocus more around the tact that it waa the initial. step ot "mental integration" 
in the three steps ot the emergence ot an empirical sociocultural s78taa. The 
sociologist is conoemed with the cODmlnication ot this new concept to other 
conSCious subjects through the steps ot ap1r1ca1. objectification and sooialil& 
tion. He 18 concerned with the relat10nship ot the law of grantation to total 
ideological, behaVioral, and material culture from. which it aroH, and, to whic 
it added new elements. Thus, he i8 interested in statements like Polanyi'. 
to the effect that science i. a 8001&1 and eul tural. ideal which proVides norma 
for the behavior of the mebers of the society dedicated to the cultivation of 
lS! 
science. For Newton's discoveries torm an tmportant part of the progress of 
the scienoe of mechanics, and this progress 11&8 deoisive in consolidating 
society's dedication to the cultivation ot science. Furthermore, it shaped 
men's idea ot what sOience was to be, and thus guided the behavior ot men 
engaged in the pursuit ot scientific truth. Thus, Newton's discovery entered 
into the world new ot western oulture, and was at the same time a confirmation 
ot that world View through its successful applioation. 
7. Primitive terms. J'rcn axper1ential conjurates which have m.eaning in 
terms of hUllan experiences, it i8 possible to go on to pure oonjugates ot two 
ditterent types. those which relate contents, of cognitional acts, and those 
whioh relate the acta themselves. The first type of pUN conjugates are 
employed in the explanato1"7 tonmdationa of empirical soience, the second t\rPe 
of pure oonjugates are empla,red in the explanato1"7 formulations ot the human 
SCiences, using the generalized empirical method. Pure con.1ugates of both 
types will include a set of pr1.'IJl1tive terms, becau8e explanations ot nature and 
explanations ot man will both require basic inSights, and "tor everr basiC 
insight there is a circle of terms and relations, such that the terms fix the 
relations, the relations fix the terms. and the insight fixes both." An 
example of a primitive term i8 mus, which is implicitly detined in Newton's 
law. Kas., however, i8 not just a term employed in 8i~le lawaI it 18 an 
ultimate mechanical concept. On the bu •• of such ultimate concepts, 
explanations on the buis of the data of _nee can reduce the element ot 
hypothesis to a ndnimurn, but can never eliminate it altogether. Exnlanation on 
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the basis of the data of oonsoiousness, however, can eeo&l)e this li.l'I1itation, 
as 
according to Lonergan. 
8. Revision!!! 'Phy;sical soienoe. Why does an elem.ent of hypothesis 
remain in the explanations of physical. soienee? "To reach the element of mere 
supposi tion that makes a:rry 91'stem of mechaniCS subject to future revision, It 
sqs Lonergan, "one must shift attention trom single lava to the set ot 
primiti ... e terms and relations Which the system employe in .tormul.atJ.ng all its 
lava. In other words, one has to distinguish between, sq, mass as defined by 
cOl'l"8lations between masse. anei, on the other hand, mas. as en,joying the 
pOSition ot an ultimate mechanioal concept." Then, althougb atl7 tutur. 8'1stem 
, 
ot mechanics will bave to explain all the data now covered by the c~ncept ot 
mass as now used, all future systems of mechanics do not haft to satiSfy this 
data 'b1 emplo,i.ng the present ooncept of masst 
Further developments might lead to the introduction ot a different 
aet ot ultimate concepts, to a consequent reformulation of all laws, 
and 80 to a dethronement of the notion ot masa from its present 
position as an ultimate ot mechanical s;yatem. Renoe, while em-
pirical Method can reduce the hypothetical to a m1niuaua, it can-
not el1minat. it entirely. Its conoepts as concepts are not hTPo-
thetical, for thq are detined implioi t1y by empirical17 established 
correlat.ions. None the lea., its concepts as systematically sig-
nificant, u ultimate or derived, as preferred. to other concepts 
that migbt be empirical.l.7 reached, do inYOl.". an element ot mere 
supposition. lor the selection ot oertain concepts as ultimate 
occurs in the work ot •• tematisation, and that work is pro-
visional. At aD1' time a STSt-. i8 aocepted because it provide. the 
simplest account ot all the known tacts. But at the 8_ time it is 
acknowledged that there U1' be unknown yet relevant facts, that tbq 
might give rise to further questions that would lead to further 
inSights, and that the further insights might involve a radical 
revision ot the accepted 87st_.86 
8Sx,onergan, pp. 334-335. 
86xbid. 
-
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9. ReYision.!!: ~ human sci.nc.s. The study of man can escape this 
radical revision because 1 t tlenjoy1l through consciousne.. an im.'lled.iate access 
to man, n which i8 utllized in description and explanation. Lonergan started 
with a descriptive account or insight, pointing out "that it was satisfying, 
that it came unexpectedly', that ita emergence was conditioned more by a 
d:yruIDic inner state ot inquiry than by external circumstance t that while the 
first emergence vas ditficult, repeated occurrence vas e&87 and spontaneous, 
that single acts ot insight accnmmlate into cluster. bearinc on a single topic, 
that such clusters may remain vi thout exact tormulation, or m..., be worked out 
into a qat_tic doctrine. If Descriptive pr~edure. gradual.l7 gave way to 
explanatory detinition by relation. Since all definition is subsequent to 
inquiry and insight, and since data, percepts, and i,-rnages are prior to insight, 
these had to be defined. ftas the materials prnupposeci and complemented by 
inquiry and insight. 1t Since the tonwlationa ot insight remain hypothetical, 
there i8 the question tor reflection. Renecti va understanding grasps the 
fulfillment or non-.tultil.lment of the conditions that nIl1st be tulfilled that 
the tomulation be affirmed, as well aa establishing what those conditions are. 
The grasp ot the tultillBu,nt of the conditions lead. to judgment, the 
affirmation ot the tormulated insight.87 Lonergan .&\1S that such an explanato 
account of human knowledge escapes the po8sib11it,y of a radical reY1sion "that 
involves a Shift in the fundamental terms and relatione ot the explanatory 
account ot the human knowledge underlying existing COll'l1lon sense, mathematics 
67Ibid., PP. 333-334. 
-
-and empirical science." And this is because of the very notion of revision. 
A revision appeals to data. It contends that 'Previous theory does 
not satisfactorily account for all the data. It claims to have 
reached complementary insights that lead to more accurate statements. 
It !:.hows that these new statements e1 ther are unconditioned or more 
closely approximate to the unoond:1tloned than previous statements. 
Nov, it in tact revision i8 as deSCribed, then it presupposes that 
cogni tiona! process falls on the three level. of presentation, 
intelligence, and reflectionj it presupposes that insighta are 
cumulative and complementary; it presupposes that the head tcnrard8 
a limit deecribed by the adjective, satistactory; it presupposes a 
reflective grasp of the unconditioned or ot what approxilu.te. to the 
unconditioned. Clearly, revision oannot revise its own presuppositions. 
A. reviser cannot appeal to data to dellT data, to his new insights to 
deny ina1gl1ts, to his new formulations to dellT formulation, to his 
ren..oti ve g-rup to deqy reflective grasp. 
The sarae point 1Uir be put in another manner. Popular rela-
ti vism is prone to argue that empirical iCience is the most reliable 
form ot human knowledge; but empirical science is subjeot to 
indefinite re'1isionJ therefore, all human knowledge is equally 
subject to indelini te revision. Nov auch argument is necessarily 
fallacious. One must defini te17 know invariant features ot human 
knowledge before one can .. sert that empirical scienoe is tlUbject 
to indefinite revision; and it one definitely knows invariant 
featuNa of human knowledge, then one knows what is not subject to 
revision. Moreover, as is obvious, such knowledge surpasaea 
empirical sCience at leut in the respect that it 18 not subject to 
revision.8e 
10. Primitive terms !.!:l sociolovical theorz- Data, crueation, inSight, 
formulation, refiect10n, and judgment all are prim tin terms in hUDlan acience, 
which are spoken of initially in experiential. oonjugates, getting their 
;nea."1ing by reterence to human experience, and then become pure conjugate. 
insofar as they are defined iJIlpllcitly in statementa 1filich express basic 
inSights into cognitlonal process such that the terms tix the relations between 
the tems, the relat-lons fix the meanings of the terms, and the insight fixes 
S8 ~., pp. 335-336. 
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both. It is the writer' 8 opinion that Soroldn, in his integralist theory ot 
cognition, never quite makes the transition rro. experiential to pure conjuga 
As Merton Sa.r8, "in so far as Soroldn adq>ta the position ot radical.17 
ditferent and disparate criteria of truth, he wst locate his own work within 
this context. It mq be said, though an extensive discussion would be needed 
to documant it, that he never reaol ves th. problem ... 89 The wr1 tar's conv1ctio 
that Soroldn's integralist theory is both vague and a somewhat inadequate 
tormulation of his own methods, along with the tact that in 8ooioloO' the acts 
of knowledge anticipated by the inquirer are acts, not only o:t' the sociologist, 
but also ot the people whom he studies, and ~ such, become primitive teru in 
any adequate sociological flY'8tem, formed a decisive part of the rationale 
behind using Lonergan's concept of heuristio structure in the the.is. 
Sorokin, h0W8Y8r, doe. provide primitive te1"ll8. The •• ha. .... cOIle up in the 
course of the discussion alread;y. Mental integration 88 the tiNt stage in the 
emergence or an empirical. sociocultural system, CO!'I'88ponde to insight. The 
phase of empirical objectifioation is aimUar to formulation, but go .. be70nd 
the conoept ot f01'l'llUlation to include arotistio or technical production or overt 
behavior of the interacting individual as !lt88n8 of empirioal objectification. 
The phase of empirical objeotifioation require. some Yehlol. ot meaning. 
Vehicle would seem to be a primitive term therefor., which would include 
different types ot vehicles-material objects, overt behavior-bJ.t 'Which gets 
its meaning fixed ultimatelJ" l:tY its relationship with insight or m.ntal 
integra.tion. Mental integration oan be a grasp ot meanings, norma, or valuu. 
89}tobert Merton, Social Theon and Social Struoture, 2nd. ad. (Glencoe, 
Illinois, 19S7), p. 41~. ---
• 
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Norms and values bring in the basic concept of desire or need. A basiC desire 
of :nan 1s the desire to know. The desire to know relates directly to the first 
of the major premises Sorokin gives for logically integrated culture, the 
nature of reality. The inclusion ot other desires relates directly to the 
second major premise of Sorokints, the nature of the needs and ends to be 
satisfied. Sorokin's third major premise of logically integrated culture, 
Itthe extent to which these needs and ends are to be satisfied," reters 
primarUy to values insofar as different needs and ends can be of relative 
value. The fourth premise, the "methods of' satisfaction," reter primarily to 
norms, just as 8cient1ticmethod a8 a means o~ satisfying the deaire to know is 
a norm fOr SCientific behavior.90 
"Meaning" would be a nrimitive term, defined implicitl7 by its relation to 
insight, formulation, and vehicle. For meaning is that whiah is grasped by 
inSight, empirically objectified in formulatiOns, or in other vehicles, 
including overt action. "Value" would be • primitive t8rll1, for it would reter 
to a meaning grasped. by a practical insight, which reters to • pos8ible state 
of attairs judged to be good, and Which is a possible or l1kel.7 content ot an 
act ot ChOO81Dg. "Norm" would be a primitive ten, defined implicit17 by its 
relationship to value, for a norm. points out the w., to achieve or maintain a 
value. On the other hand, socialiu.t1on ot meaning would not be a primitive 
90th. major prn1aea aref "(1) the nature ot realitYJ (2) the nature of 
the needa and ends to be satisfiedJ (.3) the extent to which these needs and 
ends are to be satisfied; (4) the methods ot satisfaction. It J.?fn!!n1cs, I, 70, 
original in italios. 
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term, for it refers to a complex process including objectification, persuasion, 
on the part of one interacting individual, arxl acts at experiencing, under-
standing, judging, yaluing, and chOOSing on the part of other interacting 
individual.. Nor 18 a human being as the subject of interaction a primitive 
term, tor human being. are things defined by' conjugates, not conjugate. 
themselve.. "Interaction" is a derived tem, tor it i8 defined in terms of 
many d.1tferent kinde of acts of difterent interacting subjects. Similarly, 
soci_V, culture, and personality are all derived tel"lU, since they are 
defined in terms more basic than the.elye •• 
Sorokin, hOW'ever, as haa been seen in th~ cue of m.eaning, when called 
upon to detine a term, w1ll trequentl7 gift e1 ther a nOll1nal definition or a 
definition in tenaa ot experiential conjugates. Lonergan notea that one must 
remember that "theoretical ana.lJ"s18 is one thing, and concrete practice i. 
another. Thus, one would be inclined to say that physicists move eu117 and 
unconac1ou.l3' back and forth between the use of elCperiential and pure 
conjugatee. 'When they are called upon to define their terms, canmonlJr they' 
will suppo.e that detini tion come a at the beginning and 80 otter detini tiona 
ot experiential conjugate.. On the other hand, methodologi8U and theorists of 
empirlcal science will be puzzled by the multiplicity' of detin1tiona available 
in a mature science and 80 they tend to disagree vi th one another • .,91 PUrther-
more, when the science under disousion is a soctal science there 1s an 
apparent overlapping of the field of the relations of things to U8 which 
results in u:perlent1al conjugates. and the field of the relat10ns of thinp 
91Lon.ergan, pp. 81-82. 
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to one another, which reaul ts in pure conjugates. But "the d1f'terent 
procedures of description and explanation prevent the overlapping from being 
more than apparent, for description is in terms of the given while explanation 
is in terms of the ultimates reached by' analya1s.,,92 Thus, 't!ntersubjeot!v1t:r" 
is something experienced, lying in the field ot the given, as opposed to the 
ultimates reached by Sorokin' 8 analy's!s ot the components ot meaningful 
integration. Redfield's intuited whole is in the field of the given, as 
opposed to knowledge of the communitq' as an analyzed system. 
D. SUMMARY 
1. Description .!!!! exelanation. In stu~ng man, it i8 necessary to 
take the inaide viewpOint, tor the studT ot man involves communication with 
other men. And it one is to grasp accurately what another means, one must 
recognize that his meaning is in reference to his experiences, insights, and 
judgments, along with his desires and values and habitual choices. In order to 
arrive at an accurate description ot the world view ot a people, one must take 
the inside view to a very great extent. But unless one' s goal remains 
descriptive, one will have to take the explanatory viewpoint, which is an out-
side view, alter one has described this world view. Taking the inside view is 
very similar to what Soroldn calls the psychological reading ot culture, and to 
what Lonergan calls description ot the data of conaciousness. The outside 
view is not the same as Lonergan t s explanatory viewpoint, however, for one can 
-
treat the c01lll'fPlll1ty as it is related to the outsider who looks at it, and the 
92Ibid., pp. 291-292. 
-
explanatory viewpeint lIlUst drop the netien ot the investigater as a spectator 
et the real. For this notien binds one te the use ot experiential conjugates 
which state the relations et things tc the ebserver rather than pure oonjugatea 
which state the relations ot thinga te cne anether. Ncr is the explanator,r 
viewpoint the a._ as Soroldn' 8 socielogico-phenoaenologioal reading of 
culture, tor thia is a use ot phenClllGnology in a sense s1mUar to that at 
Husserl' 8 phenomenology. which remains a hiabl7 purified BlPirici8l'll. Such an 
empirici_ cannct _ke the distinctien between experiential and pure conjugate 
between desor1ptien and explanatiGns. Although the tact that through 
consciousne.s man baa an 1Dtmediate ace.,aa to himaelf resul t& in an apparent 
, 
overlapping ot experiential and pure conjugates, it also reaul ta in a set ot 
pr1nd.t1ve te1"m8 which are beyond the radical revision which always rema1na a 
poa.ibUity in empirical science. Revision cannot rmse the appeal to data, 
to further queltions, to better insights, to more adequate tOl"llUlatioms, to 
clGser approxilnatiens to the unconditioned in reuonable judgments. Further 
primitive terms in SOCiology would be desire, need. value, norm, Choice, and 
vehicle. To arrive at implicit detinitions ot such terms, one !tlUst take the 
inside view, utilize the data of consciousness, and gc on tc seek the relatiGn-
ship. between dtf1'erent cODscious acts and patterns of experience. 
2. MeiuociQloq..!:!!! oulture. MetaaOCiclogy seems tc deal primarilJr with 
the noru 01' sociologiSts. It doea not attempt to investigate these 
empir1oall.T and. relate thea to the total vq of lUe of the sociolQgist, but 
rather to speoity or! teria ot relevance am aoientU'ic quality. The meta-
Sociologist, in other words, seeks to formulate a superior 1cnovledge to guide 
the sociologist .. to give him an interpretative framework. The SOCiologist, 
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however, in his investigation ot culture, studies the interpretative trameworks 
ot men in relationship to their whole social and oultural system. He can, 
likewise, study the interpretative framework of the metasociologist, using the 
techniques ol the sociology ot knowledge. Sorokin does precisely this in his 
studT at the fluctuations ot the three supersystems ot ideational, senaate, and 
idealistic eul tUl"e.. But he is not able to locate his own s7stem precisely' 
lIi thin this structure, and elaborate. a tourth system Called "integrali_." 
Sorokin'. recognition at the need to plaoe his system within his categories is 
pra1sewort.hT. but without a distinction between BTStems and acts at knowledge 
that is consistently' applied, he does not suc~ed. 
3. Heuristic anticipations. The Criticism ot Sorokin' 8 sociolog1co-
phenanenological reading ot cultures resulted in the metasociological judgment 
that one's heuristic antiCipations in the studiY' ot the little commun1tyr as an 
integrated whole would not include systems of meanings and vehicles that are 
independent ot meanings meant by' the people in the society or culture being 
studied. Theretore one not onlJ" expects to experience data, get inSights into 
that data, and tomulate and verity what one yTrasps by insight, one also 
anticipate. the discovery that the people one is studying have had experiences, 
partly si:nilar and pa.rtl.y' ditterent from one's own. One will work to try to 
get the people to communicate their experiences to him, using whatever 
techniques he judges to be he1pM. He will antiCipate that people have 
insight. into their experiences, most of thEn lett unformulated or empirically' 
objectified onlY in artistic manner, or in overt actions, or technical norma 
put into practioe but not spelled out in laws and rules. One will antiCipate 
that the people in the com.'mlnity will have habitual. patterns ot judgment, both 
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as to the nature of reality and as to the nature o! the needs and ends to be 
satisfied. These latter judgments, value judgments, will be influential in 
their habitual decisions. And t..l-J.eir decisions, ot course, will be an 
lmportant factor in the explanation ot their overt behavior. And finally, the 
lnvestigator will still retain notions of causal relationship, f'unotional 
relationship, logical relationship, aesthetic relationship, genetic relation-
ship, am dialectical relationship as tentative hypotheses regarding the 
relationship of the variables 1"rom the viewpoint of the total integration ot 
the community. 
-CHAPTER V 
Since anticipation of meanings is an irAportant heuristic antioipation in 
the study of the little ccnmuni ty.. the investigator will have heuristic 
antioipations as to how these meanings are integrated. The weakness ot 
oonceiving the little community as an imaginable model has already been 
treated, but the logical model has not yet been discussed. Anticipation of 
logical relatJ..onships between the meanings he1d b.1 the members of a community 
is a natural, spontaneous anticipation. Yet it shall be seen that the logioal 
model baa decided weaknesses as well. First, it will suffer because the terms 
used by the members of t.he little community I or by members ot modern urban 
cOt!Jl'lunities, are not, for the lIlost part, preoisely defined. Men ordinarily do 
not in8i5t on O'l'!ore precise 1!onoeptual precision in their everyday language than 
is ;:oequired for consistent use ot that language in communicating with other 
men. And in everydq oommunication, !INch more than C')1lcepts are communicated; 
feeling., desires, aversions, subtle nuances are indicated not only bT 
verbally oODllUnioated ooncepts, but b:I gesture, expression of face, and tone of 
voioe. 
Added to this weakness ot the logioal model for culture integration is the 
static nature ot logical detinition and relations. The viewpoints ot men are 
c;;ntinually urdergoing development, and thus the genetiC torm of relationships 
mlSt be antiCipated. Furthermore, there is conflict in the ideas held by' 
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different men, and. often even among the ideas held by' a single man. Tn1a 
confiict demands the heuristic expectation of dialectical relationships. 
An integrated rtewpolnt will oonsist in a series of related insights into 
more or l.ss corrmon experiences. But these insights vUl not, in the cue ot 
the small cOlJ1lllU.n.1ties under consideration, be formulated into logicall7 
preoi .. definitions. They will rather remain as a latent store of ideas, 
expressed. in terms that are onlJr ncminally defined, that form a sort of theory 
of the universe by practical anticipa.tion. baa insights remain incaaplete, 
but are expected to be adequate to deal with the concrete situations that aris 
through the addition of an insight into the concrete situation to be dealt 
, 
with. Such inSights enable the man ot oommon sense to select the right words 
to describe the situation, IIld to select the principles of action that will 
help him to deal with the situation. To try to make a logical tnatise O\lt ot 
such a system ot meanings would be to distort it. 
A. DE.'FENSE MIDHANISMB or AN INTIDRATED VIEWPOINT 
1. Lguy • .!!!! relativi8Dl. Redfield sa;ys that the investigator ot a 
little community must take the inside view even in stuc:O'ina fl. pot or a plow 
or a aledge, It in order to ... whether the manings of the worde he u .. s to 
deecribe the .. things correspond. to the u.s &ld other meanings attributed to 
the thing. by the natives. For the natives use different vorda to identity 
then things. And Polaqyi sq. that "our most deeply ingrained convictions ar 
determined by the idiom. i!'! wh1c h we interpret our experience and in term8 of 
whioh we erect our articulate systems. Our fomally' declared beliets can be 
l6h 
held true tn the last resort only because of our logically' anterior acoeptance 
of a particular .et ot terms, trom which all our references to reality ere 
construoted. tl2 Here is a statement ot relatl vism whioh puts judgments in 
relation to a set ot terms rather than to enaulturated experience, 88 in 
Herakonts· formulation. Yet the two statements are not basioa.l.ly different, 
since the acqui81tion of a particular set of terms i8 part of the prooess of 
encu1turation. 
2. Ls,!!«e ~ encul turation. Words only have meaning to someone who 
has learned their use. TheY' "convey nothing except by a previously acquired 
meaning, whioh ms.T be eoMWhat modified by' t~ir present use, but will not as 
a rule have been tirst diaoovered on this ocoasion. In ant cue, our 
knOW'ledge of the things denoted by' words will have been largely acquired by' 
experience, in the same way as animals come to know things, while the wards 
will have acquired their meaning bY' pre1'ioualy designating suoh experience, 
either when uttered by other. 1n our presenoe or when used by' ounelvea •• ) 
Lonergan calls terms that get their meaning from a designat.ion ot some human 
h 
experi8110e "experiential conjugated." A cbUd going through the process of 
enculturation must place confidence in his teachers, for they give hL'1l not 
only information, but the very intellectual habits and tools by' which he learne 
2personat Knowledse, p. 287. 
3xb1d., p. 92. 
-
~ergan. p. 79. 
165 
to interpret. his experience and to judge his interpretations. Polanyt sqs 
that the trust that a learner places in hi. elders 1. .imilar to the heuristic 
anticipation ot the discoverer who bellev •• that hi. problem has a solution 
.and that he has a chance ot discovering the solution. But the learner's 
confidence is not in his own power of d1acoyery; it is in others--he aseumes 
that the words used in his presence have meanings, the intellectual junior 
trust. that the doings and sqi11gS ot hi. intellectual superiors haft hidden 
5 
meaning. which will be satistying to grup. 
J. Zande !Tstem .2!. ~lie1'.. Pol&l'\11 illustrates how the logiOally 
anterior acoeptance ot a particular set ot te~ oonst.itutes a "theory ot the 
universe" by' which reality 18 interpreted by reterring to the account giftn by' 
Evana-Pr1t.cbard ot the Zande belief in the "poison-oracle ... 6 This oracle 
answer. que.tions Mthrough tne ettects on a towl ot a poisonou. .ubstance 
called beple," which i8 gathered from plants, but is thought to becOJlll8 
etfective on17 Matter it has been addressed in the words ot an appropriate 
ritual. tt The Asande are not forced in any vq to believe in the power of the 
oracle, but believe Tery firmly' in it 'because of an idiom whioh i~terprets 
reality in terms ot witohoraft and oracles. Thus, it t.he oracle oontradicts 
itself, there arelfno 1 ••• than eight seoond.ar,- elaborations of their belief. by 
which Asande will account tor the oracle'. tallure. They mq asSUM that the 
5Personal Knowledge, pp. 207-208. 
6:E. &. Evane.?ritchard., '",'itchcratt, Oracles, and MagiC A.!T101lS ~ Azand.!' 
(Oxford" 1931), cited in Personal Knowle&:e, p. 28r.;-
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wrong variety ot poison had been gathered, or a breach ot taboo committed, or 
that the owners ot the forest where the poisonous creeper rrrows had been 
angered and avenged themael ..... by' spoiling the poison; and so on. tI Evans-
Pritchard asked A.antle what would happen it beDJe were administered to a fowl 
wi thout tbe usual ritual address, thus proving that gepge 18 a natural poison. 
"'l'he Zande,n he writes, "does not know what would happen and 1s not interested 
in what would happen; no one haa been tool enough to waste good oracle-poison 
1n making such pointless experiments which only' a European could imagine •••• 
Were a European to malee a test in which his view proved Zenda opinion wrong 
they w::.>uld stand aased at the credulity ot ~e European. It the towl died 
they would siMply • .,. that it was not good begse. The very tact ot the tovl 
dying proves to them 1. ta badnea8. tI 7 The blindness ot Asande to what seem to 
Europeans to be obvious tact. i. sustained by remarkable ingemrl. va " t They' 
reason excellentl,y' in the idiom ot their bellets,' (says Evans.Pritchard), 'but 
they oannot reason outSide, or against, their belists beoause tb.,. have no 
other idiOlll in whioh to express their thoughts.,,.8 
4. Det.nee _chant_. The As.ande haft achieYeCi a higb degree ot 
integration, not only ot their ideological culture, their system of belieh, 
rut also ot their behaVioral culture, tor th.,. act upon these beliefs. Po11l1V'1 
aqs that the stability of the 878tem is m. to three -detense mechani.uu· 
1Evana-Pritohard, pp. 314-31" cited in Po1&nT1, pp. 287-288. 
8Ibld., p. 33R, cited in Po1&Q11, p. 288. 
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circularitY', automatic expansion of the e1rcl.~ and the principle of ttsup_ 
pressed. nuoleation. It Each will be treated briefl;y. 
,. Circularity. The circularity or a system enables it to meet objection 
one by one. "B;r this I mean that the convincing power possessed by the 
interpretation of al'\1 particular new topio in terms or such a COllOeptual frame-
work is based on put applications or the same framework to a great number of 
other topics not now under coneideration, while it ~ or these other topiCS 
were qusstioned now, their interpretation in ita turn would Similarly rely' for 
support on the interpretation ot all the others." The deteat ot one doubt 
results in the strengthening of all the tun~ental Convictions which were 
challenged by' the doubt. "Thus the circular! ty ot a conceptual eystaRl tends 
to reinforce itself by ever:! contact with a fresh topic." A further illustra-
tion ot how this works in an English dictionar.r, which manifest the 
"circularity ot the theory ot the universe embodied in any particular language.' 
It i8 possible to doubt that a particular E~lish noun, verb, adjecti" or 
adverb has a.rv .aning in .English. But nan English dictionary dispels this 
doubt b.r a definition using other nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs, the 
meaningfulness ot which i. not doubted tor the moment. Enquiries ot this kind 
will increasingly' confirm us in the US8 or a language. SiMilar17, an 
axiomatized 8)"8tam ot ut.'lematics is circular. "Every assf!rtion of a deduotive 
system can be demonstrated by, or e1s. shown to be implied as axioms or, the 
ot.'lers. Therefore, it we doubt each 8.8s.rt1on in its turn each is found 
contimed by' circularity, and the refutation or each consecutive doubt results 
in strengthening our belief in the system as a whole. "9 
9Pe£Sonal lQ9Kltdg!, pp. 288-289. 
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6. Automatic expansion. "A second aspect ot stability arises from an 
automatio expansion ot the oircle in whioh an interpretative 8,Ystem operatea. Q 
'Thus, there will alway's be available elaborations ot the syste."!l ~hioh will 
co"er eventualities which seem to be embart'aBsir1f-; at first sight. Furthermore, 
this principle operates in conjunction with the principle ot supore88ed 
10 
nucleation. 
1. Smmre88ed nucleation. This principle deniss any ground for a rival 
conception to take root. Experiences which support the rival conception could 
be brought forward only' one at a time. "But a new conception, e.g. that of 
natural oausation, whioh would take the place, of Zande 8uperstitutlon liJi1 
could be established or..ly by a whole series of relevant instances, and such 
evidence cannot accumulate in the minds of people if each ot them is dis-
regarded in its turn for lack of the concept which would lend significance to 
it. II '!'he reaction ot the Azande to Evans-Pritchard's argu..rllent that be!?ie was 
a natural poison "illustrates the kind of contemptuous indifferr0nce with which 
we normally regard. 'l.'1ings of which we have no conception. nil 
8. l!'.x&r.ples E.! closed !ystems. Pol~i sq8 that extreme objectiv1a 
"has forced modern bellefs to take on implicit forms, like those of Azande. 
And no one will del\Y that those who have mastered the idioms in w~, lch these 
beliefs are entailed do also reason most ingeniously within these idioms, even 
lO:rbid., p. 291. 
111 bid. 
-
lfhile--agai n like Amanda-they- unheei tating13 ignore all that the idiom does 
not oover." He quotes a former ifar:x1st and a former Freudian PSYCholos;~ist "to 
illustrate the high stability of two modern interpretati~le framel:orks. based 
on these prinoiplesf 
My' party education had equipped my mind ~d th such elaborate 
shock-absorbing buffers and elastic defences that everything 
seen end heard beoame automatically transformed to tit a pre-
conceived pattern. (A. Koestler, in The God that Failed, London, 
1950, p. 68.) ---
The system of theories whioh Freud has gradually developed is so 
consistent that when one is once entrenched in them it i8 
difficult to :nake observations unbiased bY' his way of thinki~. 
(Karen HorM1'. !!! ;,,,,,8 2!. ?syohoan:!:l.l!ia. London, 1939, p. 1}12 
The wr1 ter believes that Duncan and Sohnore' s ~obs."ation concerning the three 
different perspective. in SOCiology that "theae perspectives are not only 
different. th.,. are 80 different th.at it 1s difficult to explain and justity 
one of them to • SOCiologist com.m1 tted to another" might also be explained in 
teme of circular1ty, expansion ot the circle, and 8Uppresled nuoleation. And 
when Polanyi says that modern objectivism hu made modern beliets take on an 
implioit torm, he se .. s to be getting at a basic reason for the t~t that 
Sjoberj notedt "sociologists are reluctant to concede that they too are caught 
in the web ot demande imposed by their primary ?;roup, by the norma ot SCience, 
and especially by the broader SOCiety in which they live." '!'hey are, in 
Znanieoki's worda, using hypothe.e. "dogmatically to prevent the discovery of 
facts" rathor than "heuristically to search for facta." 
9. InX!n?retati" frllDl8WOru. The Asande possened an interpretative 
franaework di tt.rent from that of Evan s-Pri tabard. I at they reasoned very well 
l2!1As1., p. 288. 
170 
within that framework. Their conclusions about benge are excellent examples 
of the correct use ot an incorNCt interpretative tramework. The "theory ot 
the univeraeff implied in their language was judged to be inferior to a theory 
of the universe which makes room tor the concept ot natural causality. AI thoug 
5Uch an interpretative framework is acquired by an enculturation process in 
whioh one learns the language, and al. though it is defended by the mechanisms 
of circular! ty, automatic expansion, and suppressed nucleation, it is possible 
to change one's interpretative framework somewhat. Sorokin, tor example, 
changed from a predominantly' sensate outlook to an idealistic outlook, which he 
then modified to his integralist posi tion. ~ fact that Koestler is a toraer 
Marxist and Horney a former Freudian illustrates a change in their Itprecon_ 
ceived pattern," their "&y'8tem ot theories." One's interpretative framework 
18 a context of judgments which gOVerrt8 one's attention, and influences the 
occurrence ot insights and the acceptance or rejection ot judgments. Because 
of the circularity of the system, it is impossible to criticise the whole 
system all at once. it provides the terms in which the critiCism wUl be made. 
Nevertheless, a8 is Ulustl'ated by the tact ot men changing their interpreta-
-
ti ve frameworks, it is possible to cn tici.e one t s own interpret.ati.... f'ramevork 
Lonergan indicates how one can correct mistaken belietst 
• • • learning one t s errors is but a particular cue of learning. 
It takes .. its starting-point and clue the discovery of some 
precis. 1s8ue on which undoubtec:lly one wu mistaken. It advances 
by' inquiring into the sources that MaT have contributed to that 
error and, perhaps, contributed to other errors as well. It asks 
about the motives and the supporting judgments that, as they once 
contirmed one in that error, may still be holding one in others. 
It investigates the conseqllences at the view one now rejects and 
it seeks to determine wrJ8ther or not the;r too are to be rejected. 
The process is cumulative. The discovery ot one error is 
explOited to lead to the discovery ot others; and the disoovery ot 
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othel"8 provides a stUl larger bue to proceed to the discover.r of 
still more. MoreoYer, this cumulative process not only takes 
advantage of the mind's native process of learni., in which one 
insight leads on to other insights that open the way to still 
fUrther insights, but it also exploits the insistence of rational 
oonsciousness on oonsistenor; tor just as our love of consistency, 
once we have made one mistake, leads us to make others, so the s_ 
love of consistency leads us to reject other mistakes, when one is 
rejected and, at the s.e t1.me, it proTidu us with abundant clues 
for finding t.i-te other. that are to be rejected.l) 
Of oourse, a preoondi tion for the occurrenoe of suoh a process is the admission 
that one mistakenJ one cannot, like the Aaande, display' "contemptuous indiffer-
ence" to new concepts that might prove one's habitual outlook to be mistaken. 
The desire ot rational. oonsoiousness tor c f)n8istency will, when one re,1ects the 
possibility of being mistaken, ineTitably res6rt to defense mechaniama to 
reject the intrusion of different concepts. 
10. ...'tlo.-r_l .. d!!!!. The student of the little community who seeks to under-
stand the tnterpretative framework of the little community that he is stu~ng 
1. working with their "world view. lt Redfield says that the attempt to 
characterize a woole ocmmunity in terms ot their Ifoutlook on lite" 18 a 
ffco.mmitraent to tho inside view to the uttermost.fll4 Here the outsider must 
withold his suggestions for 8,1stamatizing the whole until he discovers whether 
or not the people themselves have c::mceived of an order in the whole. "It is 
their order, their categories, their emphasis upon this part rather than that 
wnioh the student listens for."lS Nevertheless, as is illustrated b.1 the 
lltonergan, pp. 714-71S. 
14Th. Little Community, p. 87. 
lSIbid., p. 88. 
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example ot Frank Cushing, it, when studTing the native, "we use only his tems 
and forms ot thought we merely' beccne natives like those we study, speaking 
and thinking as he doe ... -imag1n1ng tor a mom.ent this impossibility could be 
achieved-and no cOlllmunication to the outsider would result. If Redfield calls 
this the ttethnographical. dilemma," and claims that it is "the scientist' 8 tom 
ot the problem encountered in our camnon-aense life as the :problem ot 'inter-
cultural. understanding.'" Furthermore, the problem ot understanding Itanother 
people through det1ni tions ot expertence that are dUferent frat those we are 
trying to understand" is ult1matelJ" "the problem ot catBmlnication and under-
standing between alW' two hu.u.n beings. ,.16 
11. ComBlunication between Evans-Pritchard and the !zande. The problem ot 
--
cOi1lltUnication between &I\T two human beings raise. the problem of cultural 
relativism to rather frightening proportions, it one wishes to make an absolute 
principle of it. For every individual's eooul tvated experience is unique-
even identical. twins cannot haw exactly the same experiences throughout their 
lives, starting tram the moment that one tollowed the other out ot their 
mother's womb. Yet there is the tact ot communication and understanding bet we. 
-
individuals and between individuals ot ditterent cultures, which eases one's 
fears in the face at any theorz that might state that it 18 impossible. Thus, 
when Evans-Pr1 tabard tr1.ed to convince the bande that benge was & natural 
poison, they understood what he waa try1.ng to do well enough to soott at his 
stupidity. What he could not c01Il1lunicate to them was the necessary concepts 
to make them seriously doubt their belietst Ifa new conoeption, e.g. that ot 
l6Ibid., pp. 92-93. 
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natural cAUsation, which would take the place of Zand. supersti tution [SlY, 
<:rJUld be established on1.v by a. whole serie. of relevant instances, and such 
evidence cannot accumulate in the minds of people if each ot thertl is disregards 
17 in ite turn for lack ot the concept which would lend significance to it." 
Evans-Pritchard talked to the Azande, who listened and understood enough to 
reply, and Evane-Pri tchard, in turn, understood enough ot their viewpoint to 
wr1 te down a great deal of it (in his own terms, of course) in an et.hno-
graphical report. 
12. A8!u!ption.2! c ommen experienoe. 11 though each man t 8 encul turated 
experience i8 unique, communication depends u'.{>on the assumption that .!2!! 
exverienoes of the two part1es are alm1lar. Redfield 8.,.S that -the wtq to 
understand1ng seems to lie through an alternation ot taJ.ki.ng a.nd listening. 
One talks to the other, expresll1ng one's sell to him eo that he mq interpret 
your .ignals to him through a projection of himself into you. And then one 
li8tens to h1Jll with the best projection of one'. own 81lllpathetic feelings and 
thought about the other that one can achieve, held in suapenH and made subject 
to correction." ae 8878 that to study and report the wtq of life ot another 
people Itone must bec1n by .e8U.Dling, as oommon sense a8su.n:tes in trying to reach 
understanding in talking with another person, that something is the same in 
that wq ot life and one t s own. ••• OUr neighbors are a little different 
from. us, the peasant people. or Macedonia a little more difterent; in India, in 
New Guinea, there 1s 80mething more alienJ and yet we cannot go 80 tar as to 
17 
Personal Knowle~e, p. 291. 
18 
reach entirely be.yond the familiar.-
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13. Suml1ugy. Ars:r communication depends upon sOO\e common experience, for 
otherwise there can be no mutual understanding of the meaning ot words. This 
degree of understand1ng was necessary tor Evans-Pritchard and the Asande in 
order that they could realize just where it was that they disagreed or that 
there was misunderstanding. Points ot disagreement or incomprehension between 
two different world views or interpretative framework. stand out against a 
baClcground of similar elements. Otherwise there can be nothing but ftlUtual 
incomprehension. On the pointe where the two perspectives ditter, the 
enculturated experiences that lead to the two ,different perspectives Mq be so 
ditterent, and the de tense mechanisms ot circulari~, expanSion of the Circle, 
and. suppre.sed nucleation lIl&y' be so effiCient, that the two perspectives cannot 
be reconciled. It is even possible that those possessing one interpretative 
tra;'f!8vork nd.ght be unable even to grasp the concepts necessary to understand 
the otber Viewpoint, the Azame lacked the concept ot natural. causality, for 
example. A study of the little community can now be conceived as an attempt at 
communication between two different viewpoints_ The world view ot the 'People 
1n the community must be made known to a community of scholars possessing a 
scientific world view. In this task of achieving comlnunication, the 
investigator, as Redfield 8~S, must maintain a delicate balance between the 
inside and t,he outside viewpoints. 
18 l'!l! ti~.tle Community, p- 93. 
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B. THE [\1?ORTANCE 01 LAmlJAGE 
1. Terms. Terms, as has been s.en, oan be nominally defined or explanato 
rUy defined. Nominal detiui tion tells one how the term is used; explanato1'7 
definition explains the "naturett of the t.~lng to whioh the term refers. A 
diotion.a.ry gives nominal de.finitiona of the worda of a language and is, as 
Polan;yi states, a circular system, it defines words b.'r other words which are 
not, at the moment, in que.Uon.Explanato17 definition aY'Oids circularity 
because of the fact that "definitions do not occur in a private vacuum of their 
own. They.erge in solidarity with experiences, images, questions, am 
insights. • • tor every basic insight there i, a circle of terms and relations, 
suoh that the terms fix the relations, the relatiol18 fix the terms, and the 
19 insight fixes both.tt The terms grasped by such a basiC inSight are primitive 
terms. And they are pure or explanator,y oonjugates, whioh are "oorrelatives 
defined implioitly b.r a.pirioallY established correlations, funotions, laws, 
theories, &y'stems. lt20 The o1roul.ar 8}"stem of a dictionary doss not give pure 
oonjugates, for the terms in a diotionary are nominally defined, whereas 
implicit detinition ls explanatory. But besides pure conjugates, there are als 
experiential conjugates whose meaning 18 fixed by an appeal to some huIun 
2l 
experience. Through a series ot experienoes of watching the Azande gathering 
19Lonergan, pp. 11-12. 
2Orbid., pp. 79-80. 
-
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creepers, reciting incantations over extractions from the plants, givil1l the 
substance to a fowl, and basing predictions of events or i~portant decisions on 
the fowl's reactions, ~vans-Pritchard learned what ranges ot experiences the 
Asande designated by the sound benge. 
2. I!Rortance.S!! nominal definition. Evans-Pritchard had to get a nom.1 
definition of beps.; he needed an insight into the ~ that the Asande used the 
word. And he gave thil definition in experiential conjugates, using words 
that referred to and pointed out elements ot human experience. One lnust get 
nominal definitions of the words used bt a group it he wants to get their 
viewpoint, it he wants to use their terms and ,their categories. The possiblli 
of nominal. definition 8ees to rest on four laws, t8l'lled by Polanyi "the law ot 
poverty," '·the law ot grammar," "the law ot iteration,1t and "the law ot 
consistency. It 
3. .!h! 1!! 21. Poverty. According to t.'1i8 law, one rtl18t not onJ..y &SS'\l.!"le 
that other persons have had experiences similar to one' s own but must also 
assume tha.t mazv ditterent experiences that one has had personaJ.17 are similar 
enough to one another to be designated by' one word. For it is possible to 
construet I by different cClIllbinations of sounds already in use in English, 
enough eight-letter "code words lt to rtlplace every- sentence ever printed in the 
English language by a difterent word. "This m1ll1ontold enrichment ot the 
English language would completely destroy it; not only' because nobody could 
rementber 80 many words, but for the more important reason that they would be 
meaninglesa. For the meaning ot a word is tomed and manifested b;y its 
repeated usage, and the vast majority of our eight.letter code words would be 
used only' once or at any rate too rarely to acquire ann express a definite 
-177 
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meaning." Poverxr of n.umber of words is thus an essential features of lam-
guage. 
4. !h! l:!! 2! _G ... ra.: . .·nmar................ This la.w affims that slnce a relatl vely' tew 
words must be used to make millions and millions of statements, Ifa fixed 
vocabulary of suffioient poverty must therefore be used wi thin some fixed modes 
of combination, whioh alwqs have the same mea.n1ng. n23 Every' language has 
such fixed modes or combination, or a grammar. 
S. l!!! ~ 2! Iteration. According to this law, words must be repeatableJ 
and if words are to be identified as repeated in different spoken or written 
sentences, phonemes and lettera must be repea~ble. "They must be chosen for 
and defined by some feature poseessing the kind ot distinctiveness whioh 
Gestal t-psyohology haa described as nanz and whioh I have acknowledged 
betore, ••• together with other types ot order, by contrasting it with randcm 
24 
configurations. tt This oont.rut is much the same a8 that made by Sorold.n 
between a system and a oongeries. 
6. lh! l:!!!!!. Cons1stens:y. This law states that tfonly when repeatable 
utterances are used consistently' can they' have a definite l'l'.ea.n.1ng, and 
utt.erances without definite meaning are not language. It Pol&n71 a&lits that 
rconsistencylt is somewhat lnpreels., but says tha.t it must be so because it 
deSignates an unspeci£iable quality: 
Since the world, Uke a kaleidoscope, never exactly repeats Iln7 
previous situation (and indeed), it it did we would not know it, 
as we would have no means of telling that. time had passed in 
22Xbid., pp. 78-79. 
-23Ibid. 
-
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between), we can achieve consistency only by' identifying manifestly' 
different situations in respect to some uarticular feature, and this 
require. a series of personal ,judgments. First. we must decide what 
variations of our experience are irrelevant to the identitication of 
this recurrent feature, as forming no part of it •• i.e. we lmlI!Jt 
diScriminate against its random baekp'round.. Seoondly, we must decide 
what variations should be accepted as normal changes in the appearance 
of this identifiable feature, or should be taken, on the contrary, to 
discredi t this feature altogether as a recurrent element of experience. 
'!bus the Laws of Poverty and Consistency imply that every time we use 
a word tor denoti~ something, we perform and accredit our performance 
of an act of generalization and that, correspondinglY, the use of 
such a word is taken to designate a class to which we attribute a 
substantial. character. 
Moreover, by being prepared to speak in our language on future 
oocuions, we antioipate its applicability to future experiences, 
which we expect to be identifiable in tems of the natural classes 
&Ceredi ted by our language. These expeotations fom a theo17 of the 
universe, which we keep testing continuoUsly as we go on talking 
about t1inge. So long as we teel that our langaage clusifies things 
well, we reu.1n satisfied that it is right and we continue to accept 
the theory ot the universe implied in our language as true.2S 
7. Consistency.!!!! integration. The consistency ot the theory ot the 
universe embodied in a language 18 manifested 1n its circularity. AtV" doubted 
term can be explained by terms which are not, at the lftOment, held in doubt. 
1'11i8 circularity has been termed a tfdefense mechanism" employed b,r an integra 
v.1ewpoint or interpretative system. For Sorokin, consistency is the basia of 
logico-meaningtul integration. He says that the basis ot unity ot "the science 
of mathematics, Plato's philosophical syatem, Bach's!!!!!!!! !..M.!!m:, Dante's 
Divine Comedy, a Christian Credo, the Civil Code of Napoleon, ••• is the 
logical or aesthetic consistency or their meanings-norma-values. All system. 
of meanings-noma-values that ahow such a consiStency are meaningful, logico-
aesthetic unitiee, beginning with a simple propoBi tion: A is B, 2 -I- 2 • 4, and 
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ending with &1..1 the oonsistent scientifio, philosophioal, religious, ethical, 
artistio systems of meanings,-norms-valu9s. n26 Furthermore, Sorokin affirms 
that language is one ot the 'fI'l4in fOl":nS or logioo-:neaningfUlly integrated 
cultural syste:ns, and perhaps thellost important tom. 
8. Language.!!.! cultural systan. Sorokin sqs that Itull!terlying all the 
other systems is language (oral and written), which in its grammar and syntax 
(but not in all its words) represents one ot the most marvelous systems, 
mainly ot the oo-ordinated tuPe. That this 1s so shown by the closed character 
ot the grammar and syntax: ot arv developed language. ,,27 Soroldn indioates the 
same defensive attitude that Polanyi spells ou~ more in detail in description 
of the circularity, expansion ot the circle, and suppressed nu.cleation. For 
Sorokin l:1a!.ntains that limy developed language in its. graillmatioal and 
szwtactical nartAB is a real un1 ty whose rul€!s C')I'\])OS8 one closed ttystern and 
?llutually' suppltllment one another and jealously guard an intrusion ot titlr1' 
heterogeneous-... eontradictory--element or rules. It such an intrusion happens, 
the respoot! va parts must reorganize thEF'lSel ves in order to become un1 ty again. 
Otherwise, they remain-under the name ot texcept!ons'--oongeriea to the rest 
of the system. 28 
9. Description 2! .! S"'/stem. Besides the system of language, Sorokin ai vee 
the system of sOience, the system ot religion, the system or fine arts, and the 
26soo1etz. Culture, .!m! Personality, p. 146. 
27D.!'!!!!!cs, IV, no. 
28Ibid., pp. llQ-lll. 
-
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system of ethios, and sqs that "these tin rr.ain systems (essentially different 
trom one another) exhaust the main tundL"llImtal oultural systems of any oulture 
area. tt29 Philosophical, politioal, and eoon:;m1o S18tems are derivative 
systems, oanbining elements fran the main five. 30 It can be seen how language 
underlies all the other 81'stems, for a desoription of any system in a culture 
area will be primarily in the language of that oulture area. Jturthermore, the 
description of an:! system in III ou! ture area will be primarily in words that are 
nominally defined. One' IS task in investigating suoh a system is first of all 
that of one who is working on one aspect of a world view, and as Redfield 
S~8, the outsider' ~t withold his sugge8tio~ far systematisation until he 
discovers how the neaple themselves have conceived an order in the Vlole, ttit 
is their order, their categories, their emphasis upon this part rather than tha 
whioh the student listens for.,,31 Thus, one will oome up with a description 
consisting of a set of nominal detini tions of the main terms in the systems of 
science, religion, fine arts, ethics, ~hllosopny, economiCS, and politics. Thi 
will amount to III set of specialized dictiOnaries} more could be added for le88 
important cultural systems or for specialised subsystems. Add to this an 
account of tm grammar and syntax of the language, and one baa ASsem.bled, b.1 
parts, a deSCription of the system of language ordered. acoording to the world 
view of the people, rather than according to the alphabetical. arrangements of 
29Ibid.. pp. 110-120. 
-
30 Ibid., pp. 120-121. 
-
lLrbe Little Communi~, p. 87. 
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a dictionar,y, which omits the stress on same concepts rather ~~ others in the 
world view or theor;y of the universe it i.!llPliee. One cs<nclusion for the 
investigator of the little community, or tor any culture area, is that ~ 
technique. elaborated 2l. ~ science £! lilljUistics !!:! !!!l: helpful !2!: !!!! 
satherini .2!. cultural data. If one 1s not an expert in linguistics, he should 
be at least well enough a.cquainted wi th the subject to utilize linguistic 
analyses that have already been made of the language ot the area. 
10. SMffi!!£l. Linguistic techniques have been judged to be important tor 
acquiring an inside view ot the community one h8;'Jper.a to be stud;ying. The 
investigator must seek insights into the wtIT ~erms are used, much in the same 
manner as the child learning the Wa:/' of life in a community must get insights 
into the WIq these tenu are used. fie will haft a different viewpoint however, 
for he does not stop with the inside view, but seeks explanatory relationships. 
The residents of the COlllmUni ty will not be scientists, but men ot COf!mlon senee, 
who look not for relationships between things in themselves, but are interested 
in .!:!a relatlonshiEs 2.! thipg,s 12 themselves .2!:12 th.eir special interest 
~roup.. They are not in.terested in how the community i6 integrated, but in how 
the integration of the communitY' can be used to attain their goals, to satisty 
their needs. Accordingly, when +..aking the inside view, when using the terms 
categories of the people one studies, one 18 not e;oing to expect explanatory 
definitions of these tems, but nominal definitions. He vUl expect a poverty 
of number ot words, which will form a system ot circular, nominal definitions. 
These words, tor the most part, will get their meanings thro"gh identification 
ot some aspect ot human experience. The consistency ot' a system or language 
refers to ita intee:ration as a cultural system., and depends not so muoh on 
precise defin1 tion and logical rigidity J a.8 it doea upon a set of buic 
insights which grasp the wq the worda are used md related to one another in 
use. And this bring. up the question of the use ot the logical model. 
C. THE Loo reAL MODEL 
1. Sorokin's use. Redfield sqs that Benjamin .... lhort, in studies ot the 
....... ;".;;;;,;;;;.;;;;;.;;...;;;.-
relationships ot linguistio categories, use. a logical model, seeking to 
discover the l'Ilaj or 'Orem1ses ot a culture in order to deduce MUch ot the rest ot 
the culture. Relationa between element. 18 that ot logical consistency. 
"Sorokin' a oharacterizations of culture ~., It he adds, "probably represent 
.32 this model." It has been seen how Soroldn ~qs that the most important 
premise ot a culture consists in ita qatem ot truth and reality. His stress 
on the norma ot logic appeared in volume one, when he appealed to hia assertion 
that the noms ot logic were the same tor all cultures as evidence for the tact 
that he wu not a relativist. And it was further seen that, in practice, he 
could not c&rrT hi. relativism even far enough to retuae to judge on the major 
premis •• of ditterent culture types. 'or he place. his own work in the 
idealistic mentalit;r • .3.3 The primary stres. in idealistic culture mentality i. 
on lOtrical reasoning as a system ot truth and reality'. This preference for 
idealistic cul ture is, then, quite consistent with his emphasis on the _olute 
nature of the norms ot logic. 
In the tourth volume, as it has been .een, Soroldn embraces an integralist 
32ftTbe Relation of Anthropology to the Social Sciences and the Humanities, 
p. 734. 
33 pznaei08. I, x. 
position. He a81's in criticism. or the truth ot rea.10n that- Ifmere dialectic 
sp(~culation cannot guarantee to us ar.w valid knowledge of empirical phenOlllSna. 
It can give us an unim.peachable syllogisln or mathernatlcal deduction, but suoh 
s syllogism or deduction mll 'be empirically villd onJ.y 'ltThen its :'I1a.jor and 
Jrlnor pl"Grnises are empirically Valid. ttJ4 The rules cf logic, ,i.i1 ()th~r \fords, 
do not giva an adequate account of ~;)W the huma.n :11.0<\ arrivea at tfotzthJ they 
must be suppler1entcd by sense obeervi1tion and intuition. :~Ot.or this \if as not 
denied by !Jorold .. in the first 'I101ume, but there doos seeln to 00 a (.\lrr<8rent 
emphl.si8 in the tourthvolu .. 'ne. For he doas not f'lt?lnt..i, on integ:oo.1ism 1.n the 
first. '!:'he inadequacy- or the norms ot logic s~gge$t that. the loeical model 
for eulture intagr~tion is also inadequate. For it ism)t logic that 
lntegr3.t.os sCJnaatiol'l, lorie, and int'ct1t1on. 
2. L1.mi ta-liions ,2! lOSic. Lonergan ind.ic,aUta the inadeqll¢l.cy ot the 
logical modal, or the logical reading of' cultUl--aa "A. ffuiliarltT with the 
ale:nents of l~iZio can i>@ tlot!:\.tned b:r a very modest ettort and in a verr ahort 
tbte. U:'I.Ml one ha.s made notable progress in eognitlonal ana1y"sis.:)oo is 
constan~ tEr.lpted to mistake the r,tl'3s of logic tor the laW's of' t.'1ought. And 
as all reading inTOlve. interpreting, tnere follows automatioal.ly the 
imposl+.1on upon dOCllments of '1oa:r'lings and i:rrpllcations that 'logioally' they 
mtlst possoss but in tact do not bear. tt35 Lonergan gives five lin'.itations to 
the logical treatise, whioh oan be applied to the logical model. 
34Bzn!m!CS, IV, 763-764. 
35tonerg81, p. 573. 
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3. Ordinary lane8ae;e. The tirst l.1m1tation to the treatise 1s that one 
must use ordinary language to express the basic detint tions and rules to be 
used 1n the system. Once theae are set up, everything tollows logical·lJr, 
automatical17. "But one has to take onets initial steps into this realm ot 
automatio security without pertect exactitude and without rigour through 
expression that is relaU ve to an audience and successful when the audience 
happens to be sized up correctly ... 36 Soroldn recognizes this when he insists 
~n the importanoe of discovering and verir,r1ng the major premises ot a 
logically' integrated system. 
4. f1athematlcs. '!'he second lbdtation c:t the treatise is that, 1n 
• lllathematics J although formalization of artT system resul ts in a treatise, Godel t 
theorem implies that 11 for every set of ma.thauatical detin1 tiona and axiau 
there is also a set ot further questions that arise but cannot be answered on 
the baais of the definition and u:1.OIIS. ,,:31 Soroldn recognizes this when he 
states that in practical.ly every qstem of meanings there is an element of 
congeries, 
Even the most conaistent system of mathematics contains some, e.,..n the 
m.ost integrated systems ot philosophy' and logics ha'1e their "antinomies" 
and unrelated congeri.s, • •• The same is true of practically any 
other 81atema law-oOOe, ethioal qatem, social and humanistio 
disciplines, political ideologies, religiOUS bellef's, language 
(exceptions to the granDatic and syntax1.o rules), tine arts, and 80 
on. Some glaring or obscure congeries and contradiotions are present 
in 8lJ'1' system because a.ny concretely given 87stem of meanings, from 
m.athe.tios up to religious beliefs, is 1n an incessant process of 
development or change; some new "discoveries" or "untoldings of new 
illplicationsu ince.santly go on. These new discoveries are either 
36rbid., pp. 573-574. 
-
37Ibid., p. 574. 
-
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unrelated or contradictory to the old counterparts 1n the systan. 
Also, in aqr vast system t,here are alwl\Ys some "survivals" that 
are antiquated and stand either unrelated or cont.radictory to the 
rest ot the meani~s ot the system. The perennial pX'esence of 
nnw d1scoveries" and "survivals" ~n W13' vast system. are due to 
the imposaibility ot continual re-examination and logico-aest.l)etic 
"stra1ghteningtt ot the whole system (soience, phUosophy, law, at",.). 
In vast systems it takes time, and sometilll98 a long time, to under-
stand the unrelatedne •• or oont,radiction oi a new discover;y or 
implication to the rest of the S)"8tem, or to fraap the obsolete and 
contradictory character ot the survivals to the other parts and to 
the new d1scareriea.38 
,. P&sics ~ Chend.s!rl. Sorokin recognises the fact ()f the impo •• 1bili 
ty of coaplete I1'stematization of mathematiCS, even it he does not point to 
.. 
Godel t • theorem as the explanation. His explanation in terms of new 
discOftries and survivals shows a recognition ~ot what Lonergan calls the third 
limitation of the treati •• , which 8hOWS up in science. such as phy$lcs and 
chemistr;yl 
A logic ot term8 and relations, universals and. particulars, is no 
longer adequate. There are needed distinctions between terms that 
specify experiential conjUfllte8, explanatory conjugates, events, 
and thingS) there are needed relations between experiential 
conjugates, between explanatory conjugates, between things and such 
relations, and between con,jugates, frequencies, and events. Moreover, 
the greater logical complex1 ty is only the ~inor dittioul ty. For 
while static aystem constitutes the intelligibility" ot physics and 
ehemistry, still our knowledge of sucn system is on the move. Its 
more or les8 detinitive acquisitions can be cut quite usefully in 
the torm of a treatise; but the contemporary state ot the question 
in any science never consists simply in such more or less definitive 
acquisitions) there also are tentative solutions, tendencies, and 
unsolved problems that point to the lines ot future development 
yet would be quite misrepresented it expressed in the form ot the 
treatise. Accordingly, while the historical development of phySiCS, 
chemistry, and allied SCiences can be indicated by an unfinished 
series of treatises in each subject, still the series ot treatises 
cannot represent adequatelY the series of states ot knowledge in the 
38SOCiev, Culture, .!U!! Personality, p. 327. 
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IUbjeots.39 
6. Bioloq ~ PSj'Choloq. '!'he fourth limitation of the treatise is even 
more drastic. 
The limitations of the treatise became painfullY' evident when 
one shitta from the statio systems of p~sics and ohemistry to the 
dynamio systems of biology and psychology. Besides the previou8 
l1m1tationa iJIPosed by' the more coraplex logiC and by the develop-
ment of our lm0'4ledge, there now appears a stUl further ditt1-
culty. For the treatise expreShS S1'stfn, and each biological 
species and, on the human level, each individual psyche is system 
on the move. Unfortunately, treati8es ca1'lt'lOt move. definitions 
and postulates have the eternal qualiW of Plato's ideas; their 
implications are perpetua1.lY' the S&m8J wt the growth of an or-
gani_ or the development of a psyche is a movement fran a generic, 
rudimentary, undifferentiated system to a specific, expert, differ-
entiated system. and the proper concem of the scientist 1n the 
field of genetiCS is not the several staie8 of the dJnam1c system 
but rather the operator8 that bring about the successive transfor-
mations trom each stage to the next. Nor is one to entertain the 
hope that some day when such operators are well known there may be 
deYeloped a more oQllPlicated logic that will handle the operators with 
the exactitude, the rigour, and the automatic security that now i. 
enjo,yed b.Y the mathematical treatises. For neither the organiSM 
nor the psyche develops exactly, rigorously, and securely; 1 t 
advances tentativelYJ it adapts to a non ... systematic manifold of 
circumstances; it is what it is because exactitude, rlgous, and 
automatic 8eouri ty are irrelevant to the problems that are to be 
solved only vi tal.l7 and by consciousness.40 
Sorokin, again, recogni •• s the oasio fact to which Lonergan points, but 
speaks of a lack of integration rath~r than of a genetic type of integration: 
Not infrequently.. vacue and poorly integrated systems of meanings, 
som..,tim~s even oongeries, may have and, indeed, do have much better 
external suocess ot expanSion or apparent survival than the perfectly 
integrated system. of meanings. Tarde puts the matter aptly, stating: 
.39Lonergan, p. 514. 
40zbid., pp. 574-575. 
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'In the matter of political organizations, it hu frequently 
been observed that the most selt-conaistent--those that are most 
logioally deduced ••• are leut adeted to meet the requirements 
ot their inherited and natural enrlronmentJ and, conversely', that 
the Most practical are the least log! oal. • •• The same remark 
applies to grammars, religious II the tine arts, eto.; thus the 
ane perfect grammar, the only one whose rules are quite without 
excention is the gr8flltl1ar of--VolapUki It applies to organi8m8 as 
well, there are some that are so perfect as to be almost incapable 
ot living, and that would be better t1 tted lor life it they were 
l •• s pertectJ_tor perfectness ot accommodation m81 detract from 
aupplene •• ' .41 
Sorolr..1n indicate8 how tar his conception of logical integration is trom a 
d;ynanio eyatem on the movea "their vaguenes8 is exactly their Nemesi8. .A. larg 
politioal part,y or a religious creed aocepted b.v millions is practioally a 
serioa ot parties and creeds, diftering from ene another, and not one party 
or creed. Thay diffuse themselves an:! survive by, so to speak, their incessan 
death and replacement in ti_ and space of one short-living system ot meanings 
by another partl.7 similar to it, partly di8similar, but adjacent 1n tL'1l8 and 
vehicles and preserving the ssme name. Q42 
7. Human culture. The fifth limitation ot the treatise appears in the 
study of human oulture: 1'1'0 the oomplexities ot genetio method there have now 
to be added the graver oomplexities of dialeotical method." This method is 
needed to stud.Y the osoillation ot men and p'roups between different and opposed 
principles and tendencies1 
ei ther the real. is being or it is a subdivision in the 'already out 
there now' J e1 ther object! vi ty is reached. by intelligent inquiry and 
hlDztl!!!08, IV, 78-79, quoting Gabriel Tarde, Social Laws, p. l~O. 
42Ibid. 
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critical refiection or elee it is a matter ot taking a good look at 
what is t out there' J either knowing is mounting up the levels of 
experienoe, ot understanding and formulation, ot refiective ;rup 
and judgment, or else it i. the ineffable confrontation that makes 
the known present to the knower. Still theee contrasts stand 
between e:JCtraee. Men live their lives not in the intellectual 
pattern of experience nor again in the elementary pattern ot 
experience but, tor the most part, in some al tarna.tion and fusion 
of the aesthetiC, the dramatiC, and the practical patterns. In 
this middle wq they oscillate between tendencies to emphasize now 
the intellectual orientation and now the el_entarr; commonly' they 
never settle outright tor either view, their mirrls remain 
ambivalent and that ambivalence mocks all attempts to practioe 
Soerates' ma1eutic art ot definition in the hope ot bringing them 
to clear and distinct knowledge of what they happen to mean. Not 
only must the treatise on human meanings dispense with precise terms, 
it also has to get along withOtlt definable relations. 'or, as we 
have seen, c~~on sense oonsists in a basic nucleus ot insights that 
never is utilized without the addition ot at least one further 
insight into the situation at hand. Not ~onl:r does this nucleus vary' 
with occupation, social group, 'Place, and time, but essentially it 
is something incompleteJ its content i8 not relations between 
things but • more or les8 invariant element in variable relations; 
and that invariant element not only is without precise terms, 
thrcuch which it might be defined, but also without verifiability 
through which it might be fixed by its oorrespondence with concrete 
s1 tua tiOtUJ. 4.3 
Sorokin·. very explanation ot the fiuctuatlon between idealistio, ideational, 
and. sensate types ot integrated cu1 turee is an example ot the un ot a 
dialeotical m.ethod. And his integralist system ot truth is not a logically' 
integrated system, but a barm.onisatlon ot oppond S78terts. Finally', his 
insistence that a cultural congloil!eration i. never tlllly integrated is an 
acknowledgment ot either (1) non-systematic elements which will require the use 
of statistical heuristic structures, (2) an initial generic indeterminacy which 
w111 require the use of a genetic heuristic structure, or ('3) an opposed 
prinCiple ot integration 1m'pllclt 1n the system, which will require .. 
4lx.onergan, pp. 575-,76. 
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dialeotioal method for its study. Sorokin himselt seems to oal1 attention to 
this in explaining that e'~ery indlv1rtual oont.ains some degree of oOllferies in 
his ideoloeioal culturel "The whole dialectic logiC of st. AugustIne, Erigena, 
:acolas of Cusa, Hefel, ot most of the Oriental and Oooidental mystic thinkers 
with their olaim that every concept contains in itself its own negation, that 
in its full form any concept is a ooincidentia oppositorum, that there is a 
dialectical identity of the opposites, that a thesis contains in itself and 
puses into antithesis and this into a synthesis which as a new thesis contains 
again its anti tMais and passes into i tJ all this dialectic logiC gives 
S,YstematiC evidence of an implioit or explicit presence of inner contradictions 
: 4h 
and congeries in atW' concept and in any system. of meanings." 
D. THE NOT! ON 01 DEVELOP;'fENT 
1. Principle 2!. 1mm.anent chge. Soroldn's asaertion that no culture can 
be completely integrated logically cm be interpreted, then, to be not so much 
an l.'ttpertectlon in every culture as much as a basic lim1 tation of the logical 
modal, patterned as it i. af'ter the logical treatise. It was seen above how 
Sorokin said that a very ohangeable 57stam was not really' one system at all, 
but a succession ot difterent systema. This would stan from the static nature 
ot a logical 8Y8tem. But when Sorokin presents hi' "principle of immanent 
change lt as a principle explaining the nuctuation ot culturaJ. systems, he is 
not using the logical model, but concepts Which are very similar to Lonergan's 
genetic and dialectical heuristic structures. So true is this that Scroldn's 
ennunciation ot some or the implications of hi' prinCiple of immanent change 
hl1aQC1ety, CJ.&ltux:e, .!!!2 Personality, p. 327, footnote 3. 
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serve as a presentation ot manr ot the basic principles of genetic heuristic 
structures. 
1. The reason or cause of a change of &l\Y sociocultural STstem 
is in the sys ... itself, and need not be looked for anywhere else. 
2. Additional reason for cha:nge ot a system is its milieu, 
which is again composed m.ostly ot t."e 1manentJ.7 Ch&qling systems. 
3. ArrJ' sociocultu.ral qst. changing immanently, incessantly 
generates a series ot immanent consequences, which change not onlY 
the milieu. ot the syst_ but also the systan i teel!. 
4. Bearing the seeds ot ita change in itself, any sociocultural 
system bears also in itselt the power ot molding its own destiny or 
lire career. Beginning with the mcment of emergence, each socio-
cultural 5ystem i. the uin tactor of its own destin.y. This destiny, 
or the s;ratem' 8 subsequent life career, ~epresents mainly an unfolding 
or the bnanent potent1ali tie. of the qatem in the course ot 1 tIS 
matenee. 
s. The emr1romental force. are not negligible, but their role 
consiats essentiallY in retardation or acceleration, racilitation 
or hindranceJ reinforcement or weakening, ot the realisation of the 
immanent potentialities of the system. Sometimes they can cruah 
the qstem and put an end to its existence, or stop the process ot 
untolding the immanent potentialities at one of the earlY phases. 
They cannot, however, change tundamentally the immanent potentialities 
ot the system and its normal de.til\'r in the senee ot makillf,: the life 
career of an u.nfolding acorn that of a cow, or vice veraa. 
6. So tar as the system, since the moment of its emergence, 
bears in itseU its tuture oareer, it i& a determinate eyatem and 
in this senae deterministio. So far as the future of the system is 
determined mainly not b7 external agents, but tv the system itselt, 
such a determinism is indeterministic or free, u fiow1ng 
spontaneou.l,y, in accordance with its nature, frOia the system itself. 
1. The process of unfolding the immanent potentialities ot the 
fJmerged system is som'what predetermined by the 87stem, but this 
predetermination leaves a oonsiderable margin tor variations. In 
this aense it is not absolutely and narrowly precon<.iit.ioned. Only 
the main direction and the main phases or the unfolding are 
predetermined, the rest, including most of the details, are tt tree" 
and become an unforeseen and unprediotable matt~r of chance, 
environment, and tree ohoice of the System. 
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8. Since the destiny or life career of any' system is the result 
of the &TStem's self-control and of the influence of the environmental 
forces,. the relative share of each of these two factors in molding 
the system's career is not constant for all sociocultural systems. 
The share of the self-control of the S,1stem is the greater, the more 
perfectly the S,Ystem is integrated and the more powerful it is. 
9. As a rough indicator of the elusive concept of the power of 
a sociocultural 8.1stem, the following less elusive combination of 
the criteria is offered: the greater the membership of the s.ystem; 
the better the members biologically, mentally, morally and socially; 
the greater the actual wisdom, knowledge and experience the system 
has at its disposal; the better it is organized; the greater the 
total SUM of Means of infiuencing human behavior and forces of nature 
at its disposal; the more solidarily (or consistently) the system is 
integrated; the more powerful it is; the more independent from the 
foroes of the environment,--the greater is the share of its own 
control in molding its desti~.4' 
2. Emergence. To compare this with Loruirgan' s heuristic structure for 
genetic method is, to a large extent, to compare a general structure to a 
specifio application. Although Lonergan's heuristic structure is more general, 
the basic heuristio notion is development rather than merely change, as it is 
in Sorold.n. The first characteristic of the notion of development is the 
principle of emergence. Just as the transition from arithmetic to algebra is 
the achievement of a higher viewpoint, so also in the physical world, "chemical 
elements and compounds are higher integrations of otherwise coincidental 
manifolds of subatomic events; organisms are higher integrations of otherwise 
coincidental manifolds of chemical processes; sensitive consciousness is a 
higher integration of otherwise coincidental manifolds of changes in neural 
tissues; and accumulating insights are higher integrations of otherwise 
coincidental manifolds of images or of data. n46 One might go on to 8~ that an 
4SPfnamics, IV, pp. 619-620. 
46Lone an • 451-452. 
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integrated sociocultural system is a higher integration of an otherwise 
coincidental manifold of subjects of interaction, vehicles, and meanings. The 
coincidental manifold is a non 8,Ystematic aggregate, similar to Sorokin
'
s 
congeries. And it has been seen that for Sorokin a certain admixture ot 
congeries in any logically integrated system makes for change. 
3. Correspondence. The second characteristic of the notion of develop-
ment is the principle of correspondence which states that "different underlying 
manifolds require different higher integration," if the difference in the 
underlying manifolds exoeeds oertain limits, beyond whioh the same higher 
integration cannot exist. For example, one c~ work out the same theory from 
different data, but the data cannot be altogether dissimilar. 47 Something 
similar to this would be found in Sorokin's principle of limit. 
If a given system has unlimited possibilities of change, under such 
conditions, the system can change so radically that it will lose 
all its essential characteristics and become unidentifiable. Such 
a change means the cessation of the existence of the system; when 
a system becomes unidentifiable and loses its sameness, it dis-
appears. Hence, so long as a system lives, it has limits in its 
change. The selectivity of a system leads to the same result. An 
unlimited possibility of change for a given system means it can 
become an.ything, can ingest everything, therefore can become 
radically different from what it was and unidentifiable. Such a 
change is equivalent to the cessation of the existence of the 
system and to its replacement by another--quite different--system. 
For these almost axiomatic reaaons, practically any system MUSt 
have and does have limits to the range of its change. The limits 
transgressed, the system disappears.48 
It has been seen how Sorokin uses the principle of' limit to explain the 
fluctuations of logically integrated cultures. 
47Ibid. 
-
48pynamiCS, IV, 702. 
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4. Finali~. The third principle that Lonergan gives in the notion of 
development is the principle of finality. A higher integration can be static, 
"when it dominates the lower manifold with complete success and thereby brings 
about a notable imperviousness to change," or d;rnamic, "when it is not content 
to systematize the underlying manifold but keeps adding to it and modifying it 
until, by the principle of correspondence, the existing integration is 
eliminated and, by the prinCiple of emergence, a new integration is introduce~· 
The prinCiple of finality declares that the "underlying manifold is an 
upwardlY but indetp~nately directed dynamism towards ever fuller realization 
of being ... 49 This can be compared with Sorotqn's seventh principle of 
immanent change: "Only the main direction ani the main phas". of the unfolding 
are predetermined; the rest, including most of the details, ar" t free I and 
became an unforeseen and unpredictable matter of chance, environment, and tree 
choice ot the system." 
5. Development. The rourth characteristic ot the notion of development 
is the principle of development, which is "the linked sequence of dynamic 
50 higher integrations." This prinCiple states that a succession ot difterentlY 
integrated systems m~ themselves be systematicallY related. Sorokin never 
states such a prinCiple, to the writer's knowledge, but his explanation or the 
selt-direction of integrated social and cultural systems indicates a continuity 
in change that would perhaps approximate the notion of a linked sequence of 
49tonergan, pp. 452-453. 
5Orbid. 
-
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systeuuu "Out of similar tamUles or states--tbe family or state whioh is 
perfectly integrated, where the relationships are solidary, where all members 
spontaneously and. deliberatel.;r strive towards the same ends) have the same 
mentality and objective.; have a unified system ot aims, efforts, and 
activities-such a tamil.y or state is a builder of its own tuture muoh more 
than the tam1l.;r or state wi ttl lower causal. and lIleaningtul integration, where 
the causal interdependenoe ot the members is loose, relationships less 
solidary, and where heterogeneous aims, confliCts, and antagonisms extst." Sl 
6. Difterentiation. The tirth characteristic of the notion ot 
development is that I'the oourse of d"'.lopmen~ is marked by an increasing 
explanatory ditterentiation. tt The original single ceUs of oreanisms do not 
difter as muoh as the later, tully d.".lopfld and .functioning organisms 
difter.52 The counterpart ot this i8 in the oriterion ot better organization 
ot a group a8 a guage to its power, tor organization include. ftthe existence 
or nonexistence of the social stratitioation and differentiation, with their 
division ot labor ... '3 
7. Flex1b11lt;r. Sixth, development is nex1ble in that it can reach the 
same goal by dU'terent paths. ItThus, a normal sea urchin can ruul t from an 
embryo subjeoted to distorting presaurasJ psychic heal. th can be due to 
SlD.r'n!micS. IV, 611. 
52t,onergan, pp. 452-453. 
53Pma!iCS, IV, 616-617. 
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untutored. spontaneity or to the ministrations ot the psychiatrist, the same 
SCience can be taught successtully' in accord with different methods,and the 
88Ile discovery can be made in different l!WUlers. "S4 
Seventh, besides the minor nex1bUifq of reaching the same goal. by' 
different routes, there is also a major tle:xibUity which consistlil in a change 
in the ultimate objective. !tIn biology this is the ta'YIiliar fact ot 
adaptation; in depth psychology it m.ay be illustrat.ed by sublimation; in 
cognitional activity it appears in the manner in which inquirers, otten enough, 
begin from one problem only' to find themselves by the logic of issues forced 
to engage in the solution of another." In th~ light of these considerations, 
Lonergan deflnes a development &8 fla flexible, linked sequence of dynaaic and 
lncre&8ingly differentiated higher integrations that meet the tension of 
succesn vely transformed underlying manitolds through successi va applications 
of the principle. ot correspondence and em.ergence. "SS 
E. TrlE NOTION OF DIALECTIC 
1. HSel.!!!!! Sorokin. In explaining his principle of immanent change, 
Soronn refers to Hegel, among many others, as a predecessor of this principle 
as he, Sorokin, understands 1 t. He 88I1S or Hegel's p.hllosoplv": 
It 18 pos81bl1 the most consistent and universal conception of 
1.mm.anent change ever created in the history of huun thoucht. 
Its dialectic principle, the identity of OPPOSites, i. 
ite epring of 1mIIanent change; 1ts phUoaophical realism and 
univeraali8ftl. logically follow frOPl 1 t and lead. to the concept1on 
or the Absolute Spirit as the A.bsolute-and all-embrac1ng-Reality. 
ShLonergan, pp. 4S) ... 4S4. 
SSIbid. 
-
196 
Since the Spirit i •• alt cognizant, selt.determining, selt-changing, 
and. Selt-d1recUng, ..ver:r part ot the Universe (as an _bodiment 
ot the Spirit) bears in itselt the raason for its change. mxl is 
a participant in this selt-directlng and selt-changing process. 
Since the Absolute Spir1t is the etemal, the completely True and 
Rational and Good, the whole process ot history, or Change, becomes 
also a rational movement f'rcn an unconSCious potentiality to an 
entirely conscious actuality. 
From all theM standpoints, Hegel' 8 conception ot immanent 
change has never been surpassed.56 
Sorokin' 8 adm,iration for Hegel perhaps explains his attat.chment tor what seems 
to be a dialectical synthesis in liis integrillst syatem ot truth, as well u 
tor the dialectical tluctuation between ditterent super8y'stema ot culture. 
This also can account for the accusation that Bidney made that Sorokin makes 
. 
cul tUN into a ldnd of autanoton independent Of the individual human bearers 
ot CUlture. 
2. Hsel !.2! Lonersan• Since the writer, following Lonergan, believes 
that the notion of dialectic is an important heuristic antiCipation tor the 
stud1' ot man and aocietq, without w'r'J.ch an adequate study of integration cannot 
be conducted, 1 t is necessar,y to distinguish caretully between Hegel t s concept 
ot dialectic and the C,)ftcept to be used in the investigation ot a society or 
oulturer 
In the first place, then, Hegelian dialeotic is conceptualist, 
closed, neceSsitarian, and immanental.. It deals with determinate 
conceptual contents J ita successive triadic sets of concepts are 
complete, the relations ot opposition and sublation between con-
cepts are pronounced and necessary; and the whole dialectiC is 
contained wi t.h1n the field det1ned b.r the concepts and their neaes-
s&ry' relations ot opposit1on and sublation. In contrast our posi-
tion ia intellectualist, open, factual, and normative. It deals 
not with determinate conceptual. contents but with heuristically 
detined antiCipations, it awaits trom nature and hi8tOr,y a succes-
aion of tentative solutions. Instead of binding these solutions 
S6Brnelca, IV, 63$. 
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by' rutoeS88l'7 relations, it regards them as products of a cumulative 
succession or insights and it claims that the succession followe 
neither a unique nor a. neces8817 path; for identical. results can be 
reached by difterent routes, and beside. valid developments there are 
aberrati0n8. Finally, the appeal. to heuristic structures, to 
8.CC\UInllatlng insights, to verdiCts awa! ted trom nature and history,. 
goes outside the conceptual field to acte ot understanding that rise 
upon experiences and are controlled b:r crl tical renection; am so 
instead or an immanental dialectic that embraces all positions and 
their oppOSites, ours is a norm.ative dialectic that discriminates 
between advance and aberration. 
'l'he foregoing differenc •• have a COJ1non source. Hegel en-
deavours to pour everything into the c")ncept; we regard concepts 
1.8 ~roducta ot the development ot understanding and place under-
standing itself in an intermediate role between experience and 
cr1. tical reneotion.,7 
It would aeem that an applioation of Sorok1nt~ own integl'alism would give a 
somewhat similar distinction between Sorok1nt s sociology of historioal ohange 
and Hegel t s philosopby' of histor,YJ Sorold.n does not make the contrast. however. 
3. ! general notion. Dialectic, as used by Lonergan and by the writer, 
has a more general sense than Regelian dialectic I "Hegel employ-eel the word to 
refer to his triadic prooess from the ooncept ot being to the Abaolute Idea. 
Marx inverted Hegel and so conceived a8 dialectical a non-mechan1cal, 
materialist process." But the term was used long betore Marx and Hegel. flln 
Plato, it delloted the art ot philosophic dialogue and was contrasted with 
artstic. In Aristotle, it referred to an e.t"tort to disoover olues to the 
truth by revieving and scrutinizing the opinions or others. • •• Summarily, 
then, dialectio denote. a combination of the concrete, the dynamic and the 
contradiCtory; but this canb1nation may be tound in a. dialogue, in the history 
S8 
of philosophic opinions, or in historical process generally." 
;7Lonergan, pp. 421 .. 422. 
S8~., p. 217. 
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4. Fluctuation.2! culture wes. It can 'be seen that Sorokin's concep-
tion ot historical process is .... nt1allT a dialectical. concept. The premises 
of each ot the three culture t)"pes--ideational, sensate, and idealistic-are 
JIlUtually opposed. Yet they are bound together, tor their buio premise 1s in 
their systems of truth and reality, which are, in turn, founded upon different 
acta ot knowledge, intuition, sensation, and logical reasoning. But al\?' 
adequate human knowing involves all three aots.'9 Historical process is 
concrete, for it consists in events whioh ... concrete actions and reactions of 
human beings. Theae actions and reaotions are expres.ive ot the meanings, 
norms, and values possessed by the human beings, and thus are classified as 
behavioral culture. The actions are with reterenoe to other twman subjeots, 
and hence are interactions. The interaction ot men, both individuals and 
groups, can be solidary or antacon1stio,deperding upon whether the meanings, 
norms, and values ot the interacting parties or groups are opposed or in 
60 harmOl\Y. Now it .... to be a tact that men tend e1tMr to regard reality 
and the ultimate good to 'be derived. :l"r<a reality as either a sensate 
satistaction ot animal desires, .an ideational striving tor spirt tual goods to 
the denial of animal desires, or an idealistie caapromise that seeks to 
harmonize the two. Lonergan sq_ that "there will be a dialeetto, it (1) there 
is an aggregate ot e'Venta of a determinate character, (2) the events U8 be 
traced to 8i tiler or both ot two principles, () the principles are opposed yet 
bound together, and (4) they are modified by the chargee that succeleiV'8lT 
'~amlcl, IV, 763-764. 
60s0Cie!(. Culture, .!!!2 Peraonalitl. n. 9). 
61 
reeult frau them." 
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Soroldn's initial idealistio viewpoint oan thus be viewed as an attempt 
to integrate two opposed dialectical prlnolpl;:~8. By tho til'll. he reached the 
fourth volume, his idealistic position oame to be viewed as a third opposed 
principle. 'l'hus, events, in Sorokin's system, m1l3' be traced to an::! one of 
three rather than just two prinoiples. 
F. SUMMMlY AND COnUSIONS 
1. .-Re;:;;:l .. a;.;;t-.,iv1 __ s_M!!!! dialectic. Relativism a&1onishes the investigator of 
a community to be aware ot the fact that the people he studies have deeply 
ingrained convictions that have been determin~ by' an idiom that mq interpret 
experience in a somewhat ditterent manner from the way the investigator 
interprets experience. As PolatV1 sa.ys, !tour tormally declared beliefs can be 
held true in the lut resort only because of our logioall.y anterior acceptance 
of a particular set of terms, fran whioh all our references to reality are 
constructed." The dialogue between Evans-Pritchard and the Ala.nde is an 
example ot a dialeotic in which the interpretative tra:m.evorkt 8 ot the 
dlacu.asants fomed to linked but opposed principles. Their interaction in 
discuseins beese was not solldal"T, but antagonistic. 
2. Relativism!!!!! development. '!'he different basic set of terms held by 
Evans-Pritchard and the Azande were the results of ditterent enculturatiQn 
processes. And the process ot encul. turation is a developmental process--a 
successi on ot more comprehensive insights or the growing ohild which grasp the 
relationa ot a wider varletq or experiences. These inSights are higher 
61r.onergan. p. 217. 
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integrations which ocour according to the p1"1noiple of 8lHrgence. They will 
differ in difterent individuals according to the principle of correspondence, 
for ditterenoes in exoerienoe provide different data to be understood by 
insight. These serles ot insights are a linked sequence, for later insights 
oannot occur without the previous occurrence or other insights. And en-
oulturation .s a process oan be nexible in both major and minor wqsJ 
different experiences within t."1e same culture can result in adults with sub-
stantially the sae world views or interpretat.ive frameworks giving a minor 
nex1bll1ty; or 80M individuals in a culture mq undergo experiences or get 
insights that result in changes in world view ,that are quite substantial. 
Homey and leosUer are 8X&"l1ples ot web a major flexibility, which would be 
illustrated b.Y aqy example of a person learning to criticise and correct his 
own mistaken beliets. 
3. L5Jic ~ world.n!!. The system ot thought or theor,r of the universe 
implied in onets language which is acquired by the process of enculturation is 
'not priu.rily a scientific vi" of the universe, but a common senlte view. t~en 
do not live in the intellectual pattern of experience exclusivel;r, nor even 
primarily, but are more oonoemed with dramatio living with others and with 
getting practical tasks done. Aocordingly, lithe treatise on human meanings" 
IIlUSt both "get along without detinable relations- and also "dispense with 
preoise detinit.ions." For floommon sense oonaists in a buic nucleus ot insights 
that never i8 utilized without the addition of at leaat one further insight 
into the situation at hand.~ Rather than oonducting a formallY logical 
analJ'sis, the investigator will have to look for suoh consolidating techniques 
ot a world 'liew as the employaent ot oircular definitions and reasoning, 
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Polanyi's c1rculari~; he will loo~ tar "automatic expansion of the s,ystemft to 
deal with new situations &8 they occur, recognizing that the very lack ot pre-
eise definition in a common senae view makes it capable of such expansion; he 
will try to discover the w.,.s and means a viewpoint has ot suppressing the 
nucleation ot experience. that would give rise to insights that would point out 
the error in that viewpoint. 
4. \iorld.!!!!.!!!! l!Di!1!lge. The inveatigator ot a cOlIIIImlni ty will seek 
to get at the meanings of the community through ita language. He will try to 
take advantage ot the law ot pOV'8r~ to get at the fundamental concepta ot the 
language, and to discover the way th ••• C0nc.~ts are united and related by a 
study ot the lan ot the grammar ot the language. !ia will have the law ot 
c:msistency on hi. 8ide, tor cOIIWUnication within the conmunity is only 
posaible insofar aa the people within that cOnJIlunity consistently ident1t;y 
certain aspects ot their experience by uttering repeatable s(')urnis. Polartrl 
says that "by being prepared to speak in our language on future occasions, we 
antiCipate its applicabU1ty to fUture experiences, which we expect to be 
identifiable in terms of the natural classes accredited by our language. 'lb.e 
expectat10ns form a theory of the universe, whioh we keep testing continuouslY 
&8 we go on talking about things." Tr~s anticipation ot the applicability of 
language to future events is closely related to the oommon sense antiCipation 
that an incomplete cluster of insights can be caaplemented by a. further insight 
into the concrete situation that will enable one to deal with the situation. 
And as long a8 the theory of the universe that the set of terms and the 
oluster of inSights 1aply enables III individual or a group to deal suooe8stullY 
with th'l situations they encounter, there will be little likelihood of a 
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radical ohange in world view or interpretative f'ranevork. 
S. World.!!!!!!!! dialeotio. A series of experiences that cannot be 
succ8.a.tu.lly dealt with by the present world view i8 likely to cause a 
disintegration ot that world view. Sorok1n, tor ex:a.'1Iple, ohanged his outlook 
as a result ot being disillusioned by the experience ot eYGnts toll owing the 
F1rst World war, particularly the Russian revolution. There occurs a 
dialectical process between opposed principle., the new experiences oppOSing 
the old ideas. Ther" can also be a dialeotic between dU'terent individuals 
and f-'roups, based up:m OPPOSition in their ideological culture, it can result 
in outward events through empirical objeotlti~at1on 1n behavioral culture-
verbal. behavior or otherwise, and material culture. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE DEVELOP1'iENT OF LNDIVIDfJAL AND OF cx)~UNITY 
The unknown to be investigated has been stated to be the integrat.ion ot 
society, of culture, and ot personality in tne little conmunit7. "Integration" 
reters to the wq t.hat allot th. difterent elements within the cOllmUnlty are 
interrelated. The •• relationships can be ot ditferent kinds--classlcal, 
statistical, dialectical, genetic. The dialectical. and developmental relation .. 
, 
ships are to receive further attention in this chaptor. locus will be on the 
development of personality, not only within the community, but also ot the 
investigator. For the investigator l'III1st arrive at a notion ot objectivity' that 
require. a deliberate appropriation of his own rational and moral. consc1owmes. 
Personal development dependa, however, on cOl'llrJU.Ml. development, just as rouoh as 
oonmunal cultural. denlopment depends upon the development ot individuals 
lIithin the oOllRUni\y. Personal and oommunal development both can tollow an 
abnormal &8 well as a nonaal path. 
A. TRE LImE CmOO1NITY AS A GENERAL IZED BIOlRAPHY 
1. !!!!!! ~ ~ ifflportant thiqs !!! ~ cOimlunity. SOCiety is not a 
thing, but a group ot tilings, "the tot.ality ot intera.oting personalities, with 
their sociocultural. relationships and processes. ttl Culture is not a thing, but 
lSocietz, Culture, ~ Personality, pp. 63-64. 
20) 
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"the totality of the ;!1,-·anin:~s, valU'3S, and. nt)ImS possessed b.Y the interacting 
persons and the totality of the vehicles which objeotify, socialize, and 
2 
convey these meaninps." 11u1'noo heinps are thi 11gs, with sooial and cultural 
properties. Sorokin uses a metanhor to illustrate the relationship between 
personality, s(~ietYJ and culturel 
Sooially, eaoh of 11S is a pole attached bjr a multitude of IIvnres lf 
to several and diverse social. and cultural systezns, as a member 
of the state, of a religious orGa~ization, of the ra~ily; of a 
poli tioal party, of an occupational union, of a certain terri-
torial eOl'lIiTlun! ty (village or city), and of a num.ber of various 
educational (sport, art, scientific, pt:tilanthropic) associa.tions, 
different from one another. Culturally again, each of us belongs 
to various cultural sYstems and is a bearer of their values, like 
the system of belief of the Roman CatholiC; religion, of democratic 
political. ideology', of roma.ntic art values, of empiriCism in 
nhilosophy, of oertain value systems in eoonomic or other cultural 
systems.) 
2. Unitz.!?l concrete reference. All of these different syste:ns are 
united by being "wired" to the 6&lIe ind:tvldual, but this does not necessarily 
mean that the,y are s,rstematically united, either in themselves or in the 
personality of the individual. Sorokin says that there is a "biosocial. 
pluralis7t1 of egos" contrary to the eom.1lon belief "that the normal individual 
has a monotholic unity of personality with an indivisible self, one ego. tt4 
The biological. ego Ifis composed of' the nutrition-ego, self-protection ego • • • 
sex ego, and so on. Since these needs now and then clash with each other and 
give contradictory orders to the')rganism, they are really separate biological 
2Ibid. 
-
3Bznamies, IV, 11. 
4Society, Culture, !!!£ Personality;, p. 345. 
egos, bound together Oft one organism and constituting in their totality a 
S 
mosaic-like constellation. It Furthermore, a man haa as m&l\1 social egos as 
there are social groups to which he belongs. His Itfamily self'" is difterent 
from. his "occupational selt" and from other roles he m.ust pl.,.. His actions 
as a lIlember ot & state or bualneaa group m.ay be in contl1.ct With his belief'S 
and actions as a member of a church group. "The various egos may appear to be 
united by meana ot the integrative functions ot the nervous system, by'virtue 
of their incorporation into one body. This superficial semblance of' un! t7 i. 
espeeia1.l.y impressive when the 810S are lIlUtual.l.y solidary and ba.rmonious. 
Nonetheless they remain distinctly difterent. . The7 mq be as difterent as the 
music at Mi.sa Solemn1a, ~ .!1!!: River, .!!:l!!!!! Danube, and the ~._L_ou ......... i_a 
Blue., even though plqed on the same phonograph-our nervous 81'stem and 
6 body." Sorokin's view seems to be somewhat extreM here. Unity by concrete 
reterence is a!!!!. unity, even though it is ~ S!!! unitZ2!.! szstem. It 
.... to bear a very close res.blance to Sorokin's indirect causal-functional 
3. Indirect causal-functional int!Jtatton. Sorokin sqa that objects 
in his .tudT-"books, manuscripts, typewriter, logs in the f'il"e-place, fishing 
tools, clock, pictures, various ~:eSJ turniture"-have an indirect causal-
functional unity because they "all happen to be united through a common agent, 
the lnd1:v1dual. and his needa. Each of' the is in causal-tunctional relation-
Ship with the individual and his needs, and, through this common agent, they 
S 
.ill.!!. I p. 347. 
6Ibid., p. 348. 
-
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1 
are indirectly connected by causal-tunotional tie., one with anothor." 
Logica.lly, this same type ot unity seems to exist between all the difterent 
social and cultural. systems to which t."te individual is "wired," all the 
dilterent flrecords" plqed on the Itnhonograph" ot the bod;r and nervous system. 
'fhe biological and social egos are related to the needs-biological and social-
ot the individual just as much .s are the objects in a mants study. Indeed, 
the objects in Sorokin's stud;y are vehicle. ot the meanings, values, and norms 
which SOl"Okin haa because ot his partiCipation in various social and cultural 
systems. The books, manuscripts, and tjypewriter are not unrelated to his being 
t'wired It to the social and 001 tural system nam~ "Harvard Uni \Tersi t.r • " Tn. 
clock is not unrelated to a culturally' acquired and tran.m1tted nom ot 
behavior--that ot being on time, ot doing thing. at appointed times. Yet 
Sorokin is correct in not being satisfied with establishing that this ldnd ot 
integration be concrete reterence. Bidne1 states that Malinowski' 8 concept of 
cultural integration is inadequate because it one says that culture is 
integrated insofar as it satisties all the huic J:mman needs, this au! ture will 
remain an &€gregat., not a system ot institutions unless there is an In'tegrat-
ing prineiple tor the ne.ds which are fulfilled through the institutions. 
8 Malinowski, hovwer, conceivss man as a mere aggregate ot needs and impulses. 
4. Integration ~ deftlopment. Sorokin conceifte integration of 
personali ty as a task t hat is more or less euooes8M in different individuals1 
7Ibid., p. 145. 
Saidney, pp. 369-310. 
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"The frowth ot the individualfs personality consists in the unfolding of his 
potentialities in a given setting, in the increasing differentiation of his 
abilities and functions, in the structure and integration of his egos, and in 
the qualitative and quantitative enrichment of his world ot meanings, actions, 
and vehioles.,·9 The fact that the systsns and structures of the total 
cCt'll!l1Unity are retlected. in the personalities of individuals suggests to 
Redfield a possible wq of studying the way that the community is integrated. 
H. speak. of a sen_ralized biof?"aphy that describes the Whole community "by 
emphasizing the general am lasting character of the !!l that men and women 
10 
enter and pass through a social structure. It In Sorokin t s "ego" terminology, 
this would amount to the study' of the way that men and women acquire, modify, 
and integrate their different social egos. Redfield says that the first 
principle of ti ,is type ot study would be to take the inside view, to lIpresent 
every aspect of life in the order and in the way that it appear. to the 
individual at the time he encounter. it." Therefore: 
one would ducr1be the technolOU not as an organized system of 
operations in which perhaps many men, women, and children take part. 
One wO'..ud instead describe the lIf/J:'y the ohild begins to enter into 
the work and pla,y of the home or the labor of the cornfield-how 
gradually he cOII'les to assume activities and share understandings 
about the use and meaning ot the practical acts and objects. In 
the 88118 way the orgalisation of the village and community would 
be presented, nov not as .. social. struoture of permanent and 
tunctl. onally interrelated parts, but 88 a succession ot added 
comprehensions ot th e meani~ s of those acts whioh express kinship 
connections or public lUe. In 'the acoount of Chan Kom that I now 
imagine, one would ... a boy helping hie father, a little later 
assuming hie first public ottica under direction ot the village 
9Society, Culture, and Personality, p. 715. 
lOTii;; Little Corrmuni'fi:" p. 52. 
U Ibid., pp. 56 ... 57. 
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authOrities, and then fultilling the rolea and statuses nov seen 
as he experiences them and comes into them. It wou1d be the 
regular transtormations ot act, mind, and personali tq that one 
would deSCribe. The new system would b. unified in the form of a 
course of development in one generallzed person.11 
On the inside view, tili. development would be a series ot experiences, of 
added comprehensions. But in order to de80ribe it as the entrance into 
d1.tterent roles and social. struotures, it would be nace8s&ry' to take the outBid 
view. The members of the Community ver:r likely do not think in terms of 
"social structure." 
,. Develpent 2!. common sense. The encul.turation process by which a 
1'6l"80n acquire8 a world view has been menti0tlC!d already in relationship to 
cultural relatlvism. One ot the main tactors in thls proceal is acquiring 
skill in the use ot language. But the growing child not only needs insights 
into the way 'Worda are used, he alao needa to "ahare understandings about the 
u.e and mea."1ing ot practioal acts and objects." Lonergan puts the buis ot 
this development in the tact that there ls, "cQIIrIlon to all men, the very spirit 
of inquiry that constitute. the soientitio att.itude." This "light and drive of 
intelligent inquiry untolda methodically in mathelJ'.atlcs and empirical science. 
In the human child it is a secret wonder that, once the mystery of langu&fe has 
been unravelled, rushes torth in a casoade ot questlona. It 'When a. question ls 
toll owed by an insight, "one has only to act, or to talk, or perhaps merely' to 
think on the baais ot that insight, tor its inoOllpleteness to come to light and 
thereby' generate a further question." The acquisition of a set of related 
insight. "in which each succean va act oomplem.ents the accuracy and covers over 
209 
the deficiency of those that went before" is aided by teaching. And, ot cours 
parents are not the only ones who teach--siblings, kin .. and community, as wen 
12 
as formally conati tuted teachers do so also. 
This development is cO:l\llllUllal.. What one man discovers or invents passes 
into the possession of others, and i8 subjected to their Criticism and 
:nodification. The collaboration of indiViduals in intellectual achievement 
becomes the communal development of the knowledge possessed by tanrl.ly', tribe, 
nation, race. "Not only are men born with a native drive to inquire and 
understand, they are born into a community that possesses a cO!'lUllOn fund of 
tested answers, and from that fUnd each m81' dl:'aw his variable share, measured 
by his capacity, his interests, and his energy."l) It haa already been 
mentioned that the world view implied in the language one learns is not a 
scientific world View. Science seeks general knowledge .. but common sense 
specializes in the particular and the concret.. "It is common without being 
general, for it consists in a set of insights that remains incOlIlplete, until 
there is added at least one further insight into the situation at hand; and, 
once that situation has passed, the added insight is no loneer relevant, 60 
14 
that common sense at once reverts to its normal state of incompleteness." 
Therefore, !tit would be an error for common .ense to attempt to formulate its 
tncomp1ete set ot insights in detinitions and postulates and to work out their 
presuppOSitions and intr'lioationa. For the incomplete set is not the 
l2toru,rgan, Pp. 17.3-174. 
l)~., pp. 174-17;. 
14Ibid., p. 17,. 
-
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understanding ei th~r ot any concrete situation or of any general truth. 
,Squally, it would be an error for common sense to attempt a systematic 
.formulation of its completed set of insights in some particular case. for eTery 
ayatematic formulation enrlsages the universal; and every c,morete situation is 
particular ... l ' 
6. !!!! biologtcal eso !.! experienced. Human development is partly 
biological, sinee man is an animal. And man 1s conscious ot some of the 
biologioal needs which Sorokin says determine the different biological 810S. 
N~8 can be discoyered in both plants and animals, for in both there are 
"aggregates of events" in which "insight dise~ an intelligible unity that 
comonly i8 formulated in terms of biological need or purpose. If But to the 
higher animals, unlike plants, men attribute a pattern of conscious experienoe 
somewhat similar to their own. This pattern is II a eet of intelligible 
relations that link together sequences of sensations, mem.ories, images, 
oonationl'l, @!lotions, and bodily movements; aoo to na."a8 the pattern biological 
is simply to affirm that the sequenoes converge upon terminal activities of 
1ntus8'U:SOept1on or reproduction or. when negative in scope, self-preserva-
16 
tion." Yet an animal is conscious ollly a part of the tillle, and during that 
time, only a few of the events taking place in his ~ are conscious. 
Consoinusness is a "part-tiM employee" in t.he business of life which is called 
upon to deal with external situations. Thus, extroversion is basic-.. there are 
l$rbid., pp. 175-176. 
-
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external stimulating objecta and a responding subjeot.17 
7. !h! aesthetic pattern 2! e!perience. The pl. of children, the games 
of youth, MUSic and dance are all evdience of a spontaneous exuberance which 
goes beyond serious biological purposiveness. Experience is sou.ght for the 
sake of experiencing. Art gives a liberat.ion from rigid biological purposive-
ness, at the same time frees creative intelligence .!!:2! .!!!! burden 2!. 
verification. The act of creation i. the verificatlon of the creative insight. 
Art pos.e •• es meaning not by precise formulation, but by symbolizing. It 
communicates meaning by a participation in the inspiration ot the artist. It 
conveys the radical wonder of the subject, anc:t the reality of the object of' 
man's wonder-it views man as questioning, but concentratu on the moods in 
which great que.tions arise, and on the experiences of answering the or 
ignoring the. 18 
B. 'l.'lle IntellectUal pattern 2! experience. The flexibility of the 
authetic pattern oan develop into a tool tor a lIore serioWl purposiveness, not 
bl01ogiC8l now, but for the spirit of in~1r7. For in inquiry, the observer 
MUst use hi. outer MI18.S, not tor basic biological functions, but for a 
selective alertne •• under the domination ot elaborate clu.itieationa. Even 
subconscious ot the investigator collaboratea 1n providing the suggestive 
inuage. and missing link. in the problem. Probably all live in this pattern for 
brief interval •• the more ta1.alted lind that their experience fit. ra.ther 
easily into this pattern. But even the very talented l1lUSt pract.ice much 
17Ibld., pp. 183-184. 
-
18Ib1d., pp. 184-185. 
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abnegation to make inquiry the center of their lives. Years of effort in whioh 
living is absorbed in the effort to understand are required. to get many 
complementary insights, whioh gradually become more a'ld more oomprehensive as a 
19 
gi von field is mastered. 
9. .!h! dr&utic pattern.2! ~riance. Daily living is not in the 
artistic, biological, or intellectual pattern. The pattern of daily life is 
characterized by a desire to get things done, but also to get them done in a 
dignified or effective manner. Eating and mating are two things that must be 
done; but mere animality is offensive to man. Clothes are adornment, not .,ust 
a means of keeping warm. The first work ot cu:t ot a man is his own life; and 
t.'lis is a dram.utoLG artistry', in the presence of others. One lives well not 
just to appreciate the value of his own life, but also to win the admiration, 
respect, and love of others. The characters in the drama are moulded by the 
drama itself, for it is by insight into that drama that each discovers the 
roles he might pI." and under pressure of artistic and affective criteria 
chooses and adapts his parts. No one can choose whether or not he will have a 
oharacter, and the pattern a man chooses is going to be constructed out of 
20 
materials that are already patterned in a W8'3' that he did not choose. This 
fits in well with Redfield's characterisation of how generalized biograplV 
would present the organization of the village and the community, nnot AS a 
social structure of permanent and functionally interrelated parts, but a.s a 
19Ibid., p. 185-186. 
-
2~., pp. 187-189. 
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succession of added eo.llprehensions of the meanings ot those acts which express 
21 
kinship connections or public life." It also provides evidence for Sorokin's 
affirmation that the cultural aspect of personality is not aC(juirf'Jd biologicall 
but is molded by societr and culture: ";:lan f s beliefs, values, and norl'll8, his 
emotional and volitional expressions and hie meaningful actions (but n:)t his 
purely reflexive and instinctive raactiolUl) are furnished and processed by the 
social groups with which he interacts. There is no other sou.rce for the social 
and cultural properttes of the individual. 'He ha.e perhaps a margin of 
selection of these ,-aluefl and moanings, but he can choose and create them only 
22 from the material ot hi.! social and cultural apvironment.'f 
10. Si..IlIi.TlG.ry. The integration of Society, culturo, and personality can 
be by "concrete i~eterenceJ If every individual personalltu is l'ldredlf to a 
!IUl tl tude of difterent social and cultural qsterns. A1 though this introduc38 
a sort of external unity or indirect causal-functional unity anong the systems, 
it also introduces a diversit,. into the personality of the individual. 
Sorokin c/)lls this a Ifbiosoc1al pluralism ot egos. H Human development occurs 
through the acqu.isition of egos and in t.he integration ot these egos. This 18 
a ooncrete example of the general principle o! development that a de"1elopment 
i8 ch.aracterized by' increasing explanatory differentiation and a sequence of 
higher integra t.i.ons. Redfield suggests th.at an account ot the typical. prooes8 
o! developm~nt within a communit,. might be a w., o! oonceiving that oommunit,r 
as a whole, as a generalized biograp!V. The integration ot a un's different 
21The kittle Commun1~, pp. 56-57. 
22501.)1etz, Culture, !!ll! .!:£.a.2nalitl. p. 342. 
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"egosl! is not, accord:!'rlfc~ to Sorokin, al.1to'natic. His nolitical self ma..v be in 
conflict with i:lis religious self. In tn?s case, there is an illustration of a 
dialectical relationship. 
I,onergan nuts the basis of the development of C071'lon ser.se in "the 'TErry 
spirt t of inquiry that canst! tutes tne scientific attitude, if the Itlight and 
drive of intellli~ent inquiry. If This desire to knoW' is a princ12le 2! develop-
~, and as such, is also a basic princinle of lntegration. For not only is 
it the desire to know that leads the scientist to formulate integrated systems, 
it is the same desire that spurs the child on to acquire the related set of 
insights that constitutes a tested fund of answ:ers to funda·lental Questions 
possessed by the community. The desire to know can IBad a man beyond the 
biological pattern of experience, and through the dramat.ic and aesthetic 
patterns, to the dominance of the intellectual pattern. 
B. ABNC;R:1AL !1EV'iLOP;'1ENT 
1. Neural!!!2 psychic det>1r'''inations. Man has a vreater flexibility in 
the num.ber of different skills he can learn that do animals. His faculties are 
initially less deter:'1inate. withou.t the more definite organization of neural 
processes into patterns of stbrulus and response that characterize anil"JAl 
development. Thus in man there is a rreatAr possibility of the conSCious, 
psychic deterrnination ot neural nrocesses in such c011pllcated patterns as 1e 
ing how to speak, learning to play the plano, etc. Inversely, however, there 
are demands or neural processes tor conscious psychic representation. Changes 
in the optic nerve and cerebrum call tor a conscious act of s~~eing. These neu-
ral demands are conditioned 'rI:I such t."'1ings as intensity of the stimulus, health 
of the senses, interest, anticipation, and activity. F':Jr the demands are met 
21, 
in one or anot.lter of the patterns of experience. Since t~le elements that enter 
consciousness are already patterned, there must be SQ119 pre-conscious selection 
and arrangement" and consequentJ.y re1ection and exclusion. The function of 
exclusion of ele:;ents from consciousness is fa.-niliar as Freud's "censor." 
Thus, the demands of neural patterns and processes can be met in a variety 0f 
ws.,vs. But t.'1is nexibility is li::1i ted, for there remains an exigence for a 
conscious comple."OOnt, an eJdgenee whi.ch" if violated, "invites abnormality. 23 
2. Dra'!l.a.tic~. Insight can be unwanted, and .1ust as prejudice biases 
theoreticlll investigations, so also passions and affections re,ject understandilll 
in personal :natters. Exclusion ~ one inSight ,excludes complementary inSights 
that would lead to a balanced viewpoint, and leads to acthi.ty that results in 
misundersta"1dirlp' both in oneself and others. This exclusion of i.nsight 
consequently favors withdrawal into a world of onets own making. There results 
a differentiation between the "')ublic persona and the private ego. This duality 
tends to rob one both of the criticism of onets own developing understanding 
and of the experience of others.24 
3. Scotosis. Flight from understanding can be termed scotosis, and. the 
blind spot that results, scotoma. Although scotosis is unconSCious, arising in 
the oensorship that p:overns psychic contents, this spontaneous eXClusion does 
not inhibit all contrary insights. These contrary insights can be acoepted as 
correct, but rendered harml~ss b,y refusing to ask further relevant ~lestlonsJ 
they oan be rejeoted as inoorrect, or they can be immediately brushed aside 
2ltonergan, pp. 189-191. 
24 Ibid., p. 191. 
-
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wi th horror wi thout ever judging their correctness. And inversely, the 
insights that expand the scotoma, and carry it out to its logical consequences 
.may be rejected as inp1a'lsible. Thus, the sootosia mq remain unconscious but 
be acoompanied b.r conscious bewllderment, doubt, rationalization and inaeouri-
25 
ty. 
4. B!Preslion. Scotosis is an aberration of' both umerstanding and 
censorship. For censorship buically' is constructive; its arrangement of 
materials and consequ,ent rejection ot materials 18 so that insiehts might arise 
in consciousness, not so that insight might be prevented. But in repreSSion 
the censorship acts to prevent the images .f'r~ coming into consCiousness which 
would give rise to the unwanted insights. It dictates how neural demar~s are 
,!lCll to be. met, but admi te any other materials in Bn:Y other arrangement. This 
is, it TI1USt be noted, ditterent £rom a oonscious refusal to behave in a oertain 
26 
manner. it is an unconscious refusal. to understand. 
5. Inhibi tion. There are neural denum:!s tor both images and affects. 
Unvanted. insights, however, arise only from images, not trom aftects. Thus, it 
a neural demard for an affect oan become detached from its normal apprehenSive 
oanponent and b.r association attached to some other image, the repression "i11 
not inhibit this demand. Thus, by an investigation of ASSOCiative paths, it 
seems possible to argue from an affect as attached. to an incoDgrous object to 
its initial objeot. Thus, u the conscious affective attitudes of the 2ersona, 
2S Ibid., pp. 191-192. 
-
26rbid., pp. 192-193. 
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or outer actor, are grounded by the acotosis, there is also the repression ot 
contrary demand functions, which vill emerge into consciousness with the 
affect detached trom its initial object and attached to SODle associated object. 
The 8 &me will hold true tor the inner, L'llaginatl va pertormances ot the E, 
so that the persona ia accompanied by a non-conscious anima, and the .!.12 by a 
~onacioua shadow.27 
6. Perf'omance..!.!!! dreama. Division ot conscious living between.!1.2 and 
persona makes smooth dramatic pertol"SlW1Ca more dttticul t, since the sentiments 
of ego and it. non-conaciou8 shadow can slip over into the outward behaVior ot 
the persona, maldng it difficult to keep COll8~U8 attention away from activit,-
which normally should be governed by hab! t 80 that higher-level contro18 ot 
skills and understanding can receive the conscious attention. It is also 
possible tor ruIUl'8l. demands which are repre ••• d. to be met through the drs_. 
as attached to some seconda.r;y, incongruous object. To penetrate into the 
latent content of the dream i8 to uncover a secret that has been hid.den trail 
26 the subject himself. 
7. l!!! problem .2!..!!!. The preoccupation ot depth psychologists seems to 
be due to the tact that the peculiarities ot sexual. development make it the 
commonest source for scotosis. Hunger is present frOl'll birth, and does not 
greatly change. But sex development is both prolonged, and simul taneousl:y 
organiC and. nsychological. Besides waywardness, there 1s room for mistakea, 
27 ~ •• pp. 193-194. 
28Ibid •• pp. 194-196. 
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misunderstandi~, and secretivenes8. RandOJll occurrence of mistakes or 
wqwardness can be corrected by the function of the dream, a healthy environ-
ment, opportune in8truction, and inner acceptance of the drive to understand 
with its aesthetic and moral 1mplicatiotlll. But repeated mist.akes or W8i1Ward-
ness accumulate in such a wlrj that the improp'c\r handling ot one situation 
makes the improper handling of the next situation much more likely, and a 
8cotos18, which is 8111lultaneously an aberration ot understanding and an 
aberration of eensorship, is eatahlished. Mislead neural demands ean become so 
t1rmly e.tablished and pervasive that they cannot be met in dreans, but emerge 
into wald.ng consciousness in the torm ot compu;1sion, pain, and anx1eties. 
Control of dramatic living cannot be maintained Itand only thrangh delu8ions can 
it pretend to its old maatery.tl29 
8. Catharaia. Betore caaplete 1088 of oontrol of dr.lllatic living occurs, 
there ean intel'"'Tene a social phenomenom 
It was remarked .bove that the dre81ll prorldes release !'rom. 'the randO.ll 
repres8ions that are m.ore or less inevitable and that the development 
of scoto8U reaulta from the CWIUlatiV'e effect ot succesai.,.. adverse 
situations. Now, when adverse situationa become the rule for most 
members of a society, then the 800iety can survive only by providing 
a regular public equivalent tar the dra.. Such prophylactic group 
therapY' will exist wh ..... er unconscious needs are met in a disguised 
manner. Dr. Stekel's description of the theatre as mass therapy 
ech08 Aristotle's statement that tragedy effects a ca.tharsis ot tear 
am pity'. Nor is the invention of such therapy in a prim! t1.,..e 
culture any Blore difficult than the invention of the cultural 
organization itself. For th'3 constrains of the organization give 
ris. to corresponding dreamsJ the relief afforded by the dreams can 
be noticed, this advertence ~ be given dramatic expression. the 
dramatic expression would .et in a disguised form the unconscious 
29 Ibid., pp. 196-198. 
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nuda of the communi tTl and it the draatic expression is not in-
cluded in the cultural organisation, then the culture will not 
survi .... to be investigated. by anthropologista.JO 
9. Latent function. One ot the models proposed. in the t1rst chapter as a 
h,J'pothetical expreSSion ot the relationships between elenents in the little 
community was the tunctional model, described. by Redfield as ua culture or a 
sooiev ••• seel .s an organisation ot means designed to &ehieve certain 
ends ... Jl Merton makes the distinction between consciously acknowledged ends 
and goals which are not C onscl ou.sly recOin! zed by the oOllllUni ty. The 
conscious goala involve run1teet functions, the unconsoious goala involve 
32 
latent fUnctions. Latent functions are ill-qstrated by Lonergan's ax:a.'1lples or 
the dream, in the oase ot the individual, or of SCl!lle type of dramatio group 
therapy, in the cue ot • community. 
10. l!:!! mbolic model. Another hypothetical torm ot the relationships 
between the elements ot a little conmuntty suggested by Redfield. i8 the 
symbolic model. ItIn stloh a model a culture i8 oonceived as represented in its 
oharacteristio properties as a whole by certain symbolio representations--epio, 
dance form, allegory, etc. The symbols may be transformations of the reality 
represented an:! of the impulses projected or perhaps quite fantastio nature} 
3<1:bid., p. 198. Lonergan rerers to Wilhelm Stakel, Technique or 
!nalYtiC15iyohother!p1 (London, 1939). -
Jll1The relation ot Anthropology to the Social Soiences and the Fhtmanitles, 
pp. 733-134. 
32Robert Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, 2nd. ed. (Glencoe, 
Illinoi., 19,1), pp. 64::65'. -
220 
assumed is the capacity of symbol-creating and imaginative beings to trame 
33 
meanings for themselves." Such symbols are created in the aesthetic pattern 
of 8Xpogr1ence, and m8i1 serve latent !unctions of group therapy unknown even to 
the creatort 
The aesthetic and artistic are symbolic. Free experience and 
tree creation are prone to justifY themselves b.Y an ulterior purpose 
or significance. Art, then. becOO!es symboliC, but what is 
symbolized. i8 obscure. rt is an expression of the human subject 
outside the limits of adequate intelleotual formalation or appraisal. 
It seeks to mean, to corwq, to impart 8anething that is to be 
reached, not through sclence or philosophy, but through a partiCipation 
and. in 80M lashion, a nt-enactment ol the artist's inspiration and 
intention. Pre-soientific and pre-philosophic, it ~ strain for 
truth and value without defining them. Post-biological, it 'I'rIIfq 
renect the psychological depths, yet by ~hat very fact, it will go 
be,yond th_.34 . 
The prophylactic .fUnction of dream symbols and of the dramatic representation 
of such sYDlbols to a group has already been mentioned. It is not only' the art 
ot prim.1. ti.,.e lTlan. how8Yer. that can reflect the "psychological depths, tt as 
attempts to apply depth psychology to literary cr1 ticisrn have tried to 
demonstrate. 
11. Primitive non-difterentiation. The lMchanism ot symbolization and of 
----................ - ............................ --...... .;;; 
unrecognized satisfaction ot unconSCious needs is fiexiblel 
This basio meohanism admits a ae1"18s of applioations that raft(e 
from knowledge issui~ forth in prophylactic purpose through 
SUOCUSiV8 stages of intellectual obnubilation to close approxima-
tions to abnormal phenomena. '.yan's oapacity for art and SCience, 
pBy'Chology and philosophy', rellgi on and lTlorali ty. operates in the 
primitive and in the uneducated without awareness of the differences 
33MThe Relation of Anthropology to the Social SCienees and the Humanities, 
pp. 73h-73'. 
~onergan, p. 18,. 
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between these departments and wi thout any sharp distinction between 
them and underlying impulses or needs. In the complex phenomena of 
totem1SDlt in t.11.e rites of the >~other Goddess, in the II\1ths of the 
Sky-Gods, there appear renections not oril.7 ot the 8001&1 organization 
of hunters, agriculturalists, and parasitic nomads but also or hu.'1Uln 
sexuality'; nor did the Mosaic proscription or images prevent the 
backsliding lamented by the prophets, nor the nG"stical. night from 
sense of the Buddhists eliminate the earlier Brahm1nism, nor the 
rational criticism of the Greeks forestall popular hatred or the 
Christians.)' 
Taboos result from a similar failure to distinguish between moral judgment and 
moral feeling, so that moral feeling can take the lead and bec')me disassocia-
ted trom its ordinary objects to be extended to a. host of incongruons 
Objects.36 
. 
12. Summ8l]"e The little ocamunity has Deen looked at tram the viewpoint 
of development of the individuals within that oomunity'. The desire to know is 
a principle of development, it leads to insights into psychic representations. 
Yet other human desires can interfere with the pure desire to mow, causing 
night from insight. Psychio representations originate from the operation of 
two principles, neural demand functions, and a pre-eonscious selective agency 
referred to as the noensor. It The action of these two principles is an example 
of a dialectical process. Censorship can select in two W","St it can select by 
the oonstruction of images that will lead to insights; or it can select by the 
repression of images that would lead to un.wnt9d insights. Censorship would 
seem to be the device by which people suppress the nucleation of experiences 
which would enable them to get concepts that would show their viewpoint to be 
), 
Ibld., pp. 198-199. 
-
)6Ibid., p. 199. 
-
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in error, as in Polanyi's exa~ple of the Azande. The repressive activity of 
the censorship results in scotosis, inhibition, and difficulty 1n preserving 
control o'ler dramatic consciousness. 
Drea.:ns provide release for repressed neural demands through attachment of 
affects to secondary, incongruous objects. Dream-symbolism can take nn a social 
function when they are given dramatic expression; unconscious needs are met in~ 
disguised manner. The dramatic expression thus possesses a latent function. It 
also provides a symbolic integration of the community, for they are united in 
the satisfaction of the unconscious need, which symbolizes the psychological 
state characteristic of the members of the cOrn!l\uni~. Because the primitive 
does not distinguish between different areas of culture--explanator,y differenti· 
ation is a result of development, t:r.e satisfaction of unconscious needs, often 
sexual, is not olearly distinguished from religion; he fails to differentiate 
between science and 1l'lagic, between moral judgment and moral. feeling. Integrat1c~ 
of the various areas of culture will oe quite different in a primitive 
communi~ from integration of culture in a full7 developed civilization. For 
in the primitive oo~~unity there has been less differentiation of different 
areas, and conseqt.umtly there will be little conscious questioning of the type 
carried on in advanced societies. Primitive men do not conduct seminars on the 
relationship of sOience, philosophy', and religion. Integration is rather on a 
more 8,Ymbolic or aesthetic level, a feeling of moral and religious meaningful-
ness pervades m8.%\Y or :nost areas \")f life. And although this could be looked 
upon as an ideal by someone perturbed t1y the cOl'nplexitles of modern culture, th4 
investigator of the small oommunity that is rt:.ore or less pri.mitive should keep 
in mind that the failure to make prop~!r intellectual distinctions can lead not 
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only to "abominations" in the name of religion, blt also to a crI1shing burden 
of irrational taboos in the name of moralit,y. 
C. COMMUNAL DEVEtGPMENT 
1. !t!! wirationa .2! £!ls !2!. Redfield gives an account ot a book he 
wrote about me Kaya Indian village ot Chan iCom in Yucatan, entitled a Village 
~ Chose Progress.)? lilt is the story of how then villagers, leaders and 
followers, made up their !I1inda to do something and then did it. The unity 
of the history ll.s in the central fact of the oonspicuous collectlve eftort 
of these people to make their c01IIIluni ty the progressl va chief cODllftUni ty of 
their region. n38 He s.,s that the ethos--the ,traditional. moral attitudes, and 
the world nev--the outlook on real.lt7--rema:ined relatively the same, but that 
against this stable background the mind ot the people changed. "Let us say 
that the people tormed aspirations." The decision for progress was "attended 
with a conception of a glorious future, of wl1ding , a village just like the 
39 Americans. ,It 
2. Mental. lntmation. The conception of a glorious future tor the 
vUlage ot Chan KODl correaponds to the first phase ot the emergence of an 
empirical sociocultural system, a8 outlined by Sorokin. He says the process 
has three phases, (1) mental. integration (2) empirical objectitication, and 
0) sooialization. He sa;re of the ti.rst phue: 
3?(Chicago, 1950). 
38The Little Communttz, pp. 101-102. 
39 ~., p. 106. 
224 
The integration ot two or more meanings into one system is an act 
ot creation occurring in the human mind. Whether such a concention 
or a new system is "tvo and two make tour"; or a syllogism; or 
an idea tor a poem, picture, sculpture, or song; or a unification 
ot two or more technical ideas into a new invention; or a synthesis 
of two or more meanings and systems ot meanings into the complex 
system ot .. sclentitio theory, religious creed, code of law, artis-
tic creation or into an economic, poll tical , or an organizational. 
..,st-.-such an integration of meanings is aJ.va;rs the first logical 
pbaae ot an .. ergenoe ot 8D,1 new sociocultural 8Y'Stera. For our 
purposes it is unesa.ntial whether it i. done deliberatelJ' by 
the given individual. or without any preconceived intention; whether 
it evolve. througb a long serie. ot eftorUl, experimenta, oalcula-
tions, deductions, or apontaneously, in the twinkling of an eye, 
through .. aamentar;r intuition--sCIIIleti.'l9. even in a dream ot ec ... 
stasy, or in any other wa;y. Likewi.e it is unessential tor our 
purpose. whether such a synthesis is prodDced in one or in lI1&D7 
nuda, suggested by a tortunate combination of extel"nal cireUlll-
stance., or started by' some need or cur1~ity- telt by the integrat.-
ing person. What is important 1s the act of integration itselt, 
which evolve. a system. ot meanings (however simple) out ot what was 
before disjointed congeries ot meanings. When such an integration 
is created for the first time in the history ot mankind, it is an 
absolutely new integration. 'When an existing integration of meanings 
is learned by' a given individual or group--for instance, b,r a pupil 
who learns the mul tlpllcation table· .. ! t is new to suoh a person or 
group. 40 
). Empirical objectification. The first phase remains entirely in the 
realm of ideological culture. Keaninrs, values, and norms that "su! t frau a 
mental integration must tind vehicles. 
To becOl'le a real empirioal system it has to incarnate itself into a 
eet of empirical vehicles through whioh it can be conve;yed to others. 
It Newton' 8 Principia had been thought through by Newton but never 
told to othare, or wrItten and published, his system of physics wOt1ld 
not haye been born lUI an empirical socioeul tural system. it would 
have remained in the realm. ot pure meanings. Empirical.l7 it would 
have diecl at the steee ot conception. When it vu written and published--
that is, incarnated into a set ot _teri&! (color-light) conductors 
(manusoript ot book)-it took the second step in the prooess ot 
transition from the realm of pure meanings into that ot empirical 
4~ics, IV, 62-6). 
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sociocul tural reality. When other persons read and accepted it, it 
took a next step in its grounding.4i 
4. Socialisation. Thie next step is that of socialisation: 
A B,1stem incarnated into a eet of vehicles sometimes does not find 
other individuals 88 ita recipients, users, and bearers. In that 
case it 1s stillborn, empirica.lly dead at the moment of 1ts birth. 
Thousands of P08l1l8, novels, songs, pictures, sculptures, and 
political, religious, SCientifiC, or philosophical systems are 
c')uceived and then printed, told, broadcast, objectified through many 
empirical vehicles. And yet most of them never succeed in socializ-
ing themselves, in being accepted and used by &n1'b0d7 but their 
authors. • •• Here again are different degrees of grounding. Some 
systems spread. and are acoepted by large masses 01 people, some by' 
only .. few persons. Some enter into a close allianoe with other 
existing ayatePtsJ some remain completely isolated. The differenoes 
are mAlV'. But all systems that are born alive, And live for some 
time after the second phase, have to pastt through the above three 
phasel.42 . 
5. Emergence 2! .! sociocultural !lstem !!! £2.!!!!.2!. In Redfield t • 
account, the conception of a glorious tuture tor the Village vaa a mental 
integration. It. was an !!piration for the future, conceived as somehow 
difterent trom the past. Redfield contruts the aspirations of Chan !tom with 
the conceptions at the future had in more isolated little communities. 
Aspirations are conceptions as to how the future will be or oan 
be m.ade different from the past. 1'he concept is called torth when 
we attend to people whose states of mind are changing under changing 
cirCumstances. If we study' a stable and isolated community.. we 
shall probably find, as I remarked earlier, that the future is 
conceived to be like the past. Such people have no aspirations. 
But the peonle of Chan Kom, like people in thousands ot other little 
communities allover the world at present, have tormed aspirations. 
So we need the word to desoribe an element ot their state of mind 
that i8 distinct from ethos and world view, though of course related 
to both. The old way of c oncei ving the norma of conduct and the 
41 Ibid., p. 64. 
-
42Ibid• 
-
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nature of au things persists, but now aspirations to make things 
dU'terent lead the wq toward change, and. we are required to exa..une 
the ettect ot the old ethos and world view in li",.1 ting the 
aspirations, or the ettect ot the aspirations in modit,ying the ethos 
and world view. 
Aspiration corresponds to myth. It is a vision of the desired 
state ot things. But it is prospective, and it is more C"loselJr 
related to action than are the retrospective myths ot the lit-Ue-
changing communities; the past cannot be livedJ the tuture must be. 
So asoiration gives rise to policy at the point where the people 
tormulate means to realize the aspirations. '!'he people ot Chan 
Kem formed a Doliey to accomplish their upirations to become a 
modern town. They determined on ways of appeal to the atate govern-
ment. They adopted a program ot leadership among the neighboring 
villages. They imposed on themselves obligations of work and service 
that vould make theil' oonmIni ty something different from what it had 
been betore. Policy is the servant ot aspiration, the expression in 
real lite ot a dream ot improvement. Po~iey is primarUy politioal; 
it haa to do wi til controls and -4nfiuence. on aotion, internal to the 
community and external, domestic and. foreign. Poliey, like aspi-
ra.tion, is a conception that i8 needed in the characterization or 
changing communities.43 
In Chan Kom, mental integration vas, in this ease, largely' in terms ot a 
political, SOCiAl, and economic organization ot the community. Empirical 
objectification was initially in the tOl"Jl ot talking about the new conception 
ot what Chan KOII wu to be. Th1a conception had to attain the stage ot 
socialisation betore a new phase of mental integration took place, that ot 
torming policies to achieve the goal. The policies were socialized in the verr 
process ot putting them into etfect. Once the aspiration was shared by tbe 
majority of the OOlllllUn1ty, the sooializat.ion ot the means to achieve the goals 
tollowed easily. The ut}iratlon, in Soroldn's terminology, was not a Simple 
integration of meanings; it was a value. Policy consisted in norma for 
activity direoted towards achieving that value. The activity itselt was an 
43The Little Community, pp. 106.·107. 
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u:pr&8sion ot the norms and values, and thus was a vehicle for these norma 
and values, an instance ot behavioral oulture. 
6. Mental integration.!!!! iruJight. 5oroldn's "integration ot two or more 
meanings 1nto one system" se8ll18 to correspond closely to Lonergan's concent1on 
of insight. Sorokin gives examples ot different kinds of lnsight--"two and 
two make tonr, tI a syllogism, an artistic insight, a technological insight, a 
scienti.f'ic, religious, legal, or organizational insight. Mention has already' 
been made ot the artistic insight. It is characteristio ot tbe aesthetic 
pattern ot consciousness, it is a liberation from strict biolOgical. purposive-
ness as well as from the burden of scientific ,veritication, it linda! its 
verifioation in the artistic crea.tion itself,!a4 or, in Soroldn's terminology, 
it finds its verifioation in the phtlSe of empirical objectification. 
Scientific insights, of oourse, are quite difterentJ they are not considered 
verified 1n the aot ot formulating them, tor at the stage of formulation they 
are merely hypotheses which must be tested. But the insights behind the 
aspirations of the village ot Chan Kom were neither scientitic nor artistic, 
rut practical. As Lonergan says, "human intelligence 18 not only speculative 
but also practical. So far from beirg content to determine the unities ancl 
correlations 1n things as t.hey are, it 1s constantly on the watch to discern 
the possibilities that reveal things aa they might be.u45 Both types ot 
insights result in mental integration, in integration of ideological culture. 
b\oner!San. PP. 184-185. 
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The integration ot ideological eul ture results in a "pure system ot meanings. II 
As has been seen, whether or not a system at meanings is integrated or not does 
not depend upon its being veritled, but upon its logical or aesthetic 
conslstency in 1 taelt, or its lqsical or aesthetic dependence or interdependenc 
of the elements.L6 
7. Transtormation £! little cOl'lll1UIrl.tlea. Redfield sqs that the "people 
ot Chan Kom, like people in thoTlsands of little communities allover the world 
at present, ha.ve f'ormed aspirations. 1I And he notes that aspirations, unlike 
the myths of' the primitive community, are f'orAard looking. 1'his attempt to 
control the direction of' development is ~scribed in The Primitive World and ,- -
.ll! ... Tr ....&nS ........ t...,Ol" ... mI.;.;;;.,;;,;ti ... o...,ns ....' "Man 1.s selt-made through the slow and unpremed1ated. 
growth of culture and civilisation. ~an later attempts to take control ot this 
process and to direct it where be wills. ,,41 Aga.1n, Redt1eld sqs that in a 
tolk SOCiety, "the 1I10ral. order 1s, on the whole, taken as given. • • • But the 
tirst cities bring a literate .lite and & new freedOIll ot the mind to criticiz. 
and to record. Then the l"lloraJ. order, th01lgh it i8 shaken by clv1lizlltion, l..s 
48 
also, in civilization, taken hy reason into charge." Education takes a new 
slant. Since primitive man tends to seE! the .future <-).3 a reproduction ot the 
L'lltllsdiate past, education i8 geared to produce adults that are similar to their 
parents. In contrast, modern education emphasis.s change; it is geared to make 
46Sorokin, Socie1ir:, Culture, .!!!2 "Personality, p. 1M, l?lnamics, IV, 21. 
47Th• l!r1m1t1ve World !!!2.!!:! ... Tr;".;aIl;;;;;.;.;;8..,to;;;;rm;.,;.;;;;;at ... i;;.;::o;.;;nB;;;.' p. 113. 
48 Ib1d., p. 119. 
-
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children into adults ditferent from their parents, it is an instrument or 
49 progress. And Redfield notes in this context, as he did in the discussion of 
the aspirations ot Chan Kom, that the myths of primitives tend to look towards 
the past, but that the Jq'tha of modern man look to the future, to shape it in 
50 
a w., different from the past. 
8. Pr1m.1tive world view. Lonergan says that in :p1"1m.itive man the 
, -
·oapact ty tor art and sOience, psychology and philosophy', religion and 
morali t;r I operates • • • without awareness of the ditterences between these 
d.epartmenta and without any sharp distinction between them and underlying 
impulse. or needs. MSi This lack ot di.tinotiqns leada to a spontaneous 
integration of a pre-ci'rilized conwuni t.Y which is not 80 mob a conscious 
ordering ot distinct things u it 18 a tel t participation in things not clearly 
distinguished from one another. Redfield aq8 that the ooncept ot .elf is the 
If axis of world view. It And in every world view, there will be .ome degree ot 
distinction between the self and the non-self; the nOD-self will be distin-
guished into huJun and non-humans and the non-human aspect of the non-selt will 
be further distinguished into nature and God. But in the world vi.., or 
primitive man, the selt which confronts the non-self i8 not sharp17 distin-
guiened from it. "Tne triangle of man, nature, God is originally no triangle 
at all; the distinctness or ita side. and the sharpne.s of the angles are a 
49 Ibid., pp. 120-121. 
-
50 Ibid., p. 125. 
-
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later development, a product ot civilization." Hence, integration is spontane. 
OU8. Man does not oonfront nature, but rather "does his part within it." 
i>!ant s attitude towards what is not-man i8 one ot "partioipant maintenance," in 
a world in which man, nature, and God are not entirely separable and act in a 
personal way towards one another. "It almost follows that the relations among 
the entities-man, nature, and God however distingui8hed or merged-are not 0 
personal but also, as personal relationships alwq8 tend to be, Moru. Il'2 
9. Transtorm.a.tion.2! primitive world!!!!. From 8. world view nin which 
man was part of nature and god and acted out his sense ot participation," man 
gradually ttoomes to stand a8ide and look tirs1( at Ood-Nature, then, in the case 
ot the Hebrews, God-without-Nature, and then, beginning with the Ionian 
philosophers • • • at nature without God. 1t Subsequently I the exploitation of 
nature by the use of technology becomes the predominant attitude. "1'b.e 
aontempora.ry Western world, now imitated by the Orient, tends to regard the 
relation of man to nature as a relation of man to plV'sical matter in whioh the 
application ot piV'sioal SCience to man's material comfort is mants paramount 
5.3 
assignment on earth." Now it is obvious that scae such transformation was 
necessary if aul. tural life wu to develop; failure to distingui8h between 
SCience, art, philosophy, religion. morality, and biological impulses does not 
help any of these. But Bidney points out that specialization of oultural life 
has made modern :nan feel the need "for some principle of unifioation whereby' to 
52Red.tiel.d, "The Primi ti ve ',;orld View, It ProoeedilJ s of the Amerioan 
Philosophical Society, XCVI (Februa.r;r, 19$2), jo-:JS. --
53The Primitive World!!!!.!l! 'fransformations, pp. 109-110. 
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comprehend our culture as a whole and to provide a common meaning and objective 
for the multitude or diverse interests and values. Practically, the Second 
World T.<:ar, even more than al\Y theoretical argument, has led thin.1<ing men to 
realize that genuine, enduring peace requires a harmon;y of world cultures whioh 
may enable all the peoples of the world to live together in peace, assured or 
their common rights and opportunities for progressive development. n,4 !ldney 
here formulates 8 very powerf'ul 8!piration or 'TlOdern man, the desire for unity. 
Integration 1s thus oonceived as a value. 
10. Differentiation ~ development. The differentiation of man, nature, 
and God, and the differentiation of the varioqs areas ot cultural life, are 
necessary tor oultural. development. Lonergan say's that differentiation is & 
characteristic ot &f\Y course of developmentr 
Thus, initial single cells of different organisms admit material 
dirterenees, for example. in the number or chrOOlOSO!llea, but 
their tunctionlng does not exhibit dltferenoes that are comparable 
to the later dlfterenoe. in f\mctioning. Again, men or widely 
different temperament and character began, as intants, from in-
stanou of senai ti ve oonsciousness that not only were remarkab17 
ailnUar but also raarkably und1.f'f'erentiateciJ there were 
.ensationa but percept! veness wu undeveloped, there was nothing 
to remember and pCMers of imagination Wf're latent, afrects were 
global af'fairs of elementary types J and skills were 11m1 ted to 
walling_ Finally, intellectual development has its roots in the 
detached and disinterested desire to know, but the mere desire 
is not knowledge of anything; it will lead to highly' differentiated 
structures that are masteries of logiC, mathematiCS, natural science, 
common eense, philosophy, and human science; but these intelligible 
differentiations are yet to co_, am they' come on.lJr in and through 
the process of development." 
,4Bidney, p. 367. 
,St,onergan, p. 4,3. 
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Soroldn s.,.. that human intellectual devel~nt is impossible without 
social development. Without interaction mental development does not Of'4ur, 
there is no tran8ll1.s.ion ot cultural achievements or inYelltiotUl, there is no 
language developed, there i8 no ponibilit)" ot developing distimtions between 
true, false, right, wrong, normal, and abnormal. The basic categories ot 
human thought-identity, difterence, causality, space, tlM--need a framework: 
ot interaction. "Their emergence has occurred only' wi til the de".lopment ot 
interaction, ot social difterentiation, stratIfication, and integration. More 
speclt1call.)" , the appearance ot the anal.y'tlcal &bill ty ot the human lIIind 18 a 
concomitant ot the d .... lopment ot 80cial difrfPrentiatlon. And the growth ot 
the synthesizing faC'.llV ot man bu accompanied the proces8 or integration or 
aocial groups and oultural syatems •• S6 
11. Swamw. Chan Icn is an instance ot a community torming conscious 
aspirations and. striving to direct its own development to achieve these 
upiratione. The process ot the emergence of the desired goal is de8cribed. by' 
Sorokin as consisting ot !nental integration, empir10al objectilicati on, and 
socialization. 'ormation of aspirations and the development ot polioie8 to 
achieve them is characteristio of the transformation of tolk CClIRMUni ties 
throughout the world tocla\r. Also characteristic ot the development ot a 
cc:mtmUni t,. is increasing explanatory ditterentiation. On a cul rural level there 
is a growing awareness ot distinctions between man and nature and God, and. ot 
the ditterent aspecte ot man' 8 cuI tural 11te. On the 80cial level there is the 
emergence ot social ditferentiation and stratitication. Speoialisation, howey 
56Sooietl, Culture, .!!!!! Peraonalltr, p. 344. 
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makes integration a problem tor human intelligence, tor 11fe is no longer 
spontaneously integrated by an undifferentlated order of all things in whioh 
man partioipates. He has a oonsoiousness ot control over material nature as 
well as aver his own development. 
D. EMERGENCE OF THE EXPLANATORY 
VIPMP~NT 
1. l!!! p2;"incipat notion 2! objectiv1t"y1 <a> Judgment. The most baslc 
distinction that must be made in order to arrive at an explanatory viewpoint is 
that between the self and the nOll-self, which. Redtield 811i1S ill not sharply made 
in the primitive world view.. For this distlnotJ-on 18 necessary tar what 
Lonergan terms the ft selt -af'firma tion of the kno;.et", It which is necessary for the 
notion ot ObjectiviV. This Hlt-att1rm&tion, 11ke tItf¥ atfirmation, lIlUst be 
eubetantiated. Lonergan sa.y. that the process of verifioation leads to "a 
grasp ot the unconditioned. ft The oondi tioned is the i1n>othetlcal statement one 
wishes to verity. The conditions are usually oast in the form ot "1t" clausesa 
A is true it B,e,D, and E are true. The araap ot the unconditioned oonsists in 
what Lonergan calls a reno: insight, an answer to the question tor refieotion, 
"Is it true." By this refiex insight, one grasps what conditions must be 
-
fulfilled, and whether or not they are fulfilled. Only by' this grasp, can one 
discover a link between the coOO1 tioned (the hypothesi.) and its conditions, to 
57 grasp the bypothesis as unconditioned. It is failure to recognize the need 
tor this refiex insight, it seems, that Polmy!. criticizes philosophers who, in 
analyzing the process ot ·terU"ication, "invariably choose &s specimens such 
570f• Lonergan, pp. 2n-3l5 far a full discussion of judgment. 
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laws as are not in doubt," thus overlooking the tact that 11 aI\V crt tioal 
verification of' a f'cientific statement requires the same powers for recognizing 
rationali~ in naturo as does the process of scientific discovery. use It is 
through such a renex insight the.t theyalue judgments ot scientuts enter into 
their acceptance or rejection of scientif1c hypotheses, since, as Furt.., s.,., 
it is very ran that the conditions take the form, "If, .!!l!!.2!!1I !!, h3'Pothes1s 
X 1s true, x,,., and z will follow. 1I59 
2. !b! 2rincipal notion .2! objectivityt (b) self-affirmation. In eolt-_ ........................................ 
affirft'lI:,tion, "the relevant conditioned is the statement, I am a knower. The 
link between the conditioned and its conditton!, m.ay be cast in the proposition, 
I am a knower, if I am a concrete and intelllgible unity-identity-whole g..e., 
a thin.s;""1, characterized by acts ot sensing, perceiving, imagining, inquiring, 
understand:irg J formulating, renecting, grasping the unconditioned, and 
60 judging. The fulfilment ot: the conditions is given in consciousness." 
). !!l! principle notion 2! obJectivi'!Qrl (o)! pattern 2!. juggment.s. 
Lonergan sqs that "there is objectivity if there are distinct beings, some of 
which bo~~ know themselves and know others as others." And this notion or 
objectivity demands a definite pattern of ju-lgments. The notion is reached it 
to the affirmation, ttl am a knower," is added the judgment, "This is a 
tJpewri'ter," and the further judgment, "I &i1'l not this ty'pewr1ter." Now both 
the self and the typewriter are known as objects. tlAn indefinite number of 
sepola.nyi, Personal Knowledre, pp. 13-14. 
'59Furfey, ftThe Problem of Values," p. Sll-4. 
60x,0nergan, p. 319. 
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further objects may be added by makil1g the additional appropriate positive and 
negative judgments. 'inal.ly', in so tar as one can intelligently grasp and 
reasonably att1l"1l the existenoe of other knowers besides oneself, one can add 
to the 118t the objeots that are also subjects ... 61 'rhus, Sorokin's subjects of 
interaction" are objects as well, for an object is a thing which 18 not oneself 
and a subject is an object that 1s "characterized by acts ot sensing, percein , 
imagining, inquiring, understanding, formulating, refiecting, grasping the 
uncondi tiona, and judg1.rc." 
Lt.. Levels of consciousness. The principle notion of objectivitY' is not ............ __ .............. iooiiiioMo .................... 
reached in the dramatio, aesthetio, or b1ol~cal pattern of oonsciousness, 
but only in the intellectual pattern. 'or biological consciousness i8 directed 
towards the tult1l.lJaent of biological needa, .. sthetic consoiousness is free 
both from biological pul'poaivenen and the demand tor the unconditioned, and 
dramatic consciousness is conoerned not with determining the correlat.ions in 
things &8 they' cst, but in letting insights into how to get thing. done 
effect! vel.y. Intellectual consciowmess, on the other hand, is dominated by 
the demand tor the uncondl tloned, for verification. There are, however, 
different levels .2£. ... c... on8;;,;;;;;;.;c;,,;;;l ... ou.-&n8;;;,;;.;;,.;;,,;;;s ... s Wi thin the intellectual pattern, becau.e 
consciousness i. "an awareness il'lll1&ll8nt. in cognit.ional acta," and intellectual 
ooneciowm ... i8 characterilled by acta of experience, understanding, and 
judgment. 
61zbid., pp. 376-377. 
-
There is an empirical consciousness characteristic of sensing, 
perceiving, imagining. As the content of these acts is merely' 
presented or represented, so t.he awareness :1lmaanent in the acts 
2)6 
is the mere giv8IHJSS of the acts. But there 1s an intelligent 
conSCiousness charaoteristic ot inquiry, insight, and formulation. 
On this level. cognitional process not merely strives tor and 
reaches the intell.igible, but in doing so it exhibits 1ts intel-
ligence; 1 t operates intelligently. The awareness is present but 
it is the awareness ot intelligence, of what strives to understand, 
ot what is saUstied by understanding, of what formulates the 
understood, not as a schoolboT repeating by rote a definition, but 
as one that defines because he grasps why that detinitJ.on hits 
things ott. Finally, on the third level ot renection, grasp ot 
the unconditioned, and judgment, th"re is rational consCiousness. 
It is the emergence and the errective operation of a single l_ 
ot utmost generality', the law ot sufficient reuon, where the 
sutfiCient reason is the unconditioned. It emerge. aa a demand 
tor the uncondi tioned &I¥l a refusal to assent unreservedly on any 
leaaer ground. It advance. to grasp of t;he unconditioned. It 
terminate. in the rational cqmpulsion by 'Which grasp ot the un-
conditioned caMlanda uaent.62 
). Normative objectiviV. Rational consciousness does not pttrtain to the 
emergel¥'J8 of an empirical 8ociooul tural 878tem directlT, tor it is not 
identified. with mental integration, with empirical objectification, or with 
socialization. It is concerned indireetl.;r with socializa.tion in the cue ot 
speculative insights, for a coununiV ot scientists is unlikely to be pereuaded 
to be the "recipients, users, and bearers" of a system of meanings unless thq 
are somehow veritted. Rational. conaciousMs8 pertaina directly to the 
correctness of the trrpe ot mental integration had in a speculative insight, and 
thus constitutes the ground or normative objectivitz. which is "objectivity ILl 
opposed to the eubjeotiv1ty of wishful thinking, of rash or e.xce •• ivelJ' 
cautiou. judgments, or allowing jo;r or sadness, hope or tear, love or 
62 Ibid., p. )22. 
-
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63 detestation, to interfere with the proper march of cognitional process. 1t Ita 
ground lios in "th. unfolding ot the unrestricted, detached, disinterested 
desire to kno~," thus putting it in oppOSition to obscurantisM, interference or 
inhibition b.r other human desires, and making cognitional process subordinate 
to the satisfaction or other desires. To be objective, "in the normative 
senae ot the t~rm, i8 to give tree rein to the pure deSire, to ita questions 
tor intelligence, and to its questions tor refiection. Fu.rther, it is to dis-
tinguish between questlons tor intelligence that admit prOXimate solutions and 
other questions ot the same type that, at present, cannot be solved. 
S1m1larly, it is to distinguish between sound :queations, and on the other hand, 
queatiordl that are meaningless or incoherent or Ulegitblate." And upon this 
norma:Uve objectivitq rests tM validit.Y of all logic and methods, tor these 
"are intelligent a.nd rational; their grounds are not belief nor propaganda nor 
the pragmatic utility of atom-bombs and lltYlon stockingsJ their erounds are the 
inner ex1.gence ot the pure desire to know. They are to be accepted insofar as 
they succeed in tormulating that (~rnam1c ex:igenceJ and. they are to be revised 
insotar as they tail.'" 64 
6. Absolute obJectivi~. Absolute objectivity c:)ncerns, not a patterned 
context or judgments as does the principal notion, nor the dynamic exigence 
that constitutes normative objectivity, but the 5inel. judgments one reaches by' 
accepting that norm. Absolute objeotivity removes the content ot judgment tl"om 
63Ibid., pp. .380-)81. 
-
64Ib1d. 
-
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relati'ri.ty' to the judging ind1Y1dual, and the time and place at which he utters 
the judgment. lIeUSar'l!I crossing ot the Rubicon was a contingent event 
occu.rring at a particular place and time. But a true aftirmation or that event 
is an eternal, immutable, definiti ..... validity. For it it is true 'that he did 
cross, then no one W'hate"er at any place or time can truly deny that he d1d.,,6S 
It is by absolute objectivity that knowledge acquires its publicit.r, tor sinee 
the unconditioned. is withdrawn trca relativity to the one who utters the 
judgment, it also becOtMS ace_sible to other knowers. Absolute objectivity 
1981'S nothing about an absolute space or time, and doe. not necessarily involve 
saying that a thing, to' be real, must be in t~, or in space. "Absolute 
objectivity is simply' a property ot the unconditioned, and the unconditioned, 
as such, says nothing about space or time. It one's imagination makes the use 
ot the preposition 'within' imperative, then one may s8':1 that ""'8l'7 judgment is 
within a context ot other judgments, and that every-unconditioned i8 within a 
66 
universe ot being.1I 
7. ¥!!e!l"1ential objectivitz. Experiential objectivity "is the given as 
given. tt The field ot materials which 1s questioned, it is in itselt 
unquestionable and indubitable, tor it is not constituted by annering 
questione, it COMS prior to questioning. The given 18 residual and dUtuse, 
for it is what remains alter insight and fonwlation have selected and 
6S Ibid., pp. 378-379. 
-
66Ibid• 
-
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67 indicated clearly and precisel,. difterent elements in the given. The given 
would constitute the "randaa backgroundl! spoken of b.1 Polan;'fi in describing the 
law ot consistenq in the use of language, in identifyi~ different si tuat.ions 
in respect to some particular feature, one must first Itdecide what variations 
of our experience are irrelevant to the identification of this recurrent 
teature, as forming no part. of it, i.e. we must disoriminate against ita randca 
68 baokgrc.lund. " Sorokin sqs that the given is a Iteomplioated and inexhaustible 
chaos of int1n1te~ numerous and diverse fragments,U and that only by' methods 
such as the oausal-funotional and logioo-mean1ng:fUl. methods of integration can 
69 
one order el_ents of tQis chaos into cODq)reh~nsible ,.,.stem. Lonergan s."s 
that the given as given is equall.y' valid in all of its parts, but difterentl7 
significant; the imaginations, dreams, and personal equations that must be ,2!!-
regarded by the plVsicist lIIUSt be e!l?lained by the psychologist. Lonergan's 
acoount of the given is e.xtrinsicl 
It involves no desoription of the stream of sensitive consciou8-
ness. It involves no theol"'.1 of that stream. It discusses neither 
the contribution of the empirioal.ly conscious subject nor the 
contribution of other 'outside' agents. It sUtp~ notes that 
refieotion and judgment presuppose understanding, that inquiry 
and understanding presuppose .. terials tor inqui1"1 and something 
to be understood. Such presupposed materials will be unquestion-
able and indubitable, tor they are not constituted b.r answering 
questions. They will be residual and diffuse, for they' are what 
is left over once the f'rui ta of inquiry and renection are sub-
tracted trom cogni tiona! contents. 70 
67Ibid., pp. 381-382. 
-
68personal Knowledse, pp. 79-80. 
69Br9!!1cs, I, 22. 
1OxbicL., pp. 362-383. 
-
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8. 1h! desire 1:.2~. The explanatory viewpoint rests upon the correct 
unfolding of the deSire to know in the intellectual pattern of experience. But 
there are other human desires and needs to which human understanding can be 
subordinated in the biological, aesthetic, and drama.tic patterns of conscious 
experience. And primitive man doea not distinguish between the different 
patterns of experience, between desires and needs. Even more, he tails to 
distinguish clearly between himaelt as an empirically, intelligently, and 
rationally conscious knower, and what is not himself. Thus he cannot formulate 
the principal notion of ob.ject1v1 ty, nor the other partial aspects ot 
objectivity, related as they are to the desire. to know. He knows things, and 
knows them through experience, insight, and judgments. But he lacks the 
conceptual tools to beCCllll8 critically aware of the structure ot his knowing, 
and of the wqs that desires other than the pure desire to know oan interfere 
with correct knowing. And most important, he does not know that he lacks this 
71 
self-knowledge ot hi. knowing processes. The critical awareness necessar,y 
for science. eapeoial17 for a scientific study of man, is a result of a long 
process of development. And even the cultural relativist is aware of this 
development towards greater objectivity. Anthropologists recognise a trend in 
history which haa resulted in a standard of truth and or good that i. inherentl 
better than that pos •• sed b7 the primitives. 
What the anthropologist s.-;rs about the magic practiced in a prim! tiv. 
society' is to the anthropologist really truer, in some sens., than 
what the native saye about it. Dr .. Lads sug,ests that the 
'l'epoztecans would be better otf with le.s magiC and more applied 
science. I do not think that he r •• ls he is expressing mere~ an 
enculturated judgment no more valid than what a preliterate native 
would say on the subject. • •• Anthropologists, like other people 
around them recognize a double standard ot excellence in t1.nding the 
truth. The primitive man is not expected to reach the kind of 
truth we oall scientific with the same success with whioh civilized 
:nan is expected to reach it. There has been a transformation ot 
judgment 88 to truth. 
But I say alao that there haa been a transformation as to 
judgment as to the good. 'fhe moral order has been provided with 
measures of excellence unknown ani! unknowable in preciviUllecl 
SOCiety. The anthropologist, insofar as his describing 1nvolves, 
as I think it does, some valuing. makes un ot the .. new measures, 
and does not expect his subject matter, the preUterate people. to 
make use ot them in valuing him. 72 
These transformations or judgment have come about through the gradual recogni-
tion ot the d.1.tterences between difterent kind,l ot cultural aoti vi ty.. and 
especially of the reoogni tion of the dallinanoe of the desire to know with it. 
demand for the unconditioned. 
9. Self-knowledge!:!!! soientific development. Without knowledge ot selt 
as distinct from. other things, it is impossible to attain the principal notion 
of objectivity, which consiats in a patterned oontext ot judgments att1rm1ng 
the existence of ditterent objects, some ot which are also knowers, or subjects 
And without knowledge of such distinct ooncrete un! tie8 in data, there can be 
no continult,y of acientifio development. For sCientifio development occurs 
through sequences of d1!terent eXplanatory aystema. Systems, however, have to 
be discovered and verified in data; 11they cannot be discovered in &n.V' data 
whatever, neither can they be discovered and veritied in the data which the;r 
thfJllael vea select, tor then a numb$!' of incompatible 8Ystem.s would be equally' 
veri.tiable tor each would satiety equally well the data it selected. Accord-
ingl.y, scientific thought needs, not only explanatory systems, but also 
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descriptions that determine the data whioh explanations must satist.v." Thus, 
"soientific thought needs the notion of the thing, wnich has 88 its properties 
both experiential ard explanatory conjugates Lierms expressing properties as 
described and as explaineg7', which remains identical whether it is described 01" 
explained, which by ita identity demands a coherent explanation or set of 
explanations that is veritiable in the easily ascertainable data at the thing 
&8 described ... 13 Tn. danger of letting the system select the data has al.r~ 
discussed.. It is to use what are mereljr hypotheses as dogmatic preSCriptions 
for the denial at data that do not agree with these hypotheses. Although it ia 
true, u Polan1i sqa, that one's language itIrp?-1es a set of aaaumptiona or 
antiCipations of what the univer .. is 11ke, nevertheless, 1t the theor.r of the 
universe implied in onets language includes the notion at the thing, one will 
have a tirm basis for the critici_ of competing explanatory qstellls. The 
thing can be described. Then the question can be raiaed, "Which qst_ best 
satisfies the data, not that it selects itselt, but that a deSCription ot the 
thing in question brings to light?" In the sciences that atudy man, it is onl7 
through the developl1l6nt ot philosophy, the\)logy, ethiCS, mathematiCS, art, and 
science over a long period ot time that the self-knowledge neceSS817 tor an 
adequate description ot man as a thing has emerged. The student ot SOCiology, 
psychology, or anthropology seea too much dogmatic selection ot data by 
cOl1lpeting explanatory syatems in theae tields to doubt tor very long whether or 
not there is &a yet an adequate SCientific !!,planation at Man that satisfies 
all the data nov a-vailable. 
24.3 
10. Scientific controver!y. Any a'no'mt of develo'lment of m(~thods will 
not remove scientific controversy. As Lonert;'an says, II scientific method does 
not succeed in toae :ng old dogs new t.ricks. As ;1ro: Planck testified, a new 
scientific position rains ;:eneral acceptance, not by making opponents change 
their :'linds, hut [yJ holding its own '!Util old a~:e has retired tbem for their 
professional Chairs. 1I74 This confiMs Fur'fayls contention that value 
judgments play a rreat role in detormining scientists' acceptance of hypotheses 
It also dashes the hope of aQ1 ~ethodolo~ists who look for criteria of 
objectivity that does away with the need for critical ronection and the refiex 
insight that ~:·ra.sps the unconditioned. The wr1:ter hF'artily agrees with 
Lonergan t s judgment: ItI regard the automatic solution as a mere ':JYth that 
springs rro~ a non-rational hankerinp atter a non-rational security, tor every 
solution is to be discovered by intelligence and is to be accepted by 
reasonableness, and neither the exercise of intelligence nor the exercise of 
7$ 
reasonableness is automatic. '1 
ll. ~utomatic knowledge. Palmy! gives a sharp critioism of this I·non-
rational hankering after a non-rational security." He says that "the> ideal ot 
strictly objeotive knowledge, paradigmatlcally formulated by Laplace, continues 
to sustain a uui'Tersal tendency to enhance the observational accuracy and 
systematiC preciSion ot sCienoe, at the expense of its bearing on its subject 
74Ibid., p. 526. 
-
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matter." !h1s reeul ts in a "menaoe to all cultural values, including those ')f 
science, try an acceptance at a oonception »f man derived from a Laplacean ideal 
of knowledge and by the conduot of human affairs in the light of such a 
conception." It leads to the view that Hp'~litical action is neoessarilT shaped 
by force, motivated b;( greed and fear, with ",:orality used as a soreen to delude 
the victims. 1t He claims that the "establishment in our time of the scientific 
method as th8 supreme interpreter ot hu.man affairs" has created a. tension in 
our culture "similar to that generated at an earlier time by the rebellion of 
reason agalnst religion, but even more comprehensive in its scope." For the 
Lapla.cean view of scienoe leads to the ocnvic\ion that the supreme good 
consists in "material welfare and the establi.shment of an unlimited power for 
imposing the conditions ot matnrial weltare." This view then can add a 
supposed scientU'ic objectivity t,) intense moral aspiratiOns, and will demand 
that all cultural activities serve the state in aChieving the end ot welfare. 
Thus, "8 philOSOphic mOTement guided b.1 aspirations of scientific severltr has 
come to threaten ~~e position of science itaelf. This selt-contradiction stems 
tram a misguided intellectual passion--a passion tor aohieving absolutelY 
impersonal knowledge which, being WlAble to rec()gniH any pers-:ms, nresents us 
~.,i t" a nicture of the universe in which we ourselves are absent. In such a 
universe there is no one canable of creating and upholding scientific values, 
76 hence there is no scienoe." This is in direct contrast to the primitive 
world view that regards eve~i¥ in the universe as personal, but only a 
refusal to ad"l2it allot tho data concerning man can lead to the position that 
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nothinc in the universe is 'Oer8onal. The p&8sion for impersonal knowle<4~e is a 
flight from intelligenoe and reasonableness, a desire tor automatic security. 
12. Theolgs,y, phU08OPhz, !!!!! soience. Development has been through 
differentiation. It was only in the twelfth century of the Christian era that 
the distinction between faith and reason vas made. This distinction W88 within 
theoloQ', pertaining to the theologian' 8 deliadnation of hi. field and to his 
own m.eth(;dGlogy. But it had an blportant implication outside ot theology, "tor 
once reason is acknowledged to be distinct trom faith, there is issued an 
invitation to reason to gl"OV in consoiousness ot its native power, to olaim its 
proper field ot inqu1l7, to work out ita d~ents ot investigation, to 
determine its own methods, to operate on the buis ot ita own principles and 
77 precepta." Descartes vOrked out the problem ot an independent philosophioal 
method care.tully, but "he was oompletely innocent ot the notion that science 
could be pursued with a simUar independenoe ot philo.op.. • •• As the 
eleventh-oentury brillianoe ot an Anselm had bean mistaken in oftering nec8s8 
reasons tor the JIO"ster1es ot tat th, 80 the seventeenth-centuI7 b:r1.llianoe ot 
Deacartea V&8 .mistaken in of'tering philosophic reasons tor a theory ot 
mechanics." Thus phUoaopbT vas challenged by soiencel 
As there is a poet-Carteaian aftirmat10n of' philosoptv that rules 
theology out ot court, so there is a p08t-Kantian affirmation ot 
science that tos ... overboard even Kant's modest olaims tor 
philoaophy, and there i8 a still later totalitarian violence that 
with equal impartiality brushes aside theology and philosophy am 
soienoe. But at that empty' conclusion to the sequenoe ot ever les. 
cc.,prehens1 ft syntheses, man still exists and man stUl is called 
upon to decide. Arohaists urge him to imagine that he lives in an age 
11Lonergan, p. 527. 
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ot liberalism, or rationalise, or fal th. Futurists paint tor him a 
utopia that cannot disguise its own m;ythieal features. But the plain 
tact is that the world lin in pieces before bim and pleads to be put 
together again, to be put together not as it stood before on the 
carele.a toundation ot assumptions that happened to be unquestioned 
but on the strong ground of the possibUity or questioning and with 
lull awareness or the range ot possible answera.78 
13. Saientism.!!!! utoQia. Of the futurists who paint tor man a utopia 
that cannot disguise its own mythical features, the ones that have the most 
infiuence tOOq, perhaps, are those who believe in what Wll1iamWhyts. Jr. call 
It.aienti_ ••• the promi •• that with the 8ee technique. that have worked in 
79 the physical solences we oan eventually create an exact sOience of man." 
Although this ideal hu had a "long and dismal: record of achlevement, tt faith in 
scientiSl'll has not been shaken, "for it is essentially a utopian rather than a 
technioal idea." The argument generally rune. "We are in a terrible fix and 
it i8 almost too late. We have applied sCionce to things, and onlJr now have we 
begun applying it to man htuaU'. Already' we haft learned some useful social 
techniques; we can measure personality, cm spot the obstacles to good group 
c:t,auaa1cs, and predict coarmunicat10n response. But these are merely the 
beginning, it only we provide the time and money, before long we can unwrap the 
whole enigma with a unified science ot:uan.,,80 Sclentism betr .. its 
rrt)"'thological features in it' ideal ot a good sooiety to be attained by the 
application ot the same technique. that have worked in the p~ical sciences. 
78 ~., p. 528. 
20.7 
As Red.tield has said, modern rqths look toward the future. Scientil!ft is to be 
distingulshed fl"om science in that it ls not dominated by' the pure desire to 
know; lt ls not regulated by normative objectivity, tor practical desires 
control acti vi t.r, so that concern tor reasonable ftr1tleation is not dominant, 
10 Much as concern with the manipulation ot people in order to achieve the 
81 
ideals ot scientism. 
14. Scientism ~ ObJectivism. F. A.. Hay-ele sqs that scientism is bued 
on three fallaciesl "objectivism, collectivism, and historiciam. By this he 
means the atte~t to dispense with subJective knowledge; to treat abstract 
W'holes--sucb as 'societTt-as detinite object~vesJ like biological organisms. 
t.~e atte;npt to make histoS"T a science, and the only' one, of' social. prumomenaJ2 
The oharacteristic ot "objectivism'· shows the arlini ty ot scientiam tor the 
pasaion tor strictly" objective, impersonal knavledge criticized by' Polattr1, 
or tor the "automatic" security of mechanical verit1cation which Lonergan said 
was a l17tb. '!his ideal ot ob,jectivity regards the objective as what ls "out 
there'· to be looked at-a .2!St. 
15. 'Bodies. Bodies can be known in the biological pattern ot experienoe, 
a k1 tten can recognize a saucer ot milk. It is a bodT, what Lonergan calls an 
"already out there now real." He explains: 
'Already" refers to the orientation and d1namic anticipation ot 
biologioal conaciouanessJ such consciousness does not oreate but 
finds ita environment; it tinda it as already constituted, already 
81n,ld., p. 33. 
-
82Tbe Counter..Revolution of Seience: Studies on the abuse of Reason 
(Glencoe, Ifiinol., 1952), retmea to s:y. t~'hiG, P.2o,footnotel. 
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offering opportunities, already' isntng ohallenges. • Out' refers 
to the extroversion of a consoiousness that is aware, not or its 
own ground, but of objects distinct trOll itself. 'There' and 'now' 
indicate the spatial and temporal determinations of extroverted 
oonsoiousness. 'Real,' tlnal.l.y, 1s a subdivision within the field 
ot the 'aJ.read1' out there now't part of that is mere appearance, 
but part is real. and its reality oonsists in its relevance to 
biologioal suCCess or failure, pleasure or pain.8) 
It was stated earli(~r that Galileo inaugurated modern soience b.r going beyond 
talk about natures in terms of the relationa of things to man's aenses, to 
seek to discover the correlations that give knowledge of natures in terms of 
the relations or things to one another. But instead ot spea.ld.Dg of the 
relations of things to one' a senses and the relations of things to one another, 
, 
Galileo distinguishes between merely' apparent,' secondary qualities, and the 
real and objecti.,. primar;r qualities.84 "'w'hen GalUeo pronounced secondary 
qualities to be m.erel;r subjective, he meant that they were not 'already out 
there nov real.' When the decadent Aristotelians and, generall,y, people that 
rely on good cOll'llllOn sen •• , insist that secondary qualities obviously' are 
8S 
objective, they' mean that the;r are 'already out there now real. ttl 
16. D1tficul~.!!:! reach1gs explanatozz d!Wpoint. Thi. position ot 
Oalileo's involves a world view which stUl 1s not tully' explanator;r. For it 
fails to distinguish between what i8 imagined and. what i8 grasped by insight) 
it baae, objectivity, not on reaching the unconditioned through a process ot 
verification, but on animal extroversion. Thus, it is only rea.sonable not to 
expect primitive man to reach the kind of truth we call scientific. Indeed, 
8ltonergan, p. 251. 
84Ibid., p. 132. 
-
8SjW., p. 252. 
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"one might sq tllat it has taken modern science tOW" centuries to make the dis-
coyal")" that the objects ot ita inquil")" need not be imaginable entities moving 
through imaginable processes in an imaginable space.time. • •• Even before 
Einstein and Heisenberg it was clear enough that the world desoribed by 
scientists W8.8 strangely difterent froIa the world depicted by' artists and 
inhabited by men of common sense. But it was lert to twentietb-centur,y 
physicists to enVisage the poaaibUity that t.ite objects ot their science were 
to be reached only by severing the umbilical cord that tied them to the 
86 
maternal. imagination of man." And Sorokin sqs that although the ph1'siciste 
have made such a tranSition, sociologists o~n have ootl "WhUe the pb,ysical 
sciencee have already' abandoned the atom. as the elementary unit, and have found 
that an ever-increasing IlU!Ilber of the el_entary particles are of a lell and 
le.s 'material' nature, our 'hCllUtlaade phy'sicists' are still pl~ with atalic 
marble., still looking for locial atoms as the simplest. and smallest units of 
psychosocial phenomena. .. 87 
17. Ideal observer 2! social i,henomena. Sjoberg t s statement that 
contemporary SOCiologists hesitate to ackllOW'ledge the eftect of the socio-
cultural 8,1sta upon themselves and their research, that. thq tend to regard 
88 therA.elve. as it functioning in a Vactmll. i8 related to the tendenq to 
86 Ibid., pp. xx-xxi. 
-
87rada, p. 221. 
88 Sjoberg, p. 610. 
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objectiYiam (ae opposed to objectivity), which regards the real as something 
11 alread;y out there now." Tald.1'lI the explanator.r viewpoint in the stuq- of man 
Itdrops trom oonsideration the knower as a spectator of the real and makes hilIl 
an inconspicuous item in the real. t..~at 18 aft1rmed. 1I89 '!'he knower is one ot 
man;r objects that are al80 subjects-interacting subjects. The viewpoint that 
some social scientists are tempted to take, that they are detached. spectators 
looking at what is going on "out there, U reinforoes a.rr:! acientistio tendencies 
they may have. For this viewpoint turns the attention away from the ta.ak of 
using scientific method to reach reasonable affirmations of bypoth.MS stating 
the relationships between things as the,r are,: allowing one to equate scientU'1c 
method with one' 8 techniques tor achieving a utopian ideal society'. 
18. Anthro20l'1Whic projection. One who is oaught in a scientistic 
position is not 80 much interested in the relations that hold between the 
elements in society and culture 88 he is in society and culture as th~ relate 
to himself and to his dream. He is not in the intellectual pattern of 
experience. but in the dramatic pattern. And as such, he is interested in 
insiehta, but not the grasp of "a By'stem of terms defined by their intelligible 
relations to one another, but the grasp of intellig1b111V in the ooncrete 
presentations of his own experience." This is not in itselt bad, but can lead 
to oontusion. 
• • • I would. note that all the explaining is done by the insight 
and that, unle.s one distinguishes between the insight and the 
89 Lonergan, p. $39. 
presentations, then one is open to the blunder ot attributing an 
explanatory power to the presentations and eYen to associated 
feelings and emotions. OM can know exactly the conU"lbut1on made 
by the irudght by having recourse to concepta, to abstract 
formulations, to the utterance of tel"!!lS and relations with the 
terms tixing the relations and the relations ilIIplici tl7 detininc 
the terms. But if' one employs this procedure, one is involved in 
the explanatory viewpoint, one is without &qy' detence against th. 
tendency to regard. as explanatory what merely is an it. to be 
axplained.90 
It one is unwilling to torsake the desCriptive viewpolnt, if be "insiate that 
going be,yond concrete insights i.8 a desertion ot reality J It then. 
one canno't ris. above one'" personal, spatio-temporal traM of 
reterence and one cannot distinguish between the intelligibility' 
immanent in that fr.. and mere eenai ti ve tamiliar! ty with direc-
tions and with the lapse ot time. iUthout such a distinction, 
objective space and time are cred1 ted not only with the int.l-
ligibUi ty of the frame but also with our leelings. As we feel 
the gravitational field to be directed tr""" above to below, so a 
man at the antiposed would have to mov-e about like a tly waJ.lc1Dg 
on the ceiling ot a roam. As we make decisions and then produce 
results, 80 causes are be.tore etfacts, am. a .first cause neces-
sarily am CllXclusivalJ' is first in time. Causality cannot be 
merely an intelligible relation ot dependenoe; it has to be 
explained and the explanation is reached by an appeal to the 
sensation ot MUso'llar eftort and to the 1mage ot transmiSSion of 
effort through contact. So universal causality is a pervasive tate, 
linking all things at once, keeping the wandering stars to their 
strange cours •• and, by the s_e stroke, settling tor astrologers the 
destinies ot iMtn. 91 
19. Subjective projection. Anthropomorphic projection reSlllted from the 
addition 'Jt feelings to the contents ot insights, but subjective projection 
involves thinking that others ... things just as one does oneself, 
9Orbid., n. ,93. 
-
91 Ibid., pp. 539-,40. 
-
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subject! ve projection reaul ts when we interpret the words and deeds 
of other men by reconstruct1ng 1n ourselves their expertenoe and 
uncritically adding our intellectual viewpoints 1Ihich they do not 
share. • •• The stranger turns out to be strange when we find that 
hi8 mentality is not the same 88 our own. A visit to the next 
village, to the bordering country, to a different oontinent, leads 
first to MUseunt at the oddity ot the 1nhabitants and ulti.mately 
to despair OYer their incomprehensibility. But we cannot travel 
into the past. So fathers are misunderstood by their sons and each 
century by the succeeding century. As the data assembled by 
historical research acOUJlllllate, insights are revised continuously 
in accord w1th the concrete process of learning. But besides the 
revisions torced qy further data, there also are the revisions due 
to the advent of new investigators, tor history is rewritten not 
only by each new culture but also by each stag. ot progres8 and 
deoline in each culture. Nor 1s there art:! escape trail such 
relativism as long as men cling to the descriptive viewpoint.92 
20. Suaaarr. 'l'be _ergence of the expl8J)&tory viewpoint i8 necessary 
tor .. critioal hu1un acienoe. Without its relativi8ll, anthropGlllOl"Phic 
projection, and soientism are real dange:ra. 'l'.he explanatory viewpoint regards 
the objeotive as that which is verified, not as that lftIJ.ch is imaginable, which 
i8 ·alr~ out there now real. It The principal notion of objectiVity requires 
affirmation of oneself as a knowing SUbject, affirmation of other thing., and. 
denial th.at these other things are oneselt. Experiential. objectivity is the 
given. Normative objectivity is the demand for the unconditioned grounded in 
the pure desire to know operating in the intellectual pattern of coneeiousnes8. 
Absolute objectivity regards the veri.ricat1on of single propOSitions, taJd.ng 
them out of an euential relationship to the one who utters the propOSition, 
and making the contenw of that proposition public knowledge. Xnowledge of 
selt, and ot one's cognitional. processes has COJICt slowly, 80 that it il 
generally recognised that those who ha1fe not had the benefit of the process ot 
92 Ibid., pp. 540-541. 
-
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cultural development cannot be expected to reach scientU'lc knowledge with 
oonsistent sucoess. There is another notion of objectlv1tr, which identities 
the objective with the "already' out there now real." This notion stems from. a 
misguided intallectual passion for impersonal. knowledge, tor automatio 
solutions to problems, which tree one of the burden of being intelligent aDd 
reasonable. Seientisro seems to be oharacterised by this notion of objectivity, 
preclse17 because scientis!I1 has utopian aspirations wbich oannot be verified 
reasonably. 
E. rnm SEIJ'-CotiSCI:::USNESS 
1. Desires. Self-affirmation of the knover occurs in the intellectual 
pattern of experience, and is a result ot a eelt-appropriation ot rational 
cOlUlcioueMs8. This rational consciousnen is the gr0'1nd of normative 
objectivity, for it 18 not satisfied with bright ideas but wants verification; 
it will not give tull as.ent without a grasp of the unconditioned. Rational 
consciousness reaul ta from allowing the detaohed and disinterested desire to 
know operate un1mpeded by other desires. But man does have other desires, 
which oorrespond to real needs. The object ot desire is perceived by man as 
good, as "pleasant, enjoyable, satisfying." The good of desire ls, however, 
coupled on the experiential level with its oppOSite, which is the object of 
aversion or the bad.9) 
2. Levels E! lh! l0od. 'lbe detached, diSinterested, unrestricted desire 
to knOW', however, differs from the other desires of ·'len in that it i8 not 
254 
content with satisfactionJ f'it heads beyond one's own JOT in one's own insight 
to the .further question whether ons' 8 own insight is oorrect. It is a desire 
to know and its immanent criterion is the attainment of an unconditioned that, 
by the tact that it is unconditi.oned, i8 independent of the individualts likes 
94 
and dislikes, of his wishful and his anxious think1~." Because of the 
knowledge generated by the desire to know, there is, besides the simple good ot 
desire, tne good ot order. 1'h1s "stands to single desires as system. to 
systematised, as universal condition to particulars that are conditioned, as 
scheme ot recurrence that supervenes upon the materials of desires and the 
ettorts to meet them and, at the price ot lim~ted restrictions, through the 
tertui ty ot inte1l1gent control, secures an otherwise unattainable abundance 
ot satistactions. 1195 
The good of order is <trnanic, tor it orders the dynamio unfolding of 
desires and aversions, and is itself a system. "on the l'I1ovelt posseSSing a 
normative line ot development, ttinaamuch as el.enta of the idea ot order are 
grasped b1' insight into concrete Situations, are formulated in proposals, are 
aocepted by explicit or tacit. agreements, and are put into execution onl.y" to 
change the situation and. give rise to still further inSights. tt Unlike the good 
or desire, which is on an experiential level prior to questions and insights, 
the good of order "e ... ntiall.y is a formal intelligibility that 1s to be 
discovered onl.y' by raising questions, grasped only' through accumulating 
94Ib1d. 
-
96 ineip;hts, formulated only in concentions. 1t 
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Besides the notion of good on the levels of experience ard insight, there 
is also a notion of eood on the level of reflection and jUdgments. For the 
intellectual ~rasp of possible orders only issues in realization of one of 
these as the result of a value jUdgment and a decision to nut one of these 
orders into effect. 97 And a decisi on is a will act. 
3. The notion of ~rill. In the three phases of the emergence of a socio-
- --
cultural system, tr:e phases of mental inteeration and empirical objectification 
pertain prttflarily to the person or nersons who originally grasped the idea 
behind t..~e S".!stem, but the phase of s oclalizati:on pertains primarll:,! to other 
subjects of interaction. These other men "lust be persuaded to accept the order 
grasped by 'the originators. Their acceptance vrl11 be relative to their 
willingness to acceptl "besides the bare capacity that is will, there is the 
habitual inclination, specialized in particular directions, that constitutes 
the willingness and unwillingness with which individuals antecedentl.7 are 
disposed to making decisions and choices of determinate kinds." And besides 
will an~ willingness, there is also the act of willing, the decision. !lIt is 
the event~ and 80 it alone is revealed directly'. To know willingness, one :1'lUSt 
98 
study the changes in suoh frequencies over a litetime. t' 
4. Moral. selt-consciousness. The normative exigence of the desire to 
............ -
96rbid., pp. 596-597. 
-
97Ibld., pp. 597-598. 
-
98Ibid., p. 598. 
-
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know goes beyond speculative cognitional activities to knowledge of practical 
possibUlties, which include the field ot deliberate human acta. And thus the 
empirioally', intelligently, and rationally conscious knower becomes also a 
morally self-conscious doer, who recognizes an exigence for selt-consbtency 
between his knowing and his doing. A man can seek to dodge this exi.CetlCY, by 
ignoring the precept "Know thyself. 1I It is possible for a man to avoid a 
responsible moral analYsis ot his words and deeds b.Y a feverish persual ot 
"worthwhile activity. It Or be c an rational ize the inconsistency' bet.ween his 
knowing and i8 doing by revisi~ his knowing to make it harmonize with hi. 
doing. Finally, he can simplJ' run from moral responsibility, joining a 
speculative recognition ot the aspiration to make living oorrespond with 
reason to a total refusal to put this aspiration into practice. This anal.1'.1. 
does not militate against what. is valid in cultural relativiSlru "In different 
strata of SOCiety, in different epochs, in different cultures and civilizations 
one 11Geta with different moral codes. But the content of the moral code is one 
thing, end the dynamio function that demands its observance i8 another. Our 
consideration has centered on that dynamic tumtion, on the operati-ve exigence 
ot selt-eonsistency in self-ooneciocisoess and, since contrut. i8 luminous, on 
the threefold e.cape ot neeing self-consciousness, ot mitigating the moral 
code by rationalization, and of giVing up hope in the struggle. 1f99 
5. ~ good of value. "Now it is in rational, moral self-consci<Nsnna 
that the good as value Com.e8 to light, tor the value i8 the good as the 
possible object ot rational Choice. Just as the Objects of desire tall under 
!I,I 
I' 
I 
1,1'1 
I" 
,I 
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schemes of recurrence to Rive rise tl) the good of order grasped by intelligence I 
so also the good of order with its concrete contents is a possible object of 
ra.tional choice and so a value. tflOO I,f alues differ 1n different places because 
different processes of enculturation have resulted in d~"fferent experience, 
desires, insights, and judgments, but more important, because this different 
enculturation has resulted in different patterns of antecedent willingness, the 
habitual inclinations to make decisions and choices of determinate kinds. 
6. Eoistedc integration. At this point, a further advance can be made 
by' taking up, once aga.in, the ou.tside viewpoint. For the values which the 
members of a community consciously proclaim as :theirs :nay, as a matter of fact, 
not be as relevant to their behavior as they would like to believe. There ma.;r 
be a distinct lack of integration between their ideological culture and their 
behavioral cu! turs. The investigator can discover this simply by' studying the 
frequencies with which objects or orders relative to the value in question are 
chosen. From a stuqy of such frequenoies, he oan determine habitual willing-
ness, and then canpare this willingness with the willingness that is demanded 
by the val ues explicitly embraoed. A study of this kind can lead baok into an 
analysis of latent function. for it may well reveal needs and goals at which the 
subjeots themselves are not conscious. Obviously, the distinction between 
latent and manif'est function cannot be applied too rigidly', because in any' 
culture there ma;v be some individuals who oonsciously and deliberately work for 
ends of which the maj ori ty of the people are not aware. What is a manitest 
goal. for the propagandist can be latent tor the propagandized. What is a 
lOOIb1d., p. 601. 
-
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manitest goal tor tho teacher can be unrecognized. by the student until he has 
learned. 
1. Metaaociological value judgments. Variou8 coooeptions of sCientU'ic 
method fall under the good of order. An intelligible pattern ot means to reach 
the goal of scientific knowledge can be refiecte<i upon crt tically, and judged 
to be valuable. But, just as in any cultural system, in science there mq be 
a lack ot epi8temic integration between explicitly acknowledged values and the 
actual practice of SCientists, a lack ot integration between ideological and 
behavioral culture. ;'ledfield accused the proponents of radical cultural 
relativism of such a lack of integrationJ ~ aocused the praotitioners of 
scientilll1l who claimed to rule out all value judgments of such a lacK ot 
integration. But Polanyl noted that the integration of values and scientU'ic 
research rendered sociology suapect, for the values the scientist holds are 
those he acquired in a process of eneul turation wi thin the very sooiety he 
attempts to study'. It tollows that sociology' wst be ori tical.. The sociolo-
gist must himself become a morally' selt-conscious subject. He must recognize 
the pure desire to know as the ground ot objectivity. He lI1Uat distinguish 
between the epist.emic integration that :involves maldng one's doing correspond 
t.o one's knowing, and the epiat-.ic integration that involves ra.tionaliza.tion--
making one's knowing conform. to one's doing. But this is difficult, ~or it 
requires a courageous analysis ot one' 8 worda and deeds to discover whether one 
is interfering with the proper unfolding of the pure desire to know by 
introduoing such goals as social acceptabill t:r, scientilic prestige, or the 
establishment or scientistic utopia into his research, allowing these to 
diotate the norms ot scientific method. Difficult a.a the task mq be, it i8 
2$9 
vi tally necesaary. For t.he cn tica ot the social sciences note with soorn, 
social. scientists not with excuses, and. those students ot the social scienoes 
lIho are unwilling to take all on fal th note with anger or dismq, that very 
frequently the sociological research oarried on by the confiioting schools of 
sociology is not the detached, disinterested search tor truth that is so highly 
praised by all, but rather a partisan defense of the metasociological value 
judgments that difterent interacting human beings have acquired b,y a process of 
enaulturation in different groups. 
F. SUMl1ARY 
1. Generalised. biogr!l?N:. Every individual. is "wired" to many different 
social and cultural. systems, which results in what Sorokin calls a plurali_ of 
"egos. It These different egos can correspond to biological or social needs and 
desires. In general, it would be sat. to identity the difterent social am 
cultural systems Soroldn speaks of to Lonergan's "good of order," since these 
social and oultural systems are the l"dults of organising intelligence 
operating upon human desires and activities. And the good of order corresponds 
closel¥ to Redfield' a concept of the i\mctionaJ. model in which the oanmunity is 
concei .. d as a eystem of means and ends. Human development starts on a 
biological level, but includes aesthetiC, dramatiC, and intellectual patterns 0 
experience. Af'tinll&tion of oneself as a knower occurs in the intelleotual 
pattern ot experience. Domination of intelligence over dramatic action resul t8 
from moral self-oonsciou8ne ... 
2. Abnormal development. The deviation trom oorrect development is 
Significant for the study' ot the integration of the little conwunity because of 
it. connection with symboli_. For just as dreams oan provide an outlet tor 
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repressed attects in the indiri.dual.. so also the dramatiC enactDlent of dream. 
or artistically created symbols can provide a therapeutio release of tanalOl'l 
for a community. The process of association of a1'fects with 1ncongruws objec 
is also presented as an eXplanation of taboos. 
3. Connunal. deYelopmeut. Development can take place when a c01!llUUity 
deliberately conceives a plan tor progress and elaborates a polley to reali •• 
this aspiration. This" however J already presupposes a development &war !rca 
the more primitive outlook of participant. maintenance of the Ul'Ji verse, which 
regards everything as personal and moral. Differentiation of self and non-selt 
ot persons trom what is impersonal is made slP1lly. 
4. ~lanatorz vi!wp<!!nt. Suoh differentiation is neces8&l"7 for attain! 
to the prinoipal notion of objeotiv1V, whioh is had if it is recogni.ed that 
there are distinct beings, some of which both know theMel vea and know others 
as other. This notion ot objectiv1ty drops the "ideal observer" approach to 
social phenomena, recognizing that the knower is not a spectator of the real 
but one element in the real that i8 affirmed. The objective is not what is 
"already out there now real" but what is verified. Making the object of one's 
science the rtalread;y out there now real." results in a clinging to a descriptive 
viewpoint that oannot transcend the relativism immanent in anthropomorphio and 
subjective projection. 
5. Moral !!!£-.. c... on_8C;.;;;,;;;;i ... ou,;;.s;;;,;n8;.;;;;;,;;s ..... s. Recognition ot an exigency for malcing one's 
action conform with ona's lmow1ng leads to moral self-consciousness. And it is 
in such consciousness that the notion of value comes to light. For a value is 
a good that is the possible object of choice. It is relative to the habitual 
willingness ot individuals or groups to lUke choices of a. determinate kind. But 
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it is common to all lrdividua1s and groups to have values. Values differ tl"Oll 
the s1mple good ot desire in that a value is grasped by insight and affirmed 
to be good in a value judgment, whereas a simple object of desire il prior to 
oonception and affirmat1on; it is on the experiential. level, whereas the good 
of value 18 on the level of reneotion. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The unknown was named lithe integration ot the little community" first ot 
all, then, under the influence of Sorokints sociological theory, it was named 
the Itintegration ot society, culture, and personality in the little community." 
This .econd method ot neming the unknown, hovever, depended upon using 
Sorokin's generic phenoaenon tor sociological research, "meaningful interaction 
1 ~ 
as a or1 terton ot relevanoe. The tact that Furfey sqs that relevance 
criteria are, to a oertain extent at least, arbitrary, raised doubts about the 
objective validi~ of working out the properties of the unknown in terms of 
Sorok1n'a theor,y. For relevance criteria are relative to the basic interpre-
tative .framework ,me has acquired in the process of enculturation. And the 
encu1 turation process experienced by' many social scientists has led them to 
aftirm that it i8 impossible to say that one such interpretative .framework 1s 
better than another.2 The question of relativism thus b~came a major theme 
throughout the thesis. 
It one of the wqs ot working out the properties of the unknown 1n order 
to guide research 1s through a speCification of the wa;y that the unknown 18 to 
become known, then specification ot the interpretative framework in '4h1ch one 
lSee above, w. lal-46. 
2~., w. 41-46, 110-114, 134. 
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will work becomes an important aspect of the process of working out a 
heuristic structure. This is eapeciall.y' true in working with the little 
community, tor as Redfield points out, tne investigator must take the inside 
view without losing his grip on an outside view. This tension between the 
- -
inside and the outside views, sqs Redfield, "is the central probl_ in studies 
of oul ture or ot personali t,.. ,,3 And it is a tension between two ditterent 
interpretative frameworks. 
In addition to a specification ot one's interpretative tra.mework, however, 
there IlU8t also be a specitication ot the antioipated tqpes of interrelation-
ships one expects to discover in the little o~munitT which, taken all 
together, consti tut. the "integration" ot that cOJllllUni\7. As W'&8 seen from the 
discussion ot criteria ot relevance in relatioll8hip to Soroldn's "l'I'l8anlngtul. 
interaction," the types of interrelationships among the elements in the little 
OOl'llllunity, u wall as the specification ot the elements to be interrelated, 
depend upon the criteria of relevance one choo.e., which again, i. a result of 
a particular interpretative framework. 
1. ~-_af_t_i_rm.;;;.;;;&t_i_o_n. A basic atep in clarification of one' a interpret&-
tift frlllMWOrk 1s selt-aft1rmation ()t the knowing atXt ohoo81ng subject. 
Redt1eld sqs that in every world view there is some distinction between the 
s.lf and the non-self. 4 Tbe self that wishes to undertake a soientific stuctr 
ot man must make this distinction more explicit. He must. distinguish the 
3The Little Communitl' p. 82; see above, pp. Uo-120. 
hsee above .. p. 229. 
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conscious subject the further level of moral. se1t-eonsciousne8S; to affirmation 
8 
of oneself as not only a knower but also a responsible actor. 
2. Interpretative framework. Self-aftirmation involves an explicit 
recogni tion ot the detached, disinterested, unrestricted desire to know and ot 
the e:agency ot JlU)ral. consciousness tor consistency between knoving and doing. 
These two principles are important for the study of integration. For the dest 
to know termInates in a demand tor the uncondit1oned; this dllllW'ld i. pa.rtl¥ a 
demand tor consistency in one's ideological. culture, for it a proposition 
which one is testing appears to contradict other proposi tiona which one holds 
to be tru., further questions lJIUSt be asked l::)ef'ore one can att1rm that 
proposition as unconditioned. One of the conditions that rational conscious-
nes. sets up, in other words, is that the oom.itioned propOSition mst not 
contradict a context of judgmenta,9 a syste.'Tl ot superior know1edge.lO And it 
is this same demard tor consistency in one' 8 ideological. culture that enables 
the discoveJ'Y' ot one mistaken beliet to start a process ot correction ot other 
mistaken belief •• ll 
The second principle, that of' the exigency tor consistency between knowing 
and doing, 1s a demand, not tor integration at ideological culture, but tor 
lOpolanyi, Personal Knowledge, pp. 375-376, see above, pp. 104 ... 106. 
llLonergan, pp. 7l4 ... n5J s •• above, 1'1'. 17Q..ln. 
1ntegration of behavioral. au! ture with ideological oul ture. Upon these two 
principles rests an interpretative .trs."!lf!tWork which can give vhat is valid to 
the principle ot oultural relatiVism, even though it remains invariant itaelt. 
lSperience varies from oulture to culture, and from individual to 
individual. There is no eY1denee, however, that a culture exists composed ot 
people who have no conscious experience. 
Insight is into onets own experi·~nee. Therefore, just as the oontents of 
experiences differs so alao the contents ot ditterent insights are not 
identical. ret whenever the use ot language has nourished, insi~rhts into the 
wq words are to be used have occurred. 
Desire or aversion oan be to what 1s presented to on~'s experience, but 
variations of desire .trom oulture to culture does not ch~e the reality ot 
desire as an element in human experience. 
Order 1s put into the objects ot desire and the means ot getting them by 
human intelllf!ence. This is a recurrent tact, desDi te the differences in the 
good of order in different times and places. 
Judeent is had whenever people accept same statements and reject others. 
','hat statements are accepted or rejected is relative to enculturation; that 
- -
atfirmations and denials occur is not relative to encul turation. 
Choice occurs whenever there is a selection of one of two or more 
alternatives, the qu.est10n of freedom need. not be discussed here, altllough the 
writer does affirm the capacity of man tor free choice in the right conditi01l8. 
Value is a good of desire or of order considered as an object ot rational , 
choice. Men with different backgrounds have different values, but they all 
regaJ"d it as reasonable to choose scm. course of action, to choos~ some order of 
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doing th.ings. 
3. 0bjectivitZ. The ~)rincipal notio!'"! of objectivity 1s a patterned 
context ot judgments, and hence an interpretative fra.>nework, or a part ot one. 
The first necessary judg-:nent is affirmation of oneself as a knower; the second 
is affirmation of some other thing, such as a typewriters the third nee.sear" 
judgment is a negation of identity between oneselt and the other thing_ItI am 
not ~~is typewriter." Other objects are added, including other objects that 
are also knm-18rs, and hence other Subjects.l2 
The ground of normative objectivity is the pure desire to know; this 
partial notion ot objectivit.y is a refusal to~al1ow other desires to interfere 
with oognitional process, and a refusal to judge logics and methods on anr 
other grounds than that ot whether or n'Jt the". satisty the demands ot the 
pure desire to know tor the unconditioned.l3 
Absolute objeotivity is signiticant tor relatiVism, for it removes the 
content of the attirma tion from rel at! vi ty to the one af'tlrm1ng 1 t. It regards 
single judgments as unoondi tioned.14 It a man affirms "! am a knower," the 
content. of that affirmation is not relative to who it is that atf'irms it; his 
friend changes the words, however, to make the S8me aff1rmation--"You are a 
-
knower." 
F.xperiential. object.irlty regards t.he given as given. It states that sinoe 
what can be judged to be true or talae is the answer to a question, and. since 
12Lonergan, pp. 376-377J see above, p. 234. 
13rb1d., pp. 360-381. 
14~., pp. 378-379; ••• above, p. 238. 
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the given is prior to all questions-the .ma.terial to be questioned, the given 
is indubitable.1S 
4. Meaniggtul interaction. Meanin~tul interaction as the generic 
phenomenon ot sociology i8 logically consistent with Lonergan's prinCipal notior 
of objectivity. For the prinCipal notion of ob,jeetlv1ty is the affirmation of 
ot.t.ler objects which are not oneself, and some of which are, like oneselt, 
knowing subjects. The knowing subjects are the subjects of interaction, other 
objects are vehicles, what is known by the subjects is the meaningM aspect 
ot interaction. Add to these notions the further affirmations or oneaelf as a 
doer, wi til ita recognition ot the exigenc;y tor~ integration of one' a action with 
one's knowledge, and the reasonable attirmation that others operate on the same 
prinoiple, and it follows that one's own action and the actions ot others are 
going to be meaningful. 
The selection of meaningful interaction a8 the generic phe1'l<Jlenon to be 
studied qy sociology, along with the criteria of relevance that this invo11"ea, 
is not arbitrar.r. It 1s a choice, based on a value judgment. The content ot 
that value judgment i8 that it 1.s better for sociological re •• arch to be 
dClldnated b.r the pure desire to know than by other deSires, such as the utopian 
16 
aepirat10ns of scientism. Acceptance ot thi.,value judgment 1s an acceptance 
ot Lonergan's det1nition of nonut.1ve objectiv1ty. '1'0 follOW' this norm is to 
place oneselt in the intellectual pattern of experience, to be a knover. 'n1e 
value judgment, however, i8 not arbitrary, ev-8n though rejection at it would be 
lStonergllll, p. )81-383J see above, pp. 239-240. 
~, p. 26, aee above, pp. 245-21,.6. 
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arbitrary, tor to del\Y the pure desire to know is. ulti.mately, to -put oneselt 
outside the realM of scientitic discourse. 
5. ~alectic. Lonergan says that there will be a dialectic "it (1) there 
is an aegre~"ate ot events ot a determinate oharacter, (2) the events may be 
traced to either or both of two ,rinciples, (3) the principles are opposed yet 
bound together, and (4) they are ;l'1Od1fied by the changes that 8ucoessive17 
17 
resul t from t':'lem." An::! interaction, 1 t would seem. satisfies these condi tioru I-
The opposition between the two partie. need not be a clash ot ideas; it need 
be no more than minor differenoes of opinion or viewpoint or understanding that 
result !"rom the tact that each experiences tne interaction ditterentlJ"-tbe 
Itseltt' ot the one i8 tfanothertt tor the second. And every interaction process 
1s an aggregate of events.18 Tn1s 1s 1n oontrast to Soroldn's characterilation 
ot an interaction process as a oausa1.-tunctional unitT_ 
The investigator of a little COlmlUn1ty interacts with the members ot that 
cornmu.ni ty. Redfield speaks ot the tension between the iMide and the outside 
viewpoints that he must maintain. This tension is between two interpretative 
tl"&<"!JI1forks whioh act a8 the opposed principles in a dialectical relationship. 
The insights the investigator gets. and the formulations he makes and aeek. to 
verii)' will be acts which torm a concrete aggregate of events that are traced 
to e1 ther the inside vi_, the outside view, or both. 
The correetion ot a mistaken belief laads to the oorreotion of other 
mistakea, due to the demand tor oonsistency imposed by rational oonsciousness. 
11I,onergan, p. 211. 
lasee abov.. p. 20. 
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The process of correction is dialectical, for there are two princlnles 
:lnvol'led: th.'Z! set of beliefs and values buUt around and supporting the mis. 
taken belief, as opposed to the insight and judgment that pronounoed the 
beliet to be mistaken. 1,,'hat had been 1'crrwrly a !'lore 'r less well tntep:rated 
system now is broken down, and a new integrated patwrn forms as new and 
rela.ted inSights and judgments are added. A change in viewpoint through such a 
dialectical process ~ be through a saries ot events that are all private--one 
man-nedi tating in. his room. But it is more 111<011' that m8l'\Y' or the events will 
occur in a dialogue, in reading, or in t.~e meaning 01' another's action; it will 
itself take place as part or an interaction P~OC&S8 or processes. 
6. L2gie. Interaction b&t~.f8en ahthropologist Evans-Pritchard and the 
Asande illustrate a dialectical tension between viewpoints which did not ohange 
the beliar of the Azande in besse. The Azande reaisted &rrJ' change in their 
viewpoint by the utilization of defense mechanisms, such as circularity, 
automatic expansion or the cirole, and suppressed nucleation ot contrar,r 
19 
concepts. A viewpoint such as this is not reallY integrated logically, a.s a 
treatise in logic is integrated. For it is expressed, not in precisely defined 
terms, rules of operations, with axioms and derived theorems, but in ordin.ary 
language. And an outJ.ook of a comnmni ty', as interpretative frarnework, a lforld 
viw, cannot be translated into a logical s,ystemJ it is consistent, and this 18 
what 1s often meant by being logioal, but the consistency is something that is 
only grasped by understarlding the coherence of a set ot rela ted insi~ht8 that 
19Polaqri, Personal Knowle~e, pp. 288-291, see above, ?p. 166-169. 
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are lett vague and unformulated nrecisely because of the need tor emnla,ying not 
only defense mechani&~s, but also supplementary insights into concrete 
situations. iWen a system of mathematics cannot be oompletely formalized, much 
less a EUstem of culture. 20 
7. I,snguse. Since the investigator 9roceeds with his investigation ot 
the little community only by communicating with the :aemb9l"S of that COIYlllUnity, 
language is going to be a major entrance into the inside view of that community 
There is a theory of the universe, a world view, implicit in the language of 
the COl1'l!l1uni ty. The integration of that wrld view is not going to be aocording 
to precise definition of terms and striot relationships, but through its overalJ 
oonsistency. Language, according to Sorokin, is one of the main systems of 
culture.2l And although an understanding of the grammar and vocabulary of a 
language does not give a logically integrated whole, it still will be consistent 
to a rather high degree. But floonsistency" refers to a somewhat unspeclfiable 
quality. Polanyi says that it is had o.nly through a aeries of personal 
judgments, through an act of generalization similar to the one made when om 
uses one word to refer to several objects that are similar, but not exaotlJ' 
22 
aJ..ike, or to several similar situations or relationships as well. ',;ihen is a 
man no longer of "average height," but Ittall?1t 
8. Primitive terms. The above disoussion is in reference to ordinary 
language in whiob the terms are nominally defined as a result of insight into 
20r,onergan, 573-576, see above, pp. 183-189; 200-201.. 
21Brnamics, IV, 110-111; see above, 118-179. 
22personal ~nowledge, pp. 79-~O; see above pp. 177-178. 
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the way they are used. The oonsistency spoken of, however, can be compared to 
the oonsistenoy ot the set of terms and relations needed to express any' basic 
insight into the things to wilioh language refers. ItIf one grasps the noosss 
and sufficient condi tiona for the perfect roundness of the imagined plane 
curve, then one grasps not only the ~irole but also the point, the line, the 
cirownferenoe. the radii, the plane, and equality'. All the O()ncepts tumble 
out together, because all are needed to express adequately a single insight. 
All are ooherent, tor coherence basically' means that all hang together from a 
Single insight.,·23 
Such pr1m.1tive terms are pure conjugates,: defined. impl1citl.7 by the set 
of terms and relations which lixes the meaning of each term. :Experience, 
question, insight, formulation, reflection, and judgment are suoh terms, for 
they are tixed prec1se13' by an insight into their interrela.tions.24 They are, 
however, abstract, insofar &8 they' prescind trom particular contents o£ what 
is e.xperienced, understood, affirmed.. 1rfuen one takes possession of the 
structure of his own knowing processes in self-affirmation, he is grasping a 
concre~ and ~ic structure, personal to himself. When he generalizes trom 
this to a oognitional the"ry anplicable to any hwun knowing, he abstracts not 
only trom the particular contents experienced here and now, but also trOOl the 
ooncrete end nartloular nature of his own intelligenoe. In antiCipating the 
acts by which he wUl come to know an unknown, he is working with a heuristic 
23Lonergan, pp. 11-12; see above, p. 27. 
2U1bid., PP. 333-3)6) see above, pp. l53-1~4. 
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struoture that deals with his own concrete knowing processes. i<lhen human 
oognition entera into the object of his study, as it does in SOCiology or 
anthropoloo, he is dealing with concepts that abstract not onlJr' trom 
particular contents but also from particular knowing sub.1ects. 
9. Classical laws. The signiticanoe of classical laws tar the SCiences 
ot man 1$ not in their .'Mth • .atical nature in physics and chemistry, but in 
their abstractness.25 The basic acts of knowing--experience, question, 
insight, judgrnent, and the basic a.t£ective acts-such as desiring, and choosi 
along wi th tha intellectual ordering of desires and value judgnlents-are 
concrete when viewed personally as the dynamic structures behind one's knowing 
and doing, but abstract when they fom basic tems in one's sociological 
theory. The correlations bettieen insight and experiences and desires and 
judgments and choices can be verified in concrete ill8tances ot men in d1tferen 
cultures grasping intelligibility in their experiences and attirrning their 
understandings as correct, by men ordering their practical action to satts-
by' needs and desires through insights grasping possible orders, by men 
selecting from S'Ilong these orders through ju1ging their value. But the 
correlations between the terms abstract from the concrete contents. Such 
correlations stand to the sciences of man as classical laws do to physics and 
chemistry. :)ne is able to go back t.o the concrete schemes of recurrence in 
this or that culture only tu employing experiential conjugates, b.Y which the 
acts are joined to specific contents. 
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10. Causal ,'nOdels. Sorokin and ,tedtield interpret CS,11Sal systems 
concretelY. Thus, they are speaking, not of abstract correl&tions of 
26 
correlativds, but of concrete schemes of recurrence. A scheme or recurrence 
rAt({ c,~nsti tute a systematic or a non-systematic process. If t.he scheme is a 
qster.w.tic process, all the events C tltl. be deduced l.""rom a knowledge ot the 
relevant abstract laws and a knowledge ot a basic s1 tuation. And the relevant 
lawa will be systematically related. Their relationships can be gra8';ed b.1 a 
single insight or set of related insights. Ibt if the events consti tuts a 
non-S"fstematic process, such a conerete inference trom a sirlgle set of 
27 
classiCal. laws is impossible. 
If SoCiocultural interaction, with all the avents, cognitive, affective, 
ph;ysical, neurological, etc., that cunstitute an interaction process, is a 
systema.tic process, then explanat.i.on can be on the basis of classical l3ws 
alone. If, however, events can sometimes be traced to e1 t.'ler or both ot two 
or more opposed principles so as to constitute a dialectiC, then explanation 
cannot be on the buis of classical laws alone. And interaction would not 
necessarUy be a causal ... tunc tional system, a.t least if such a syste."Il is 
interpreted as a s,ystematic process. 
ll. Statistics. Events in non-sys te.1latic process do not occur 
neceS8~, once the process is initiated, but occur with a greater cr lesser 
probability. menta still are defined ill terms of classical laws, or at least 
26see above, pp. 66-9h. 
27LOnerga.~, pp. 46-50, see abov., pp. 68-72. 
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in conjugates that abstract trom the concrete occurrence in a particular time 
and place, but whether a determinate event will take place 1s known through a 
28 
statistical. law determining probability. This is a concept of statistical 
method that makes it refer to a t,-pe of intelligibility distinctly different 
from a position that would reduce statistics to a wq of getting "looser" 
correlations of essentially classical ~. 
Statistical probabilities cOlIlbine with classical laws, for they reter to 
the cc,ncrete events which classical laws or abstract conjugates define. 
Statistical probability joins hands with dialectical analysiS, for 
dialectic analyzes the way- events can proceed: from opposed principles and how 
the occurrence of the events modifies the principles. But dialectic does not 
deal with how frequent1,. such events occur. And in this connection, the 
-
integration .2! ideo1olical .!!:2 behaVioral. cuI ture .!! .2!! ~ baais .2!. 
s ta.tistical 2robab1l1tz. For behavior consists of events which are likely' to 
contom or not to confOrM to one' 8 moving on the basis of one t s habitual 
willingness.29 Such integration will be higher insofar as the culture otters 
tewer alternatives to the 'behavior demanded by its norms. 
Statistical. probability is also intimately connected with de'felopaent, 
and in this connection is relevant to integration. 
12. D~91!!!nt. BasiC in the notion of development i8 the concept of 
30 
emergence ot an integration of an othennse Coincidental. man1f'o1d. !his 
29Lonergan, p. 598, see above, p. 2". 
3Ozbid., p. 4SlJ ••• ahoYe, p. 191. 
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emergence is an event, and ita occurrence can be judged to be more or len 
probable. An insight is such an event; it is the Ifl'l'lental integration" that 
Sorokin s~ is the first step in the emergence ot a sociocultural system.3l 
Such an integration can dominate the underlying manif'old w1 th complete 
suooesa, resulting in a static system. Or it can allow suoh changes in the 
underlyIng mmI,told so as to require a new higher integra.tion.32 The 
frequency and number ot such changes in the underlying manifold are meuured 
statistIcally. The Azande, for example, possessed an integrated viewpoint 
which had an explanation for the action ot benge upon fowl. E.vans-Pritchard 
was not able to provide a sufficient number of experiences that would enable 
the inSight that would give the Azande the concept of natural causalIty to 
occur. The defense mechanism of suppressed nucleation worked to prevent the 
gr!)uping ot such experiences. 
13. Difterentia.tion. Development 1s also characterized by increasing 
differentiation)3 Cultural development, and personal development within a 
culture, are prerequiSites tor the clear distinction between selt and non-
selt, between objects that are subjects and those that are not subjects, 
between the desire to know and other desires, between moral judgment and moral 
feeling, and between different areas ot cultural lite.34 Thus there is 
possible, in a verr undeveloped community, an integration hued primaril:r upon 
the feeling ot inter-subjeotivity and or a pervasive moral or religious 
31DfnamiC8, IV, 62-6); see above, p. 227. 
32Ibid., pp. 78-79; Lonergan, pp. 452-453; see above, pp. 187-193. 
33Ibid., pp. 616-617; Lonergan, pp. h,2-543J see above, p. 19h. ~above, pp. 22a.:.231. 
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significanoe to all aspects of life. Such a community would be a multibonded 
group, but the different bonds would not be distinguished by' the members of 
the group. Differentiation brings the dialectical processes of opposed but 
linked principles out into the open. 
14. 1:!! ...... no ... rm ........ s. Inoreased ditferentiation brings a need for explicit 
prinoiples of integration; this need is likely to be met by the explioi t 
formulation ot law-norma. Thus, communal development brings about an increase 
in the number of offioial law-norms 1n ~roportion to t.~e unotficial law-norms. 
There mq be laok of comprehension ot official law-norms on the part of man:r 
of the people, ~lich would result in a lack of integration of ideological 
culture. There ma1 also be a dialectical opposition between offiCial and un-
official law-norms within the oommunity.35 
It is through self-affirmation that the investigator arrives at an 
interpretative fra~work based upon the d,ynamic structure of human oognition 
and hu.!llan deSire, value, and. choice. This same interpretative framework is 
operative in the investigator and in the subjects whom he is stu.dying, 
althollgh it is likely that the subjects have not reached a tully explicit 
knowledge of the distinotion and relationships ot the different aots. Within 
this basic tra1lltnlork, the investigator t.hen can formulate possible w&y'8 in 
which thin.78, conjugates, and events can be related. The heuristic ant1c1pa-
t10na ot abstract relationships between terms. ot concrete events occurring 
wi th vary1ng trequenoies, of dialectical and genetic processes, ot concrete 
)$SOOie]l, Culture, ~ Persona11![, p. 79) see above, pp. 32-33. 
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oausal. systems, of aesthetio and symbolic unities al.l oan aot as clues in the 
formulation of hypotheses when one is oonfronted with a question of how this 
or that particular communi t(r is integrated. 
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